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Introduction 
Section 1) Background 
In seeking to illuminate the state of political theory, the best 
approach is often to try and understand the divisions central 
within it at a given time. The topography of Ancient thought can be 
examined in the study of the differences between the Platonic 
Kallipolis and the Aristotelian polity; the Lockean focus on consent 
as opposed to the Hobbesian one on authority reflects similarly the 
thought of the seventeenth century. Likewise, much of the thought 
of this and the last century centred on whether the collective had 
needs and rights which should be allowed to subsume those of the 
individual. 
A couple of things emerge from an examination of the political 
theories of these and other eras. Firstly, the differences in the 
institutions and policies advocated by the thinkers in a particular 
era usually stem from the different answers they give to what they 
consider more basic questions about reality. Thus, Plato and 
Aristotle focus on how politics can best reflect the truths of 
moral reality, the nature of which they debate. Hobbes and Locke 
circle around competing accounts of how the natural law should be 
understood. Much light is shed on the clash between Marxism and 
liberalism by Isaiah Berlin's distinction between the commitments 
involved in the notions of positive and negative liberty'. A second 
realisation emerges on consideration of this point; political 
justification frequently rests on the identification of certain key 
features of a pre-political reality. 
I Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1969) 
Perhaps the defining expression of recent political theory, on 
these terms, is John Rawls's 1971 publication of A Theory of 
Justice2. Rawls deduces the titular theory, with which to bound an 
accompanying political system, through the identification of what 
he takes to be the identification of the key ontological feature of 
modernity: the autonomous, volitional self. Whether this is a fair 
reading of what is a complex book is, in the context of this thesis, 
a peripheral question. What is of interest, however, is what 
emerged from the debate which sprung up between 'liberals' and 
1communitarianS13 in the wake of A Theory of Justice. The focus of 
this debate- whether this reading of Rawls's image of identity 
could serve as the basis for a theory of political obligation- and 
its subsequent development marked the entrance into the 
mainstream of many of the issue and themes that are the concern 
of this thesis. 
The debate that Rawls initiated focused mainstream critical 
attention on the predominant ontological motif which underlies the 
bulk of the political theory of modernity. In addition to the 
questions concerned with whether or not Rawls had correctly 
identified the requisite features of our identity upon which to 
ground his theory arose the further question of what was involved 
in the search in itself. This set of questions does not, of course, 
originate in this context nor is it limited to the Rawls debate in 
present theory. Rather, this aspect of the Rawls debate is 
emblematic of a wider, radical claim that it is not just the content 
of modern answers to questions of who we are that has been 
unsatisfactory, but the terms in which these questions of identity 
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) 
3A debate too subtle and extensive to detail here. Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift's Liberals and 
Communitarians (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) surveys the debate in which Michael Sandel is often seen as 
Rawls's pre-eminent, early antagonist. 
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have been phrased. It is the nature and ramifications of this claim 
that this thesis addresses. 
In surveying the present state of political theory, it is 
increasingly apparent that what might be broadly termed the 
postmodern turn in intellectual life, coupled with the social and 
technological changes somewhat amorphously grouped together by 
theories of 'globalisation', have combined to undermine even the 
minimal consensus which used to characterise much of political 
theory4. Specifically, the universalist and foundational aspirations 
of the conception of the self central to modern thought have come 
under attack. 
This attack has come from several sources. The philosophical 
foundations of modernity have been attacked by thinkers including 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Habermas, Foucault, Rorty, 
Taylor and Derrida. Further, the social and political limitations of 
a modernity based on the notions of objectivity, neutrality and 
impartiality, which are frequently taken to accompany the 
conception of the detached self, have also come under scrutiny. 
The communitarian expression of this position has already been 
mentioned5 but the theme is continued in the writings of some of 
the philosophers I have just referred to, as well as those of 
Lyotard, Deleuze and LevinaS6 and the school of what White calls 
"difference feminiSM"7. In the United States, Stephen K. White8 has 
4 See Nodl O'Sullivan's, Political Theory in Transition: Towards a New Politics (London: Routledge, 
forthcoming) and "Postmodemism and the Politics of Identity" in K. Deane (ed. ), Politics and the Ends of 
Identity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997) for some overviews of this move. Stephen K. White also offers such 
an analysis in his book Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991); as does N. J. Rengger in Political Theory, Modernity and Postmodernity (Oxford, Blackwell, 
1995), esp. pp. 83-85. 
5A particularly salient example here would be Michael Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the 
Unencumbered Self", Political Theory, vol. 12 (Feb. 1984). 
6 For a discussion of these three see O'Sullivan and White as in footnote 4 above. 
7 White Political Theory and Postmodernism, p. 95. Leading proponents might include Carole Gilligan, 
Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser, as cited therein. 
8 Ibid. 
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undertaken a critique from a Habermasian perspective, whilst 
William E. Connolly has built on the work of Foucault in a similar 
manner. 
All of these thinkers share a rejection of what they take to be 
the unacceptable pretensions associated with the modern emphasis 
on the Subject. Some of them seek to comment directly on the 
moral and political implications of those pretensions; others go 
further and seek to provide alternative moral and political theories 
themselves. This thesis offers an analysis of one particularly 
influential branch of the attack on the modern conception of the 
self- that related to the work of Martin Heidegger. 
Heidegger is a natural starting point for several reasons. The 
more specific, thematic reasons are considered in the following 
section. Two more general reasons are worth noting here, however. 
Firstly, Heidegger is cited by many recent contemporary social and 
political theorists as a major influence. All of the theorists I 
focus on in this thesis acknowledge him as an important influence. 
Heidegger raises many of the key questions around which the 
debate between modernists and postmodernists centres. Secondly, 
Heidegger himself has become the focus of some recent studies 
about the nature of political theory and identity9. Their suggestion 
is that Heidegger's work contains the seeds for a critical 
rethinking of the way politics and political theory is conducted. 
This thesis sets out to examine the value of the work of 
Heidegger and his successors in this regard. I am interested in 
9 Some recent examples are Stephen K. White's Political Theory and Postmodernity, Miguel de 
Bcistegui, Heidegger & the political: dystopias (London: Routledge, 1998), Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and 
Ethics (London: Routledge, 1995), Fred Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991), Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (tr. C. Turner), Heidegger, Art and Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990). 
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each case in whether or not the theorists I am examining offer 
persuasive treatments of subjectivity, modernity and, where they 
attempt to do so, politics. I aim to determine what each thinker 
has to offer the political theorist; some thoughts about which I 
offer in the concluding section of this introduction. My aims 
determine that this thesis is not a specialist study of Heidegger's 
work but a more general survey of the impact he has had, and may 
yet have, on contemporary political theory. 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first focuses on 
providing my interpretation of those parts of Heidegger's work 
which I consider relevant to the political theorist. This section 
culminates in a consideration of those features- emerging from 
Heidegger's critiques of subjectivism and modernity- alongside 
what I take to be Heidegger's political limitations. These 
limitations stem, I argue, from Heidegger's failure to frame a 
theory of the relationships between subjects which adequately 
accounts for the differences that exist between them. Heidegger 
understands intersubjectivity in terms which largely ignore the 
negotiations and clashes in wills and desires that are the stuff of 
politics. 
The second part of the thesis looks at the influence of 
Heidegger's work on four recent theorists. The aim is to present an 
account of the success or otherwise they meet with in taking 
Heidegger's philosophical insights, concerning the nature of agency 
and modernity, and developing them into theories of 
intersubjectivity. In each' case, however, my guiding interest is in 
seeing what their thoughts on subjectivity, modernity and (where 
this is an explicit concern) politics have to offer the political 
theorist. The following section outlines the path of my reasoning 
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in the thesis and gives an account of some of the conclusions I 
draw. My third section gives a summary of how these themes and 
conclusions are structured within each chapter and in relation to 
each thinker. 
Section 2) Themes and Conclusions 
2.1 Thesis- Part 1 
It is against this background that my thesis moves. The first 
part of it seeks to offer an account of Heidegger's philosophy as it 
relates to, in the first instance, understandings of subjectivity and 
modernity. The concluding chapter of the first part of the thesis 
draws these themes together and offers some considerations of 
their political implications. 
Heidegger's work has been the focus of much recent interest for 
two reasons. Firstly, his thought provides an early and powerful 
statement of the philosophical objections to the traditional 
emphasis on the Subject. His work serves as both a motivating 
force and a resource for many of the most influential critics of 
modernity and its politics who have come after him. Heidegger is 
thus at the root of the thoroughgoing critiques of modernity which 
influence much of contemporary political thought. 
Secondly, Heidegger's attempts to apply his philosophical 
insights to moral and political matters are truncated; from an 
abortive theory of the state to his own disastrous involvement in 
the Nazi party. The nature and implications of Heidegger's fascism 
have been the subject of numerous studiesIO since the 1987 
10 The key moments of the Heidcggcr Affair, and some of its implications for the man's philosophy are 
the focus of, amongst others, Richard Wolin (ed. ) The Heidegger Controversy (Cambridge, Ma: MIT 
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publication of Victor Farias's Heidegger and Nazism". I argue in 
my third Chapter that Heidegger's philosophical challenge remains 
in place despite his political failings. 
For all the strength of Heidegger's criticisms of the bases of 
modern moral and political theory, it is clear that he, for all his 
aspirations, does not develop a satisfactory alternative account of 
politics. There have been a number of explanations proffered as to 
why that should be so. In my first Chapter, I reject the arguments 
of those who seek to locate Heidegger's political failing in one 
aberrant aspect of his philosophy. Distinguishing between two 
moments in Heidegger's philosophy, the hermeneutics of 
everydayness and suspicion, I argue that the two cannot be 
separated off (and one removed) without losing the full meaning of 
Heidegger's work. Arguing instead that the two hermeneutical 
dynamics exist symbiotically, I trace how this reading of 
Heidegger offers an analysis of Subjectivity which is situated 
within the context of a criticism of the hegemony of technical or 
instrumental rationalism. 
It is in this light that I consider Heidegger's treatment of 
modernity. I thus conclude that Heidegger's rejection of much of 
modernity cannot be characterised merely as a failure to expunge 
the last vestiges of objectivism from his thought or as a product 
of personal idiosyncrasy. The challenges Heidegger poses to the 
moral and political understandings of modernity are an integral 
part of his philosophy and persist even after his political 
Press, 1993), Hans Sluga Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany (Cambridge, Ma: 
Harvard University Press, 1993), Tom Rockmore, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992), Keith Ansell-Pearson "Heidegger's Decline: between Philosophy 
and Politics", Political Studies, vol. XLII (1994) and Daniel Conway "On the Marriage of Philosophy 
and Politics: Revisiting Laftaire Heidegger", Political Theory, vol. 25, no. 6 (Dec. 1997). 11 Victor Farias (tr. Burrell and Ricci), Heidegger and Nazism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1989) 
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affiliations are known. I give some consideration to Heidegger's 
Nazism, therefore, but the focus of my Chapter on his politics is on 
why his characterisations of agency and modernity do not translate 
into a satisfactory political theory. 
Since the problem cannot be identified with some superfluous or 
revocable part of the ontology Heidegger offers, I attribute his 
political failure to what is omitted from his account. Specifically, 
what I argue he lacks is an account of the relationships between 
agents which utilises the language of intersubjective difference. 
This approach, which focuses on the actions and differences that 
exist between agents in considering social and political meanings, 
is, I argue, compatible with Heidegger's thought although he 
eschewed it in favour of a political understanding that privileged 
the disastrous moral and social understandings of his time. 
I conclude that Heidegger's political failing emerges from his 
own overdetermined rejection of the politics of modernity as 
marked by an instrumental rationalism. Heidegger assumes that 
the dominant political understandings of modernity- the liberal T 
and the collective 'We'- are immediate extrapolations from an 
instrumentalist understanding of agency to which he is opposed. 
For reasons I discuss in the second part of my thesis, I do not 
assume that this is true of all modernist understandings of the 
relationships between agents. I do not believe, however, that this 
means one can, as recent commentators have12, simply distinguish 
between a paradigmatic and a practical understanding of politics in 
order to place Heidegger's thought wholly at one pole or the other. 
12 1 consider the works of Stephen K. White and Fred Dallmayr, already cited, emblematic in this regard. 
Miguel de Beistegui, in Heidegger & the political: dystopias, is another recent theorist who has also 
argued for such a distinction. 
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Rather, Heidegger's work questions the universalist assumptions 
upon which this division is itself based. 
Thus, my consideration of Heidegger's philosophy culminates in 
two conclusions. The first is that Heidegger's criticisms of 
Subjectivism do pose a challenge to the moral and political self- 
understandings of modernity which endure beyond the obvious 
shortcomings of his own alternatives. Heidegger's relevance to the 
political theorist is twofold. He undermines a key component in 
many modern theories of political justification- the belief in the 
epistemological centrality of the autonomous volitional individual- 
whilst offering an alternative method with which to develop an 
account of our agency. My second conclusion concerns those 
seeking to develop these Heideggerean insights concerning the 
nature of agency into accounts of intersubjectivity that, in turn, 
frame either moral or political understandings. If one wishes to 
avoid Heidegger's political limitations, one needs an account of 
agency that does not characterise intersubjective difference 
without reference to social or political action. 
2.2 Thesis- Part 2 
The second part of the thesis examines the efforts of four 
theorists- Sartre, Foucault, Connolly and Charles Taylor- to 
develop the themes of Heidegger's work. They are united in 
accepting Heidegger's argument that the epistemological Subject 
cannot deliver the certitude at which it aims. Each moves instead 
from a position that draws on or modifies Heidegger's 
hermeneutical phenomenology. 
9 
In looking at these thinkers I have three considerations, each of 
which emerges from my earlier treatment of Heidegger's thought. 
My first concern is the extent to which the thinker in question 
incorporates Heidegger's insights into their own understandings of 
agency. Secondly, I focus on how the thinkers I look at translate 
their theories of agency and identity into accounts of the nature of 
intersubjectivity. In the light of these concerns, thirdly, I ask how 
the answers given by each thinker contribute to an understanding 
of political theory. In the cases of Charles Taylor and William 
Connolly I do this by a direct consideration of their theories of 
politics; in Foucault's case, as with Heidegger, I look at his 
tentative treatment of political reason. Rather differently, I argue 
that Sartre's theory of intersubjectivity could not be developed 
politically because it is based on an account of identity that does 
not, in fact, meet the challenges Heidegger's philosophy poses. 
Each thinker responds, in some way, to the concerns raised in 
the first part of my thesis. Sartre argues that Heidegger's 
political failing stems from his failure to provide an adequate 
account of intersubjectivity. I concur that this is indeed a crucial 
omission on Heidegger's part. In contrast to Heidegger, however, 
Sartre seeks to remedy this through the provision of an account of 
agency that remains within the philosophy of consciousness. I 
offer arguments, following Heidegger's criticisms of Sartrel3, that 
this perspective does not allow Sartre to address the full force of 
Heidegger's criticism of the instrumental rationality which 
characterises modernity. My interest in Foucault, Connolly and 
Taylor centres, therefore, on how they aim to provide a theory of 
intersubjectivity that responds to this aspect of Heidegger's 
understanding of identity. 
13 Presented in the "Letter on Humanism" in Martin Heidegger (tr. D. F. Krell) Basic Writings (London: 
Routledge, 1994) 
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Foucault's contribution is to apply Heideggerean suspicion to 
what can be seen as the more subtle operations of instrumental 
rationality in modernity. For Foucault, human agency is to be 
understood wholly in terms of power. This allows Foucault to 
uncover the constructed, and hence contestable, nature of many of 
the basic concepts of modernity- prime amongst them the notion of 
the autonomy of the individual. Hence, Foucault follows Heidegger 
in rejecting the notion of autonomy central to much modern 
thought. From this perspective, Foucault provides multiple 
histories which aim to show how moral and political justifications 
based on claims to universal or foundationalist truth invariably 
mask the workings of power. 
William Connolly attempts to illustrate how a political theory 
based on these analyses might operate. My argument is that this 
politics could not support an account of political legitimacy but 
would, in f act, mirror the aesthetic adventurism which 
characterises Heidegger's approach to the state. This I attribute to 
the limits of the Foucauldian conception of power with which 
Connolly operates. 
I do not, however, draw the conclusion that Connolly is simply a 
confused nihilist. Rather, I argue by way of a comparison with 
Heidegger's work, the Foucauldian understanding of power focuses 
on Heidegger's hermeneutics of suspicion whilst overlooking the 
hermeneutics of everydayness in a way that it need not. Foucault 
and Connolly offer a useful corrective to those who would seek to 
cast the products of this hermeneutical dynamic in ahistorical, 
universalist terms. Hence, they offer an useful critical 
perspective on some attempts to derive political identities from 
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'hidden' claims to moral or political privilege- a slippage to which 
Heidegger himself is susceptible. Despite this, I conclude, any 
moral or political theory that offers an understanding of either 
authority or legitimacy needs to draw on resources that Foucault 
and Connolly do not theorise. 
This concern- that, as Mark Bevir puts it, Foucault "leaves 
himself no epistemological or normative grounds on which to build 
his own histories with their ethical connotations" 14 - is shared by 
Charles Taylor. He seeks to temper the hermeneutical suspicion 
which underpins Foucault's accounts of moral and political action 
with the claim that the meanings of everyday life can be 
qualitatively distinguished. For Taylor, the language of 
undifferentiated power alone cannot account for the full range of 
phenomena central to our self -understandings. He argues instead 
that our need and capacity to make evaluations in the name of 
better or truer self -understandings betrays our need to both 
explain and orient ourselves to our moral realities. 
Taylor argues that the instrumental conception of reason and 
the punctual self alone cannot account for these phenomena. Taylor 
is drawn to two phenomenological conclusions. The first is that 
the nature of agency is essentially dialogic; our meanings arise 
only within social contexts. For Taylor, therefore, both 
instrumental reason and the atomistic conception of agency can 
themselves only be understood against a background which 
surpasses those meanings. Taylor's second conclusion concerns the 
nature of that background; the best explanations of our moral 
identity lead, he claims, to moral objects outside of the merely 
human. 
14 Mark Bevir, "Foucault and Critique: Deploying Agency against Autonomy", Political Theory, vol. 
27, no. 3 (Feb. 1999), p. 70. 
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Taylor thus argues that Heidegger's work is of value in 
demonstrating what he calls the "engaged"15 nature of agency, and 
that this will lead not to a rejection, as Taylor reads Heidegger 
here, but an awareness of the partiality of the self -understandings 
of modernity. A reconsidered understanding of the nature of agency 
will, claims Taylor, lead to a theory of intersubjectivity that, in 
turn, will lead us to reframe what we demand and expect from the 
political realm. For Taylor, politics can no longer be conceived of 
as the defence of pre-socially autonomous individuals. Rather, he 
argues, politics ought to be indexed to an account of agency that 
makes reference to the role of intersubjective action in the 
realisation of our moral identities. 
My argument is that the strength of Taylor's work lies in his 
development of a theory of intersubjectivity which, by 
encompassing aspects of both the hermeneutics of suspicion and 
everydayness, develops Heidegger's insights about the limits of 
subjectivism and modernity. Further, and in contrast to Heidegger, 
Taylor develops this theory in a way that does not reject outright 
the products of modernity. This, I argue in the first part of the 
thesis, is in line with Heidegger's philosophy of agency but not his 
approaches to moral or political practice. Hence, Taylor's theory of 
intersubjectivity allows him to countenance the instrumental and 
technical aspects of ordering a society. This, in turn, means he is 
able to index moral and political understandings to the 
relationships and actions between individuals rather than the more 
amorphous 'sendings of Being' that mark Heidegger's later work. 
13 See his essay "Engaged agency and background in Heidegger" in Charles Guignon (ed. ) 77te Cambridge 
Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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Taylor's theory of intersubjectivity, from this perspective, 
promises to be a more satisfactory base to a political 
understanding that aims to mediate between the differences which 
emerge between subjects. I argue, however, that the second set of 
conclusions Taylor draws from his application of the Best Account 
principle undermines the development of a satisfactory theory of 
political identity. Taylor's belief that our moral and social 
identities are indexed to preterhuman moral objects is, I argue, not 
phenomenologically secure in the way Taylor claims. 
My analysis suggests that this leads Taylor to demand more of 
the political realm than a less ambitious interpretation of our 
moral reality would support. As a result, I argue, Taylor premises 
political rights and obligations on a moral identity that is more 
demanding than the resources of modernity or his own subscription 
to phenomenological transparency as expressed in the Best Account 
principle, allow. Through an analysis of his treatment of some 
recent political theory I draw out some of the implications this 
has for Taylor's theory of political identity. I conclude that Taylor 
offers an important insight about the limited and situated nature 
of any account of political justification but that this is not carried 
through to his own political account. In the final analysis, 
therefore, I conclude that Taylor underplays the centrality of the 
negotiation of conflict as the basis of authority and legitimacy in 
both his own and liberal political theory. 
2.3 Conclusions 
The thesis ends by drawing together my analyses of the thinkers 
I have looked at with some conclusions about what they have to 
offer the political theorist. All the thinkers I look at in this thesis 
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are linked by their refusal of the primacy of the traditional 
epistemological conception of the self. Each is united in arguing 
that we cannot approach the understanding of our agency in the 
terms of the model of knowledge prevalent in modernity- which 
privileges universal and atemporal certitude. 
One of Heidegger's strengths lies in his phenomenological 
demonstration of the limits of the image of the detached Subject 
seeking knowledge of an external, objective reality. What 
Heidegger and those who come after him establish is that this 
understanding of existence cannot account for the meanings central 
to the full range of phenomena we countenance. 
This has an immediate implication for those interested in 
moral, social and political theory. Put simply, those positions that 
draw their power or legitimacy through an appeal to the 
fundamental nature of the Subject-object division require 
rethinking. The thinkers I have looked at all identify at least the 
moral understandings of modernity as premised on one of the 
products of this division; a theory of identity based on the 
epistemological conception of subjectivity. This conception is 
deemed, at best, partial by the theorists examined in this study; 
they are further united in their belief that this has had damaging 
implications for the moral and social practices of modernity. 
It is in their responses to this problem that one can determine 
both the differences between each of the theorists I look at and a 
second phase of interest to the political theorist. Each seeks to 
establish a new understanding of agency which, in turn, leads them 
to frame alternative theories of intersubjectivity. Examining 
these theories allows one to see how various alternative 
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understandings of agency produce different accounts of politics. 
Looking at these theorists and their theories of identity, 
intersubjectivity and politics (where they develop them) thus 
allows the political theorist to consider and evaluate some of the 
options available in the wake of the criticisms of modernity 
offered in recent times. 
Sartre's work offers a reminder of the depth of the problem 
facing the political theorist in modernity. Sartre reinforces 
Heidegger's message that there can be no external objects around 
which we can construct a theory of truth that will provide an 
absolute or universal grounds for justification. For Sartre, 
therefore, the conflicts between individuals and their values will 
remain a persistent feature of the relationships between 
individuals. 
If the problem of political conflict cannot be eradicated by 
reference to an external certainty, the work of Foucault suggests, 
neither can that certainty be located within an account that takes 
conscious Subjectivity to be the irreducible starting point. 
Foucault's focus on the operations of power in some of the most 
basic institutions and understandings of modernity- most notably 
the autonomy of the wills, desires and choices of the Subject- 
offers a caveat against any attempt to produce a theory of 
justification or legitimacy that is phrased in absolute or universal 
terms. 
Charles Taylor, however, argues that the language of power 
alone does not allow one to account for the moral dimensions of 
our agency that are central to our existence. Taylor's work goes on 
to demonstrate the need for some theory of justification and 
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legitimacy, whilst accepting that this will not be phrased in 
absolute terms. 
Thus, although none of these theorists in themselves offer 
sufficient resources with which to construct a political theory, 
they are of interest to the political theorist. Each develops 
Heidegger's criticisms of modernity in ways that cast light on the 
scope and state of political theory after the collapse of confidence 
in traditional conceptions of the self. 
At the same time, however, I reach a more negative conclusion 
concerning the political theories, actual and potential, offered by 
the theorists I look at. Having linked Heidegger's political errors 
(actual and theoretical) in part to his failure to separate his 
ontology of agency from his understanding of intersubjective 
action, I argue that a similar conflation occurs in the work of the 
other thinkers in this study. I trace how this leads to limitations 
in the explicit political theories offered by Connolly and Taylor and 
in the less developed political thoughts and proclamations of 
Foucault and the early Sartre. 
Specifically, I argue that the revised ontologies of agency 
offered by the theorists in this thesis do not identify features of 
our existence which can, in themselves, ground an account of 
political legitimacy. Rather, these features must be located in a 
consideration of intersubjective action which allows for the 
differences between subjects. Thus, in the final instance, I argue 
that the study of Heidegger and his successors restates the need 
for a political identity that has a degree of autonomy from the 
identification of philosophical, moral or social truths. 
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Section 3) Chapter Summaries 
What follows is a brief outline summary of each chapter of the 
thesis. The themes I treat, and the general conclusions I reach, 
have been considered above. These summaries, therefore, offer a 
brief statement of the content and structure of each Chapter. 
3.1 Chapter 1: Heidegger and the Critique of Subjectivism 
Heidegger's critique of the philosophy of the Subject is one of 
the major planks upon which the postmodern turn, outlined above, 
is built. Thus, if one wants to understand the philosophical 
pedigree of the recent challenges to political theory posed from 
this quarter, an examination of Heidegger's work is necessary. 
Hence, my first Chapter is concerned with showing how an 
understanding of Heidegger's work illuminates the contemporary 
emphasis on the difficulties of basing political justification on a 
model which draws on the universalist assumptions and 
aspirations of traditional epistemological theory. 
As I argue throughout the first part of the thesis, looking at 
Heidegger's work in this regard is doubly revealing. In the first 
instance, this is because Heidegger's own account of the philosophy 
of subjectivism is located within a body of thought which includes 
a critique of the conception of reason that is an integral part of 
the self -u nde rstandings of modernity. Secondly, I claim in my 
first Chapter, there is a confusion amongst many recent thinkers 
as to the context in which Heidegger's critique of the philosophy of 
subjectivism occurs. This, I argue, means that some of the 
accounts which claim to develop Heideggerean insights on the 
philosophy of the subject do not, in fact, do so. Indeed, my 
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conclusion is that typically these thinkers actually offer a weaker 
critique of modernity and its politics than is to be found in 
Heidegger. 
3.2 Chapter 2: Heidegger and Modernity 
My second Chapter is therefore dedicated to developing an 
interpretation of Heidegger's philosophical nexus, particularly in 
the light of the two symbiotic hermeneutical dynamics (of 
everydayness and suspicion) I identify in my first Chapter. In doing 
so, I examine the links between Heidegger's critique of 
subjectivism and his rejection of the understandings and 
institutions of modernity. Pursuing this serves the second of my 
main interests in Heidegger's work; the identification of a 
particularly powerful link between the errors Heidegger associates 
with subjectivism and what he takes to be the dominant aspects of 
modernity- humanism and instrumental, technical reason. In the 
absence of any clearly humanist perspective (and therefore in 
contrast to some of the thinkers who lay claim to Heideggerean 
orthodoxy looked at in the previous Chapter), I argue that some of 
the immediate links made between Heidegger's comments on 
subjectivity and the self -understandings of modernity and his 
politics- by his supporters and detractors alike- are, at best, 
vitiated. The premature politicisation of Heidegger's philosophy, 
both by himself and later commentators, obscures, I argue, the 
nature of his philosophical insights. 
3.3 Chapter 3: Heidegger and the Political 
The concluding Chapter of the first part of the thesis thus aims 
to arrive at some conclusions about the value of Heidegger's work 
19 
to the political theorist, in the light of the attempt made in the 
previous Chapters to clarify the nature of his philosophical 
contribution. This covers my third, and crucial, interest in 
Heidegger; the ways in which his work might inform a political 
account. 
To have that as an interest at all necessitates that one address 
Heidegger's involvement with the worst moments of twentieth 
century European politics. My claim is that his engagement with 
the Nazis, whilst not a necessary facet of the philosophical 
dynamics discussed in my first two Chapters, can be traced to an 
omission in his thought. Specifically, I argue that Heidegger's own 
conception of agency- Dasein- cannot be developed in ways that 
culminate in an account of intersubjectivity that allows for a 
political conception of the differences that exist between agents. 
If Heidegger's criticisms of what he takes to be the founding and 
justifying image of modern political practice are powerful, it is 
also clear that he offers no satisfactory alternative. 
Recognising Heidegger's importance in much contemporary 
political theory is thus to recognise a source of ambiguity. The 
density of his thought coupled with the contextual and embedded 
complexity of his terminology allow for an array of often 
contradictory interpretations as to what Heidegger's philosophy 
offers the political theorist. Some point to his critique of the 
limits of traditional understandings of human being as revealing a 
basic receptivity to what one might term a politics of openneSS16, 
others associate that openness with a perspective which allowed 
Heidegger to make, for a while, a god out of Hitler17. 
16 See, for example, Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger. 
17 See Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1990) and Otto P6ggeler's "Heidegger's Political Self-Understanding" in 
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There are, then, diverse conclusions about Heidegger's political 
implications, extrapolated from a philosophical legacy itself 
bitterly contested. I argue, however, that Heidegger's value to the 
political theorist is not best assessed, however, by seeking, as he 
did, to translate his philosophical terminology directly into real 
political commitments. Heidegger's philosophy calls into question 
traditional understandings of agency but a revision of this account 
alone is not sufficient to provide either a moral or political theory. 
I reach the conclusion that Heidegger's relevance, at least for 
the political theorist, is spread throughout his work. His insights 
are not situated exclusively in either the hermeneutics of 
everydayness or suspicion, nor, in parallel, in one or other of his 
treatments of subjectivism or modernity. Rather, his real 
challenge lies in a rejection of humanistic accounts of agency, that 
extends beyond a simple rejection of the subject, and is developed 
throughout all his critical and interpretative moments. If the 
politics of modernity are extrapolated from the instrumental 
account of agency, then Heidegger's criticisms are of political 
relevance. Heidegger's error, however, is to assume that a revised 
account of agency alone will serve as the basis from which a 'right' 
politics can be divined. My argument in the second part of the 
thesis is that this mistake is a motif which runs throughout the 
work of many of Heidegger's successors. 
Having suggested that Heidegger's philosophy does not in itself 
have immediate political application, and having clarified what I 
take that philosophy to be, I then turn my attention to the 
reception of his work by recent theorists. All of the thinkers I 
Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy, especially the latter's treatment of Heidegger's Beitrdge zur 
Philosophie in section 2 of that essay. 
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look at- Sartre, Foucault, Connolly and Taylor- identify with 
Heidegger's suspicion of what they take to be the central tenets of 
modernity. Further, they share in his identification of the modern 
conception of agency as a central feature in the limitations of our 
self -understandings. Unlike Heidegger, however, these thinkers 
devote substantial effort to producing theories of the relationships 
between individuals. Hence, they offer Heideggerean inspired 
treatments of agency whilst maintaining a concern with 
intersubjective action that allows them to keep moral and political 
questions to the fore. The second part of this thesis examines the 
character of these various attempts. 
3.4 Chapter 4: Sartre and the politics of existential freedom 
The first of the approaches I look at is that of Jean-Paul Sartre, 
focusing on the phase of his work associated with Being and 
NothingneSS18. There are a number of reasons for selecting Sartre. 
The first is historical. Tom Rockmore19 has documented Sartre's 
crucial role in keeping Heidegger's philosophy in the centre of the 
public consciousness after the latter's denazification. The French 
interpretation in general did more than simply lend the reception 
of Heidegger's work a distinctive flavour; it was largely the impact 
of his work on certain key thinkers that meant he continued to be 
read at all. 
The second reason is more specific to the focus of the thesis. 
Sartre is emblematic, and instrumental in the development, of a 
particular and key misinterpretation of Heidegger, which 
understands him in humanist terms. For Sartre, Heidegger's 
18 Jean-Paul Sartre (tr. Hazel Barnes), Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology 
(London: Routledge, 1996) 
19 See Rockmore, Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism and Being (London: 
Routledge, 1995). See esp. p. xvii. 
22 
philosophy is a way of understanding reality which remains defined 
by the Cartesian distinction between a human subject and its 
world. In examining the limits of Sartre's work, my primary aim is 
to show that Heidegger's failing cannot be attributed to a failure to 
focus on individual consciousness. It follows that his errors 
cannot therefore be remedied by the provision of such an account. 
In the course of demonstrating this, I argue that Sartre's politics 
are hampered by the instrumentalist shortcomings a more incisive 
reading of Heidegger might lead one to expect. 
Sartre attempts to render Heidegger's hermeneutics of 
everydayness into the language of the philosophy of consciousness. 
In doing so, however, he misses the intrinsic link this hermeneutic 
dynamic has to the hermeneutics of suspicion and, in missing the 
link, misses the fundamental incompatibility of his perspective 
with Heidegger's. 
3.5 Chapter 5: The Politics of Difference: Foucault and Connolly 
Having concluded that Sartre fails to take on Heidegger's 
criticism of the philosophy of consciousness, I turn to a thinker 
whose work is heavily marked by that suspicion. Michel Foucault is 
interesting because, as with Sartre, he admits to being deeply 
influenced by Heidegger whilst representing a second moment in 
his French reception. 
The suspicion which Foucault shares with Heidegger is 
expressed in his refusal, in contrast with Sartre, to accept 
individual consciousness as an autonomous and absolute starting 
point. In treating the individual conscious subject not as the 
guarantor of certitude, but as itself one of the phenomena which 
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require explanation and interpretation, Foucault mirrors 
Heidegger's suspicion of the transparency of humanism. 
This translates, in Foucault's account, into a treatment of 
matters of politics and the state solely in the terms of power. 
Thus, for Foucault as for Heidegger, politics in itself has no 
discrete or proper place. Hence, like Heidegger, Foucault does not 
expend effort on the provision of a distinctly political theory. 
Therefore, after a consideration of what Foucault does say about 
politics and the state, I turn to the account of politics offered by 
William E. Connolly. For my purposes, Connolly is interesting 
because he brings what he interprets as the Foucauldian 
perspective to bear in an extended consideration of politics. 
Foucault and Connolly's focus on power ensures that their 
comments on the nature of human agency are more closely informed 
by the spirit of Heideggerean suspicion than Sartre's work. 
However, my argument is that Connolly and Foucault remain, for 
the political theorist at least, too close to Heidegger's work in 
other crucial respects. Both Foucault and Connolly offer political 
accounts which are, as they are for Heidegger, solely extensions of 
supposedly more fundamental understandings of human agency 
and/or Being. Examining the constitution of the basic vocabulary 
upon which Foucault and Connolly base their accounts of 
intersubjectivity, I conclude that their arguments mirror 
Heidegger's in failing to develop or sustain a political dimension. 
Hence, I argue, their political theories are equally marked by 
inability to provide an account of legitimacy which is separate 
from the truth claims of their ontological accounts. As with 
Heidegger, the provision of these accounts is thus not insulated 
against a one-dimensional focus on philosophical, moral or social 
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'truths'. The historical and social contexts which inform Foucault 
and Connolly's writings are less extreme than Heidegger's and are 
thus more constrained by liberal democratic sensibilities. As a 
result, they are more concerned than Heidegger to offer an account 
of the ways in which technical reason in moral and political life 
can impose itself on the individual. Despite this, their failure to 
consider intersubjective difference in terms which support 
languages of authority and legitimacy means their understandings 
of politics can no more be insulated from the charge of aesthetic 
adventurism than Heidegger's engagement. 
3.6 Chapter 6: The Politics of Recognition: Charles Taylor 
The final thinker I look at criticises Sartre, Foucault and 
Connolly for offering accounts of both morality and politics w hich 
draw on too narrow a notion of agency. For Charles Taylor, the 
problem with most previous moral and political accounts is that 
they are based on theories of agency that fail to reflect the 
intersubjective nature of human existence. 
My sixth Chapter addresses the development of Taylor's politics 
of recognition. Thus, I trace Taylor's provision of an alternative, 
'dialogic' account of agency, especially as it is presented in 
Sources of the SON. I focus on the Best Account Principle (the BA 
principle) which, I argue, fulfils a crucial role in Taylor's 
philosophy. The BA principle expresses Taylor's basic commitment 
to the phenomenological method, which is intended to establish his 
central thesis: our identities have inescapable real moral 
orientations which can be realised only through social action. For 
Taylor, the modern conception of agency and the politics which it 
20 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. - The Making of the Modem Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) 
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grounds (a nexus of atomism and liberalism in Taylor's terms) do 
not reflect the basic moral reality of human being. In The Politics 
of Recognition2l, Taylor launches his argument that a new politics, 
which reflects the moral needs and discoveries of the community, 
in a way that what he calls atomistic moral procedural politics 
does not, is required. 
The remainder of my Chapter assesses Taylor's account. I 
consider, in the first instance, whether Taylor's account of the 
modern identity is as secure as he believes. Arguing that it is not, 
I call into question both Taylor's own perspective on the 
foundations of 'liberal' politics and the persuasiveness of his own 
account of a politics based on recognition. My claim is that 
Taylor's politics are based on substantive moral claims that extend 
beyond the phenomenological basis which would render his account 
authoritative. Without such argument, Taylor misreads and 
underestimates the thrust of much liberal theory. 
My conclusion is that Taylor's linking of moral to political 
identity does not contradict at least some contemporary 
understandings of political theory in the ways he suggests. 
Further, I argue, insofar as Taylor does reject what he deems 
'liberalism' he mirrors Heidegger's own attempt to construct a 
political sphere from moral and cultural assumptions that outstrip 
those he can philosophically establish. In both cases, therefore, I 
assert that neither can lay claim to establishing a vocabulary of 
political legitimacy or authority in the ways both suggest. 
21 Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in Amy Gutmann (ed. ), Multiculturalism: Examining 
the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 
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3.7 Chapter T Conclusion 
The substance of my final Chapter is determined, in large part, 
by the thematic concerns which are outlined in the last part of the 
previous section of this introduction. My concluding Chapter 
consists of a review of my analyses of each of the thinkers I have 
looked at in the light of these concerns. Of particular interest in 
each instance is the way each theorist treats the 'traditional', 
predominant conceptions of agency, and the ways they seek to 
develop their critiques into moral and political accounts. 
The first thing that emerges is that their treatments of the 
understanding of agency raise a question that remains at the centre 
of contemporary political theory; if our political understandings 
cannot be indexed to the universal or absolute truths of 
instrumental reason and autonomous Subjectivity, how can we 
frame an account of legitimacy? Moreover, the work of Heidegger 
and his successors extends beyond simply raising the question in 
two ways. 
Firstly, they offer alternative accounts of the nature of agency 
and reason which can serves as the basis for new understandings of 
the relationships between agents. Secondly, these accounts of 
intersubjectivity can frame political understandings which need 
not make justification or legitimacy dependent upon the universal 
or absolute claims that Heidegger and his successors argue 
underpin so many of the basic institutions and conceptions of 
modernity. 
Nonetheless, I argue, the thinkers I look at in this thesis largely 
fail to develop their insights on the understanding of agency into 
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satisfactory accounts of moral and political identity. In each case, 
I argue that this is because they incorporate assumptions within 
their theories of agency that lead them to either ignore or 
undertheorise the consideration of the differences that exist 
between agents. These assumptions, however, are not necessary 
ones in the operation of Heidegger's dual hermeneutic, 
phenomenological understanding of agency. From the political 
theorist's perspective, it is in the provision of this distinct 
articulation of an intersubjective dimension, free of arbitrary 
ontological assumptions imported from the understanding of 
agency, that Heidegger and his successors have been found wanting. 
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Chapter 1: Heidegger and the Critique of Subjectivism 
Aims and Outlines 
From Being and Time onwards, Heidegger offers a critique of 
what he takes to be the starting point of almost the entire 
tradition of Western philosophy: the separation between Subject 
and Object. In that text, and throughout his career, Heidegger 
states that his fundamental aim (and that of all perspicacious 
thinking) cannot be pursued until the keystone of this tradition, the 
subject, "has been phenomenologically destroyed"'. 
This Chapter suggests that recent interpretations which 
conceive of Heidegger's work in terms of two separable dynamics- 
which Hubert Dreyfus has termed the "hermeneutics of 
everydayness" and the "hermeneutics of suspicion"2- have 
misinterpreted him. I argue that treating these hermeneutical 
dynamics as separable misinterprets the conceptual framework 
motivating Heidegger's critique of subjectivity in ways which lead 
to an inappropriate politicisation, by both Heidegger and his 
commentators, of certain aspects of his thought. 
To this end, this Chapter is divided into two sections. The first 
section expounds Heidegger's comments on subjectivity with a 
view to situating them in terms of his project in Being and Time 
and beyond. In the course of this, I consider the claims of those 
(particularly Rorty and Lacoue-Labarthe) who see Heidegger's work 
as bifurcated along metaphysical lines and thus view him as 
I Martin Heidegger (tr. Macquarrie and Robinson), Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 123. 
The quote is in reference to Descartes, but the cogito sum is taken as the archetypal statement of this 
subject. Hereafter, Being and Time is referenced as BT within the text- italics are as original unless 
otherwise indicated. 
2 Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World. - A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I 
(Cambridge, Ma.: MIT. Press, 1991) p. 34-5. 
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coming up with an ultimately philosophically illegitimate account 
of the world or the agent within it. This paves the way for my 
second, concluding, section which argues that the rejection of this 
interpretation of Heidegger's work also entails the rejection of the 
claim that his political engagement consists merely in his attempt 
to index the public realm to the truths of such accounts. I further 
suggest that this leaves the way open to interpret Heidegger's 
work as a challenge to precisely the claim that right political 
conclusions can simply be extrapolated from true philosophical 
beliefs. 
Section 1) Heidegger's Critique of the Philosophy of the 
Subject 
1.1 The Question of the Meaning of Being, Dasein and the 
Traditional Subject 
Heidegger defines his work against what he deems to be the 
prevailing traditions of the Western world. The motivation behind 
Being and Time is Heidegger's claim that "the fundamental 
question" (BT, p. 24)- "the question of the meaning of Being" (BT, 
p. 19)- has been forgotten in our time. Heidegger's project is thus 
to render this question "transparent, and in an appropriate way" 
(BT, p. 24). 
Heidegger is clear about the reasons why this question has been 
(at best) wrongly formulated. The philosoph ical tradition has 
attempted to understand Being in the wrong terms, and has 
therefore not succeeded in putting the question at all. Heidegger 
believes that this can be understood through a focus on the 
properties of traditional philosophical inquiry. 
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Any inquiry whatsoever is "guided beforehand by what is 
sought" (BT, p. 24). Heidegger follows this claim by identifying, 
through a modification of Husserlian intentionality, three essential 
moments of inquiry qua inquiry. Of necessity, any question 
involves three structural planks; "that which is asked about", 
"that which is interrogated', and "that which is to be found out by 
the askingP(BT, p. 24). Philosophical inquiry which aims to ask 
about Being at the most fundamental level must be transparent 
[durchsichtig] in each of these three cases, understood in terms 
derived only from the existence of the question. Therefore, when 
asking the question 'What is Being? ' the basic task of the 
philosopher is to become clear about the significance of the 
existence of the question in this form. Heidegger claims that, in 
inquiring into Being a perspicacious consideration of that inquiry 
will reveal that that which is asked about is Being, that which is 
to be found out by the asking is the meaning of Being, and that 
which is interrogated is what follows from the existence of the 
question: the implications which follow from the fact of the 
'there-is' an inquiry into Being. 
Heidegger's claim is that in considering Being in its most 
fundamental aspect the type of Being of the Inquiry itself needs to 
be taken into account. The first entity the Being of which one 
needs to become clear about is thus that which does the inquiring. 
This entity, by which the 'there-is' of the question of Being exists, 
is Dasein. Dasein is thus introduced as constituted of the formal 
fact of the existence of the question of Being. It is this, and thus 
Dasein, that needs to be interrogated in order to address the 
question of the meaning of Being. 
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Heidegger contends that the philosophical tradition has in each 
case failed to formulate perspicaciously, and understand, each of 
these three planks. In assuming that the 'is' of the question 'What 
is Being? ' is self-evident, when in fact this 'is' simply restates 
the more fundamental question of Being, Heidegger finds that the 
tradition has failed to reach a transparent self -understanding, 
substituting instead answers conditioned by an unexamined 
assumption. This unexamined assumption is caused by an approach 
to Being which is partial and narrows the horizon of one's inquiry: 
Heidegger at one point calls it the tendency towards "Being- 
certain"(BT, p. 46). The tradition has, in constructing each of the 
three planks upon which it is built along substantive lines, petitio 
principii, failed to consider the question of the meaning of Being: 
rather it has, guided by its own unexamined assumptions, 
considered only the question of the meaning of Being of substance. 
Heidegger thus identifies the philosophical tradition with a 
misplaced certitude concerning the horizons of its inquiry, and a 
failure to examine its own basic assumptions. In failing to 
transparently consider itself on these lines, the tra dition has not 
understood each of the three planks upon which, as an instance of 
inquiry, it is necessarily built. Hence a failure to lay "bare the 
grounds"(BT, p. 28) for inquiry has led to philosophy looking in the 
wrong place- at an objective world- for the wrong thing- 
epistemological certitude of a world thus conceived. This lack of 
clarity has disguised the fact that subject-object epistemologies 
do not constitute an addressing- let alone an ans wering- of the 
question of Being they purport to be. 
From this failure of formal transparency, Heidegger sees the 
tradition's error as taking as its guide the Subject, which operates 
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in a way that narrows the horizons of inquiry, and hence of one's 
access to the question of the meaning of Being, whilst 
simultaneously disguising that that is what is happening. 
Heidegger cites "the subject, the soul, the consciousness, the 
spirit, the person" (BT, p. 72) as the means by which the question of 
the meaning of Being has become reified into the search for 
certitude. To ask about Being from the perspective of the 
philosophy of the Subject is to assume, unconsidered, a separation 
between the Subject seeking certitude about Being, and the 
objective world which one aims to know. This assumption 
embodies an error when considering the question of Being since it 
fails to take into account the type of Being which belongs to the 
Inquiry itself. 
Heidegger's aim is to show that the tradition, as a result of its 
failure to understand its own essential form by scrutinising its 
reliance upon the Subject, must be superseded by an analysis of 
Dasein. Heidegger identifies the Cartesian ego cogito as the purest 
representative of this tradition of metaphysical error and states 
that he will have not succeeded until "the 'cogito sum' has been 
phenomenologically destroyed" (BT, p. 123). 
1.2 Descartes and the Subject of the Western Tradition 
Having taken the Cartesian subject as representative of the 
essence of the tradition, Heidegger goes on to define his own 
position in contrast to it. This section examines how, given what 
appears the common starting point of reflexivity, Heidegger seeks 
to demonstrate the primacy of his account by showing how Dasein 
and the ego cogito differ. 
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Descartes's aim, epistemological certitude, is determined, 
Heidegger believes, by the distinction between res cogitans and res 
extensa. Heidegger maintains, however, that the only certitude 
pointed to by the claim that cogito ergo sum is Descartes's own 
inability to determine "the kind of Being which belongs to the res 
cogitans" (BT, p. 46). Heidegger mounts two related arguments. 
The first seeks to show the internal consistency of Descartes's 
argument is suspect. The second seeks to show that Descartes's 
arguments fail because of the tacit assumption of the primacy of 
substantia implied by taking the Subject as one's guide in 
understanding Being. For Heidegger, Descartes's project must fail 
because the goal of epistemological certitude, which is the 
starting point, is a necessarily flawed way of conceiving of the 
appropriate stance towards Being. 
Heidegger then is clear. He will not have succeeded until 
subjectivist epistemology has been overcome. This Destruktion 
entails a consideration of the "basically undiscussed ontological 
'foundations' those Interpretations of the world which have come 
after Descartes- and still more those which have preceded him- 
have operated" (BT, p. 122). 
To make his point Heidegger selects the Cartesian understanding 
of 'hardness'. Heidegger argues that having divided Being, in the 
guise of substantia, into things intellectual and corporeal, 
Descartes is unable to adequately portray the phenomenon of 
hardness. Hence, although Descartes presents hardness as the 
resistance of two objects next to each other, in terms of "the 
different velocities of two corporeal Things" (BT, p. 130), this 
definition cannot explain how hardness or resistance can "show 
themselves at all" (BT, p. 130) without referring to the existence 
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of an entity for which hardness is an issue. At this point the 
familiar objection to the Cartesian system becomes crucial; 
Descartes cannot account for how res extensa can affect res 
cogitans, without reducing one to the other or avoiding the issue, 
and submerging both in the substantive ego cogito. 
The Cartesian Subject is thus both cause and symptom for 
Heidegger. It is the culmination of an ontology of substance 
[substantia], but it is only because of the fundamentally incoherent 
formulation of the Subject that such an ontology can remain in 
place. It is in the assumptions of Cartesian ontology that 
Heidegger perceives the real problem. The emphasis Descartes 
puts on Being-certain, on epistemological knowledge, takes for 
granted the separation of Subject and Object, in this case the 
thinking man and his world. Heidegger believes this diremption to 
be far from transparent, and, worse, by asserting the 
fundamentality of the certitude of the Cartesian subject, the path 
to providing an ontology of Dasein, through which Being could be 
considered is specifically ruled out. A concern with substantia is 
quite acceptable to Heidegger, but not as ontology. The problem is 
not that the Subject has not been properly represented, but that the 
goal of Western thought- adequate representation- continues to be 
defined by the assumptions of which it is both a part and an 
expression. 
One difference between Dasein and the Cartesian subject is now 
apparent. Heidegger's objection to the Cartesian Subject is not 
based on the claim that it misrepresents a given entity or reality. 
Heidegger's objection is formal; the accusation against Descartes, 
and the Western philosophical tradition, is a methodological one. 
Later in Being and Time, whilst considering Kant, Heidegger offers 
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a characterisation of this failing as the acceptance that the basic 
problematic of philosophy is motivated by the distinction between 
the "in me" and the "outside of me" (BT, p. 249). The search for 
certitude on these terms is not wrong; rather, it lacks 
transparency and this is no way to conduct philosophical inquiry. 
Heidegger declares that the "'scandal' of philosophy' is not that the 
proof of the proper relation has yet to be given, but that such 
proofs are expected and attempted again and again" (BT, p. 249). 
Dasein, then, is not intended as a replacement, or refined, 
Cartesian subject. They are about different things. Joan 
Stambaugh has said of Heidegger that what he "is criticizing about 
the subject-object split is not its legitimacy on a certain level of 
thinking, but rather its ultimaCy"3. 
In addition to the internal inability to relate the mental 
representations of the subject to the objective world outside it, 
Heidegger criticizes Cartesian inspired philosophy especially for 
losing sight of any philosophical task beyond this (ultimately 
hopeless) one. To understand why it is not simply Descartes's 
failure to correctly represent the epistemic subject, but the 
project per se, that stands in the way of what he asserts to be the 
fundamental philosophical concern, one needs to look at the 
development of hermeneutic phenomenology. Heidegger develops 
this through his modification of Husserlian transcendental 
phenomenology. 
3 Joan Stambaugh, Thoughts on Heidegger (Washington, D. C.: Center for Advanced Research in 
Phenomenology/University Press of America, 1987), p. 4. 
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1.3 Husserl and Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
Dasein, as the 'there-is' of inquiry into Being, is preconceptual. 
In contrast to the epistemological subject, it is not an entity to be 
understood in terms of spatiality, substantiality or intellectual 
function. Dasein is better understood as a commitment to 
'transparency' [Durchsichtigkeit] in the consideration of the 
meaning of Being. 
Heidegger's position, as presented thus far, might seem prima 
facie very close to Husserl's doctrine of intentionality. For 
Husserl, all consciousness is consciousness of something. The 
subject is fundamentally construed as an Ego constituted in "the 
contents of phenomena andthe place they appear'14. The existence 
of conscious thought cannot legitimately be taken as any sort of 
proof for my existence beyond that as a site of mental 
representations of a series of objects of such thoughts. Husserl 
thus radicalises the notion of what can be taken as 'admissible' 
evidence in investigations into what can be known by the subject 
of its world. It is only at the formal level that we can reach 
certainty in our claims, maintains Husserl. We cannot prove any 
deep T by being aware of the existence of our thought processes- 
mental states are not indications of anything beyond an Ego as 
"transcendental 'field' "5- the zone of the appearance of those 
mental states and the fact of content. Knowledge and certitude are 
only possible if one strips things down to the necessary- if one 
lays bare the essential dynamic of subject-object relationships. 
To this end, Husserl undertakes eidetic analyses of our perceptions 
of the world. 
4 Leslek Kolakowski, Husserl and the Searchfor Certitude (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), p. 40. 
5 P. Thevenaz (ed. J. Edie, tr. Edie. Courtney, Brockelman), What is Phenomenology? (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1962) p. 69. 
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Husserlian intentionality is the notion of "meaning as 
constituted through a relation between thought as cognition and 
thought as that which thought is about, with a fulfilment of 
meaning in the actual existence of the objeCt"6. From this 
position, explanatory schemes, such as that forwarded by 
Descartes, which move from the base assumption of a detached, 
discrete subject observing a separate world of objects are 
untenable. The Cartesian 'I' of 'I think, therefore I am' is one of 
Husserl's targets. Husserl accepts as evidence only that which is 
logically necessary given the phenomenon of consciousness. It is 
therefore illegitimate to start with an entity or structure whose 
substantive existence or meaning one wishes to establish. The 
notion of transparency in Husserl's work is present in his emphasis 
on the need for a rigorous removal of any initial conceptual 
'baggage' that will obscure the provision of an account of 
representing, intentional, consciousness. 
It might appear, then, that one is in a position to understand 
what Heidegger means by 'transparency', and to see why this belief 
demands the assuming of the phenomenological approach. If one 
was to make the mistake of assimilating Heideggerian and 
Husserlian phenomenology then Being and Time would appear an 
extension of the Husserlian project. On this interpretation, 
Heidegger would be at heart concerned with providing an "edifying 
elaboration of Husserl"7 which supplements the Husserlian method 
with a focus on practical activity as a means by which one can 
enrich the account of intentionality and obtain knowledge about the 
subject as transcendental Ego. 
6 The formulation is Joanna Hodge's, from Heidegger and Ethics, p. 184. 
7 Hubert Dreyfus in Being-in-the- World, argues that Dagfinn Follesdal is one such interpreter of 
Heidegger. The quote is from p. 13 and the topic receives further attention on p. 48. 
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It should be clear, however, that this is emphatically not 
Heidegger's project in Being and Time nor, indeed, his subsequent 
work. Heidegger, in fact, sees Husserl as making a mistake typical 
of the Western tradition of thought: trying to give a theory of the 
world, or our place in it, experienced through the model of 
conscious intentionality. Heidegger does not introduce Dasein in an 
attempt to redraft the conscious subject, whether as embodied in 
practice or constituted in more collective terms. Rather, 
Heidegger's point is that Husserl is still seeking to resolve a 
problem that only arises because one is looking in the wrong places 
for the wrong thing. To wit, Husserl uses conscious representation 
as a model for establishing epistemological certitude. 8 Husserl 
continues to move within the horizons opened up , by the 
subject/object distinction and, therefore, in the final analysis, 
remains implicated in the "scandal of philosophy" (BT, p. 249) 
mentioned above. 
The problem is not a poor execution of proper epistemological 
procedure, but the practice itself. It is against this background 
that one has to understand Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. 
Heidegger claims to be returning to the "Greek conception of truth" 
(B T, p. 57). What Husserl, Descartes, Kant, and just about all 
Western philosophers have in common, in Heidegger's view, is their 
governance by an alternative, less primordial, account of Being. 
All of them seek to frame theories which lay claim to truth, where 
'truth' is held to be "something that 'really' pertains to 
judgement" (B T, p. 57). This referring back- the 'truth of 
judgements'- is the root of the problem. The notion of an account 
through which the veracity of one's philosophical account can be 
On this see L. Kolakowski, Husserl and the Searchfor Certitude, passim. 
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compared, is, says Heidegger, only "a secondary phenomenon of 
truth, with more than one kind of foundation" (BT, p. 57). He 
continues, 
[b]oth realism and idealism have- with equal thoroughness- missed the meaning of the 
Greek conception of truth, in terms of which only the possibility of something like a 
'doctrine of ideas' can be understood as philosophical knowledge. 9 
In contrast to the 'logos' of epistemology, the 'logos' of 
phenomenology rests "in merely letting something be seen, in 
letting entities be perceived" (BT, p. 58). Phenomenological 
perception requires the removal of any notion of truth as the 
appropriate binding of "psychical occurrences" with "something 
physical outside" (BT, p. 56). The logos "is just not the kind of 
thing that can be considered as the primary 'locus' of truth. " (BT, p. 
57) 
The logos of representational epistemology is seen by Heidegger 
as at best a subsidiary of the logos of phenomenology, of logos as a 
letting-be-seen. The truth of the former logos depends not on the 
presence or absence of an 'agreement' on its own terms, but in the 
sense of the logos of Being. The 'truth' associated with this 
second sense of logos is that of perception. This understanding of 
logos "can never cover up; it can never be false; it can at worst 
remain a non-perceiving... not sufficing for straightforward and 
appropriate access. " (BT, p. 57) 
If any doubt exists about whether Heidegger conceives of his 
project as fundamentally divergent from Husserl's, it should be 
dispelled directly. Husserl's phenomenological approach captures 
BT, p. 57-8. Italics in original. 
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an important part of the approach Heidegger is forwarding- 
summed up in the maxim 'To the things themselves! ' which 
demands "the avoidance of characterizing anything without such 
demonstration" (BT, p. 59). This in itself means nothing however: 
whilst the logos of the representing subject holds sway "any 
exhibiting of an entity as it shows itself in itself, may be called 
'phenomenology' with formal justification" (BT, p. 59). The 
discoveries of such 'formal' phenomenologies when seen as 
ontological claims are etiolated- a phenomenological concept thus 
presented is "understood in an empty way and is thus passed on, 
losing its indigenous character, and becoming a free-floating 
thesis" (BT, p. 61). For Heidegger, Husserl is right to assume that 
Descartes's mistake is to seek to establish the reality of the 
independent subject, but wrong to then move to provide a 
replacement account of a more formal subject in the guise of 
consciousness. It is not the content of Descartes's theory that is 
its real error, nor indeed that of Husserl's. It is rather that both 
fail to perspicaciously challenge their aim, to ground a formal 
theory, at all. 
To be truly durchsichtig it is not just simply the content of 
one's claims that must be free of undemonstrated, hidden 
prejudices but one's methods as well. Thus, if one wishes to be 
'transparent' here one cannot import an assumption of my status as 
representing subject, nor that of the content of my mental 
representations as of a discrete world of objects. What is to be 
explained is not my experience of my existence, but the meaning of 
Being itself (albeit an issue because of the formal fact of my 
existence). 'Transparency' is not a product of a purer ratiocinative 
process in one's description of the relation between subject and 
object. Rather, it is the capacity to understand one's inquiry into 
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Being in a way which allows phenomena to show themselves in a 
way which is not predetermined by an unexamined interpretative 
stance. In addition, the 'formality' aimed at by epistemological 
theory differs from that which Heidegger intends when he talks of 
the formal structure of the question of the meaning of Being. The 
'science of Being', which Being and Time purports to be, is not the 
certitude driven epistemology of Husserl; the aim is neither a final 
nor a neutral representation of Being. Rather, the concern is an 
examination of all the means by, and through, which Being comes to 
be interpreted. 
1.4 Dasein, Fundamental Ontology and the Hermeneutics of 
Everydayness 
Three things remain to be understood. Firstly, why Heidegger 
considers the focus on the subject obscures the most 'fundamental' 
access to the meaning of Being. Secondly, one needs to understand 
what Heidegger believes it is about the way Dasein is constituted 
that avoids that obscuration. Thirdly, and in the light of these two 
considerations, there is the question of what it means to claim 
that a fundamental ontology of Dasein, conducted through 
hermeneutic phenomenology, better- or more transparently- 
provides access to the question of Being. 
The first concern is fairly easily met. The assumption behind 
the Western tradition is that reflexivity is categorically separated 
from Being; the aim has therefore been to become clear about the 
nature or implications of this diremption, between reflecting 
subject and the object of this reflection. Heidegger, however, 
challenges the very notion of this separation, not just the adequacy 
of any particular formulation. It is through the ontological 
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difference that Heidegger expresses his attack. Whereas most 
philosophers have modelled their understanding of the reflexivity 
of Being in terms of actual entities, Heidegger attributes this to 
the impulse towards Being-certain. He seeks to present an account 
which is concerned with Being as a whole, not just with actual 
existential entities, but the openness of their manifestation. 
Dasein is a being amongst beings, but is also the manifestation of 
the link between beings and Being, the actual and the possible. 
Thus far, Heidegger has defined Dasein in terms of a formal 
openness to Being. Heidegger, however, makes an early and 
dramatic move to equate Dasein with the "essential character" of 
"those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are 
ourselves"(BT, p. 27,26). Essentially, then, human being is to be 
understood through the formal necessity of interpretative 
understandings of Being: philosophically, better understandings 
attempt to render this relationship transparent. Those positions 
which seek to explicate human existence through substantive 
metaphysical conceptions (the epistemological subject, the self, 
personality) miss its essential characteristic. Dasein is not 
human being, as it has previously been understood, but human being 
is essentially to be understood as Dasein. 
At the end of the previous section, Heidegger's criticism of 
'formal' philosophies- from Cartesian epistemology to Husserlian 
intentionality- was noted. Heidegger, however, uses the word 
'formal' in a technical but important sense. Thus, the question of 
Being and Dasein are both first introduced in Heidegger's section 
on "The Formal Structure of the Question of Beincf (BT, p. 24). In 
this context, though, Heidegger contrasts his use of the notion of 
'formal' structure with what he sees as the traditional notion of 
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formality as an abstraction from the entities, practices and 
processes of one's inquiry. Heidegger challenges both the 
maintenance and grounds of this separation. Hence, following the 
section on his conception of the formal structure of the question 
of Being, Heidegger asks the rhetorical question "[d]oes it simply 
remain- or is it at all- a mere matter for soaring speculation 
about the most general of generalities, or is it rather, of all 
questions, both the most basic and concrete? "(BT, p. 29). 
Heidegger's intention is to challenge the separation between the 
formal and the concrete which he perceives as integral to 
subjectivist accounts of Being. 
Secondly, then, in contrasting Dasein to the subject of previous 
philosophy, Heidegger points to the conception of human nature in 
terms of subjectivity as embodying the error of Western 
philosophy. In deeming this conception of our existence to be, in 
terms of the most fundamental concern with Being, obscuring, it is 
not the distance of the self'O from the objects of. its perceptions 
and beliefs which most interests Heidegger. Rather, it is the 
subjectivist assumption that reflexivity should be considered 
apart from Being in the first place that Heidegger questions. 
Dasein is' neither an individual nor a collective conscious subject 
which serves as a platform from which Being can be viewed or 
understood. Dasein is a facet of Being: "the question of Being is 
nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of- 
Being which belongs to Dasein itself- the pre-ontological 
understanding of Being"(BT, p. 35). 
The pre-ontological understanding of Being is not an inherent 
understanding, implicit or explicit, lodged in an existential 
10 The 'distanced selr is a phrase used by David Kolb in The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, 
Heidegger, and After (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986). 
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subject. Rather, Dasein is simply the fact that it is true of Being 
that there is an aspect of it which is "ontically distinguished by 
the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it... this 
implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that 
Being- a relationship which is itself one of Being"(BT, p. 32). What 
is pre-ontological is not any actual understanding of Being, but the 
existence of possible understandings of Being. 
Heidegger is thus concerned with the interpretation of Being, 
not with a direct account of Being itself. It is against this 
background that Heidegger's claim, to be attempting a fundamental 
ontology of Dasein must be understood. The aim is not to reveal or 
come to know Being, to render an account in a final or absolute 
way, but to understand the ways in which Being comes to be 
revealed. There is, Heidegger is clear, no one definite answer to be 
discovered: only the possibility of an increasing perspicacity about 
the ways in which particular understandings manifest themselves. 
It is this clarity of vision, of the processes of interpretation 
involved in thinking about Being, that constitutes 'transparency'- 
one of the key terms in Being and Time. Heidegger puts it thus: 
The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence we call 
"transparency' [Durchsichtigkeit]. We choose this term to designate 'knowledge of 
the Self' in a sense which is well understood, so as to indicate that here it is not a 
matter of perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the "Self", but 
rather one of seizing upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world throughout all 
the constitutive items which are essential to it, and doing so with understanding. (BT, 
p. 186-7) 
The constitution of Dasein must therefore be understood on 
different terms from those of the Subject. Whereas the 
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subjectivist tradition has sought to understand human existence as 
a special category (conscious) of thing, for Heidegger, the defining 
characteristic of human existence ought to be understood in terms 
of the means by which beings and practices -consciousness and 
thinghood included- can come to show up as meaningful at all. 
Two crucial points follow from this. Firstly, as discussed 
above, the best understanding of Dasein will not aim at the 
adequate representation of an entity, but will instead focus on the 
ways in which meanings come to be disclosed. Disclosedness, the 
uncovering of the truth of beings, is not merely something Dasein 
does; it is closer to the nexus of conditions which make 
interpretation possible at all. Heidegger thus states that "Dasein 
is its disclosedness"(BT, p. 171). At the most fundamental level, 
then, Heidegger's concern is with interpretation. 
Secondly, Heidegger's hermeneutic concern cannot be seen as 
the study of an activity or capacity of an entity whose constitution 
is framed in a way which has unexamined assumptions. Thus, in 
undertaking a fundamental ontology of Dasein one cannot simply 
seek the 'truth', as traditionally conceived, of a particular entity. 
The aim is not the accurate representation of an actual entity, but 
an examination of the way beings come to show themselves as 
having meaning in the first place. 'Truth' is one of the concepts 
which is under analysis, and Heidegger's fundamental ontology of 
Dasein reflects this. Thus, after Heidegger claims that: 
In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as 
something disclosed to this extent it is essentially 'true'. Dasein is 'in the truth. 
This assertion has meaning ontologically. (BT, p. 263) 
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he is at pains to point out that this does not mean that the 
disclosing of meaning can be understood as the activity of " 
gconsciousness in general' " or an "idealized absolute subject" (BT, 
p. 272). Transparency demands a barer account. Rather, for 
something to show up as true in the traditional (Heidegger calls it 
the 'second") sense, Being-uncovered, requires an activity; Being- 
uncovering. 'Truth' in the primordial sense rests in the 
's exis ten tial-ontological foundations of uncovering"(BT, p. 263). 
Thus, the phenomenon to which one must look cannot be the Subject 
or consciousness but the most primordial structure by which 
these, and all, entities show up; disclosedness. This cannot be 
understood by objective or distanced consideration, but, of 
necessity, "pertains equiprimordially to the world, to Being-in, 
and to the Self"; that nexus of relations and distinctions which are 
characterised by "Being already in a world" (BT, p. 263). 
Thus, truth, for Heidegger, is dependent on disclosedness; a 
state of Being of Dasein, where Dasein is necessarily already 
thrown into, and absorbed in the world. It is this relatedness of 
meaning and truth to those phenomena usually considered outside 
the Self- social practices, 'average understandings', equipmental- 
contexts- which Dreyfus calls the "hermeneutics of 
everydayness" 12. The point, however, of Heideggerian hermeneutic 
phenomenology and fundamental ontology, is not to establish the 
truth, or what can be certainly known, of Dasein or Being. The 
'problem of truth' is, in Heidegger's eyes, derivative to the 
question of the meaning of Being, and it is to this that Heidegger's 
thought is addressed. 
II BT, p. 263. 
12 Dreyfus, Being-in-the- World, p. 34. 
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Heidegger's project finds its roots in the Kantian project of 
explaining how it is possible that things can come to show up as 
meaningful in the field of human understanding at all. Heidegger is 
careful, however, from the fourth page of Sein und Zeit, and 
throughout the rest of his career, to differentiate his work from 
the Kantian project. It is not his concern to move from or to "self- 
evidence" (BT, p. 23). From the first, Heidegger defines himself 
against the task of establishing transcendental conditions for the 
possibility of interpretation at all, which he perceives to be the 
Kantian aim. Heidegger argues that the attempt to define the 
conditions of intelligibility in terms of a 'clearer' understanding 
of human understanding as it is "in-itself" is itself couched in 
metaphysical terms. This retains the segregation between subject 
and object, inner and outer, which characterises subjectivism. The 
conditions for the intelligibility of Being do not come to be known 
through a transcending of the phenomenon of a separated world, nor 
through introspective meditation aimed at knowledge of the 
substantive nature of a Subject. 
Heidegger thus considers the investigation of the question of 
the meaning of Being to precede the concepts of subjectivism.. 
Dasein, as the occurrence of disclosedness of the meaning of Being, 
is not a reflection on Being from outwith it but is itself a mode of 
Being. The interpretation of Being thus understood, as an integral 
aspect of Being, cannot be understood in ways which ignore its own 
temporal and involved aspects; Heidegger thus asserts that "the 
proposition that 'Dasein is in the truth' states equiprimordially 
that 'Dasein is in untruth' "(BT, p. 265). This is entirely consistent 
with the claim that truth and untruth are themselves phenomena 
secondary to what Heidegger calls the "existential-ontological 
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condition" of Dasein's "thrown projection"13, or "the structure of 
care" (B T, p. 265). Therefore, insomuch as Heidegger seeks 
knowledge, it is knowledge of the understanding of the meaning of 
Being, not knowledge of Being itself14. For Heidegger, conceiving 
of the meaning of Being in terms of the structures of a Subject, 
even the Kantian one, retains the flawed epistemological aim of 
defining reality in ahistorical terms which will ultimately be 
partial and dogmatic. 
1.5 Dasein, Subjectivity and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion 
In assessing Heidegger's critique of subjectivism, one needs to 
examine two key moments. The first is Heidegger's internal 
critique of the epistemological tradition, the second, Heidegger's 
claim that only an overcoming of the tradition can address the 
problems he diagnoses. Heidegger then offers two basic families 
of objection to the philosophy of the Subject. 
Firstly, it seeks to interpret existence in ways which he 
believes are internally incoherent. Thus the inability to theorise 
adequately the experience of 'hardness', temporality, personal 
identity and the relation between mind and body in the language of 
substantia are, for Heidegger worse than temporary obstacles, 
because the assumption of the primacy of substance contravenes 
the aims of any truly transparent philosophy. 
Secondly, then, Heidegger takes the difficulty encountered in 
rendering an account of how subject and world interact in the 
terms of substantia (and thus, he argues on the ontic, the present- 
13 Originally in italics. 
14 For an extended consideration of this point see Mark Okrcnt's "The Truth of Being and the History of 
Philosophy" in H. Dreyfus and H. Hall (cds. ), Heidegger: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). 
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at-hand, and the existentiell) as an example of an incoherence 
which acts as a clue to a deeper inconsistency. This inconsistency 
is the attempt to render as self-evident that which is necessarily 
in question throughout any inquiry: Being. The aim of subjectivist 
epistemology- final and definitive knowledge of Being- is only 
tenable if one assumes a separation between the knowing subject 
and the object of its knowledge. Heidegger claims, however, that 
the assumption of this separation, upon which the epistemological 
tradition is based, can never be self-evident; thus, the goal of 
traditional epistemology, the adequate representation of reality, 
must be equally lacking in transparency. 
Heidegger accepts that this project is very ambitious. He does 
not want to correct or amend the observations of his predecessors 
but resituate their claims within a new conception of (hermeneutic 
phenomenological) truth. As Charles Guignon, amongst others, has 
observed, this entails that Heidegger does not wish to have "his 
work interpreted as a point of view or a standpoint which 
correctly represents the facts where others have been mistaken"15. 
Two basic objections suggest themselves. Firstly, one might 
attack the characterisation of the tradition upon which Heidegger 
bases his attack. Heidegger asserts that the aim of the Western 
intellectual tradition has been to offer a single and defining 
account of Being. Heidegger, however, is selective in his examples, 
both of the thinkers and of the aspects of their work he uses to 
support his claim. So, in addition to querying the particular 
readings Heidegger gives of Descartes, Kant, Husserl, etc., one 
might ask whether, given the evidence he selects, he has done 
anything to show that subjectivist epistemology leads to an 
15 Charles B. Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983) p. 248. 
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assertion that what can be known is coextensive with the whole of 
reality16. In addition to Heidegger's questionable reading of the 
intellectual achievements of the West, critics17 have pointed out 
that in excluding the practical and social achievements from his 
characterisation of the Western tradition, he runs the risk of 
falling prey to his own warning that any inquiry "gets guided 
beforehand by what is sought"(BT, p. 24). 
Heidegger explicitly considers the question of whether or not he 
is reductionist in his discussion of Descartes18, asking "have we 
not fobbed off on Descartes a task altogether beyond his horizon, 
and then gone on to 'demonstrate' that he has failed to solve 
it? '"(BT, p. 131). Heidegger's answer to his own rhetorical 
question is telling; the problem is not that Descartes, and by 
extension all those in the epistemological tradition, sought to 
consider entities in terms of their physical presence ('presence- 
at-hand'), but that this one aspect of the intelligibility of Being 
has been extended to all of existence- an ontology of Thinghood. 
The problem is that "Descartes not only wants to formulate the 
problem of 'the "I" and the world'; he claims to have solved it" 
(BT, p. 131). This solution is bought at the cost of ignoring those 
phenomena which do not fit into the terminology used (Heidegger 
cites the inappropriateness of conceiving of value-predicates in 
terms of a Thinghood ontology); a strategy which Heidegger claims 
reveals that such positions do not subject themselves to "positive 
criticism"(BT, p. 131). 
16 On this see David Kolb's Critique of Pure Modernity. p. 141. 
17 Particularly instructive in this regard is Gail Soffer's "Heidegger, Humanism, and the Destruction of 
History" in The Review of Metaphysics, vol. XLIX (March 1996). 
18 A charge well laid by David Kolb, in respect to Descartes and in the course of pointing to Heidegger's 
over-intellectual characterisation of the tradition, in his Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 141-4. 
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Thus, to the charge that he is a reductionist in his portrayal of 
the tradition, Heidegger counters that if one were not to be so the 
tradition's own reductionism would be unchallenged. It is the 
over-ambition of representational epistemology that requires 
deflation. Heidegger, then, refuses to accept the outlooks which he 
believes condition the criticisms under consideration of his work; 
these objections result from the limited range and uncritical 
nature of the inquiry conducted by his critics (recall "[e]very 
inquiry gets guided beforehand by what is sought"). Thus, 
Heidegger rejects the accusation that his portrayal of the tradition 
is a caricature; suggesting instead that he will provide an account 
of truth which both reveals the expansionist tendencies of the 
subjectivist conception, and shows how its limitations can be 
better understood. The claim that accreted tradition masks a more 
fundamental or transparent approach to Being, supplied by 
hermeneutic phenomenology, Dreyfus terms (following Paul 
Ricoeur) the "hermeneutics of suspicion"19. In his critique of 
subjectivism, Heidegger thus identifies the conception of truth 
operated by both his targets and himself, as the crux. 
It is to Heidegger's claim that an alternative to the account of 
truth found in subjectivist metaphysics is required that one must 
turn. The crucial question here is whether Heidegger's alternative, 
outlined in his description of Dasein and disclosedness, is free of 
the 'dogmatism', opacity and vitiating arbitrariness he attributes 
to the traditional conception of truth. 
It is here, then, that the second, and more important, set of 
objections to Heidegger's project is located; viz those positions 
that argue he replaces the essentialism he diagnoses in the 
19 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-lVorld, p. 35. 
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subjectivist tradition with an isomeric equivalent. The criticism 
is that Heidegger's alternative conception of truth repeats the 
metaphysical error of assuming that true knowledge is indexed to 
the adequate portrayal of an objective, 'real' state of affairs (in 
Heidegger's case Being and the disclosedness of Dasein); and that 
the determination or testing of this reality is as arbitrary in 
Heidegger's case as it is in the subjective epistemologies he 
criticizes. In other words, Heidegger's critique of subjectivism is 
premised on the same unwarranted claims to privileged access to 
the 'truth' (framed in terms of the 'objectivity' one finds in 
metaphysics of presence) as the tradition. 
Amongst the diverse perspectives from which this point has 
been pUt20, opinion varies on whether Heidegger is right to declare 
the subjectivist paradigm dead. Where all agree, however, is that 
in seeking to go beyond the tradition, Heidegger erred at some point 
in a way that means "he propagates a mere inversion of the thought 
patterns of the philosophy of the subject... Heidegger remains 
caught up in the problematic of that kind of philosophy"21. Many 
critics attribute Heidegger's politics to his enmeshment in the 
subjectivist nexus; it is, therefore, important to be clear about 
why these thinkers maintain that Heidegger retains at key 
moments the uncritical essentialism he attributes to metaphysical 
thought. 
20 Some of the more prominent representatives being Ernst Tugendhat, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, 
Richard Rorty, Richard Wolin and Jargen Habermas; relevant articles from each are cited throughout this 
Chapter. 
21 JOrgen Habermas (tr. F. Lawrence), The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) p. 160. 
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1.6 Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Objective Truth: Ernst 
Tugendhat 
Ernst Tugendhat's treatment of Heidegger's "phenomenological 
theory of truth"22 is particularly instructive in this regard. Taking 
(as I have done above) T44 of Being and Time- 'Dasein, 
Disclosedness, and Truth'- as central, Tugendhat argues that 
Heidegger's radicalisation of Husserlian phenomenology is 
philosophically speculative and results in Heidegger conceiving of 
'truth' in ways that overlook the critical and regulative role the 
concept plays within the tradition. Further, Tugendhat asserts, 
this overgeneralisation about the concept of truth means that 
Heidegger loses the capacity to reflect on- or subject to 'positive 
critiCiSM'23- his own position. 
This occurs, believes Tugendhat, because Heidegger seeks to 
radicalise Husserlian phenomenology- whereby an assertion is true 
if it uncovers "the entity 'just as it is in itself"'24- by removing 
the concept of intentionality. Thus, whereas Husserl operates with 
a notion of objectivity conditioned by his grounding of intentional 
consciousness in the transcendental ego, Heidegger questions the 
acceptance of entities as 'given in themselves'. Therefore, while 
Husserl (rightly or wrongly) retains a dimension of depth in the 
distinction between the pointing-out (apophainesthai) and the 
unconcealing (aletheia) of an assertion this, argues Tugendhat, is 
silently collapsed by Heidegger. Hence, Tugendhat continues, 
Heidegger, in dropping the references to entities as they are in 
themselves, can only talk of truth apophantically. 
22 Ernst Tugendhat, "Heidegger's Idea of Truth" in Wolin (ed. ), The Heidegger Controversy, p. 25 1. 
23 Heideggees own words, as cited earlier. 
24 Tugendhat, "Heidegger's Idea of Truth". p. 252.54 
This has two consequences. Firstly, any notion of truth as "a 
superior form of givenneSS"25 is rejected. If truth is understood as 
apothesis, or, as Heidegger puts it " 'Being-true' ("truth") means 
Being-uncove ring" (BT, p. 262), then the problem of truth which 
motivates thinkers from Plato to Husserl is ignored. Truth is made 
to depend simply on the disclosure of Dasein, and since (as quoted 
earlier) Dasein is its disclosedness (BT, p. 263) truth seems 
ultimately to be a product of Dasein qua Dasein. This reading is 
supported by Heidegger's assertion of the equiprimordiality of 
truth and untruth, the latter hence also seeming rendered as 
Dasein-dependent. 
Insofar as Heidegger talks of aletheia as truth he is being 
disingenuous, concludes Tugendhat. If Heidegger wishes to use the 
notion of truth in any way which suggests better or worse 
understandings- precisely the phenomenon of truth for Tugendhat- 
then he needs to retain a sense of truth as referring to entities as 
they are in themselves. Further, locating truth in relation to the 
apophantic aspects of Dasein- in the very existence of horizons of 
understanding- makes it impossible to apply the concept of truth 
to reflect upon these horizons at all. Thus, Tugendhat takes 
Heidegger to have prematurely and summarily dismissed the 
Husserlian notions of critical consciousness and Evidenz which, for 
Tugendhat, contribute to a genuine understanding of the aletheiac 
dimension of the unconcealing of Being. 
Secondly, however, Tugendhat asserts that Heidegger continues 
to operate the distinction between the uncovering involved in the 
apophantic dimension of any assertion, and the (now illegitimate) 
alethelac sense by which the understanding of an assertion can be 
25 Ibid., p. 254. 
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judged true or false in reference to a state of affairs external to 
the mere fact of that assertion. 
Tugendhat's criticism of Heidegger is thus double-edged. 
Heidegger misunderstands Husserl's conception of certitude as 
seeking to make explicit a particular and absolute account of 
Being, when it is actually a "regulative ideal"26 which moves from, 
but does not claim to capture, the phenomenon of givenness. 
Further, Tugendhat argues, by failing to realise that Husserl's 
concern with truth does not aim at the "dogmatism of self 
certainty"27 by reflecting on an absolute conception of entities as 
they are in themselves, but instead is intended to reflect on the 
conditions which make possible "critical justification"28, 
Heidegger robs himself of the means to reflect upon his own 
position. In the final analysis, then, Tugendhat believes that the 
accusation Heidegger levels against Husserl- the desire for an 
immediacy with the transcendental- in fact rebounds, and 
Heidegger's own "metatranscendental position"29 lapses into the 
arbitrary quest for immediacy he (wrongly) attributes to Husserl. 
I have dwelt on Tugendhat's philosophical analysis at some 
length because it brings to the fore the crux of almost all 
contemporary criticisms of Heidegger. Tugendhat reads Heidegger 
as bifurcated in terms of truth and illegitimate speculation. This 
he attributes to Heidegger's failure to separate the concern with 
truth as providing critical and objective standards for reflection 
from that of an attempt to provide a complete metaphysics 
arbitrarily grounded in an unitary and totalising philosophy of the 
26 Ibid., p. 262. 
27 Ibid., p. 263. 
28 Ibid., p. 263. 
29 Ibid., p. 262. 
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Subject. The result of failing to realise this separation, argues 
Tugendhat, is that Heidegger simply replaces one attempt to 
provide an immediate account of the Being of reality with another, 
the latter possessing the same uncritical claims to privileged 
access to the real as Heidegger himself perceives in the former. 
Hence, Heidegger remains implicated in the arrogances of the 
metaphysical project he claims to reject. 
This charge is levelled at Heidegger from across the 
philosophical spectrum. Building on the beliefs expressed in 
Tugendhat's work, Habermas and Rorty both identify a rejection, 
amounting to an overdetermined and speculative 'suspicion, of, 
respectively, the 'lifeworld' and 'social practice pragmatism' as 
responsible for Heidegger's philosophical failure in this regard. 
Mirroring this, it is the overemphasis on the practices and 
constitution of Dasein- that is an overdetermined and speculative 
'everydayness'- and precisely a failure of suspicion that is seen as 
Heidegger's fai ling by Derrida30 and Lacoue-Labarthe3l. 
At root, then, the claim is that in failing to separate the two 
hermeneutical dynamics referred to above ('suspicion' and 
'everydayness'), Heidegger's project never extends beyond the 
attempt to provide, in Habermas's words, a "temporalized 
Ursprungsphilosophie", the truths of which are "in each case 
provincial and yet total"32. Although the above thinkers differ as 
to which of the two hermeneutical dynamics is to blame for 
Heidegger's failure to overcome the drive to metaphysical 
30 Some useful treatment of Derrida's relationship to Heidegger are provided by Tom Rockmore 
Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism and Being, pp. 139-147, Charles Spinosa, 
"Derrida and Heidegger: Iterability and Ereignis" in Dreyfus and Hall (eds. ), Heidegger. A Critical Reader 
and Richard Wolin, "French Heidegger Wars" in R. Wolin (ed. ) The Heidegger Controversy. Wolin's 
article also provides an useful reading of Lacoue-Labarthe's treatment of Heidegger. 
31 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics. 
32 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 154. 
57 
certitude associated with subjectivism, they all assume 
Heidegger's ambition unravels as a result of his failure to isolate 
and eradicate one from the other. Examining this move in Rorty's 
work, and a similar move in the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, 
is instructive in this regard. 
1.7 Heidegger and The Truth of Being: Metaphysical 
Interpretations of the Ontological Difference 
Richard Rorty claims that Heidegger is best read as a 
pragmatist whose true message- the finality of exclusively human 
social practices in all questions of truth and meaning- is lost in a 
16nostalgia"33 for a deeper, Greek conception of truth in terms of an 
entity, Being, "which has meaning even though it has no place in 
social practice"34. 
Rorty separates what I have termed Heidegger's hermeneutics of 
everydayness, which Rorty takes as the emphasis on the 
importance of public practice in grounding truth and meaning, from 
his nostalgic suspicion of those practices as embodied in 
modernity. Rorty views this suspicion as embodied in a theological 
conception of Being which seeks a God's-eye view of everyday 
practice "as a limited whole"35. 
It is with the notion of a realm beyond that of the practices of 
human society that Rorty takes issue. Rorty does this by offering 
his own reading of the history of philosophy, in terms of a 
distinction between "type A" and "type B" entities. Rorty takes 
33 Richard Rorty, "Heidegger, Contingency, Pragmatism", in Dreyfus and Hall (eds. )Heidegger. - A 
Critical Reader, p. 226. 
34 Richard Rorty, "Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language", in Charles Guignon (ed. ), 
The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, p. 352. 
35 Ibid., p. 346. 
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type B entities to be those which are available through language. 
The tradition's mistake, as Rorty characterises it, is to move 
beyond the Wittgenstinian theory of the ineffability of language 
and seek to establish the conditions on which actual entities 
become possible from outwith that perspective. Hence, Rorty 
claims, type B entities are approached as those entities which 
"stand in need of being related in order to become available"36. 
Those who postulate type A entities do so to explain the conditions 
of such availability. Type A entities cited to by Rorty include 
Plato's Forms, Kant's categories, and Russell's logical objects. In 
the twentieth century, with the early Wittgenstein, late Heidegger 
and others, type A entities take the availability of linguistic 
accessibility itself as the 'stuff'- type B entities- of their 
analyses. Wittgenstein withdraws from the project of establishing 
a type-A-ology, a system for capturing the essence of language. 
Heidegger's mistake, claims Rorty, is to move in the opposite 
direction as his career progresses. 
Guignon, who follows Rorty's reading here, puts it thus- 
[t]he dream of achieving "transcendental knowledge" and "veritas transcendental is" 
(SZ 38) concerning Being seems to dissolve when the situatedness and historicity of 
inquiry in general is brought to light. 37 
Rorty suggests that in the account of the ready-to-hand and the 
identification of Dasein with its "projects and language"38, 
Division 1 of Being and Time provides a nascent pragmatist 
account of existence which accepts the relatedness to social 
practice of all meaning. Rorty claims, however, that this account 
36 Ibid., p. 342. 
37 Charles Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, p. 241. SZ 38 is a reference to Sein 
und Zeit, p. 62 in Being and Time. 
38 Rorty, "Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language", p. 346. 
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is buried in Heidegger's talk of Being, an entity which delimits 
language in a search to identify the transcendental conditions of 
its possibility. Thus, argues Rorty, Heidegger resurrects the 
distinction between type A and type B entities and, in mistakenly 
attempting to "avoid relatedness, to think a single thought which 
is not simply in a web of other thoughtS99, attempts to remove his 
thought from the history of human social context and argument. 
Rorty, therefore separates Heidegger's work according to a 
perceived adherence to metaphysical subjectivism. Whereas Rorty 
believes the writings on Dasein and everyday practice can be 
interpreted as a proto-pragmatist account of agency and meaning 
(an exclusively type B account), Rorty reads 'Being' as a type A 
entity. The result is that Rorty views the distinction Heidegger 
draws between the ontic and the ontological as a metaphysical 
distinction between those objects that are present, and the 
fundamental quality of Presence which they share40. As with any 
position forwarding claims about an entity transcending historical 
and social context, Rorty declares Heidegger's thought here 
philosophically illegitimate; it is simply another speculative 
"language-game"41. For Heidegger to claim that a Being, thus 
conceived, can lead to arguments or assertions the truth of which 
could be tested- for it to be philosophically meaningful at all- 
would require the impossible; for Heidegger to "break free of 
metaphysics, free of the world which metaphysics has made, would 
require that Heidegger himself be capable of rising above his 
time"42. 
39 Ibid., p. 352. 
40 For a treatment of this metaphysical conception of the ontological difference, in reference to Derrida's 
reading of Heidegger (which mirrors Rorty's in this regard), see Charles Spinosa, "Derrida and Heidegger: 
Iterability and Ereignis". V 41 Rorty, "Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language", p. 353. 
42 Ibid., p. 353 
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Rorty's argument has a fundamental flaw, however. He 
misunderstands what Heidegger means by Being and the ontological 
difference, which leads to him fundamentally misconceiving 
Heidegger's project as a whole. Rorty's first and most basic error 
is to conceive of the ontological difference as encompassing a 
metaphysical division between Being and beings; the former taken 
to be a transcendental type A entity which grounds the Being of 
beings, conceived of in terms of those entities which are present. 
Rorty is simply wrong to conceive of Being as anything like an 
entity which grounds the existence or determines the possibility 
of beings. Once one has understood this, Rorty's criticisms of the 
legitimacy of Heidegger's supposed move to delimit the realm of 
'human self -conceptions' in terms of a Being, the truths of which 
can only ever be understood on quasi-religious claims to privileged 
access, collapse43. 
There is no doubt that Heidegger, right from the start of his 
career, is at pains to claim that Being is not to be understood as a 
metaphysical entity. Thus we find in Being and Time the claim 
that " 'Being' cannot indeed be conceived as an entity; enti non 
additur aliqua natura: nor can it acquire such a character as to have 
the term "entity" applied to it" (BT, p. 23). In the later On the Way 
to Language, as reported by Mark Okrent, this concern has 
deepened- Heidegger explicitly claims that he "knows with full 
clarity the difference between Being as the Being of beings and 
Being as 'Being' in respect of its proper sense, that is, in respect 
of its truth (the clearing)"44. 
43 Mark B. Okrent, in "The Truth of Being and the History of Philosophy" offers a particularly sharp 
rebuttal of Rorty's attempts to render Heidegger's work into metaphysical, and hence ultimately Rortian 
pragmatist, terms. 
44 Okrent, "The Truth of Being and the History of Philosophy", p. 145 
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In failing to take account of these claims, Rorty continues to 
miss what it is that Heidegger intends to examine with the 
ontological difference. Rorty assumes that the ontological 
difference names a distinction between two types of entities with 
the former, Being, seen as primordial. The motivating concern 
behind the ontological difference bypasses such metaphysical 
distinctions altogether, however, and Rorty is thus mistaken to 
suggest that Heidegger is seeking to privilege one metaphysical 
conceptual scheme over another. The distinction Heidegger draws 
between Being and beings does not seek to differentiate or 
prioritise one (speculative) hermeneutical dynamic over the other, 
but is concerned instead with "the truth of Being"45. Okrent has 
observed that although this phrase comes from Heidegger's middle 
period, one could equally substitute the "question of the meaning 
of Being" or "place of Being" from the earlier or later workS46. 
Because Heidegger's concern is not Being but the truth of Being, 
the criticisms of both Rorty and Tugendhat are blunted. When 
Heidegger talks of truth in terms of aletheia he is not committed 
to the claim that what is unconcealed is Being as an entity. 
Rather, Heidegger is concerned with the clearing in which both 
beings and Being can show up; not the difference between beings 
and Being as entities. What is uncovered through the analysis of 
Dasein, and the sense in which aletheia is unconcealment, is (to 
borrow an analogy) the "phenomenological horizon"47. As has been 
seen throughout the course of this chapter, Heidegger's 
hermeneutic phenomenology has different goals from those he 
identifies with the metaphysical tradition. Thus, just as 'Being' 
does not name an entity of which Heidegger seeks direct 
45 This is a point Okrent makes at length. The quotation from Heidegger is to be found in Okrent's 
article, ibid., p. 145. 
46 See ibid., p. 145. 
47 Ibid., p. 148. 
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knowledge, so 'Dasein' or the 'history of beings' does not refer to 
either a subject, or a set of practices, upon which more 'modest' 
truths could be based. 
Heidegger's concern is not then, as Rorty contends, to try and 
present Being in such a way that the history of human practices 
and self -conceptions - beings- are conceived on a conceptual 
scheme which reaches beyond those conceptions. Heidegger's 
approach, hermeneutic phenomenology, is not intended to try and 
establish how things actually are: this applies as equally to an 
ontotheological Being as to a concept of a distinctly human 
practice or language. Heidegger's primordial conception of the 
truth of Being does not find its completion in a particular account 
of an actual state of affairs, however conceived. Rather, a concern 
with the "truth of Being" does not aim to establish final or 
explicit truths at all, nor provide an account of how the world 
$really' is, but focuses instead on what it is formally and 
necessarily involved in the provision of any interpretation at all. 
Thus, when Heidegger distinguishes between "explicit, deliberate 
Interpretation" [Interpretierung] and "interpretation of a practical 
sort"48 [Auslegung], his aim is not to ground the former in the 
latter, nor to move towards one authoritative interpretation of 
Being, but to bring into question the 'formal' requirements- 
encompassing both dynamics- which are involved for beings to 
show up as having meaning. 
Thus Rorty is wrong to assume that Heidegger subordinates the 
human world to an ontotheological/metaphysical conception of 
Being. For Heidegger the two are not separate entities or planes 
which require relation; rather they are dedicated conceptual tools 
48 David C. Hoy, "Heidegger and the hermeneutic turn", in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, p. 179. 
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in a systemic philosophical inquiry into the field in which any 
instance of truth- or falsity- can be produced. 
Heidegger's hermeneutical concern with everydayness should 
not be interpreted as a proto-pragmatist position. It is not, as 
Rorty assumes, the beginnings of an abortive attempt to render an 
account of human being from which the metaphysical and 
subjectivist baggage has been expunged. It is instead part of a 
career long focus on the assumptions behind any interpretation of 
Being, whether metaphysical or 'postmetaphysical'. Heidegger 
does not aim to replace one set of justificatory principles (those 
of subjectivist metaphysics) with an improved set (which Rorty 
identifies with Heidegger's speculative nostalgia for a Greek 
conception of Being). If this were the case Heidegger would not 
have claimed, in the Letter on Humanism, that metaphysical 
thought, like his own, "belongs to the history of the truth of 
Being... [a]ll refutation in the field of essential thinking is 
foolish"49. For Heidegger, the 'transparency' associated with 
hermeneutic phenomenology is not that of a direct view of a more 
dreal' or 'true' world, but an increased awareness and clarity about 
the implications involved in forwarding any interpretation of Being 
at all. 
Thus, although Rorty is right in his claim that Heidegger's work 
amounts to "one more in a long series of self -conceptions", and 
that "Heideggerese is only Heidegger's gift to us, not Being's gift 
to Heidegger"50 he is wrong to assume that Heidegger's position is 
opposed to this characterisation. More importantly, however, he 
misunderstands the purpose of Heidegger's account of the truth of 
Being; an examination, but not a rejection, of the limits involved in 
49 Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism" in Martin Heidegger (tr. Krell) Basic Writings, p. 239. 
50 Rorty, "Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language", p. 353. 
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attempting to give any account whatsoever of the grounds of truth- 
Heidegger's own work, and Rorty's humanist pragmatism included. 
Rorty places a metaphysical divide between the hermeneutics of 
everydayness and the hermeneutics of suspicion, viewing the latter 
as injecting an illegitimate metaphysical dimension into 
Heidegger's work. Equally, those in the French deconstructionist 
movement have interpreted Heidegger as retaining an unacceptable 
metaphysical dimension. As in Rorty's case, they perceive 
Heidegger as having two distinct concerns; the first to do with the 
grounding of meaning in practice (the hermeneutics of 
everydayness as construed above), the second to do with the claim 
that those meanings disguise the full horizon of Being (the 
hermeneutics of suspicion). Unlike Rorty, both Derrida and Lacoue- 
Labarthe place Heidegger's error in the former dynamic, and 
defend, rather than attack, the hermeneutics of suspicion. 
It is Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe who offers the most dramatic 
formulation of this claim. Following Heidegger's own later claims, 
that he was entrapped by the hidden metaphysics of Nietzsche5l, 
Lacoue-Labarthe identifies Heidegger's metaphysical error with 
his failure to distance himself enough from the meanings and 
practices of modernity, characterised as 'humanism'. It is, then, in 
the hermeneutics of everydayness that Lacoue-Labarthe finds that 
Heidegger's work retains a metaphysical dimension. 
Whereas Rorty finds Heidegger's career to be a story of 
increasing movement towards a metaphysical standpoint, Lacoue- 
Labarthe takes the later work to be a move away from such a 
position. Just as Rorty's interpretation fails to account for the 
51 In The Politics Of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger, Richard Wolin cites 
Heidegger's 'oft-heard lamentation' that "Nietzsche did me in! ", p. 141. 
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continuity of Heidegger's work, so Lacoue-Labarthe is committed 
to the view that Heidegger's corpus is marked by a passage 
between a metaphysical and a non-metaphysical position. 
However, as was argued in respect to Rorty above, this view 
(although not discouraged by Heidegger)52 runs counter to strong 
evidence in the writings themselves that there is a great degree of 
continuity in Heidegger's thought53. Further, his ongoing focus on 
the truth of Being, does not, as both Rorty and Lacoue-Labarthe 
assert, aim at 'direct access' to Being, however construed. 
As Rorty is wrong to assume that Heidegger reveals an 
illegitimate metaphysical intention in retaining a hermeneutics of 
suspicion, so Lacoue-Labarthe is mistaken to assume that 
Heidegger reveals a similar desire in retaining a hermeneutics of 
everydayness. In fact, neither hermeneutical dynamic aims at 
proffering such an account at all. Heidegger is not seeking to give 
a foundational account of the worl d and how man relates to it, but 
the preconditions for any such interpretation to become an issue in 
the first place. 
The problem with Lacoue-Labarthe and Rorty's metaphysical 
interpretations of Heidegger is that they fail to keep in sight the 
focus of Heidegger's work. Dasein and the critique of subjectivist 
metaphysics are not intended to establish the framework within 
which all possible truths lie; this is true of positive claims such 
as Rorty's assertion that contingency underlies all truth claims, 
and of the negative thesis that Lacoue-Labarthe wrongly imputes 
52 Heidegger, after all, in encouraging the French reception of his thought may well have had the 
maintenance of his philosophical reputation, and his denazification, in mind. A point put at length in 
Tom Rockmore's Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism and Being and in 
Richard Wolin's "French Heidegger Wars". 
53 Those who have realised, and argued this, include Frederick A. Olafson's "The Unity of Heidegger's 
Thought" and David Hoy's "Heidegger and the hermeneutic turn", both in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger. Another notable exception is Heidegger who, after all, claims to have been the thinker of one 
thought only! 
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to Heidegger, that metaphysical assumptions cannot ground truth 
claims. Heidegger's contribution is prior to such attempts to 
relate truth to reality, however ironically conceived, but is 
concerned instead with the relation between the conditions of 
possibility and actuality within which anything can show as 
meaningful at all. Heidegger's point is that the conditions of 
possibility cannot be seen as a distinct realm from which any 
particular set of manifest entities is drawn. Dasein as temporal 
care is not Heidegger's attempt to define human being, nor the 
universal principles about it which enables the world to be known. 
It is, instead, Heidegger's move to suggest what must be necessary 
for such relations to have meaning or make sense at all. 
Thus, when Heidegger claims that "[h]igher than actuality 
stands possibility' (BT, p. 63) he is not suggesting that the problem 
with the tradition has been that it has failed to find the true or 
right principles underpinning how we come to know actuality. As 
Carelton Christensen has argued this would remain within the 
epistemological tradition- a "mere question of truth"54. 
Heidegger's project is to redraft not the solution but the problem. 
Properly understood, the 'truth of Being' is concerned with the 
clearing within which questions of truth can make sense; with 
meaning rather than truth. The phenomenological approach does 
not seek to better relate the subjective experience of reality 
(actuality) to the objective conditions which must hold (reality); it 
seeks rather to suggest that reflection on this relationship- 
whether metaphysically or 'postmetaphysically' understood- fails 
to account for how such a relationship can come to have meaning at 
all. It is this field of meaning which constitutes possibility. The 
54 Carleton Christensen, "Heidegger's Representationalism", The Review of Metaphysics, vol. LI, no. 1, 
issue 201 (Sep. 1997), p. 102. Italics in original. 
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problem is not how we come to know reality but why the issue is 
itself a problem. 
In fact, as was suggested at the beginning of this Chapter, 
Heidegger's critique of subjectivity is not a refutation, but a 
recasting. It is not simply because he takes the Subject as his 
starting point that Heidegger takes Descartes as the prime 
representative of the Western tradition, nor because his work 
proves the spring of talk of representative intentionality. 
Heidegger does not claim such positions are false, but, rather, that 
it is mistaken to view such stances as generating principles 
through which what Carleton calls the "psych o-p hysical"5 5 
transaction can be modelled. Heidegger's challenge is to the heart 
of the assumption of this division, regardless of whether it is 
'addressed' through a distinction between a knowing Subject and an 
objective world, or between the cognitive and embodied 
dimensions of human practice. 
I now consider some of the implications of Heidegger's critique 
of subjectivity that become apparent when one rejects the 
metaphysical readings of his work offered by Rorty, Lacoue- 
Labarthe and all those who interpret his work as an attempt to 
better present the truth of things. 
Section 2) Conclusion: The Truth of Being, Metaphysical 
Subjectivism and Meaning 
Dreyfus has compared Heidegger's insight to that of 
Wittgenstein in On Certainty- "Giving grounds [must] come to an 
end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it 
55 Ibid., p. 102. 
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is an ungrounded way of acting"56. What emerges from examining 
the work of Rorty and Lacoue-Labarthe is that Heidegger is not 
attempting to characterise this 'ungrounded way of acting' in 
metaphysical terms at all; regardless of whether or not one 
conceives of this metaphysics in terms of either the hermeneutics 
of everydayness or suspicion. 
Heidegger's concern is rather with what is involved in the 
search for grounds per se. He is not trying to render an account of 
what Being really is but how such an inquiry into Being can come to 
be meaningful. This applies equally to all theories of meaning and 
it is a tenet of Heidegger's position that no particular answer is to 
be ruled out. Thus, the superiority, or otherwise, of Heidegger's 
position is not premised on any claim to privileged access of a 
substantial truth or set of truths, but relates to his claim that 
some theories of meaning are clearer with regards to the formal 
assumptions on which they are necessarily based than others. 
'Transparency' is thus indexed to the relation between the form of 
an inquiry and its content, rather than any comparison of 
substantial claims with a pre-determinable or knowable 
(metaphysical) order. The problem with metaphysical accounts, for 
Heidegger, is not that they are wrong but that they claim an 
explicit completeness that, in-the absence of a consideration of 
their own phenomenological foundations, is, at the very least, 
questionable. 
Heidegger's critique of subjectivity and the interpretative 
position from which it is advanced cannot, therefore, be 
assimilated to an attempt to move beyond metaphysical accounts 
of existence to a more adequate account of how things come to be 
56 Dreyfus, Being-in-the- World, P. 155. 
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true in terms of either a "hermeneutics of everydayness" or a 
"hermeneutics of suspicion". Thus when Rorty portrays 
Heidegger's error as seeking to try and found truth on a 
"hermeneutics of suspicion", or when Lacoue-Labarthe reverses 
the claim and sees his error as trying to found truth on a 
"hermeneutics of everydayness", both miss the point. The two 
hermeneutical dynamics are not differing methodological 
approaches in a search for definitive knowledge, but symbiotic 
components in an investigation into the preconceptions involved in 
seeking to provide any account of the grounds of truth. Heidegger's 
concern is not with truth but meaning. 
In separating the hermeneutics of everydayness from the 
hermeneutics of suspicion along metaphysical lines, both miss 
Heidegger's emphasis on the need to be clear about what must be 
involved in forming any account which tries to delimit the grounds 
upon within which we produce the meanings we do. Alasdair 
Maclntyre, in a review of the work of Charles Larmore, has 
characterised "[k]nowledge [as], whatever else it may be, [a]s that 
which is able to withstand critical testing. "57 Heidegger is not 
concerned, as metaphysical renderings of Being suggest, to provide 
the definitive grounds or rules governing such testing. Rather the 
aim of hermeneutic phenomenology, of which Dasein and 
'transparency' are integral parts, is a philosophical inquiry which 
aims to determine what any "phenomenological horizon" must, of 
formal necessity, draw on. Heidegger's answers, from the ek- 
static temporality of Dasein to Ereigni's, prepare the ground for an 
addressing of the question that MacIntyre identifies as crucial: 
"How [ ... ] do we test our beliefs about reasonS? "58 Heidegger's 
57 Alasdair MacIntyre, "Review of Charles Larmore: The Morals of Modernity and The Romantic 
Legacy" in The Joumal of Philosophy, vol. XCIV, no. 9 (Sep. 1997), p. 489. 
58 Ibid., p. 489. 
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work on the truth of Being, as presented thus far, points to the 
importance of clarity about the form of such a question, 
irrespective of the substantive answers about reasons that one 
reaches. 
Rorty and Lacoue-Labarthe thus misinterpret Heidegger when 
construing 'Being' or Dasein as a metaphysical entity, the 
knowledge of which reveals substantive truths. Two important 
implications follow from this mistake. Firstly, the belief that the 
fundamental ontology of Dasein or his references to Being (or the 
truth of Being) are intended to constitute a set of truths about the 
relationship between the world and our conception of it is a 
misinterpretation of Heidegger. Thus, Rorty is wrong to suggest 
that Heidegger's work contains a pragmatist thrust which seeks to 
ground human understanding in a distinct set of practices which 
found that understanding. Heidegger is not simply seeking to 
ground the cognitive dimension of human understanding in a 
fundamental set of non-cognitive practices in which humans 
participate (e. g. "embodied practical know-hoW"59). 
Heidegger's concerns with the distinctions between cognitive 
and non-cognitive, inner and outer, subject and object are not 
intended to constitute refutations or denials. Rather, he seeks to 
question the primacy of, and thus (more accurately) explore the 
conditions for, the truth of these distinctions. It is not, therefore, 
as Rorty and Lacoue-Labarthe assert, Heidegger's mistake to assert 
that a particular set of truths better 'capture' the reality of human 
being, the world or a metaphysical order or entity governing the 
two. Heidegger's political involvement cannot, therefore, be 
attributed to an unexamined desire for presence; whether of a 
59 Carleton Christensen, "Heidegger's Representationalism", p. 97. 
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theological conception of Being or an ontologised account of 
Dasein. 
Secondly, this misinterpretation masks a particular set of 
claims that Heidegger makes concerning how it is that any claims 
about truth or reality come to have meaning. By overlooking this 
vital aspect of Heidegger's work, Rorty fails to take account of one 
of its implications; that Heidegger's critique is not simply of those 
who would seek to claim a preterhuman objectivity for their 
claims about reality. In fact, Heidegger is as concerned with those 
who assume that it is the language of knowabilitY that is best 
applied to questions of how we come to experience truth. 
Thus, although Rorty is quite right to point out that 
'Heideggerese' is another language game, the assum ption from 
which he makes this claim is precisely what Heidegger questions. 
Asserting the finality of human language and contingent practice in 
questions of truth does not run contrary to anything Heidegger 
claims. Assuming that these grounds of truth are identical to the 
grounds of meaning does. 
That Rorty and Lacoue-Labarthe misinterpret Heidegger's 
conception of Being does not, of course, mean that they are wrong 
about the claim that Heidegger's approach to the thought and 
institutions of modernity might be shown to be erroneous. 
Heidegger, after all, famously found the political self- 
understandings of modernity inferior to Nazism. The question at 
hand is whether this rejection, indexed to Heidegger's perception 
that they are simply products of metaphysical subjectivism or 
"humanism", is based on any distinct argument about politics in 
his thought, or whether it is an arbitrary antipathy which points to 
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a lack in his thought. As Richard Polt puts it "one must ask 
whether Heidegger's hostility to liberalism points to a fatal flaw 
in his thought- or perhaps simply an absence"60. 
In other words, if one accepts, contra the metaphysical reading 
of the ontological difference, that Heidegger's work does not 
relapse into a desire for presence which demands the obliteration 
of modern politics in terms of an illegitimate belief in the 
substantive truths of a Being conceived of as 'real', how does one 
explain Heidegger's rejection of the political constructs of the 
West? If Heidegger's critique of subjectivism is that it lacks 
'transparency' concerning the phenomenological horizons on which 
it must of necessity be based, is there any reason to assume that 
this has ramifications for politics at all? Rorty and Lacoue- 
Labarthe are wrong to attribute Heidegger's suspicion of modernity 
to a straightforward subscription to a particular, speculative 
conception of the reality of human being or the world; it is the 
reason(s) which motivate such conceptions which are Heidegger's 
concern. 
In the light of this, the next step is to determine what it is 
about modernity's conception of reason that Heidegger objects to, 
and to evaluate whether that explains his politics. 
60 Richard Polt. "Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrage zur Philosophie" in Political Theory, 
vol. 25, no. 5 (Oct. 1997), p. 656. 
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Chapter 2: Heidegger's Critique of Modernity 
Introduction 
Recap 
The previous Chapter examined the question of how Heidegger's 
critique of Subjectivism ought to be interpreted. In concluding 
that it is a misinterpretation to see Heidegger as simply seeking to 
adjudicate between various conceptions of how the world or the 
Subject 'really' are, and how the two might be related, I suggested 
that Heidegger's concern with the 'truth' of Being should be read as 
opening the way to an evaluation of what it means to claim that 
one can give reasons about how these things can be known to be 
true. 
Heidegger's answer is not grounded in an attempt to uncover an 
authoritative set of principles, but in the examination of how the 
conception of 'grounds' can come to be meaningful at all. These 
grounds, he asserts, cannot be said to be 'true' in the traditional 
sense. 'Truth' in Being and Time is indexed to Dasein, but better 
understandings of Dasein do not yield a greater amount of truth, as 
opposed to 'untruth', but, in f act, demonstrate the 
equiprimordiality of both concepts in respect to the 
phenomenological concern with meaning. 
In the light of this, I argued that both Rorty's pragmatist 
interpretation of Dasein as the 'right ' understanding of the 
constitution of human be ings, and tho se interpretations which 
assert that any talk of the truth of Being refers to a metaphysical 
conception of truth, miss the full force of the phenomenological 
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approach. To clarify, Heidegger's concern with 'possibility' is not a 
search for how best to represent or understand how the world or 
ourselves actually are, but how the issue of 'best' representation 
can come to be meaningful at all. 
In talking of the relationship between 'possibility' and 
'actuality' (BT., p. 63), Heidegger is specifically questioning those 
who would seek to model 'conditions of possibility' on terms which 
fail to take full account of the formal necessity of Being and time 
in questions of meaning. Heidegger's critique of subjectivism is 
not simply that it mis-identifies these conditions of possibility, 
but that, in failing to identify the phenomenological horizon with 
temporality, it misunderstands the character of its own inquiry. 
Further, this misconception, in failing to bring to the fore what is 
formally necessary (the temporality of Dasein, the question of the 
meaning of Being), leads to a mis-identification of what exactly is 
involved in talking of 'conditions of possibility'. The errors of 
metaphysics and subjectivity are thus not directly linked to their 
truth claims, but are a product of their self -understanding of those 
truth claims. 
Thus, although Rorty is right to assert that Heidegger believes 
the metaphysical answers one finds in the philosophical tradition 
are wrongly modelled on those used in understanding the 'objective' 
world, he does not identify precisely why Heidegger thinks this is a 
mistake. The problem with the subjectivist and metaphysical 
tradition, for Heidegger, is not simply that those in it have 
overlooked certain entities or concepts in framing the conditions 
of possibility governing actuality, but that the phenomenon 
overlooked- most pertinently the historicity of Dasein- 
75 
qualitatively changes what one takes to be a condition of 
possibility. 
It is the second moment in this criticism that is crucial in 
understanding Heidegger's point here. For Heidegger it is not 
whether one is a metaphysician, subjectivist, humanist, or a 
Rortian social practice pragmatist, that is directly of greatest 
importance. Rather, it is the view (hidden or otherwise) that these 
positions have of the 'conditions of possibility', and the nature of 
their constitution, which is crucial. 
The problem Heidegger diagnoses with the philosophical 
tradition is that it has sought to understand Being in ways which 
privilege a notion of 'self-evidence' that has been dogmatically 
derived from the terms of presence. Thus, it has been assumed 
that the standards relating to the 'conditions of possibility' will be 
those of objective certitude, a tacit and continuing reliance upon 
the separations between Being and the experience of Being 
embodied within subjectivist epistemology. 
As was argued in the previous Chapter, Heidegger characterises 
the philosophical tradition as having been in error about the 
(phenomenological) foundations upon which it is necessarily built. 
The desire to think Being objectively has led to a privileging of a 
reality considered "deeper"' than that of its appearance. 
Heidegger's argument is not simply that such "depth" cannot be 
conceived of on metaphysical or subjectivist schemes, but that 
conceiving of the conditions of possibility thus is both dogmatic 
and untenable in the light of hermeneutic phenomenology. 
I BT, p. 193. 
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One implication of the assumption that the 'conditions of 
possibility' underlying the experience of Being are either beyond 
this world, or prior to it, is, Heidegger believes, a drive in thinking 
about these conditions to aim at the explicit naming, knowledge, or 
discovery of principles which order Being. This is the emphasis on 
"Being-certain" (BT, p. 46) which was discussed in my previous 
Chapter. 
Insofar as Heidegger can possibly be described as having 
principles underlying his discussions of Dasein, they rest in the 
emphasis on the temporality of concern, and the need to understand 
that 'transparency' is to be understood in the light of the type of 
inquiry which he is conducting. The aim in thinking about how 
things come to show up as they do is thus not to come to 'know' a 
set of principles by which things come to have meaning, but to 
become clear about what is involved formally, which for Heidegger 
entails historically, in such an inquiry. For Heidegger, this extends 
beyond a need to ground one's notion of truth in purely human 
practices and involves raising the question of what is entailed by 
the notion of an understanding of the grounds of truth in the first 
place. Thus, for Rorty to seek to ground his conception of truth in 
the claim of the contingency of meaning in relation to human social 
practices simply repeats the error made within the metaphysical 
tradition: that the perception of meaning in the world entails 
certain principles governing that appearance, and that knowledge 
of these principles is to be understood in terms, at least borrowed, 
from epistemology. 
Heidegger's philosophical critique of subjectivity is thus based 
on a set of alternative philosophical premises, which is perhaps 
better termed an ethos rather than a position. In questioning the 
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tenability of a philosophical position which reflects upon Being in 
terms of a fundamental separation between subject and object, or 
the paradigm of consciousness, Heidegger focuses on the need to 
understand the meaning of phenomena in terms of temporality. 
Heideggerian suspicion, and hermeneutic phenomenology, are thus 
philosophical claims which assert that the meaning of Being cannot 
be exhaustively understood in terms of the conception of 
explicitness that one finds within the tradition. Further, as was 
argued in the previous Chapter, Heidegger's own emphases are 
intended, right from the beginning of his career, to call the form of 
the epistemological project into question; not just its execution. 
I argued at the end of the last Chapter that in the light of this it 
was a premature interpretation of Heidegger to suggest that either 
the "hermeneutics of everydayness" or the "hermeneutics of 
suspicion"- the mechanisms by which Heidegger presents his own 
position- are ways of grounding or privileging a new set of truth 
claims. In seeking to resituate the account of truth within the 
context of his phenomenological concern with meaning, Heidegger 
aims at different goals, not just better execution. Therefore, 
those who understand the ontological difference as intrinsically 
metaphysical, in the sense of laying claim to deeper or ahistorical 
truths, are wrong. 
Just as Heidegger's hermeneutics of everydayness cannot be 
reduced to a pragmatist commitment, so his hermeneutics of 
suspicion cannot be seen as a straightforward rejection of the 
history of philosophy- it is, rather, a reinterpretation of its 
meaning. That Rorty, Lacoue-Labarthe, and those who conceive of 
the ontological difference in metaphysical terms misinterpret 
Heidegger does not, however, imply that they are necessarily wrong 
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about Heidegger's rejection of the thought and institutions of what 
he deems 'modernity'. 
This Chapter, therefore, seeks to provide an exposition and 
analysis of the critique of modernity in Heidegger's thought. 
Focusing on Heidegger's analyses of humanism and technology, the 
aim is to seek to understand how his critique of modernity is 
linked to what appears, prima facie, to be his purely philosophical 
critique of subjectivity. 
To this end, the following Chapter is divided into four sections. 
The first section examines Heidegger's description of modernity 
and analyses his treatment of the themes he identifies as central. 
The following section looks at the reception of those themes 
amongst recent commentators on Heidegger, particularly Stephen K. 
White. My third section, in the light of the previous two, assesses 
the extent to which Heidegger's critique of modernity is based on 
what I have earlier called Heideggerian suspicion, rightly 
understood. This builds on my discussion of Heidegger's thoughts 
on subjectivity discussed in the previous Chapter. Having argued 
that the hermeneutics of suspicion does not constitute a separable 
dynamic, and that Heidegger's concern with meaning thus embodies 
distinct philosophical claims missed by Rortian-style pragmatist 
reductions of Heidegger, I am concerned with how Heidegger's 
'suspicion' of modernity ought to be understood in relation to his 
hermeneutical suspicion. Once I establish the relationship between 
Heidegger's critique of philosophical objectivism and his related 
critique of instrumental reason in my fourth, concluding section, 
the way is clear for the following Chapter to examine and evaluate 
the social and political implications that can be drawn from his 
analyses. 
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Section 1) Heidegger's Conception of Modernity 
1.1 Describing Modernity 
The consideration of modernity as an explicit issue is most 
prevalent in Heidegger's middle and late writings, most notably in 
the 1946 Letter on Humanism, the 1954 Question Concerning 
Technology and, in the 1960s, with the publication of the Nietzsche 
lectures. The themes through which Heidegger approaches 
modernity are, however, largely prefigured within Being and Time 
and the Beitrige zur Philosophie. It is, then, especially hard to pin 
down a definite and decisive conception of modernity, an already 
deeply contested term, in Heidegger's work. Therefore, the best 
way to proceed is an identification of the main themes which 
persist when Heidegger considers modernity. 
Talk of modernity is, as David Kolb2 has observed, marked by 
two meanings. Firstly, it refers to a period that is 'now'; the 
contemporary time. Secondly, it e mbodies the belief, and 
Heidegger is clearly no exception, that that period which we call 
modernity is distinguishable from those times which have preceded 
it in more than simply c hronological terms. Thus, in understanding 
Heidegger's description and critique of modernity, one needs to 
examine the themes he takes, and the ways in which he 
differentiates them from what has gone before. 
2 David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and After, pp. 1-2. 
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1.2 Heidegger's Analysis of Modernity: Themes 
Throughout his career, Heidegger has one overriding concern: the 
field within which the meaning of Being comes to be understood. 
Although there is movement in the way Heidegger terms this- the 
ecstatic temporality of Dasein, the sendings of Being, or, 
ultimately, das Ereignis- there are good reasons, as seen 
previously, to understand this concern as continuous. In 
understanding modernity (as with anything else), therefore, 
Heidegger's primary objective is a consideration of the ways in 
which Being comes to show itself. Thus, Michael Zimmerman has 
identified Heidegger's concern with modernity as a concern with 
"the contemporary mode of understanding or disclosing thingS"3; as 
long as one bears in mind that 'things' should not be understood as 
'objective things', but Being, this is the peg on which the rest 
hangs. 
Given this architectonic structure, it is not the foci of 
Heidegger's attacks that mark his critique of modernity out. 
Heidegger's treatment of industrialisation and machine technology, 
natural science, and the advent of mass culture are, as manv 
thinkers have pointed oUt4, far from original. What is original in 
Heidegger's analyses is what he takes to underpin these phenomena, 
and his reasons for treating them as ills; as Gail Soffer puts it- 
"What is peculiar to Heidegger... is his diagnosis of the cause of 
modernity's ills... the humanism of the Western philosophical 
3 Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. xiii. Italics in original. 
4 See David Kolb's The Critique of Pure Modernity, Michael E. Zimmerman's Heidegger's Confrontation 
with Modernity, Gail Soffer "Heidegger, humanism, and the destruction of history" amongst sundry 
others for a working out of this point. Fritz Stern's The Politics of Cultural Despair. - A Study in the 
Rise of Germanic Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), whilst not specifically 
considering Heidegger, provides an excellent overview of the roots of the Germanic tradition upon which 
Heidegger draws. 
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tradition"5. Thus, in understanding why it is that Heidegger feels 
the Rhine has been besmirched by hydroelectric power plants, or 
describes the understanding of natural resources as "standing- 
reserve" as a "threat"6, it is to the account of humanism that one 
must turn. 
In the Letter on HumaniSM 7, Heidegger defines humanism as the 
"concern that man become free for his humanity and find his worth 
in it. "8 Identifying this with the Roman Republic's appropriation of 
the Greek conception of man in the conception of homo humanus, 
Heidegger portrays all the historical occurrences of humanism as 
essentially concerned with the attempt to 'educate' ourselves 
about the nature of our humanity. Heidegger argues, however, that 
in all cases "the humanitas of homo, humanus is determined with 
regard to an already established interpretation of nature, history, 
world, and the ground of the world, that is, of beings as a whole"9. 
The roots of Heidegger's attitude towards modernity can thus be 
traced back to Being and Time, where Heidegger contrasts the 
modern understanding of the truth of Being with the pre-Platonic 
"Greek conception of truth"10. As in Being and Time, where he 
asserts that the modern conception of Being is determined by "the 
subject, the soul, the consciousness, the spirit, the person" (BT, 
p. 72), Heidegger names "man", as understood in humanism, as the 
key concept. For Heidegger, humanism, since its Roman beginnings, 
has been metaphysical. The aim of defining the "essence of man" 
against a backdrop of reified interpretations of nature, history, 
5 Gail Soffer "Heidegger, humanism, and the destruction of history", p. 547. 
6 Heidegger (tr. D. Krell), "The Question Concerning Technology" in Basic Writings 2nd ed. (London: 
Routledge, 1994), p 323,333. 
7 In Basic Writings, as above. 
8 Ibid., p. 225. 
9 Ibid., p. 225. 
10 Being and Time, p. 57. See also p. 63. 
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world or ground means that humanism retains the metaphysical 
assumption of a divide between subject and object. However 
expressed, this division ensures that humanism "presupposes an 
interpretation of beings without asking about the truth of Being"". 
To its very core, then, modernity is seen by Heidegger as lacking 
transparency about the form of its own inquiry into Being. It is 
important to note at this point that Heidegger sees "humanism" as 
more than just a philosophical tradition pursued at certain times 
within certain societies. Rather, for Heidegger "humanism" is both 
definitive of particular historical periods, and, at the same time, 
these periods are essentially to be understood in 
philosophical/metaphysical terms. Heidegger thus equates the 
understanding of the history of modernity with the understanding 
of metaphysics, and grounds both in the question of the meaning of 
Being. 
Heidegger's critique of modernity is thus premised on his 
assumption that the full range of the phenomena of modernity is 
best analysed in relation to the metaphysical understanding of man. 
The metaphysical assumption that man stands apart from 
experience is, for Heidegger, the essence of modernity. Hence, in 
the Nietzsche lectures we find the claim that: 
[t]hat period we call modern... is defined by the fact that man becomes the center and 
measure of all beings. Man is the subjectum, that which lies at the bottom of all 
things, that is, in modern terms, at the bottom of all objectification and 
representation 12 
II Letter on Humanism, p. 225-6. 
12 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche (Pfullingen, 1961) Vol. 2, as cited in Habermas's Philosophical Discourse 
of Modernity, p. 133. 
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As was seen in the previous Chapter, and restated above, in 
Being and Time Heidegger cites the "subject, the soul, the 
consciousness, the spirit, the person" as at the heart of the 
problems of the philosophical tradition. By the time Heidegger 
comes to consider modernity in its own right in the Letter and 
beyond, however, he has focused on the modern conception of the 
self as responsible for the problems he attributes to this period. 
In understanding modernity, therefore, the problem is not that of 
the subject-object divide, but the conception of man as ground 
upon which such a division is built. As Kolb puts it, when 
Heidegger considers modernity, the "self is not just one pole of the 
subject-object relation; it is the foundation of that relation"13. 
The previous Chapter argued that it was not the subject-object 
divide, but the assumptions on which it is based that Heidegger 
objects to in Being and Time. Having explored the hermeneutical, 
and largely philosophical, implications of these assumptions in 
that book, Heidegger's turn to the 'essence of man', or the 'self' of 
humanism, carries the critique of subjectivism into realms more 
commonly considered sociological, cultural, or political. The next 
two steps to be taken are: firstly, to establish how Heidegger 
considers the 'self' to be constituted, especially in relation to the 
philosophical subject which was his previous concern, and 
secondly, to trace how persuasive Heidegger's arguments are that 
it is in the light of such an understanding that the analysis of 
modernity ought to be conducted. 
1.3 Modernity and Humanism 
If the problem with metaphysical subjectivism is that it 
obscures the full nature of one's inquiry into Being, the problem 
13 Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 138. 
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Heidegger perceives with the centrality of the self in modernity is 
that it both embodies and obscures the implications of this 
'forgetting of Being. Heidegger does not suggest that the former, 
metaphysical subjectivism, causes the latter, but that by 
conflating the history of 'modernity' with the history of 
metaphysics the two are taken as indicative of the same error. 
In the Letter on Humanism Heidegger distinguishes between the 
philosophical subject, with which Being and Time is largely 
concerned, and the 'self' thought of as the "essence of man" in 
humanist times. The latter is essentially summed up, for 
Heidegger, in the picture of man as "animal rationale"14, which he 
sees as the underlying understanding of man's existence in 
modernity. 
In taking "man", rather than the 'subject' modelled on his earlier 
reading of the Cartesian ego15, as the central concept of 
modernity, Heidegger moves the focus from the defensibility of a 
philosophical account, to the reasons and grounds for that account. 
Thus, in the later work, Heidegger develops the question, raised in 
the conclusion of the previous Chapter, of how one can evaluate 
modernity. In Heidegger's view, the distinctive and essential 
feature of modernity, encapsulated in the consideration of 
experience as the experience of an animal rationale, is the 
conception of, to borrow Habermas's phrase, "subject-centered 
reason"16 as ground. It was seen in the previous Chapter that this 
is philosophically suspect for Heidegger; reason can no more be 
grounded in the subject than it can in the Platonic Forms, the 
transcendental Ego, or God. 
14 Letter on Humanism, p. 226. 
15 Bearing in mind that this reading is disputed by (amongst others) Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 141, as discussed in the previous Chapter. 
16 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 133. 
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For Heidegger, "reasons" must essentially be understood apart 
from any notion of grounds thus understood. There is no privileged 
position from which man can survey and order experience in a 
definitive form. In his account of modernity Heidegger adumbrates 
the ways in which this error resonates across the political, social 
and cultural dimensions of our time; viz through the predominance 
of the conditions which lead to subjectivism being seen as the 
final and definitive understanding of Being, and how one might 
start to come to an understanding of how this happens. 
The account of the 'grounds' of reason in modernity is developed 
in The Question Conceming Technology. Since Heidegger has 
already argued that the assumptions upon which philosophical 
subjectivism is based must transcend its own self -understanding, 
Heidegger's next move is to give an account of how that self- 
understanding might itself be understood more transparently. 
1.4 Modernity and Technology 
Heidegger declares at the beginning of The Question Concerning 
Technology that "the essence of technology is by no means anything 
technological" 17. Heidegger's aim in considering technology is not 
to show how the 'grounds of reason' of modernity have become 
perverted in the concepts and institutions of modern industry and 
machine technology, but to illustrate in more detail how these 
grounds and reasons come to be manifest. 
Technology is thus understood by Heidegger as the phenomenon 
which finds its philosophical expression in the modern treatment 
17 Basic Writings, p. 311. 
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of the fourfold conception of causality: causa materialis, causa 
formalis, causa finalis, and causa efficiens. In modernity, 
Heidegger finds that all four causes have been taken to find their 
fulfilment in the final category. It is the placing of the "essence 
of man", as understood in humanism, as the guarantor of this move 
that Heidegger takes as the clue to his development of his account 
of technology. 
Heidegger illustrates his point with a consideration of the way 
in which a silver chalice might be understood as coming into 
existence. He argues that the modern way of explaining how such a 
being is "brought-forth" subsumes the first three 'causes'- the type 
of material, the shape it takes, and the purpose for which it is 
created- into the fourth. This fourth cause, the causa efficiens, 
which is taken to indicate where final "responsibility" 18 for the 
bringing-forth of the being, is located within a subject whose will 
it is to fashion it. 
At this point, Heidegger makes the (for him) typical move of 
analysing "technology" etymologically. As it often does, this 
means that Heidegger believes that "technology" ought to be 
understood and contrasted with the Greek conception of the term 
-"Technikon"- as "that which belongs to techne"19. On Heidegger's 
account, the Greeks saw each of the four types of causes as "co- 
responsible"20 for the manifestation of a being, and the whole lot 
are to be understood in terms of the ways that all beings pass 
"beyond the nonpresent and go[... ] forward into presencing... [a]s 
p oieSiS "21. The craftsman is thus just one part22 of the bringing- 
18 Ibid., p. 316. 19 Ibid., p. 318. 
20 Ibid., p. 315. 
21 Ibid., p. 317. 
22 For a development of this thought compare Heidegger's conception of the "fourfold" 
Jdas Gevierd in 
"The Thing" in Poetry, Language, Thought (tr. Hofstadter) (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). 
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forth of the chalice; a facilitator at most in the revealing of the 
chalice. Thus, Heidegger argues, in the pre-Socratic Greek context, 
techne was understood as an aspect of aletheiac revealing: it did 
not "at all lie in the making and manipulating, nor in the using of 
means, but rather in the revealing"23. 
By contrast the modern conception of technology, and the way in 
which beings are assumed to be brought-forth, is associated with 
the will and reasons of a subject, rather than the occasion of a 
coming into presence of a being, an event in which the craftsman is 
merely one aspect of Being. 
In both cases, when Heidegger talks of technology he points out 
that it is, 
[... ] therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to 
this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. 
It is the realm of revealing, i. e., of truth. 24 
Equally, the modern account of how things come into presence is 
an account of revealing; "modern technology... too is a revealing"25. 
Heidegger's account of the nature of this revealing is both familiar 
and unspectacular in itself: the objectification of Nature, the rise 
of industrial technique and rationalization, the bringing of all 
aspects of existence (particularly the work of art) under scientific 
laws. In terms of the human understanding of the situation, this 
culminates in the understandings of nature, artefacts and, 
ultimately, man himself26 as "standing-reserve"27. On Heidegger's 
23 Letter on Humanism., p. 319. 
24 Ibid., p. 318. 
25 Ibid., p. 320. 
26 1 keep Heidegger's own masculine fonn here. 
27 Letter on Humanism, p. 322. 
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account, this understanding means even those objects not 
immediately being dealt with are brought under the sphere of 
influence of human will and purpose: thus, as in Heidegger's famous 
example, the Rhine (and all rivers) become "water-power 
supplier[s]"28, or potential water-power suppliers. From this 
perspective, beings are brought-forth as means to subjective ends. 
Heidegger gives as examples of the way things are revealed under 
these conditions as "[u]nlocking, transforming, storing, 
distributing, and switching"29. 
It is the next step in Heidegger's argument which is crucial. 
Heidegger considers the question: "Who accomplishes the 
challenging setting-upon through which what we call the actual is 
revealed as a standing-reserve? "30. In Heidegger's view the 
'obvious' answer will not do; it is not 'man' or 'human beings' that 
are responsible for such ordering. Taking as evidence the way in 
which human beings effortlessly fit into this order, themselves a 
resource within the productionist process, Heidegger states that 
"[m]odern technology, as a revealing that orders, is thus no mere 
human doing"31. 
Heidegger is clear; placing "man" as the entity responsible for 
the instrumental ordering of entities associated with the 
institutions and conceptions of modernity is an error. Instead it is 
in the Greek conception of technology, and ultimately in their 
conception of the truth of Being understood in terms of aletheia, 
that a more appropriate understanding is expressed- one which 
understands that human beings are themselves gathered under the 
ordering of technology. In Heidegger's view the Greeks were right 
28 Ibid., p. 321. 
29 Ibid., p. 322. 
30 Ibid., p. 323. 
31 Ibid., p. 324. 
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to look beyond any self-contained and definitive conception of man 
in order to understand how things come to be present. 
Returning to his interpretation of the Greek conception of human 
existence, as simply one- albeit distinctive- entity amongst 
others, Heidegger asserts that 'Mankind' itself is an entity which is 
revealed; it is neither the source nor event of unconcealment 
itself. Rather, for Heidegger, this event must be understood as 
prior to the emergence of 'Man', however understood. The 
instrumentalist way in which Man and entities appear in modernity 
is thus attributed to a particular epoch in the way Being reveals 
itself. Modernity, for Heidegger, is marked by beings being 
revealed in relation to their use as indexed to a subjectivist 
understanding of human being; it is this nexus of beings and 
meanings which Heidegger terms das Gestell. The Gestell is the 
frame within which all questions of the truth of Being in modernity 
are situated. 
1.5 Heidegger's Description of Modernity: Analysis and Summary 
For Heidegger, then, modernity is marked by two distinctive 
features. Firstly, it is characterised by a placing of human being, 
in terms of the subjective certainty associated with 'self- 
consciousness', which finds its first clear expression with 
Descartes, at the centre of all things. To this first diagnosis, of 
subjectivist humanism, Heidegger adds his second- the primacy of 
instrumental ordering of both man and objects; the Gestell. 
There is, however, a clear tension between Heidegger's two 
emphases. Humanism takes human understanding and experience as 
the starting point, and measure, for all inquiry. Heidegger, 
90 
however, clearly suggests that the centrality of man, as the 
provider of order, has been surpassed in a modernity characterised 
by the technological Gestell. The preliminary task, therefore, is to 
understand how the two, humanism and technology, fit into the 
description of modernity in Heidegger's account. 
Kolb, who reads 'technology' as 'universal imposition', considers 
two possible responses; that "universal imposition was underneath 
subjectivity all along", or that "the modern age comes in two 
stages, the first characterized by the domination of subjectivity 
and the second by universal imposition"32. It is important to 
realise why the two themes are taken to be problematic; it is 
widely assumed that in talking of the technological ordering of the 
Gestell, Heidegger initiates a new phase within his thought, in 
which the 'sendings of Being' negate entirely any concern with 
human being at all. Thus in the Letter on Humanism, Wan's' 
centrality is the dominant concern, but by the time of the Question 
Concerning Technology this is so "decisively in subservience to... 
the challenging-forth of enframing" that the Gestell, "[a]s a 
destining [ ... ] banishes man"33. 
Habermas, who perceives and 
vehemently opposes this movement in Heidegger's thought, 
characterises the situation thus- 
[t]hat dimension of unconcealment prior to propositional truth passes over from the 
conscientious project of the individual concerned about his existence to an anonymous 
dispensation of Being that demands subjection. 34 
Habermas's point is that, in passing from a concern with the 
individual person to a conception of Being which supersedes any 
32 Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 146. 
33 Question Concerning Technology, p. 332. 
34 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 155. 
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notion of human control or responsibility, Heidegger treats Being 
as an entity conceived of on ontotheological terms. If this is right 
then Heidegger is indeed in trouble: since a conception of Being in 
these terms would be as indefensible as the pretensions to 
objectivist completeness of the humanism that precedes it. 
Habermas's criticisms take two paths here. Firstly, there is the 
concern, discussed in the previous Chapter, that Heidegger's work 
arbitrarily claims privileged (literally superhuman) access to the 
ontological state of affairs as they really are. A second, but 
related point, is that within such a schema- which lacks any 
conception of human beings as responsible for their own actions- 
there are no checks on this ontologizing of the idiosyncratic. 
Applying Habermas's view to the Gestell, the point is that to talk 
of modernity in terms of the destining of Being entails a bypassing 
of the standards of empirical testability for any claims one makes. 
Equally, however, something like an account of the Gestell is 
needed for Heidegger's account to retain both its continuity and 
originality. Heidegger's account of both subjectivism and 
humanism is distinctive precisely because it seeks to delineate the 
horizons within which such positions arise. Thus, Heidegger's 
account of Being cannot be couched in theological, social or 
psychological terms; Heidegger's treatment must go beyond the 
metaphysical anthropologism which he criticises. 
The accounts of humanism and technology are neither opposed 
accounts of one particular period, nor stages in which the former 
leads to the latter. Rather, both are complementary parts of a 
criticisms of any attempt to find the position from which one can 
establish the definitive conditions for understanding Being- a 
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project marked by the metaphysical desire for certainty which 
Heidegger's philosophical project declares itself against. 
In fact, the confusion only arises if one conflates humanism 
with subjectivity. Heidegger does not, contrary to Habermas's 
suggestion in the above quote, move from treating the individual as 
the ground of propositional truth to a similar position in respect of 
Being, technological or otherwise. Heidegger is not asserting that 
the problem with humanism is that it deals with human being at 
all, or that the Gestell shows how futile and wrong such a belief is. 
Equally, in his account of the Gestell, Heidegger's claim that the 
instrumental ordering 'banishes man' does not entail that there is 
no legitimate room to talk of human being. Heidegger's point is 
that neither humanism nor technology can define the ways in which 
Being must always be understood, but both risk being understood 
thus. 
If Heidegger neither starts enmeshed within the philosophy of 
the Subject, nor moves to escape through a recourse to the 
implausible objectivity of a mystico-theological Being, then 
'humanism' and 'technology' are not contradictory accounts of the 
'real world'. Rather, Heidegger's point is that they are in fact 
remarkably similar aspects of an underlying metaphysical 
subjectivism which defines modernity. For Heidegger, the proper 
understanding of this subjectivism will not seek to reassert the 
primacy of traditional human agency, nor seek an immediate 
encounter with Being; it will instead seek a "free relationship" 
which "opens our human existence to the essence of technology"35. 
35 Question Concerning Technology, p. 311. 
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The following section is concerned with how one Heidegger's 
account of modernity ought to be interpreted in two respects. 
Firstly, if it is a critique, how ought that critique to be 
understood? Addressing this first issue raises the second- is 
Habermas right in his presumption that Heidegger has nothing 
constructive to say about human agency or action? 
1.6 Heidegger and Modernity: Critique, Human Agency and 
Metaphysics 
Over the course of his career, Heidegger's attitude towards 
modernity and its products is either ambivalent or deliberately 
ambiguous; depending on how far one imputes personal opportunism 
to Heidegger's reconsideration of his support for Hitler. For 
whatever reason, the question of what, if anything, one ought to do 
about the forgetting of the question of Being in the contemporary 
age remains a live one throughout Heidegger's corpus. One finds the 
claim that the modern understanding of science needs to be brought 
under the control of a spiritualised Volk36 in order that Germany 
may survive the collapse of the "moribund pseudocivilization"37 
that is the West. Simultaneously, Heidegger is clear, however, that 
this very will to 'master' modern technology by bringing it under 
the control and will of human beings, or any fraction of them, is 
itself indicative of the forgetting of the age38. 
Prima facie, Heidegger is not clear about how, if at all, his 
accounts of humanism and das Gestell should be taken. His 
36 Heidegger, "The Self-Assertion of the German University", in R. Wolin (ed. ) The Heidegger 
Controversy, esp. pp 32-3,36-7. 
37 Ibid., p. 38. 
38 See (amongst other works) " 'Only a God Can Save Us': Der Spiegel's Interview with Martin 
Heidegger" in R. Wolin (ed. ), The Heidegger Controversy, "The Question Concerning Technology", and "Gelassenheit" [releasement] in Martin Heidegger (tr. J. Anderson and H. Freud) Discourse on Thinking 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1966). 
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answers of the 'Political TeXtS'39 of the early 1930s- a subjugation 
to the will of the FOhrer- failed to deliver the hoped for revolution 
in thinking, and following this there is a clear move from a search 
for an active 'solution' to a more passive consideration as to 
whether there really is a 'problem'. In his 1959 work Gelassenheit, 
Heidegger considers how to respond to a situation in which the 
defining relationship is that of "man as ego to the thing as 
objeCt"40; his answer is that the "historical character"41 of that 
relationship must be kept in view. 
Throughout his work, there are clear indications that keeping 
the 'historical character' of subjectivity in focus does not 
necessarily entail a rejection of that relationship, nor the products 
of an era defined by it. As Heidegger makes clear from Being and 
Time to the 1969 Zur Sache des Denkens (published in English as On 
Time and Being42), and especially in the Letter on Humanism, the 
critique of the subject is a critique of subjectivist metaphysics. 
The problem is not the existence of the subject, but that it and its 
products have become 'the only game in town, and that this 
monopoly is necessarily based on false promises of a future 
complete and correct representation of how things really are 
which, Heidegger argues, can never be kept. It is not subjectivity 
but subjectivism that is rejected by Heidegger. 
Heidegger's aim in presenting his thoughts on humanism, 
technology and subjectivism is not to move beyond them in a way 
which leaves them behind as redundant errors, but to situate them 
in a history of Being informed by an understanding of the 
39 The name given within The Heidegger Controversy to the collection of Heideggeespolitical speeches 
and pamphlets issued whilst rector at Freiburg. 
40 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 79. 
41 Ibid., p. 78. 
42 Heidegger (tr. Stambaugh), On Time and Being (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). 
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phenomenological horizon within which such practices and entities 
make sense. This is a recurring characteristic of Heidegger's work; 
often seemingly pejorative terms such as the 'fallenness' of 
Dasein, the 'average' understandings of the One [das Man], the flight 
of the gods, the withdrawal of Being, and the 'threat' posed by 
technological enframing are utilised without the imperatives to 
act differently that one might expect. This is, of course, less 
surprising when one takes into account Heidegger's assertion that 
actions which aim at mastering or controlling these situations are 
marked by the will to mastery that they might be expected to 
counter. 
On Habermas's view, the inability to offer any plan of action is a 
necessary consequence of Heidegger's distinction between the 
ontological (defined by the 'Being-question') and the ontical 
(everything else including, most importantly, the will of the 
subject). Placing truth as a function of Being means that Habermas 
sees no way for Heidegger to take the concerns of what he deems 
the ontical dimension seriously; they will always be important 
only as pointers to a Being defined in such a way as to make self- 
referential critique impossible. 
Luc Ferry and Alain RenaUt43 have similarly identified 
Heidegger's ambivalence about modernity as embodying an inherent 
tension between criticism and phenomenology. Insofar as 
Heidegger wishes to criticize the forgetting of Being he associates 
with modernity and technology, Ferry and Renaut argue that 
Heidegger needs a conception of value which draws upon the 
voluntarist subjectivity he identifies with modernity. In common 
with Habermas, therefore, they conclude that Heidegger's critique 
43 Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut (tr. F. Philip), Heidegger and Modernity (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1990). 
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of modernity can only be made by drawing upon the voluntarist 
assumptions whose limitations he is diagnosing. 
For Ferry, Renaut, Habermas and many of those (looked at in the 
last Chapter) who perceive an ongoing metaphysical subjectivism 
in Heidegger's work, Heidegger's greatest error is to wish to 
combine a criticism of modernity with a phenomenological concern 
with Being that denies the possibility of such a criticism. Thus, as 
was seen above, Habermas believes that Heidegger is left with a 
philosophy of the subject that robs him of the possibility of 
critical reflection. 
These criticisms are based on three assumptions, each of which 
is questionable. Firstly, they assume that 'Being' in Heidegger's 
work takes the place of the subject as the measure of objective 
truth. Secondly, they assert that Heidegger equates any conception 
of human being and action with a commitment to subjectivist 
metaphysics. The third claim, which conjoins the other two, is 
that Heidegger's rejection of modernity follows from his other two 
beliefs; viz that modernity's thinking of Being, by starting from a 
conception of man as subject, cannot help but end up with a 
subjectivist metaphysics which wrongly accounts for the history 
of Being. 
Heidegger's work, however, is far from straightforward on any 
of these points. The need to understand Being in hermeneutic 
terms, and thus in terms distinct from subjectivist/objectivist 
epistemology has already been discussed. A simple assertion that 
Heidegger is seeking objective knowledge of Being as an entity 
overlooks Heidegger's specifically hermeneutical concerns. 
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The second claim, that Heidegger equates all instances of human 
action with the move towards the totalising conception of Being he 
associates with subjectivist metaphysics, is a strong one. The 
decisive move Heidegger makes in this respect is his placing of 
twill' at the centre of modernity. In his treatment of modernity, 
technology and humanism, Heidegger takes the notion of will as 
definitive, not just of certain human practices, but of all ways of 
approaching Being post-Descartes. Indeed, since Being was first 
understood by the Greeks in terms of substantia, Heidegger finds 
there has been a move which necessarily culminates with the 
Nietzschean notion of the will to power. With the will to power, 
however, it is will alone that determines the truth of Being; 
without grounds in a subject or object, will becomes the "will to 
Will"44. 'Will' is not here related to the wishes or desires of human 
beings; 
[r]ather, it indicates the very reverse, that man first of all comes to know himself as 
a willing subject in an essential sense on the basis of a still unelucidated experience of 
beings as such in the sense of a willing that has yet to be thought. 45 
The will to will is, for Heidegger, nothing other than the 
inevitable move towards a totalized metaphysics within which 
human beings have no free relationship to Being. Thus, familiarly: 
The basic form of appearance in which the will to will arranges and calculates itself in 
the unhistorical element of the world of completed metaphysics can stringently be 
called "technology". 46 
44 Martin Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics" in R. Wolin (ed. ), The Heidegger Controversy, p. 74. 
45 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche VoL2 cited by David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 142. 
46 Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics" in The Heidegger Controversy, p. 74. 
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Gail Soffer47 in "Heidegger, Humanism, and the Destruction of 
History", has traced the implications of Heidegger's treatment of 
post-Socratic 'modernity' as a unified body of thought and 
practice- 'humanism' as Heidegger terms it. For either of these 
two terms to have the meanings they do, Soffer argues, Heidegger 
must be operating them with a double determination- "(1) as a set 
of familiar historical phenomena (for example, the Renaissance 
revival of the classical heritage) and (2) as the underlying 
philosophical essence of these phenomena. "48 
I am not concerned here with the main thrust of the argument 
that Soffer goes on to develop, as to whether the rejection of 
orthodox historical inquiry means Heidegger's hermeneutics can 
have no practical implication. Her other thesis, however, is 
important in the present context; Heidegger's explicit move away 
from previous conceptions of 'objective' historical inquiry mean 
that he does load all the responsibility for his characterisation of 
modernity onto his own claim to have determined the 'essence' of 
that era through the hermeneutic phenomenological method. It is 
clear that Heidegger does indeed characterise human concerns in 
modernity as defined by a conception of will which ultimately is 
itself grounded in an understanding of das Gestell as 'completed 
metaphysics'. Soffer is right that this does indeed boil down to a 
rejection of "orthodox historical inquiry" in favour of what she 
deems "a reductive philosophical essentialiSM"49. 
It is, however, to what might be involved in such reductive 
philosophical essentialism that I want to turn. This is raised in an 
examination of the third assumption made by Heidegger's critics- 
47 Gail Soffer, "Heidegger, Humanism, and the Destruction of History". 
48 Ibid., p. 549-550. 
49 Ibid., p. 576. 
99 
the claim (which subsumes the first two assumptions) that 
Heidegger's antipathy towards modernity is based on a suspicion of 
all human action, itself premised on a rejection of all metaphysics 
as failing to provide an immediate confrontation with Being. 
Stephen K. White, in his book Political Theory and 
PostmodeMiSM50, has, from a Habermasian perspective, both made 
such an assumption and traced the implications he believes it has 
for political theory. Analyzing that text in the light of the 
questionability of its assumptions is revealing. 
Section 2) Heidegger, Instrumental Reason and 
Modernity 
2.1 Stephen K. White's Critique of Heidegger 
Following Habermas, Stephen K. White seeks to explicate 
Heidegger's stance towards modernity in terms of his perceived 
rejection of all instrumental human reason, premised on an 
identification of all products of human will as metaphysical and 
therefore to be rejected. 
For White, Heidegger's work can be analysed in terms of two 
senses of responsibility; the "responsibility to otherness" and the 
"responsibility to act"51. These two perspectives are "intimately 
related to how one thinks about language"52 and correspond to 
language used in its "world-disclosing" and "coordinat[ing] action- 
in-the-world"53 roles respectively. 
50 Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism 
51 Ibid., p. 20. 
52 Ibid., p. 22. 
53 Ibid., p. 25. 
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White interprets Heidegger's concern with Being as reflecting 
the responsibility to otherness; a concern with the possibilities of 
disclosure. In common with Habermas, White finds that this 
concern is an exclusive one; Heideggerian ontology is obsessed 
with possibility to the extent that actual states of affairs are 
ignored except insofar as they act as a clue to Being. Heidegger's 
work is so tied up in the event of disclosure (Ereignis) that he is 
completely unable to respond to the responsibility to act. 
This results, White claims, in an "antipathy towards 
everydayness", a denigration of the ontic, which "condemns 
Heidegger to a lifelong misunderstanding of action"54. Heidegger, 
White argues, cannot fail to find modernity problematic because he 
analyses it from a perspective which focuses one-dimensionally on 
Being in such a way that any actual human construct can appear 
only as a closure to other potential configurations. 
Secondly, this one-dimensional understanding of existence 
means that not only does Heidegger miss what it is that ethical and 
political actions aim at in modernity, but he associates all such 
action with the closure and alienation from Being that ultimately 
finds its expression in the notion of the Gestell. Heidegger, then, 
does not merely fail to comprehend the action co-ordinating 
aspects of human reason and will, but is actively hostile to them- 
a hostility rendered either impotent (a willing of non-willing) or 
unconstrainedly idiosyncratic (White is thinking of Heidegger's 
Nazism). In either case the problem is the same; Heidegger's 
critique of all actual human reason blinds him to the differences 
between the ontological, ethical and political dimensions of human 
54 Ibid., p. 35. 
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being. All aspects of human society and action are analysed simply 
as a distancing from Being. 
White finds that Heidegger's one dimensional approach to 
existence means that he misconceives modernity. Without an 
ability to comprehend the action co-ordinating aspect of human 
will and reason, Heidegger wrongly determines the ethical and 
political situation of modernity to be a crisis of alienation from 
Being, that, secondly, is without human solution. 
I have dwelt on White's analysis at some length because he 
isolates several themes that are central to many commentaries on 
Heidegger, both critical and supportive. Firstly, it is assumed that 
Heidegger retains the desire for a direct encounter with Being, or 
at least a reversal of the forgetting of Being with which he 
associates both metaphysics and modernity. Secondly, Heidegger is 
seen as unable, because of his blanket association between the 
stuff of all social and political action- human will and technical 
reason- and metaphysics to countenance any way that modern 
society and politics can be reformed. The Gestell, as the 
completion of metaphysics, ensures that whatever actions human 
beings take amount to further metaphysical permutations within 
that nexus; Being cannot be brought closer by human action. The 
best that can be hoped for is the coming of a god: an extraordinary 
destiny in which Being is brought closer to us. 
For White, Heidegger's inadequacy in conceptualising modernity 
and its problems arises from a philosophical suspicion of tradition 
which is maintained only by a wholly inadequate conception of 
existence. White views Being (a word which appears startlingly 
infrequently for a book largely about Heidegger) as an illegitimate 
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longing for presence motivated by the hole which Heidegger's one- 
sided understanding of human existence leaves. 
White holds the belief, examined in the previous Chapter, that 
Heidegger's account of existence is dominated by an illegitimate 
and speculative deference to a conception of Being that retains the 
status of 'ground' previously associated with objectivity. White, 
however, is more expansive on why he thinks the resulting 
suspicion of the epistemological tradition feeds into a rejection of 
the institutions and conceptions of modernity. 
Heidegger, White believes, has systematically missed a crucial 
dimension of all human experience- the constitutive role played by 
instrumental reason in human action. Therefore, White believes, 
Heidegger's aversion to modernity is not a result of any distinctive 
feature of that period, but is symptomatic of a general failure to 
adequately understand human agency. 
White thus interprets Heideggerian suspicion as culminating in a 
refusal of action co-ordinating reason and its products. In 
attributing this to an inability to conceive of the action co- 
ordinating aspect of language, White situates this failing in 
Heidegger's hermeneutic method itself. Whether in reading 
philosophical texts, or surveying interpersonal relationships in 
modern societies, White's assertion is that Heidegger's wrong 
assumptions about the nature of human beings, expressed through 
the desire for an ontology/presencing of Being, mean that any 
conception of openness or otherness will be both partial and 
without practical application. 
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Therefore, White concludes, an openness to alternative meanings 
(whether textual or social) can only be meaningful in a context 
where one takes into account the constitutive role of reason in 
human agency. From White's perspective, Heidegger's critique of 
modernity can have no meaningful application as social or political 
critique. Similarly, the rejection of the action co-ordinating 
aspects of reason is simply at odds with the conditions for any 
addressing of what Heidegger takes to be the problems of 
modernity. White is in the company of (amongst others) Hans 
Sluga55 and Fritz Stern56. Stern perceives the German critique of 
modernity to be a "wild leap from political reality", a largely 
impotent philosophical attempt to "condemn all existing 
institutions" which amounts simply to the "triumph of 
irresponsibility"57. Sluga argues Heidegger's approach to modernity 
fits easily into German concerns with crisis, nation and leadership, 
but, through a transportation of the categories of "common sense 
and practical experience"58 into abstract philosophical terms, 
overlooks the inherently social and political aspects of these 
problems. 
The criticisms offered of Heidegger's thoughts on modernity can 
now be evaluated. The thinkers looked at above are united in their 
agreement that Heidegger's characterization of modernity is 
determined by a philosophical position that lacks any ethical or 
political dimension. Further, this absence is taken to reduce not 
just the breadth of applicability of Heidegger's account, but the 
quality of what he does say. This is because he is taken to have 
rejected the role of instrumental reason in the moral and political 
dimensions of life whilst retaining the desire to generate 
55 Hans Sluga, Heidegger'Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany 56 Fritz Stem, The Politics of Cultural Despair. A Study in the Rise of German Ideology 57 Ibid., p. 298. 
58 Sluga, Heidegger' Crisis, p. ix. 
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prescriptive practical imperatives which require precisely these 
considerations. 
In the view of these thinkers, for Heidegger to have anything to 
say of actual practical importance about modernity would require 
that he incorporate into his account precisely that aspect of human 
existence with which he identifies modernity and yet will have no 
truck- the technical use of reason in human action. Thus 
Heidegger's desire for openness in revealing Being can only make 
sense if the nexus with which one would replace modernity took 
account of the integral role of instrumental reason. These thinkers 
argue that the underlying objectivity Heidegger accords his 
conception of Being makes that an impossibility. 
In short, Heidegger can either define Being neutrally in terms of 
any disclosure whatsoever or he must accept that any vision he 
offers of it will be nothing but another metaphysical conception. 
Neither case allows his characterization of modernity to make the 
evaluative and/or prescriptive claims that are taken to underlie 
his case; as such there can be no meaningful ethical, social or 
political imperatives generated from within his account. The 
claim is that without a return to some conception of reason 
(subjective or intersubjective) Heidegger's work cannot rightly be 
called critique at all; it can have no model of emancipation or 
perspective from which one could construct an account of what 
would constitute a better state. 
105 
Section 3) Heideggerian Suspicion and the Critique of 
Modernity 
The thinkers examined in the previous section are united in the 
belief that Heidegger's critique of modernity is based upon a 
misunderstanding of the nature of human reason. Habermas 
identifies Heidegger's rejection of any conception of 
communicative reason with an arbitrary readiness to obey. White, 
in identifying the rejection of will with a refusal of all products 
of practical reason as metaphysical, claims simply that no 
"adequate approach to ethics or politics could come out of such a 
position"59. Heidegger's inability to conceive of these aspects of 
existence is attributed to a philosophical error; a failure to 
understand the dimension of propositional truth which is an 
intrinsic part of all human action. White crucially identifies this 
with an aspect of language itself- Heidegger's hermeneutic method 
from the first cannot be applied to those meanings of texts which 
aim at considering practical action and/or social meanings. That 
Heidegger further seeks to extend this partial theory of meaning to 
'modernity', the constitution of which cannot be understood in ways 
analogous to those of the understanding of philosophical texts, 
compounds Heidegger's mistake for both White and Habermas. 
It is not clear, however, that Heidegger fails to understand this. 
Although Heidegger does ally his philosophy to a particular 
political movement in the 1930s writings, this support is quickly, 
(although arguably not surprisingly or unambiguously) withdrawn. 
In addition to his continuous assertions that Being cannot be 
understood as an entity which grounds propositional, social or 
political truths, Heidegger is also clear that his concern with 
59 White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, p. 4 1. 
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Being is not an attempt to ground final or 
traditional sense, nor is it an attempt to 
Rather, as was argued in the previous ChaptE 
with the 'truth of Being' does not aim at 
tradition, but at developing a new approach 
the tradition ought to be understood. 
definite truths in the 
escape metaphysics. 
,., r, Heidegger's concern 
the refutation of the 
to understanding how 
Heidegger claims that he does not aim to provide solutions to 
the failings that he perceives in either the philosophical or the 
socio-political tradition. Thus, the claim in the Letter on 
Humanism that "[a]ll refutation in the field of essential thinking is 
foolish"60 links Heidegger's work with the metaphysical nexus 
within which he works. Equally in his interview with Der Spiegel, 
Heidegger states that a thinking more original than metaphysics 
does not aim at practical social or political answers: "A decisive 
question for me today is: how can a political system accommodate 
itself to the technological age, and which political system would 
this be? I have no answer to this question. "61 
Habermas and White, although acute about Heidegger's failings 
in understanding Nazism as a political movement, are wrong to 
attribute this to an underlying conception of Being as objective 
ground on Heidegger's behalf. Heidegger does not seek to purge the 
'history of Being' from any metaphysical dimension. Rather, his 
aim is to challenge the claim that metaphysical understandings of 
existence can exhaust, or make fully explicit, the conditions for 
understanding existence. 
In doing so Heidegger forwards a phenomenological conception 
of truth which he believes subsumes the traditional understanding. 
60 Heidegger. Letter on Humanism, p. 239. 
61 Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us", p. 104.107 
As cited in the previous Chapter, Stambaugh finds that it is not the 
subject-object split that Heidegger is criticizing, but "its 
ultimacy"62. This ultimacy does not find its expression in the 
metaphysics of subjectivity, but in the epistemological claim that 
this is the only legitimate gr ounds for knowledge. For Heidegger, 
the error does not lie with subjectivist metaphysics per se, but 
with the absolute hegemony of self-certainty. 
Thus, he does not try to establish that all metaphysical 
constructions are wrong, but, instead, that the meaning of 
existence cannot be exhausted by this outlook. Heidegger's concern 
with phenomenological horizons needs to be understood in the light 
of this; the aim is not the explicit knowledge of certainty of Being, 
nor the provision of a set of ontological principles governing the 
ways in which beings show up. To furnish such an account of 
phenomenological horizons would indeed be the simple inversion of 
the philosophy of the Subject that Habermas suggests. 
I suggested at the end of the last section that the criticisms of 
Heidegger's conception of modernity are based on three 
assumptions: that Being takes the place of the subject as the 
measure for objective truth, that Heidegger sees all human action 
as instances of metaphysical subjectivism, and that Heidegger's 
rejection of modernity is premised on the refusal of the latter 
determined by the former. 
If, however, Heidegger's singularity of concern with the truth of 
Being is taken not to run contrary to all subjective aspects of 
existence, or the use of instrumental reason, but is confined to the 
lesser thesis that the objectivism claimed by the related 
62 Joan Stambaugh, Thoughts on Heidegger (Washington, D. C.: Center for Advanced Research in 
Phenomenology, 1987), p. 4. 
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epistemologies does not suffice to ground truth, things look 
different. The 'truth of Being' does not entail that a concern with 
I phenomenological horizons' aims at a certainty of knowledge, nor 
that actions can never be understood as those of a subject or in 
metaphysical terms, but that the understanding of existence cannot 
be limited to these moments. 
With the reconsideration of the first two assumptions comes 
the refutation of the latter. Heidegger does not conceive of Being 
as an alternative source of, or target for, self-certainty. Further, 
the history of metaphysics does not run counter to the history of 
Being, but is an integral part of it. Heidegger's claim, in the first 
instance, is that the paradigm of self-certainty found in the 
epistemological tradition cannot, as is believed, generate the 
conditions for a total and exhaustive understanding of existence. 
Heidegger does not ignore the ontic appearance of beings in the 
search for ontological certitude, but challenges the emphasis 
which underpins the division in the first place. It is not the 
content of the division (whether everyday practice, the subject- 
object division, or instrumental reason) that Heidegger rejects, but 
the assumption that the division is fundamental. 
Equally, Heidegger's consideration of technology, humanism, and 
modernity aims at neither refutation nor replacement, but at 
establishing, as cited above, a "free" relationship of humanity to 
humanism and technology. White and Habermas see no way for 
Heidegger to determine which next move would be appropriate- but 
this is not the sense of freedom which Heidegger is attempting to 
invoke. Heidegger should not be read as concerned with what 
human beings should be doing, but with the way we should 
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understand how they are constituted: he is examining the 
conditions of human agency. 
The critics looked at in this Chapter are right to point out the 
narrowness of the way in which Heidegger conceives of modernity, 
and the disastrous implications of attempting to transfer that 
vision into a programme of social and political action. If, however, 
one views Heidegger's project as oriented towards a different 
issue- the dangers of conceiving of human being exclusively on a 
model of subjectivity and the associated instrumentalism- then 
this objection in itself neither names nor addresses the reasons 
for Heidegger's political failings. 
The last Chapter examined Heidegger's 'suspicion' of the 
philosophical tradition. Heideggerian suspicion, it was argued, was 
not the idiosyncratic rejection of anything to do with the subject, 
premised on an arbitrary ontotheological conception of Being, but a 
constitutive part of the idea that the traditional attempt to 
conceive of Being/existence objectively was, at best, partial. 
Thus, the metaphysical urge to completion, expressed in the drive 
to certitude within subjectivist epistemologies, is mistaken in 
taking the conception of objectivity derived from substantia as 
fundamental. Hence, Heidegger takes issue with the associated 
conception of human agency as fundamentally separated from the 
world and the resulting privileging of the 'external' or universal 
perspective in conceiving of existence. 
Heidegger finds that the way human beings have understood 
their existence (and therefore that of the world) has increasingly 
been thought of in terms of the model of external objectivity, but 
that phenomenological analysis reveals that this can at most be an 
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abstraction from one aspect of reality. As was seen in the last 
Chapter, Heidegger extends this criticism to all positions which 
aim at a definitive or final account of the world or agency- 
whether through the 'revelations' of a God, the reification of the 
Subject or world as grounding object or Absolute, or the 
pragmatist attempt to provide the account of social practice upon 
which our truths are based. 
Heidegger views all these positions as essentially homogeneous. 
In each case, reason is taken to aim at a truth, the existence of 
which is conceived of in the objectivist but partial terms 
considered above. This frequently tacit assumption stresses the 
role of reason in identifying why things are the way they are. In 
192863 Heidegger sees this as best represented in Leibniz's 
treatment of the principle of sufficient reason; the belief that 
there is a reason behind everything (the positive statement of the 
principle nihil est sine ratione) means that 'reason' has been 
equated with "clarifying" the first or "basic principle"64 which 
orders Being. It is this aspect of the tradition which Heidegger 
defines himself against. In the same work he states that the 
striving of reason for an identity of truth and ground 
refer[s] back to something more primordial, something which does not have the 
character of a principle but belongs to the happening of transcendence as such, namely, 
temporality. 65 
Heidegger is thus applying the notion of 'transparency' to the 
consideration of what might be called the modern understanding of 
reason. Heidegger states boldly that the modern conception of 
63 Martin Heidegger (tr. T. Malick), The Essence of Reasons (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1969). 
64 Ibid., p. 127. 
65 Ibid., p. 127. 
reason is determined from the first by an unexamined assumption 
of what an essence or ground is- a conception based on presence. 
In contrast, Heidegger says the essence of reasons "fall back on 
freedom... Freedom is the reason for reasons... freedom is the 
'abyss' of Dasein, its groundless or absent ground"66. 
In arguing that Heidegger fails to consider one dimension of 
human agency, White misses the full force of Heidegger's argument. 
Heidegger's point is that by making the identification of an 
'adequate' or 'complete' conception of human agency the starting 
point for finding truth or considering freedom, one is guaranteeing 
that one will never move beyond the dictates of the past and 
present. Through this partial understanding of our temporality, 
'Man' becomes an object of study, and the goals of objective 
certitude and self-certainty are inappropriately applied. 
Similarly, Heidegger is clear that it is not simply that the means 
to achieving such knowledge have been mis-identified or have thus 
far been denied us; it is the very project of seeking certitude on 
these terms which Heidegger opposes. 
Heidegger's work thus runs against any attempt to rethink the 
essence of human being in terms of new social or intersubjective 
practices, not because such redefinitions retain traces of the 
Subject, but because they are marked by the same partial and 
instrumentalist conception of Being. White is not wrong in 
identifying another dimension of human being, but Heidegger is 
questioning the framework within which another such 
identification is considered important. There is little to suggest 
that Heidegger would see White as having moved beyond what he 
66 Ibid., p. 127,129. 
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termed "anthropology", another attempt to see "that man will and 
ought to be the subject that in his modern essence he already iS"67. 
Heidegger's critique of modernity is not based on an absolute 
refusal of technical or instrumental rationality, but of the 
unchallenged hegemony of this attitude. Any position which makes 
the adequate conception of man or human reason its measure can 
never move beyond the tradition which precedes it. Thus 
Heidegger's criticism of Dilthey could have been applied equally to 
White- 
[t]hrough anthropology the transition of metaphysics into the event of the simple 
stopping and setting aside of all philosophy is introduced. The fact that Dilthey 
disavowed metaphysics, that fundamentally he no longer even understood its question 
and stood helpless before metaphysical logic, is the inner consequence of his 
fundamental anthropological position... [O]ne thing, surely, anthropology cannot do. It 
cannot overcome Descartes, nor even rise up against him, for how shall the 
consequence ever attack the ground on which it stands? 68 
Section 4) Conclusions 
This Chapter has sought to show, against many recent 
commentators, that Heidegger's thoughts on modernity are not 
merely indicative of an underlying and fundamental objectivism 
revolving around the concept of Being. In the course of making this 
point the importance of realising that is not the division between 
subject and object that Heidegger objects to, but its exclusive 
centrality, was stressed. 
67 Martin Heidegger (tr. W. Lovitt), "The Age of the World Picture" in The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 133. 
68 Ibid., p. 140. 
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Applied to Heidegger's thoughts on modernity, I argued that 
Heidegger's comments on, what are for him the two key themes, 
humanism and technology, should not be construed as a rejection of 
any and all thought on human being or the present age. Rather, they 
serve as an extension of his thesis that without a recognition of 
the centrality of temporality in understanding Being, any 
understanding of human existence will be hypostatized in terms of 
the partial meanings of a tradition which has increasingly failed to 
understand the importance of time as the horizon of meaning. 
Thus, the danger Heidegger associates with the forgetting of the 
question of the meaning of Being is not that the final, immediate 
answer becomes yet more distant, but that a failure to attend to 
the structure (that of a question) by which Being comes to have 
meaning, means that the openness of future interpretations is lost 
to a self-sustaining functional instrumentality that disguises its 
own partiality. 
Heidegger's critics are right that this approach is not 
fundamentally concerned with the prevailing social and economic 
aspects of modernity, but wrong to attribute this to a wholesale 
rejection of any instance of instrumental reason. Heidegger's 
interest lies elsewhere; in diagnosing and exposing the ongoing 
dominance of objective instrumentalism in the tradition, even by 
those positions that appear to have overcome it. As was argued in 
the previous Section- and similarly in the last Chapter in regard to 
his thoughts on subjectivity- Heidegger's comments on modernity 
ought to be interpreted in the first instance as an ongoing critique 
of the project of coming up with the grounding conception of 
agency or reason for knowing Being. 
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Having argued that Heidegger's thoughts on subjectivity do not 
constitute a refutation but must themselves be situated in the 
context of his wider concern with the partiality of the model of 
self-certitude, it should now be clear that a similar approach is 
appropriate when reading Heidegger on modernity. Heidegger's 
comments on modernity should not be read as blanket refutation or 
arbitrary antipathy, but as a continuing assault on the reasons for 
placing objective rationality, as it has been understood within the 
tradition, at the centre of thinking about existence. 
Neither Heidegger's critiques of subjectivity, nor humanism and 
technology entail a rejection of all the institutions and 
conceptions of modernity- even if his 1932 political affiliation 
may have been with a movement that did. Outside of the rectoral 
missives published in the Freiburg Students Newspaper, which 
Heidegger deemed "compromises"69, there is little to suggest, on 
the reading I have offered, that Heidegger did make this link. 
Heidegger's hostility towards the modern age and its products is 
not premised on a belief that Being can be recalled, but on the 
conception of truth and reason which operates such a criterion of 
right representation. 
To expand, the current of Heidegger's work which has been 
missed, and my reading of the aim of his 'suspicion', moves not to 
affirm or adjust our philosophical, cultural or political traditions 
but to suggest that without an understanding of the temporal and 
interrogative form of these understandings instrumental and 
technical reason will continue to dominate human existence. 
Attempting to refine our conceptions of human agency and reason, 
69 See "Only A God Can Save Us", p. 96. 
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in common with Rorty and White, belongs, from this perspective, to 
the same style of thinking as the tradition Heidegger criticizes. 
Heidegger's suspicion of modernity is not constituted by a 
gainsaying of the content of its particular claims about the nature 
of agency or the use of reason in matching means to ends, but an 
objection to the nature of the finality such conceptions are taken 
to embody. It is not, therefore, the appearance of the Subject or 
technical reason in the fabric of modernity which spurs Heidegger's 
criticisms, but the implicit omnipotence of the notion of a correct 
account in terms of objective self-certitude of which either can be 
an expression. 
In the following Chapter I discuss the implications for politics 
of this account. It should be clear that this will not consist of an 
attempt to find a conception of agency which is indexed to an 
account of how Being really is, in terms of either an objective 
conception of Being or will alone, but of an analysis of how 
Heidegger's critique of objectivist rationality resonates with the 
prevalent understandings of the nature and proper place of politics. 
In doing so, Heidegger's comments on modernity will be interpreted 
as part of an attempt to render a philosophical account of how we 
come to have the "beliefs about reasonS"70 that we do- not as part 
of a project of identifying new reasons from within the traditional 
nexus. Heidegger's critique of modernity does not constitute an 
attempt to divine the next appropriate political move, but to raise 
the question of our constitution. 
Thus the question is not what Heidegger identifies, or misses, 
about our identity, and the ramifications of this for the conduct of 
70 Alasdair MacIntyre, "Review of Charles Larmore: The Morals of Modernity and The Romantic 
Legacy", p. 489. 
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politics, but how his work contributes towards an understanding of 
the perspective which takes this question as central in 
understanding Being. I have argued that Heidegger's comments on 
modernity have, in themselves, no necessary connection with a 
program of political action, and that those who take them thus 
misinterpret the central thrust of his work. If the seemingly 
political and social dimensions of Heidegger's comments on 
modernity are not to be interpreted thus, I want now to turn to the 
question of whether there is anything political at all to be 
garnered from his work. The question at hand is whether there is 
reason to believe that the politics of modernity are indeed best 
interpreted as marked by the philosophical errors Heidegger 
associates with metaphysical subjectivism, and what follows from 
that. 
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Chapter 3: Heidegger and the Political 
Introduction 
Aims and Outlines 
The previous two Chapters examined the question of how best to 
interpret Heidegger's work on subjectivity and modernity. The 
conclusion drawn was that the seemingly social and political 
imperatives of these aspects of Heidegger's thought (particularly 
the latter) should not be taken thus, but as part of a philosophical 
critique of the exclusivity of instrumental reason in questions of 
the meaning of Being. I also suggested that attempts to 
'rehabilitate' Heidegger by situating his comments on, for example, 
humanism and technology within a 'new' conception of agency or 
reason misunderstand the nature of these comments, and thus the 
thrust of Heidegger's work as a whole. 
This is not, of course, to say that Heidegger's work can be 
simply deemed philosophical not political; rather it is to deny that, 
on this interpretation, Heidegger's thoughts ought to be treated as 
aiming, at least in the first instance, at direct political 
application. Heidegger's point, after all, is that the traditional 
separations and distinctions with which we operate are accreted 
around a basic philosophical error. 
The question that this Chapter addresses is whether Heidegger's 
diagnosis of this error has any ramifications for the way one 
approaches politics and notions of the political. In order to do so, 
this Chapter is divided into four sections. Firstly, I survey the 
comments Heidegger makes about politics as a phenomenological 
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regime. Secondly, I look at how Heidegger perceives and analyses 
liberal democracy, which he takes to be the dominant political 
practice of the time. The division of labour between these two 
sections thus broadly follows the distinction drawn between das 
Politische ['the political'] and die Politik ['politics']'. My third 
section discusses both how far such a distinction illuminates 
Heidegger's work, and, in turn, how far his work sheds light on the 
grounds upon which that distinction is itself founded. I suggest, 
mirroring my discussion of the ontic/ontological difference and 
Heidegger's two hermeneutical dynamics, that his contribution is 
not at one or the other of these poles, as has been suggested, but at 
the level of the analysis of how such a distinction is to be 
understood and operated. This is followed by my fourth, and 
concluding, section in which I consider how Heidegger's critique of 
the traditional understanding and basis of politics allows for any 
conception of politics and the political as having a "proper place"2 
at all. Specifically, my interest here is how Heidegger's critique 
of the 'metaphysical' understanding of the self which he finds at 
the centre of modern ethical and political thought and practice 
impacts on the possibility of presenting any politics or political 
theory at all. 
Section 1) Heidegger and Being-Political 
1.1 Heidegger and Politics: Themes 
Heidegger offers two sorts of suggestion as to how his work 
might find political application, and it is around these that the 
IA distinction made in various ways by different thinkers. White's distinction between the politics of a 
responsibility to otherness, and that of a responsibility to act serves as an example. For a brief, lucid 
discussion of the distinction see Fred Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger, p. 50, where following Vollrath's 
distinction between das Politische and die Politik he defines the former as the 'paradigmatic framework'of 
politics, and the latter as the practice of 'concrete decision making'. 
2 Miguel de Beistegui, Heidegger & the Political, p. 5. Italics in original. 
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subsequent debates have crystallised. Firstly, there is the move to 
link his philosophy to support what he saw in 1932 as the 
restorative project of Hitler. Hence the claim of the 
Rektoratsrede, that the only way to fulfil the demands of true 
knowledge and science is a spiritual rebirth "rooted in the soil and 
blood of a Volk"3. Secondly, there are, throughout his work, the 
references to the polis, nation, state and politics in general; 
moments in which Heidegger deliberately considers the ways in 
which he believes the key terms of political thought should be 
understood. 
The inflammatory nature of the former, and the rarity of the 
latter have ensured that the debate about Heidegger's political 
application has remained open and hotly contested. This Section 
has two aims. Firstly, to explain why I believe that, in the context 
of my study, Heidegger's most blatant moments of Nazi affiliation 
can be divorced from the more general considerations about 
politics to be found in his work. Secondly, I offer a preliminary 
approach to interpreting these latter comments in Heidegger's 
work. 
1.2 Heidegger, Nazism and Politics 
Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis remains, for most, the 
dominant issue in addressing his work. This is in itself 
-unsurprising, but more curious is the reach that this motif is taken 
to have in reading any aspects of his work. Thus one finds the 
claim that "it would be tantamount to an abdication of intellectual 
responsibility for an author not to address the issue"4. MY 
intention here is to show that, at least in the context of my study, 
3 Martin Heidegger, "The Self-Assertion of the German University", p. 34. 
4 Keith Ansell-Pearson, "Heidegger's Decline: between Philosophy and Politics", p. 505. 
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this overstates the case; a denial would be unforgivable, but if, as 
I argue below, Heidegger's Nazism is not a necessary consequence 
of his philosophy, his political engagement can be moved beyond. I 
am not suggesting that those who make this claim are wholly 
wrong, but that there has now been sufficient 'addressing [of] the 
issue' elsewhere to allow one to be confident that its importance 
will not be forgotten if not explicitly raised each time one comes 
to talk of Heidegger's work. I don't aim to exhaustively address the 
relationship between Heidegger's work and his Nazism here, but to 
delineate why I think other aspects of the man and his work can 
now be dealt with without such a prolonged account. 
As was mentioned in the previous Chapter, it is commonly 
argued that Heidegger's Nazism is conditioned by a belief in an 
ultimately objectivist ontology of Being. The character of this 
belief in Being is taken to bypass any critical testing of the 
'truths' Heidegger derives from it, and subsume any concern with 
politics as the mediation of conflict and power between subjects 
in favour of a search for an immediate contact with Being. Hans 
Sluga thus identifies a commonality between certain philosophical 
motifs which he sees emerging out of this conception of "absolute 
truth"5- crisis, nation, leadership and order- and their political 
understandings. The common assumption, of which this is a 
particularly lucid example, is expressed by Ansell-Pearson: 
To fulfil his essentially philosophical interests and aspirations for change, he was 
prepared to sell his soul to the devil and adopt the mantel of the philosopher-king to 
Hitler's FOhrerstaat (it is a familiar Faustian story in several respects). As Wolin 
rightly points out, Heidegger's support for national socialism was philosophically 
overdetermined. 6 
5 Hans Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany, p. ix. 
6 Ansell-Pearson, "Heidegger's Decline: between Philosophy and Politics", p. 516. 
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These comments are right and useful when applied to those 
moments when Heidegger does place his philosophy explicitly 
behind the Nazi movement. It is true that Heidegger's error is to 
find an "inner truth"7 in National Socialism, and generally to 
believe that, in Anse 11-Pearson's words, "the political is to be 
understood in terms of an experience of truth"8. I don't dispute 
that reading of Heidegger's support for the Nazis, but I have a 
different interpretation of the conclusions to be drawn from it. I 
do not think that the connection back to Heidegger's philosophical 
understanding is as strong as has been assumed. Specifically, I 
think it overplays the substantive conceptions of truth which 
Heidegger does at times present (particularly in his consideration 
of the Greeks), but which are at odds with the interpretation of his 
work, which I have forwarded, that reads the "truth of Being" as a 
formal concern with meaning opposed to such claims to 
objectivity. 
Thus, whilst I agree that the former interpretation is of great 
value in understanding Heidegger's support for National Socialism, 
I do not think that it is of great value in understanding his 
philosophy. The conception of 'truth' which would ground the 
National Socialist revolution, or any political movement, cannot be 
that of the 'truth of Being' which I take to be the fundamental 
concern of Heidegger's philosophy. This is not to say that 
Heidegger's concern with the meaning of Being is incompatible 
with fascism, but it is to deny that there is either an intrinsic or a 
necessary connection. In claiming that there is no direct 
7 Martin Heidegger (tr. R. Manheim), An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1987), p. 199. 
8 Ansel]-Pearson, "Heidegger's Decline: between Philosophy and Politics", p. 513. 
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connection, however, it is clear that Heidegger perceived nothing in 
his views to stop him affiliating with the Nazis. 
Although, then, the Germanocentrism present in Heidegger's 
philosophy is an important factor in understanding his political 
engagement, it should not be identified with an attempt to identify 
substantive truths of Being which demand that- or any particular- 
engagement. This mistakes the way in which Being operates as a 
founding conception with an associated ontology within Heidegger's 
work. 
Instead I want to turn to the question of whether politics of any 
sort has any place in Heidegger's philosophy. Hence, I do not seek 
to identify what it is in Heidegger's philosophy that led him to 
Nazism, but what it is that is absent from his work which makes 
him unable to conceive of a role for politics that is distinct from 
its philosophical or cultural context. To pursue this I want now to 
turn to the way Heidegger does talk of the phenomenon of politics 
and the political. 
1.3 Heidegger, the polis and the political 
Outside of those texts declaring his allegiance to the Nazis, 
Heidegger's comments on the state and conceptions of the political 
are unstructured and sporadic. Many of them are also situated in 
the BeitrAge zur Philosophie, yet to be translated. What is clear, 
however, is that he presents no explicit political philosophy. 
What Heidegger does offer, however, is an account of how the 
Greek understanding of the polis captures an aspect of experience 
missed by the contemporary understanding of the state and 
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politics. Heidegger asserts that the meanings of the polis and 
politics are not founded in the "relation with a statesman and a 
general and the business of the state"9 but that: 
Polis means, rather, the place, the there, wherein and as which historical being-there 
is. The polis is the historical place, the there in which, out of which and for which 
history happens. 10 
Elaborating, Heidegger claims that the polis is the historical 
site in which the understandings of Being available at a time are 
enshrined. It is, therefore, not merely constituted by citizens but 
includes "the gods, the temples, the priests, the festivals, the 
games, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler, the council of elders, the 
assembly of the people, the army and the fleet"". In his 1942 
lecture on H61derlin, Heidegger states clearly that the essence of 
the Polis exists before the conception of state or city: 
Rather, it means that the essential in the historical abode of man lies in the pole-like 
[polhaften] relatedness of everything to the site of the abode, and this means of the 
being-at-home [of man] in the midst of beings as whole. From this place or site 
springs what is allowed and what is not, what is order [Fug] and what is disorder 
[Unfug], what is fitting and what is not... Thus the essence of the polis appears as the 
way in which beings as such and in general step into unconcealment. 12 
Heidegger's claim is clear. The essence of the polis is not 
captured by modern conceptions of the state and politics framed in 
terms of power relations between individual subjects and states. 
The nature of the polis is, in this sense, pre-political; it is the 
9 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 152. 
10 Ibid., p. 152. 
11 Ibid., p. 152. 
12 Cited (and tr. ) by Miguel de Beistegui in Heidegger & the Political, p. 136-7. Italics in original. 
Taken from Heidegger's lecture HdIderlins Hymne "Der Ister" - Gesamtausgabe (53) (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann), p. 101-2. 
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historical expression of a particular set of understandings by 
which the community is itself defined. Thus, for Heidegger, the 
most fundamental understanding of the polis views it as the 
expression of a phenomenological regime. 
At this point it might seem that the criticisms of White, 
discussed in the previous Chapter, were given short shrift. Can 
Heidegger's description and approval of the Greek conception of the 
polis still allow for any dimension of human action, and the co- 
ordinating of power and capital relations between individuals? 
Heidegger idealizes the Greek conception of the poliS13. It is 
clear that he believes that an examination of the Greek polis 
reveals an error in the equivalent understanding of the modern 
state and politics. What Heidegger thinks has been overlooked is 
the understanding of the polis and politics as a dimension of a 
phenomenological expression of Being; this is the dimension that 
White terms the world-disclosing aspect of experience. The danger 
associated by many of Heidegger's commentators14 with this 
idealization of the Greek experience is the placing of politics in 
the hands of the poets: those who have an aesthetic conception of 
politics. The risk, in turn, is that identified by Habermas and 
White- political power is legitimised in terms of a conception of 
truth that is not, and cannot, be subjected to any critical testing. 
One is again left with a foundational account of Being which is 
both objectivist and personal in its formulation. 
13 For a selection of Heidegger's idealization of the Greek polis see Ansell-Pearson, "Heidegger's Decline: 
between Philosophy and Politics" pp. 512-14, Karsten Harries, "Heidegger as a Political Thinker" in 
Michael Murray (ed. ) Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1978), Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger, esp. pp. 
114-18, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics, (passim, but especially when talking of 
national aestheticism), Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics, p. 4-5. 14 In each case in the texts cited above. See especially Wolin, Lacoue-Labarthe and Ansell-Pearson. 
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These thinkers are right to assert that Heidegger's support for 
Hitler did, in the rectoral and political writings, proffer an 
ontological support for the Nazis, and that the "national 
aestheticism" 15 that support expressed was frequently phrased in 
terms which idealized the Greek experience in general. However, 
there is good reason to believe that these connections are not 
necessary ones, and that Heidegger's philosophy does not in fact 
rule out the possibility of a distinctly political realm. 
To see why this is so, one needs to identify what Heidegger's 
discussion of the polis is intended to establish. The issue is 
whether Heidegger's focus on the polis as the place where Being is 
disclosed (aletheia-cally), and his associated assertion that the 
polis is as much the realm of the poet as the statesman, run 
contrary to the modern understanding of the state and politics. 
I argue that it does not. Again, as was seen in considering 
Heidegger's comments on modernity, it is important to bear in mind 
that Heidegger is not analysing the institutions or practices of 
Ancient Greece (or else he would have more to say about its 
democracy for example), but the way in which those practices were 
understood. Heidegger's concern remains with meaning. In his 
analysis of the polis, Heidegger does not suggest that the practices 
or institutions of Greece were substantively closer to objectifying 
Being, but that in considering how they understood this aspect of 
their existence it will become clear that they understood an aspect 
of their lives, through their conception of politics, in a way that 
we no longer do. 
15 A particularly illuminating term utilised by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics, p. 58. The original is hyphenated. 
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This aspect, central to the Greek conception of the polis, 
precedes any conception of a distinctly political realm. Heidegger 
is arguing that the polis was a pre-political (and pre-moral) site 
where Being and beings came to be revealed. It is, in fact, only 
when technological questions arise- at least from Plato onwards in 
Heidegger's view- that politics and the state become themselves 
wholly an extension of the technical enterprise. 
In suggesting that the polis is at least as much about the poet 
and poiesis as the statesman and statescraft, Heidegger is not 
arguing that the state should be put in the hands of those who 
write poetry, or be put towards poetical ends. Both moves would 
belong to the technical approach to both politics and Being which 
Heidegger is questioning. Heidegger is not distinguishing between 
statesmen and poets in order to adjudicate which of the two are 
best suited to rule. Heidegger's attack is on the underlying 
conception of agency which separates and isolates the one from the 
other. 
Heidegger is trading on a twofold conception of poiesis. As 
Zimmerman notes it means both "poetry" and "producing" 16. 
Heidegger's injection of the poetical into the political does not aim 
to add an aesthetic dimension to politics- that conception of art 
remains embedded in the humanist conception of the subjective 
appreciation of a separated object. Rather, his claim is that an 
understanding of politics framed entirely in terms of its technical 
or productive aspects will overlook the ways in which political 
life resonates with, and itself uncovers, the understanding of 
Being. 
16 Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, Art, p. 
231. 
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The distinction between the polis and poiesis does not embody a 
separation, but intertwined dimensions of Being. Heidegger's 
criticisms of the modern conceptions of the state and politics are 
not fuelled by the existence of technical ends and purposes in 
themselves. Rather, it is the monopoly of the conception of agency 
and reason which has led to these ends dominating the 
understanding of politics with which Heidegger takes issue. 
Heidegger's critique of modern politics is not that it is doing the 
wrong things- "[n]o mere action will change the world"17- but that 
it is an expression and reflection of an understanding of Being 
which is partial. This partiality, focusing entirely on the humanist 
and therefore technological understanding of Man, bars us, 
Heidegger believes, from asking the decisive question of modernity: 
"how can a political system accommodate itself to the 
technological age, and which political system would this be? "18 
Heidegger's critique of the politics of the age thus mirrors his 
critiques of subjectivity and modernity. The practice and 
understanding of politics has been vitiated by an understanding of 
Being, and human agency, in technical terms. For Heidegger the 
distinction between the poetic, understood as the revealing of 
Being, and the political has come to be understood in terms of 
separable dynamics. In fact, he argues, one cannot exist without 
the other; the technical understanding of politics reveals a 
technical understanding of Being, grounded in the humanist outlook, 
which embodies a fundamental error about the nature of human 
Being. 
To see how Heidegger applies this conception of the nature of 
politics and the political and the underlying error he believes it 
17 Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics", p. 89. 
18 Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us", ibid., p. 104. 
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indicates, one can look to his analysis and critique of what he 
takes to be the dominant political regime of the modern age; 
liberal democracy. 
Section 2) Heidegger's Analysis of Liberalism and 
Liberal Democracy 
2.1 Sources and Themes 
If Heidegger's comments on the political are scarce, his analysis 
of liberalism, liberal democracy and liberal humanism, which he 
uses interchangeably to describe the political life of the modern 
West, is sparser and more tentative still. In considering 
Heidegger's thoughts on liberalism and liberal democracy19, an 
examination of his explicit comments on liberalism (found in the 
Beitrige zur Philosophie 20) needs to be supplemented- in the light 
of that work- with a reading of his comments on the relationship 
between the self and community. 
2.2 Heidegger and the Essence of Liberalism 
As the preceding discussion suggests, Heidegger does not just 
have a particular formulation of a political doctrine of rights in 
mind when he refers to 'liberalism'. Rather, Heidegger claims, 
'liberalism' as a political theory is to be analysed in terms of the 
phenomenological assumptions upon which it is based. This relates 
to Heidegger's claim, discussed in the previous section, that all 
political doctrines and practices ought essentially to be 
19 For the purposes of this Chapter I will, when talking of Heidegger's treatment, simply use 'liberalism' 
to denote the range of uses indicated above, unless otherwise indicated. 
20 Sections of which are translated by Richard Polt in his article "Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's 
Beitrdge zur Philosophie". 
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understood as the expression of a particular understanding of 
Being, as part of a phenomenological regime. 
Heidegger sees liberalism as defined by an approach to Being 
governed by the "self -sureness" of the person thought of as the "I". 
In asking "who are we? 21", the "meditation on the self" found in 
liberalism refers to: 
the most dangerous subjectivism that lurks in the cult of "personality". Wherever 
personality is posited... everything is moving along the track of the modern thought of 
the "I" and consciousness... all experiences and achievements are carried out merely as 
the expression of "life" which is sure of "itself", and are hence taken to be organizable. 
In principle there is no experience that could ever set man above himself into an 
untrodden realm, on the basis of which man up to now could become questionable. This 
self-sureness is the innermost essence of "liberalism", which for this very reason can 
apparently develop freely and devote itself to progress for all eternity. 22 
Two related things are noteworthy here. Firstly, the simple 
equation Heidegger makes between 'liberalism' and a particular 
(individualistic) account of humanism. Secondly, the link between 
the humanism of liberalism, with its emphasis on the 'self- 
sureness' of the T, and the critique of the exclusive centrality of 
that concept developed in Being and Time and beyond is important. 
The terms Heidegger uses in defining liberalism recall those he 
names as the main obstacles to conceiving of human Being in the 
most full and coherent ways; "the ego cogito of Descartes, the 
subject, the T, reason, spirit, person" (BT, p. 44). The essence of 
liberalism, in Heidegger's eyes, is thus reached by an understanding 
of its essentially subjectivist character- a point reiterated in the 
Nietzsche lectures: 
21 Ibid., p. 662. From Beitrdge p. 48. Italics in original. 
22 Ibid., p. 662. From Beitrdge p. 52-3. Italics in original. 
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"Liberalism, " if with this word we think any sufficiently clear concept at all, is just a 
particular permutation [Abartung] of the fibertas whose essence unfolds as the history 
of modernity ... The history of subjectivity is the history of liberation for the new 
essence of freedom, in the sense of humanity's unconditional self -leg islatio n. 23 
If one relates this characterisation of liberalism to the critique 
of subjectivity as developed in Heidegger's account of modernity a 
number of implications for assessing Heidegger's potential for the 
political theorist become apparent. 
Firstly, Heidegger's critique of liberalism does not constitute an 
outright rejection or refutation. Heidegger's assertion that 
liberalism takes the subjective "I" as central, does mean that he 
analyses liberalism as "metaphysical politiCS"24- as "a particular 
permutation of subjectivism"25. As my discussions on Heidegger's 
critique of subjectivity, as it is developed in his account of 
modernity, should suggest, neither such characterisation renders 
liberalism 'wrong' for Heidegger. 'Permutations of subjectivism' 
are, after all, 'permutations of Being', and metaphysics a part of 
the history of Being. 
The problem of 'liberalism' is not that it is premised on a 
conception of agency that has subjective or metaphysical 
dimensions; a politics based on a conception of Dasein would, in 
this respect, be no different. Rather, the problem for Heide-qqer is 
that liberalism is an expression of a conception of human agency 
which allows for no other dimension. Liberalism, as an expression 
23 Ibid., p. 657. From Nietzsche: Der Europdische Nihilismus, Gesamtausgabe 48 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1986), p. 213. 
24 See Robert B. Pippin's "Heideggerean Postmodernism and Metaphysical Politics" in the European 
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 4, no. I (1996), pp. 17-37. 
25 polt "Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrdge zur Philosophie", p. 657. 
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of humanism, shares the exclusive instrumentalism of that 
position. The problem, again, is not that liberalism makes use of a 
notion of the subject; rather, it is that this notion is framed in 
terms of the self-sureness of the "I", taken as the exclusive means 
to understanding Being. As was discussed in relation to 
Heidegger's conception of humanism and das Gestell, the problem is 
not that a concern with instrumental reason or human being on 
these terms is in itself wrong, but that it remains partial: 
crucially, it is oblivious to the temporality of Being associated 
with the analytic of Dasein. 
Liberalism, therefore, is not viewed by Heidegger as merely the 
wrong set of political emphases. It is not wrongly or falsely 
premised in that sense. The problem which liberalism expresses- 
the domination of the instrumental in understanding Being- cannot 
simply be addressed by a changing of political focus. The reduction 
of the political to the technical is a symptom of a more 
fundamental misconception of the question of the meaning of Being. 
It is this misunderstanding- reflected, but not caused, by 
liberalism- which Heidegger is targeting. 
Heidegger's criticism of liberalism is thus primarily an 
extension of his critique of the instrumental understanding of 
Being expressed in humanist positions. This should be unsurprising 
considering his attack on the modern separation of politics and 
poiesis, and his diagnosis of the domination of the modern 
understanding of the Subject in all aspects of considering the 
question of the meaning of Being. 
Heidegger's point is that liberalism, in common with all 
humanist positions, draws exclusively on instrumental reason in 
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understanding Being, and thus has only a partial conception of 
human agency. The question at hand, therefore, is not whether an 
alternative conception of agency can be found which 'corrects' the 
errors of liberalism, but how a fuller conception of that agency 
would show the conception of politics which gives rise to 
liberalism to be vitiated. 
In his interview with Der Spiegel, Heidegger lends support to 
this reading of his work. Talking of "democracy" and its associated 
concepts, as the catch-all term of the political expression of the 
Western world (i. e. a concept to which the term liberalism equally 
applies), Heidegger claims that 
I would characterize them as half truths because I do not see in them a genuine 
confrontation with the technological world, because behind them there is in my view a 
notion that technology is in its essence something over which man has control. In my 
opinion, that is not possible. 26 
It is not simply liberal politics that Heidegger sees as a half 
truth, but the liberal conception of the political. The "I" which 
liberal politics seeks to defend is an expression of the 
technological humanism which Heidegger believes ought to be 
'confronted'. 
Heidegger analyses liberalism as an expression of the 
phenomenological regime dominated by technological reason. As 
was seen in his critique of subjectivity this does not in itself 
render it false or wrong, and as was discussed in relation to his 
thoughts on modernity Heidegger's conception of Being does not 
26 Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us", p. 105. 
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offer an alternative set of true goals at which he believes an 
authentic politics should aim. 
Heidegger's assertion is, at root, that modern understandings of 
politics are based upon conceptions of agency dominated by 
instrumental reason. It is the dominance of instrumental and 
technical reason in conceiving of agency that remains unconsidered 
and unquestioned. Heidegger's worry, at a political level, is that a 
framing of politics in relation to the constitution and problems of 
that notion of agency will perpetuate the obscuring of the 
partiality and limits of that conception. Heidegger's assertion is 
that the vitiated conception of agency one finds in modernity 
determines an equally vitiated conception of politics and the 
grounds of the political. 
Heidegger's critique of modern politics is based on a diagnosis 
of an underlying fundamental malaise, the dominance of 
subjectivist reason for which he can see no immediate cure. The 
most obvious candidates, philosophical or political reform, are 
themselves based on conceptions of human action which are 
themselves symptomatic of the problem. It might appear prima 
facie that there can be little here apart from the fatalistic despair 
or destructive antipathy which Heidegger's critics, with occasional 
encouragement from Heidegger himself, identify. The dominance of 
technology is not something 'mere human action'- the domain of the 
modern conception of politics- can address. 
Because he situates politics within the realm of subjective 
action, many thinkers have suggested that Heidegger's work offers 
nothing but a leap into a blanket refusal of politics and political 
theory- a nihilist destructionism. Certainly Heidegger's 
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association with Nazism does nothing to counter this claim. 
However, if one looks past the question of why Heidegger chose 
Nazism and asks instead why he came to reject liberal democraCy27 
(and in his later comments the course National Socialism took) one 
finds a different path open. 
Heidegger, as was argued in the previous Chapter, does not 
simply reject the conception of the subject which underlies the 
liberal T, but its finality. Rather, it is the taking of this T as 
exhaustive in conceiving of human agency to which Heidegger 
objects. The problem with liberal politics is not that it makes 
reference to the Subject at all, but that it belongs to au 
understanding of agency which takes the instrumental conception 
as paramount, which leads to a politics that misconceives the 
nature of the political in its fullest sense. Heidegger's claim is 
that whilst politics continues to be conducted on these terms it 
can never be anything more than an extension of an incomplete 
understanding of human being. 
It might, of course, be thought that this is precisely what some 
liberal theorists claim as their central point. On this account, the 
willing and desiring liberal T around which liberal politics is 
based does not need to encompass an exhaustive account of agency. 
Rather, it might be argued, the point is to leave room for the 
Subject to pursue his or her own will and desires. 
Heidegger's suspicion of the politics of modernity is not 
indicative of an absolute refusal of the Subject per se, but instead 
is a claim that so long as politics and the political is defined 
within the terms of that understanding it can embrace only that 
27 This is the line taken by Richard Polt- see "Metaphysical Liberalism in Heidegger's Beitrdge zur 
Philosophie", p. 655. 
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part of human Being. In itself, of course, this is not a problem for 
the liberal, but Heidegger is suggesting that once one understands 
the central role of politics in allowing man to develop a "free 
relationship" both to our humanity and technology the liberal 
conceptions of both the Subject and politics will be seen as 
inadequate. The problem with liberal politics in Heidegger's eyes 
is not that it is liberal, but that it operates with a conception of 
the political that stops politics, in the sense of the polis, being a 
conduit through which an understanding of true freedom might be 
realised. 
The problem is not that liberalism wrongly focuses on just one 
aspect of agency but that that aspect generates a politics which 
strives for an ideal of freedom it does not have the resources to 
meet. A politics which focuses on the technical T at the heart of 
liberalism can only perceive technical problems and solutions in 
terms of that conception. Therefore, Heidegger argues, it cannot 
raise -the most fundamental problem facing human beings in the 
modern age- that of the enmeshment of all human understanding in 
tech nical/instru mental terms. 
For Heidegger, therefore, liberal democratic politics cannot 
deliver its goal- the freedom of the individual- until it reconsiders 
what such freedom entails. The language of agency drawn upon by 
the liberal democrat (and the communist and- later- the National 
Socialist) does not allow for a political realisation of the real 
problem. Considering one of Heidegger's liberal critics, Keith 
Ansell-Pearson puts it thus; 
the political question which continues to haunt us in these late-modern times is one 
which Heidegger asked: is it possible to devise a political system which can 'control' 
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the reifying effects of global technology?... When Richard Wolin castigates Heidegger 
for devaluing the modern project of liberal autonomy, he fails to realise that for 
Heidegger it is not the philosopher who has rendered otiose individual freedom but 
rather the objectification processes of technological modernity. 28 
A number of questions arise from this reading of Heidegger's 
wo rk. Two sets of questions are particularly important. Firstly, 
there are questions about whether Heidegger is right to see liberal 
democratic politics as simply reflecting and repeating the 
philosophical error of an exclusively instrumental conception of 
the self. Secondly, if one finds that elements of the critique of 
liberal democracy as technological are illuminating, there are the 
questions of how (and whether) Heidegger's work can offer an 
alternative conception of the political which addresses these 
problems. 
Section 3) Politics and the Political 
Taking the first family of questions, concerning the 
metaphysical analysis Heidegger gives of liberalism, first, two 
things need to be established. Firstly, the precise nature of the 
problem of taking the T as central needs to be understood and made 
explicit. Doing so requires that one considers the nature of 
politics and the political as they are found in the thinkers and 
tradition Heidegger is criticizing, allowing one to address the 
second set of questions; whether Heidegger's work can incorporate 
such concerns at all. This will pave the way for a consideration of 
how Heidegger's attempts to offer an alternative fail, and to see 
what of the original critique stands. 
28 Ansell-Pearson, "Heidegger's Decline: between Philosophy and Politics", p. 518. 
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3.1 Heidegger and the Problem with the Metaphysical Tradition 
of Politics 
Having given a definition of liberalism in the Beitrige which is 
not narrowed down beyond a politics based on the self-sureness of 
aT based around the notions of will and opinion, Heidegger quickly 
blurs things yet further by including National Socialism and 
communism in the same style of politics. Thus, the important fact 
about liberalism is that it is the volitional subject that is central; 
a focus which is unchanged if that volitional subject is a Fi1hrer or 
a communal 'We'. Hence, just after the writing of the Beitr. 5ge one 
finds Heidegger pre-empting the communitarian critique of 
liberalism, and finding it to be equally shallow: 
Only because and insofar as man actually and essentially has become subject is it 
necessary for him, as a consequence, to confront the explicit question: Is it as an 'T' 
confined to its own preferences and freed into its own arbitrary choosing or as the 
"we" of society... that man will and ought to be the subject that in his modern essence 
he already iS? 29 
The above passage is revealing. Although Heidegger goes on to 
conclude the above discussion with a poem from H61derlin "[t]o the 
Germans"30 and a call to the community to struggle against 
individualism, the problem with modern politics is the assumption 
of a model of human autonomy and identity which is static and 
objectified. For Heidegger, human being is wrongly reified when 
conceived of in terms of instrumental technical reason- a position 
which can hold as true in liberal individualistic as social 
communitarian politics. Heidegger's argument is that shifting 
one's political focus from the individual to the collective does not 
29 Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture", p. 132-3. Italics in original. 
30 Ibid., p. 136. 
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in itself demonstrate that one has abandoned the instrumentalist 
approach to agency. The aim is a political self -understanding that 
reflects the non-instrumental nature of agency; not to find an 
alternative basis on which to inscribe, or respond to, the claims to 
certitude of instrumentalist accounts of agency. 
Having examinE 
the paradigmatic 
consideration of 
criticisms of the 
modernity, I want 
engages the work 
.d Heidegger's account of what might be seen as 
qualitative dimension of politics- found in his 
the Greek conception of the polis- and his 
liberal, democratic and humanist practices of 
now to turn to how Heidegger's critique actually 
of other thinkers. 
3.2 Heidegger, die Politik and das Politische 
Heidegger's contrasting of the Greek polis with the modern 
conception of politics and the state is usefully approached through 
a consideration of the distinction drawn by Ernst Vollrath between 
die Polifik, decision making politics, and the qualitative dimension 
of the political, das Politische3l. Heidegger's analysis suggests 
that he finds that modernity has conflated both dimensions of 
political life with the technical rationality intrinsic to the 
calculative element of die Politik. 
As was discussed in the preceding Chapters, the novelty of 
Heidegger's concern with the processes of rationalisation is his 
identification of the source of the problem; the anthropological 
focus of humanism. It is this, rather than any particular set of 
political practices or focus, that has led to the understanding of 
das Politische in terms of the technological paradigm. 
31 As cited by Fred Dallmayr in his book The Other Heidegger, p. 50. 
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Fred Dallmayr has analysed Heidegger's contribution in the light 
of this distinction. Dallmayr concludes that Heidegger's analysis 
of all Western politics in terms of its technological metaphysical 
roots, and his antipathy to that base, means that Heidegger's 
Upolitics resists direct application- which means at least 
politically, there cannot be an 'applied Heidegger"'32. Heidegger's 
rejection of instrumental reason, Dallmayr believes, leads him to 
have no interest, actual or potential, in the decision making world 
of die Politik. In contrast, Dallmayr does believe that Heidegger 
can, and does, have a contribution to make at the level of da s 
Politisch e- 
Heideggerean thought is not simply nonpolitical or beyond politics (in a transcendental 
and hence metaphysical sense). Instead, paradigmatic reflection infiltrates and 
pervades politics on all sides, but in an oblique and noninstrumental way; to this 
degree, it injects into politics a playful and liberating dimension, one particularly 
crucial in our age wedded to planetary planning and control. 33 
Dallmayr's conclusions are unsatisfactory for a number of 
reasons, however. Firstly, one cannot, as Dallmayr does, simply 
write Heidegger off as having an antipathy towards 'everyday' 
politics (die Politik) in a way which allows one to safely isolate 
the ramifications his thought would otherwise have in that realm 
from an 'acceptable' dimension of divorced paradigmatic reflection 
(das Politische). Heidegger does not make the simple refusal of 
metaphysics which would allow one to argue that his work resists 
direct application. Heideggerean suspicion does involve the 
everyday- however unpalatable the political regime he allied 
himself with. The history of Being cannot be considered without 
32 Ibid., p. 76. 33 Ibid., p. 76. 
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the history of metaphysics, nor can Being be conceived of as a 
theoretical paradigm apart from a practical reality. 
This leads to a second set of objections; what exactly does 
Dallmayr mean when he claims such reflection 'injects into 
politics a playful and liberating dimension'? One could be forgiven 
for wondering exactly what dimension of politics Dallmayr is 
referring to here (let alone what would and would not constitute 
acceptable 'play' from the institutions of the state). Clearly, a 
self-conscious effort to be 'playful' at the level of die Politik is 
unlikely to find much support here. This would be simply 
senseless in the terms of the phenomenological regime of which it 
is a part and/or a self-conscious, and thus self-defeating, attempt 
to avoid instrumental iSM34. 
Alternatively, if Dallmayr intends to inject 'play' into the 
consideration of the qualitative dimension of politics, das 
Politische, more needs to be said about what such play involves and 
how what appears to be a purely contemplative reflection can be 
considered, or effect the, political in any sense at all. 
To explore this point it is salient to recall Stephen K. White's 
attempt to theorise the problem. White (in common with 
Heidegger) does not explicitly use Vollrath's distinction; it might 
appear, however, that in distinguishing between the world- 
disclosing and action co-ordinating aspects of language in the 
approach to ethical and political questions that he is operating a 
similar distinction in order to consider Heidegger's critique. This 
comparison is further encouraged by White's conclusion; that the 
responsibility to act, associated with action co-ordinating reason, 
34 In Oakeshott's words 'A plan to avoid all planning may be better than its opposite, but it belongs to 
the same style of politics. ' 
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ought to be tempered by the introduction of an awareness of a 
responsibility to otherness characterised by the world-disclosing 
aspects of language. 
Dallmayr and White share a belief that Heidegger's contribution 
is to be made at the paradigmatic level of politics in terms of an 
openness to 'otherness'. Of the two, it is White who seeks to 
provide some account of the form this contribution might take. 
However, the distinction between die Politik and das Politische or 
that between the responsibility to act and the responsibility to 
otherness, and the placement of Heidegger's work in one pole or the 
other, in either case is questionable. 
White is highly critical of those 'postmodern' thinkers (Dallmayr 
included35) who seek to consider Heidegger's work as moral or 
political without considering the very stuff of politics-the 
relationships between subjects; intersubjectivity. For White, 
Heidegger's contribution serves to highlight the possible 
"conceptual blindness[es]"36 that a (particularly Habermasian) 
consideration of the responsibility to act might have. What is of 
particular interest here, however, is what White takes that 
'otherness' to involve and, crucially, deliver. 
In fact, White does not digress from the Habermasian line. The 
'otherness' which one needs to take account of is the otherness of 
other agents' narratives. These agents, however, are individuals 
who, ultimately, all can or ought to share in Habermas's 
Universalisierungsgrundsatz- 'All affected can accept the 
consequences and the side effects its general observance can be 
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests 
35 See the footnote on p. 74 of Stephen K. White's Political Theory and Postmodernism. 36 Ibid., p. 140. 
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(and those consequences are preferred to the known 
alternatives)'37. 
What is established, therefore, belongs to the Habermasian 
project of seeking to legitimate constraints on plurality through a 
set of rules arrived at in a discourse that all can find 
authoritative. White sees Heidegger's value in terms of his 
capacity to better determine what sort of discourse can serve this 
purpose: 
The attempt at justification has to move to the narrative dimension. If one is 
persistently pressed to say why the criteria of normative justification ought to be 
understood in a certain way, one is forced to contextualise that judgement 
progressively up to the most general and comprehensive level of narrative about one's 
culture. And at this level, what we have is not simply another, slightly bigger 
narrative... Rather we have a narrative that is recounted to those with whom we 
radically disagree, with the intention of showing them that they could freely recognize 
themselves as having a place within, could find some sense of affirmation within it. 38 
How satisfactory this project of the search for an 
authoritative narrative (and the concept of the political which 
accompanies it) is, are questions I return to later. At present, two 
things are particularly worth noting. 
Firstly, White rightly contends that Heidegger's work has 
nothing to say, directly at least, about the relationships between 
agents/subjects. For White, whatever positions Heidegger offers 
leave the political context at base untouched; the aim remains to 
find universal and general narratives. Any claims relating to the 
37 Eirgen Habermas (tr. Lenhardt and Nicholson) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1990) cited in'Motivating Political Dialogue', paper given by Matthew Festenstein 
at University of Hull, 1995. Italics in original. 
38 White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, p. 142. 
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social/public dimension which Heidegger makes must therefore be 
constrained by the procedural and communicative processes 
appropriate to an era defined by the 'facts' of pluralism and 
diversity. Without a greater deference to the responsibility to 
act- developed from Habermas's conception of critically testable 
propositional truth claims- Heidegger's work remains trapped 
within the monological discourse (that is, premised on the 
objectivist conceit) of the philosophy of subjective consciousness. 
Secondly, therefore, White reads Heidegger from a position 
which views him as offering potential (and ultimately 
illegitimate) courses of action for agents whose basic natures are 
already known. In seeking to frame an account of political 
legitimacy in terms which reflect both the responsibility to act 
and the responsibility to otherness, both 'action' and 'otherness' are 
indexed to desiring, volitional agents whose beliefs and desires 
can ultimately be ordered only by the communicative process 
amongst agents whose valuing of such a community lends that 
process authority. 
If, however, one reads Heidegger's work as calling into question 
precisely such a concept of agency and the associated conception 
of reason, rather than merely a selection of the actions or desires 
such an agent or agents might have, then things are less clear. For 
Heidegger, the hermeneutics of everydayness and suspicion are not 
various ways for human beings to understand either a separate 
world or each other, but part of an attempt to think about the 
conditions which make these experiences possible. 
Two things emerge from examining White's treatment of 
Heidegger. Firstly, White is right to point out that in the absence 
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of an explicit consideration of the relationships between subjects, 
any political contribution, even at a philosophical or paradigmatic 
level, Heidegger could have made remains at most a potential one. 
Secondly, however, in attempting to pursue how that contribution 
might have developed within a nexus of responsibilities (to act and 
to otherness) grounded in a modern conception of moral agency 
White misses the dimension of Heidegger's thought which calls into 
question the uniformity of that conception of agency. 
Approaching Heidegger as a thinker bound by the distinction 
between practical politics (die Politik) and the paradigmatic 
conception of the political (das Politische), or as a thinker 
concerned with how we should treat others will be to find him, at 
best, incomplete. Heidegger is not concerned with how appropriate 
our next political move is, but with the conditions that lead to our 
constitution making such moves possible. In contrast to White's 
distinction between the responsibilities to act and to otherness, 
Heidegger's distinction between the hermeneutics of everydayness 
and suspicion is not intended to reflect various different ways in 
which an agent can relate to others, but to examine how human 
being ought to be understood in the first place. Utilising 
Heidegger's work in order to identify reason and legitimate 
meaning with particular contingent social practices (as Rorty 
doeS39) or (as White does) in terms of a procedural narrative based 
round the ideal of normative discourse which has, at least 
potential, universal applicability in which all could find "some 
sense of affirmation"40 misses the challenge Heidegger lays down. 
Heidegger's intertwined hermeneutics challenge the notion that 
human agency is to be understood in terms of an understanding of 
39 See the discussion of Rorty in my Chapter 'Heidegger and Subjectivism'. 
40 White, Political Theory and Postmodemism, p. 142. 
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either the practices of agents or a transcendental principle that 
they share in common, however conceived or wherever located. 
This claim belongs to the nexus of technological conceptions of 
Being which Heidegger's work questions. Hence, for Heidegger, a 
full understanding of moral or political human relationships has to 
realise that it is not founded in any grounding conception of human 
Being but in Dasein. Dasein is to be understood as the condition for 
any concern with Being; it is prior to any particular concern with 
human agency and reason. The freedom with which Heidegger is 
concerned is not the freedom of human agents thus conceived, but 
of ontological truth. The 'free relationships' to humanism and 
technology which Heidegger's analyses aim at do not aim to 
establish the principles which govern the relationships of subjects 
to the world they find themselves in, but of the conditions which 
much exist for such experience and meaning to be an issue in the 
first place. 
In Heidegger's work this finds its clearest expression in his 
consideration of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason, where 
Heidegger rejects the notion that any basic principle explaining 
human freedom can be made explicit. This is because what is taken 
to constitute a full explanation is based on an assumption of a 
model of self-certitude based on the assertions of a subject or the 
nature of an object which is subordinate to the conditions for 
either type of inquiry to be meaningful at all. Any attempt to 
'solve' the diremption between subject and object thus will fail to 
deliver a basic principle which fully encompasses human being; the 
freedom of Dasein cannot be finally defined in such terms. Thus, 
whether one seeks to locate such a final vocabulary in the 
contingent history of a particular human society and set of 
practices or a set of transcendental universal principles of reason 
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governing individual human agents, the project of finding a 
definitive, knowable and authoritative conception of agency must 
remain open-ended. The otherness with which Heidegger is 
concerned is not the otherness of other agents, but of the 
conditions of human freedom in the first instance. Hence, in The 
Essence of Reasons (1929), Heidegger claims that: 
[F]reedom is the reason for reasons... however, freedom is the "abyss" of Dasein, its 
groundless or absent ground... We must clarify the essence of the finitude of Dasein in 
terms of the constitutive features of its Being before proceeding to any "self-evident" 
definition of the finite "nature" of man, any description of those characteristics which 
follow from finitude alone, and certainly any hasty "explanation" of the ontical 
heritage of finitude. 41 
As Joanna Hodge42 has pointed out, this conception of 
Heidegger's project stresses the specificity of the Aristotelian 
concern with the situation (which she deems an ethical project) 
over any anthropological concerns with the relationships between 
agents whose nature is already assumed. Heidegger's concern with 
agency is how it can come to be meaningful at all, not the various 
ways (universal or particular) in which agents can come to relate 
to each other. 
Section 4) Conclusion: Heidegger and Politics? 
Hodge reads Heidegger's concern with human agency in a world 
in which technological reason has come to dominate as a 
suggestion that "it is necessary to return to the context in which 
political philosophy becomes distinct from moral philosophy and 
41 Hcidegger, The Essence of Reasons, p. 127,129,131. Italics in ofiginal. 42 Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics, see esp. p. 7, p. 203. 
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meta p hys I CS 1143. This thought, that Heidegger's political 
contribution is not at the paradigmatic level of a thought on the 
ways relationships between agents are conceived, but predates 
such an understanding is echoed by Miguel de Beistegui who also 
looks to Heidegger's comments on the Greek polis, adumbrated 
above, as raising the question of what if anything grounds the 
notion that politics has a "proper place"44. 
To those, White amongst them, who maintain that no body of 
thought can have a political dimension until it considers the nature 
of relations between subjects, it may now be replied that 
Heidegger's work need not be understood as at odds with this claim. 
Instead, Heidegger's work challenges the attempt to justify the 
political claims one makes in such a mode through an appeal to the 
finality (transcendental or historico-contingent) of a particular 
conception of the nature of human being. Read this way, Heidegger 
demands that the question of how we ought to treat each other 
morally or politically should not be divorced from an open-ended 
inquiry into what or who it is 'we', as our inquiry, are. The lack of 
one definitive answer is not an indication of an insufficient 
capacity for reason, but of the subordination of that reason to the 
question of the meaning of Being. The finitude of Dasein refers to 
its essential temporality, not the finitude of limited or incomplete 
knowledge. The problem Heidegger diagnoses is not with an 
incompleteness of self-knowledge, but with the incompleteness of 
an outlook which conceives of knowledge in terms of a fundamental 
divide between the enquirer and that which is enquired about. 
Thus, the attempt to delineate a 'proper place' for politics 
understood as the realm of relationships between subjects is not 
43 Ibid., p. 4-5. 
44 de Beistegui, Heidegger & the Political, p. 5. 
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incompatible with Heidegger's work. What is questioned by 
Heidegger are the closures and incompletenesses that he identifies 
with positions which understand human being in ways that hold 
instrumental and technical reason paramount. The notion of 
politics having a 'proper place' is, as it stands, simply one aspect 
of modernity's anthropocentric self -understanding. That finality is 
as strong in Rorty's social ethnocentrism as it is in Habermas's 
appeal to the universality of an ideal speech situation. The 
implications of such a position are drawn out in a different context 
by Alasdair Maclntyre: 
A hostile critique of... [our] self-image might understand it as disguising a situation 
whose moral eclecticism and incoherence are such that fundamental moral and political 
debate cannot provide its politics with a common mind, and that the outcomes of debate 
are often in fact determined not by how the arguments go- the incommensurability of 
standpoints sometimes ensures that they could not be so determined- but by the 
solicitations of power and interest. 45 
In terms of Heidegger's work, the failure to reconcile 
'incommensurable standpoints' within a paradigm of politics 
informed by 'a common mind' or unitary understanding of human 
agency is not surprising. Heidegger's political value is to suggest 
that the search for such a grounding in terms of the modern 
conception of (human) identity echoes and deepens "Nietzsche's 
rebuke that seeing things as similar is merely the sign of weak 
eyes"46. 
The final question to be answered before looking at different 
attempts to try and develop a politics which responds to 
45 Alasdair MacIntyre, "Review of Charles Larmore: The Morals of Modernity and The Romantic 
Legacy", p. 490. 
46 Anthony Julius "Can Censorship ever make sense?: Review of Censorship and Silencing" in The 
Guardian, Saturday June 13th, 1998, p. 9. 
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Heidegger's diagnosis of the limits of the modern conception of 
agency, is whether Heidegger's failure to develop a political 
thought is a necessary result of his own understanding of human 
being. Although Heidegger's critique of instrumental reason means 
that he has no immediate political application, is it also true that 
the nature of his critique rules out any rethinking of the political 
at all? Two reasons might be suggested for this being so; firstly, 
if Heidegger's conception of human agency necessarily ran contrary 
to any possible consideration of the intersubjective dimension and, 
secondly, if it were shown that this conception was completely 
irrelevant to any political consideration (whether of action or 
paradigm) at all. 
Taking the second objection first, some contemporary theorists 
have sought to defend the modern liberal democratic project as, in 
Rawls's counter to his predominantly communitarian critics, 
'political not metaphysical'. Whatever the concessions to social 
embeddedness in the construction of that self- from the 
Rawlsian/Habermasian appeals to a transcendental ideal to the 
emphasis on local and historically contingent practice of Rorty- 
the claim remains that it is more reason which holds the key to 
both the understanding and emancipation of human beings within 
society. The conceptions of reason deployed are diverse but these 
thinkers point, as examined in the previous Chapter, to one or other 
of Heidegger's hermeneutic dynamics as being unreasonable on 
their terms. For White, for example, Heidegger's failure rests in 
his inability to develop an universal account of political identity 
because of an overemphasis on the hermeneutics of suspicion. 
Rorty, by contrast, sees Heidegger's failing as seeking an universal 
account because of an underemphasis on suspicion. Both thinkers 
perceive Heidegger's talk of Being as masking an underlying 
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objectivism that draws on a subjective and arbitrary understanding 
of reason. 
To both objections the defence of Heidegger's work as having 
relevance for the political theorist remains the same. Firstly, the 
claims that Heidegger's work retains an unexamined claim to 
objectivity should be rejected in light of his hermeneutic concern 
with the unsupportability of maintaining that the language of 
substantive objectivity (o r the associated conception of 
subjectivity) is the basic or fundamental mode of human existence. 
Heidegger's work does not aim at providing a substantive 
conception of either human being or social practice, but argues 
instead that these understandings will always be temporal and 
limited in nature. Thus, for Heidegger, an authentic self- 
understanding simply reveals the temporal aspect of Being; it does 
not render an account of human being from which the principles 
required for the founding of a social order can be abstracted. From 
this follows, secondly, a questioning of the conception of politics 
which sees the defence of the 'fundamental' autonomy of agents (or 
the promotion of their values and wills) thus conceived as basic. 
This questioning does not equal a rejection but a diagnosis of 
partiality of that style of politics. For Heidegger, the attempt to 
ground a political understanding in any notion of an universal or 
unchanging understanding of human nature remains marked by the 
necessarily frustrated technological desire for certitude. 
Heidegger offers in his account of technology a twofold argument 
to those who might wonder what the problem of a partial account 
of human agency and politics might be; the inability of the 
traditional philosophical conception of existence (on which modern 
politics is based) to solve its own 'most basic' questions and the 
associated inability of modern societies and states to deliver the 
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goal of freedom which is generated from the philosophy of 
consciousness. 
Hence, if, as I believe one should, one accepts that Heidegger's 
National Socialism does not necessarily follow from his basic 
philosophical position- that is, as argued previously, that his work 
does not demand that one rule out all possibility of talking about 
human agency in terms of subjectivity or metaphysics at all- then 
it is apparent that Heidegger's critique of technology, understood 
as an attack on the hegemony of instrumental reason in conceiving 
of human existence, does raise an important set of questions for 
the political theorist. Heidegger's own reaction to the threat of 
technological modernity does, as his critics suggest, show a 
'crisis' response47 which renders his thought susceptible to the 
Messianic myths of German culture and the perverse extremes of 
the Nazis. As argued above, however, this is not necessarily 
entailed by the philosophical claims within Heidegger's work and 
reflects an absence of, rather than an opposition to, a 
consideration of the intersubjective in his work. Further, his 
'solutions' aside, it is Heidegger's attempts to identify the limits 
of the conception of human being around which the intersubjective 
is based which even those critical of him have to address. 
Reading Heidegger's considerations on the understanding of the 
political in technological modernity apart from his overtly Nazi 
moments what emerges is a critique of attempts to justify 
political power in terms of the defence of the autonomy of the 
individual (or community) where these are taken to be final or 
grounding terms constituted in relation to traditional, humanist 
reasons. Heidegger's legacy, therefore, is indeed to suggest that 
47 See Hans Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis as discussed in the previous Chapter. 
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there is no 'proper' place for the political grounded in these terms; 
to quote Ansell-Pearson " the ethical project of autonomy... is being 
rendered more and more redundant"48. Ansell-Pearson cites global 
capital as the cause of the problem, but Heidegger's work suggests 
that it is rather the instrumental understanding of human being 
(whether 'subjectivist' or 'objectivist') and the very conception of 
ethical autonomy as end which is the origin of human unfreedom. 
Heidegger's own conception of a non-instrumentalist 
understanding of human being, Dasein, remains undeveloped in 
political terms. Heidegger's philosophical considerations are not 
separated from social, cultural and political concerns in a way 
which allows him to develop a clear conception of Dasein that is 
convincingly free of the fundamental instrumentalism of the 
tradition he is criticizing nor, therefore, does he provide any 
outline of how a non-instrumentalist conception of agency might 
inform an understanding of the political dimension. 
1 Directions 
The following Chapters examine recent and contemporary 
thinkers who have claimed to be developing a politics based on, or 
responding to, Heideggerian insights. Heidegger's work as looked at 
thus far provides three themes with which to approach the 
treatment of his work by those seeking to ally his work to political 
concerns. 
Firstly, in each case the primary focus will be on the extent to 
which the conception of agency operated by each thinker actually 
reflects Heideggerian concerns. Of particular interest in this 
48 Ansell-Pearson, "Heidegger's Decline: between Philosophy and Politics", p. 518. 
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regard is the assumption that there is an authoritative mode of 
understanding human being, characterised in terms of Heidegger's 
conception of technological reason, which will serve to deliver the 
base assumptions underpinning a 'right' politics. This theme has 
been touched on in my discussion of the attempts to render Dasein 
in anthropological, pragmatist terms and will be returned to in the 
discussion of Sartre's work which follows this Chapter. 
Secondly, I look at thinkers who have attempted to develop an 
alternative picture of human agency to that based around the image 
of individual self-consciousness. Although this is closer to 
Heidegger's project, and addresses his criticisms of the 
contemporary understandings of politics better than the attempts 
of Sartre, I seek to show that the attempts to develop a politics 
which responds to this image of agency fail. To this end, I examine 
the works of Connolly and Foucault and find that their attempts to 
consider difference and otherness share Heidegger's failure to 
provide an analytics of understanding agency which allows for an 
articulation of the political dimension of the relations between 
agents. 
The final thinker I will look at, Charles Taylor, seeks to develop 
a politics which reflects a conception of agency that does not aim 
at a grounding and objectifying knowledge of our nature. Rather, 
for Taylor (as for Heidegger), reflection upon ourselves- whether 
centred around a substantive conception of the subject or universal 
communicative norms- cannot deliver the self-certainty about our 
natures that is associated with the conceptions of reason that have 
previously emerged. Taylor thus moves away from the project of 
seeking knowledge about ourselves through an isolation of 
privileged capacities, practices or conceptions of reason and 
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instead, like Heidegger, seeks a hermeneutic approach to 
understanding human being. Unlike Heidegger, Taylor gives explicit 
consideration to how this approach might work in the moral and 
political arenas. 
In each instance my interest is in the ways in which these 
thinkers frame moral understandings or analytics from 
Heideggerian claims about agency and, in turn, how they retain an 
inability to ally any revisions in the instrumentalist conception of 
agency to an adequate articulation of the political dimension. 
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Chapter 4: Sartre and the Politics of Existential Freedom 
Introduction 
Aims and Outlines 
Having concluded in the first part of the thesis that Heidegger's 
conception of agency, centred around the account of Dasein, is not 
developed into a theory of either moral or political agency, I now 
turn to the first of three thinkers who have sought to develop these 
dimensions in the light of Heidegger's work. 
For my purposes, Sartre is a natural place to start. That 
Heidegger continues to be read is, in part, due to his influence on 
the French tradition of thought' which is the predominant site of 
the ongoing critique of the modern conception of the subject- 
itself one of the central themes of Heidegger's work. In turn, this 
tradition has largely developed in relation to Sartre's work. Even a 
cursory glance at Being and Nothingness reveals the centrality of 
Heidegger's thought in the early Sartre's mind; Tom Rockmore 
reports that this was echoed in a letter Sartre wrote to Simone de 
Beauvoir in which "he complains that in rereading his journal he 
became aware that the clearest ideas were due to Heidegger"2. It 
is important to note that these concerns are a facet particularly of 
Sartre's early works; as a result this Chapter focuses on that 
period. 
There is an extensive body of literature dealing with this linkage; it is perhaps most thoroughly dealt 
with by Tom Rockmore in his Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism and Being 
and is also the subject, to a lesser extent of Vincent Descombes's Modern French Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut's Heidegger and Modernity 
and Richard Wolin's "French Heidegger Wars". 
2 See Rockmore, Heidegger and French Philosophy, p. 220, n 140. 
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Sartre is of particular interest because he claims, in Being and 
Nothingness, to have discerned both the manner in which Heidegger 
misrepresents the relationships between human beings and the 
reasons underlying this error. Specifically, Sartre thinks that 
Heidegger's conception of Dasein fails to capture the conflictual 
nature of human relationships, bypassing the 'reef' of solipsism by 
submerging the phenomenon of one human's relation to an Other 
within the image of "a creW"3. Sartre thus finds that Dasein cannot 
serve, as Heidegger suggests that it does, as the basis for an 
understanding of the nature of human freedom. 
This Chapter is divided into four Sections. Firstly, I provide a 
brief overview of the foundations of Sartre's project of excavating 
the activity of Being-for-itself in relation to Sartre's own reading 
of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. In doing so, I refer to 
Heidegger's claims in the Letter on Humanism that Sartre's 
conception of the congruence of their concerns is mistaken. 
Secondly, I examine whether Sartre is nonetheless right to assert 
that any adequate conception of human reality and, by extension, 
the relationships between human beings requires a starting point 
that draws on Cartesian origins. This section is concerned with 
the implications of Sartre's decision to remain within the 
philosophy of consciousness. My third section follows Sartre's 
attempt to turn his philosophy to the provision of a theory of 
intersubjectivity. I consider the limits of Sartre's account, in part 
through a comparison with Heidegger's conception of freedom. This 
is continued and concluded in my fourth section which asks 
whether Sartre's failure to give a convincing account of the 
intersubjective dimension of human being is, in fact, illuminated 
3 Jean-Paul Sartre (tr. H. Barnes), Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology 
(London: Methuen, 1972), p. 246. Hereafter BN. 
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by aspects of Heidegger's account which cut deeper into the notion 
of human being than Sartre's focus on individuated consciousness 
allows. 
Section 1) Sartre's Methodological Framework 
1.1 Sartre and Heidegger., Preamble 
Being and Nothingness is a long and complex work marked by 
many influences. That Heidegger is, at the very least in Sartre's 
eyes, one of the key thinkers in the book is undoubted; a notion 
perhaps most powerfully confirmed (the titular similarity aside) in 
Sartre's claim in the Introduction that: 
(c]ertainly we could apply to consciousness the definition which Heidegger reserves 
for Dasein and say that it is a being such that in its being, its being is in question. 
Having delineated what he takes to be the common ground he 
shares with Heidegger, Sartre immediately follows with a 
statement of what he takes to be the crucial difference: 
But it would be necessary to complete the definition and formulate it more like this: 
consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this 
being implies a being other than itself. 
Sartre, in other words, finds human existence to be more than 
simply one, reflexive, facet of an unified Being. Rather, the 
negating capacity which both thinkers ascribe to human being leads 
them in opposite directions. For Heidegger, our existence is 
4 BN., p. xxxviii. 
5 BN., p. xxxviii. 
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fundamentally understood through our participation in the question 
of the meaning of Being. There is nothing about consciousness, 
person or man which, for Heidegger, is apart from Being. The 
temporality of Dasein is fundamentally an aspect of, and a window 
into, Being. 
For Sartre, in contrast, human reality is a distinct and separate 
realm of being. The seeming separateness of consciousness and its 
object, which for Heidegger is indicative of a more fundamental 
unity within the ontology of Being, signifies instead for Sartre a 
fundamental division within reality. Human being, as conscious 
being, is a different type of being from the rest of the world. 
Further, conscious being as being-for-itself is in fact marked by 
being apart from Being altogether: "Man is the being through whom 
nothingness comes to the world"6. Being and Nothingness is thus 
partly constituted by an attempt to revise the formal implications 
which Heidegger draws from the reflection upon the appearance of 
reality. In order to examine these differences a brief account of 
Sartre's contrasting methodological structure and development is 
required. 
1.2 Sartre's Humanist Foundations 
Human being is treated by Heidegger as fundamentally defined by 
the temporality of Dasein, and thus the disclosure and 
disclosedness of Being. Thus, in Heidegger's view, there is nothing 
fundamental about human existence that cannot be rendered 
transparent in terms of Being. The analysis of Dasein is therefore 
an analysis of the different manners in which Being comes to have 
BN., p. 24. 
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meaning. There is, beyond what follows from this, nothing that is 
authentically essential about human being. Hence, one finds in 
Being and Time a rejection of any attempt to treat any further 
aspects of human being, whether conceived of as the ego cogito, 
subject, T or consciousneSS7 as fundamental. Being and Time and 
the works that follow are a thoroughgoing critique of any position 
which prejudices the question of the meaning of Being through an 
acceptance of the unexamined basic categories of substantive 
subject/object-ivity. 
Sartre, however, places human reality at the very centre of his 
philosophy. The human subject is not, as it is for Heidegger, 
simply of interest to Sartre insofar as it is a clue to a 'deeper' or 
more fundamental question of Being. In fact, the basic question of 
Being and Nothingness is, as Sartre acknowledges in the first 
paragraph of the main body of the book8 the same as that which 
motivated Descartes; how am I to understand my relation to the 
world? Thus, although Sartre rejects the Cartesian attempt to 
establish the imagination as the unifying moment of soul and body, 
he nonetheless remains centred on the conception of the human 
subject. 
To see how Sartre's different philosophical origins underpin 
different philosophical and, ultimately, political conclusions from 
those of Heidegger requires a more detailed account of his 
ontology. 
7 See my previous Chapter, "Heidegger and the political", especially pp. 129-130xx. 8 BN., p. 3. 
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1.3 Sartrean Ontology 
Sartre's departure point is the existence of reflexivity. Given 
the existence of consciousness which, following Descartes, Sartre 
takes as the indisputable foundation of all that can be known about 
our Being, Sartre then goes on to excavate what can be known of 
that Being. Unlike Descartes, Sartre's theory is atheistic and thus 
Being is not from the first indexed to the existence of a deity. 
Further, the Being with which he is concerned is human Being; the 
ontology that he seeks to provide is aimed at giving an account of 
human existence. This contrasts strongly with Heidegger's efforts 
to distance his conception of his own 'scientific' method from 
either empiricism or the human sciences. 
One way to conceive of the difference between Heidegger and 
Sartre here is to ask how one might heuristically understand 
'Being' and reflection upon it by human beings at the outset of their 
treatises. For Heidegger, the question of the meaning of Being is 
perhaps best understood as an attempt to understand the widest 
range of phenomena possible, with no preconceived target about 
which knowledge is sought. Destruktion, the search for 
transparency and the hermeneutics of suspicion all testify to 
Heidegger's desire that, in seeking to address the question of the 
meaning of Being, the focus on human beingshould not import 
hidden assumptions. As Heidegger's later critiques of humanism 
display, the emphasis on the individual subject or self is simply a 
manifestation of Being, not a category of Being within itself. In 
other words, humanity apart is never the final explanandurn. 
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Sartre, on the other hand, frames the ontological problem in a 
more traditional manner. Sartre follows Husserl in asserting that 
"knowledge refers to consciousness" and that "[a]ll consciousness, 
as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something"9. Sartre's 
project thus remains formally Cartesian. What can be known of 
Being can be known only as the result of the activity of 
consciousness. Sartre has an alternative account, of course, of 
what can be taken to follow from this in terms of the constitution 
of the cogito but his philosophy is fundamentally Cartesian in its 
taking as central the problem of the two regions of Being 
uncovered by consciousness. Sartre aims in Being and Nothingness 
to furnish an ontology which will serve as an "examination of the 
in-itself - which is never anything but what it is- which will 
allow us to establish and to explain its relations with the for- 
itself"10. It is through this analysis that Sartre will provide his 
account of the human subject. 
1.3.1 Sartre and Husserl 
Following Descartes, Sartre takes the fundamental ontological 
question to be that of the relation of man to his world; a 
relationship defined by the conscious subject and its relation to 
its object. In analysing that relationship, Sartre retains the belief 
that all that can be known must be founded on what can be shown 
to necessarily follow from the existence of that relationship. 
Sartre, however, follows Husserl in using the doctrine of 
intentionality to challenge both the conclusions Descartes draws 
9 BN., P. xxvii. 
10 BN., pp. xlii-xliii. 
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and the depth of his methodical doubt' 1. In assessing how our 
perceptions can be said to meaningful, Husserl suggests that what 
is required is not simply the assertion that our self-consciousness 
is consciousness of ourselves as a psychophysical entity which 
straddles the separation between mind and body. Rather, Husserl 
argues, in order to determine what we can know about 
consciousness and ourselves we can take as apodictic only that 
evidence which is derived from the essence of intentional acts per 
se. 
Husserl therefore extends Descartes methodical doubt in a 
Platonic way. Meaning, knowledge and certitude can all be derived 
only by an analysis of how anything comes to be intelligible, and 
that analysis ought to be eidetic, or essentialist, rather than 
idiosyncratic or arbitrary. The essence of any meaning implies, 
Husserl argues, an act of cognition and an object about which that 
cognition is about. Intentionality thus states that "consciousness 
only exists as consciousness of'12. Husserl, as was seen previously 
however, retains the aim of establishing how one can come to know 
what we do about the world; he continues to seek to explain how 
mental states relate to their object. As Hodge has put it, the 
notion is of "meaning as constituted through a relation between 
thought as cognition and thought as that which is thought about, 
with a fulfilment of meaning in the actual existence of the 
object"13. We can know about ourselves only that which follows 
from the analysis of the necessary formal structures implied by 
II For a discussion of Husserl's doctrine of intentionality see my previous Chapter, 'Heidegger and the 
Critique of Subjectivism'. 
12 Leo Fretz, "Individuality in Sartre's philosophy" in Christina Howells (ed. ), The Cambridge 
Companion to Sartre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 72. Italics author's own. 
13 Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics, p. 184. 
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consciousness- not what is suggested by the content of particular 
perceptions themselves. 
For Husserl, therefore, the Cartesian Ego is overblown. The 
intentional act, in its essence, proves nothing beyond an Ego which 
is constituted by "the contents of phenomena and the place where 
they appear" 14. It is this conception of place, not as res extensa or 
matter, but simply as a "transcendental 'field' "15 which is the 
Husserlian Ego. The Ego, transcendental to any particular 
conscious representation does not, as Descartes argued, have the 
character of a substantive entity. It is, for Husserl, simply the 
constancy which underlies the sense of personhood which lies 
outwith, but binds, any individual's set of conscious 
representations. 
From a concern with what can be known about human beings 
from their perceptions of reality, Husserl's analysis retains a 
fundamental and Cartesian dualism between the knowing subject 
and the objects about which it seeks knowledge. Husserl attempts, 
however, to ground an epistemology which, unlike Descartes's, is 
founded entirely in terms of an analysis of self-grounding 
consciousness which is free of external metaphysical 
commitments. 
Leo Fretz has pointed oUt16 that just as Husserl radicalises 
Descartes so Sartre radicalises Husserl. Expanding the conception 
of the extent of doubt required to establish what can be known 
against the rigours of scepticism, Sartre argues that Husserl's 
14 L. Kolakowski, Husserl and the Searchfor Certitude, p. 40. 
15 P. Thevenaz, What is Phenomenology?, p. 69. 
16 Fretz, "Individuality in Sartre's philosophy", p. 72. 
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conception of the Ego retains too much unestablished metaphysical 
assumption. This, Sartre claims, is because Husserl is content to 
take acts of perception as the subject matter of his supposedly 
eidetic analyses of consciousness, when, in fact, this merely 
amounts to a question-begging of what one wishes to establish- 
the constancy of individuated human being. 
Sartre argues that Husserl's taking of acts of perception as the 
raw material of his analyses is overdetermined and contrived. 
Husserl says that he sees perception as a suitable source of 
evidence because it provides a model of clarity and stability in a 
way which, for example, the inconstancy of the emotions does 
not17. Sartre finds these illegitimate criteria to operate in 
selecting one's examples. They ensure that those phenomena which 
run contrary to the conclusion one wishes to reach- the 
establishment of the Ego as constant and binding- are excluded 
from consideration. In other words, the transcendental Ego as the 
source of ongoing individual personhood is no more convincing than 
the Cartesian substantive Ego, and ultimately amounts to a 
theoretical fudge of the sort instanced by Descartes's recourse to 
the pineal gland. 
Sartre's alternative is to address what he considers Husserl's 
methodological error, and to include all intentional transactions 
(including those of imagination and emotion as well as of 
perception) in the consideration of what it is that underpins and 
binds these acts. Pace Husserl, Sartre seeks to show that the 
sense we have of ourselves as individuated and unitary can be 
established through an examination of consciousness and, 
17 On this see Robert Cumming "Role-Playing: Sartre's transformation of Husserl's phenomenology" in 
C. Howells (ed. ), The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, p. 46-7. 
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therefore, without an appeal to a transcendental ego. Thus, 
although Sartre continues to start with the notion of 
consciousness, he attempts to show that the experience of our 
individuality and personhood can be derived from the analysis of 
consciousness alone. Sartre considers himself to be borrowing 
from Heidegger in seeking to show that the Ego is not radically 
detached from the world in a way which demands the explanation 
of that separation; rather human being is associated with a 
conception of consciousness as an activity within the world. 
To understand these claims one needs an account of how Sartre 
believes Husserl's account of human being can be derived and 
improved upon by a focus on conscious activity alone and, secondly, 
how Sartre's account differs from Heidegger's. 
1.3.2 Being-for-itself, Consciousness and Human Being 
Being-for-itself, human being, is set aside from the other sorts 
of entity in existence, Beings-in-themselves, as conscious being. 
Sartre does not equate consciousness and Being-for-itself; 
consciousness is rather the defining activity of Being-for-itself. I 
have already discussed above the intentional nature of 
consciousness- the task now is to show how Sartre assigns 
individual personality to the activity of consciousness. 
Consciousness is, for Sartre, the means by which Being-for- 
itself brings nothingness to the world. Consciousness, as the 
activity by which being is both revealed and negated has three 
moments for Sartre. 
166 
The first is intrinsic to all meaning as an aspect of 
intentionality. Beings first become differentiated from the rest of 
Being by consciousness by means of a conscious negation of the 
object as not being anything else. In other words a book appears as 
a book by way of its not being an armadillo, a jacket, or any other 
of the alternative meanings that might be attached to it. Without 
this first negation the part of the world I posit as a book would be 
undifferentiated from the rest of Being and it is thus through this 
negating that consciousness can be said to bring Being into the 
world, through its role as meaning endowing activity. 
The second negation is more complex. In being aware of an 
entity, e. g. a book, as there I imply that my consciousness is a 
presence to the object, and that the object is not my awareness. 
There is, in other words, an implicit pre-reflective awareness of 
the acts of consciousness as separated from their object. Fretz 
has characterised this second moment of consciousness as 
"nonpositional consciousness of itself"18, where 'itself' refers to 
the awareness of perception which constitutes the first moment of 
consciousness. 
This second step, which marks the first move towards the 
personalisation of consciousness, leads to a third step which 
Sartre sees as both explaining what one means by using the term T 
or 'Me' and as being derived from consciousness alone. The final 
negation is of the second moment of consciousness, in which the 
unity of the awareness of perceptions is itself the object. 
18 Fretz, "Individuality in Sartre's philosophy", p. 76. 
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Sartre thus rejects Husserl's conception of a consciousness 
transcendent Ego, and instead makes the Ego a facet of conscious 
activity itself. Sartre attempts, in Being and Nothingness, to show 
how this account of consciousness can underpin a full and proper 
understanding of human reality. 
Heidegger, of course, objected to the rendering of Dasein as 
human reality; a point he made at length in the Letter on Humanism, 
and which was discussed in my preceding two Chapters. The extent 
to which Sartre was, at the time of writing Being and Nothingness, 
aware of the importance of this difference despite his expressed 
closeness to Heidegger's work is debatable'9. For my purposes, 
however, it is enough simply to note that there is a significant 
difference between the two, centred around Sartre's retention of a 
Cartesian humanism. 
Some commentators reject or dismiss Sartre's work as a 
regressive misunderstanding or underestimate of Heidegger's break 
with tradition20; a tendency encouraged by the bluntness of 
Heidegger's own attack in the Letter on Humanism. It is clear that 
there are fundamental and important differences between the two, 
as outlined above, but the following section will now provide an 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Sartre's sticking with 
the Cartesian path as a precursor to the third section which cashes 
out the political implications of this decision for both Sartre and 
Heidegger. 
19 For a treatment of this topic see Christina Howells's "Conclusion: Sartre and the deconstruction of the 
subject" in C. Howells (ed. )The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, esp. pp. 344-350. 
20 An accusation levelled by, for example, Rockmore in Heidegger and French Philosophy, but denied by 
Ferry and Renaut in Heidegger and Modernity, p. 95-97. Howells gives a review of some of Sartre's 
detractors, as ibid. 
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Section 2) Sartre and the Philosophy of Consciousness 
There would, of course, be much more to be said in an exhaustive 
account of the philosophical differences between the respective 
projects of Heidegger and Sartre. This might take the form of a 
return to a study of the coherence of the Sartrean cogito compared 
with the integrity of Dasein within the rest of Heidegger's oeuvre. 
In the latter case I have suggested that I would view Being and 
Time as more consonant with the rest of his work than some, and 
thus would read Dasein as a forerunner of Heidegger's later 
concerns rather than simply an early humanist infection. Although 
interesting, I want to leave a further examination of these themes 
aside in order to examine instead the philosophical consequences 
of the differences between the two, with a view to looking at the 
extent to which the political contrasts between Heidegger and 
Sartre can be attributed to the play of these divisions. 
The first stage in this process is to examine Sartre's claim that 
the analysis of Dasein fails to adequately account for human 
reality, and why he believes that retaining a focus on the paradigm 
of consciousness addresses the inadequacies he diagnoses. 
2.1 Sartre on Dasein 
In seeking to account for how what is apparent comes to be so, 
Sartre remains, as the subtitle of Being and Nothingness suggests, 
a phenomenological ontologist. In making individual human reality 
the absolute ontological basis of meaning, however, Sartre departs 
from Heidegger's position in which the experience of the individual 
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human Being is taken to indicate a more fundamental, and pre- 
ontological, structure to meaning. 
Whether or not he is right in his claim that Sartre simply sees 
past the true extent of the departure from the humanist way which 
Dasein represents, Heidegger is quite correct to identify a 
concentration on the individual human consciousness as the 
difference between himself and Sartre. In Being and Time 
Heidegger argues that the oldest questions of traditional 
philosophy, crystallised in the works of Descartes and Kant, did not 
require the answers it had always been presumed that it was the 
philosopher's role to give. Whereas Heidegger's suggestion is that 
this was because the questions themselves were symptoms of a 
fundamental error in thinking about Being, Sartre goes some way to 
confirming Heidegger's diagnosis of the differences between them 
by reading Heidegger as having laid the groundwork for a more 
adequate approach to these questions. 
Thus, in Being and Nothingness, Sartre praises Heidegger for 
providing a method (phenomenological ontology) with which to 
examine Being, but retains the Cartesian emphasis on the 
representation of the world by the conscious individual and, hence, 
criticizes Heidegger for failing to flesh out certain dimensions of 
that entity. Although the attempt to utilise Heideggerean 
arguments in Carte sian-i nspi red debates about consciousness may 
seem, at best, odd2l, what is of interest in the context of this 
study is Sartre's assertion that Heidegger's account fails on three 
counts. 
21 Fretz, "Individuality in Sartre's philosophy", p. 80. Essentially Fretz's point is the one Heidegger 
makes in the Letter on Humanism; a choice needs to be made between a metaphysical and a non- 
metaphysical framework. 
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Firstly, as has been discussed in the previous section, Sartre 
believes that Dasein can be best understood in terms of a refined 
understanding of consciousness. At heart, this reveals a 
fundamental difference in the theoretical concerns of the two 
thinkers. This leads to Sartre's second criticism, viz that 
Heidegger misrepresents freedom. I consider this claim 
immediately below, but Sartre's assertion is that freedom is 
constituted in the activity of the individual human conscious, and 
that it is this which is responsible for being and beings coming to 
have the meanings they do. Thirdly, and of particular relevance to 
the criticisms of Heidegger looked at in the previous part of this 
project, Sartre accuses Heidegger of having an inadequate account 
of human being which leads him to have an inadequate account of 
the nature of intersubjectivity. 
2.2 Sartrean Ontology and the Centrality of Consciousness 
As was seen above, consciousness is at the absolute root of 
Sartrean ontology. In a world where anything appears as anything 
at all, consciousness is necessarily entailed and further, argues 
Sartre, close study reveals that it is consciousness that gives 
meaning to the world. 
In Sartre's philosophy the centrality of consciousness as the 
source of meaning and knowledge of the world, rather than simply 
the means of access to it, is reflected in his basic ontological 
distinction between Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself. For 
Heidegger what is immediate is the question of the meaning of 
Being: for Sartre it is consciousness ofthe question of Being which 
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is fundamental. Thus in the first Chapter of Part Two Of Being and 
Nothingness Sartre states boldly where he finds Heidegger to have 
failed. How, asks Sartre, "could there be an understanding which 
would not itself be the consciousness (of) being understanding? "22 
In other words, Sartre implies, what Heidegger and the analytic of 
Dasein are blind to is the cogito through which any meaning of 
Being comes to presence to the self. Without the basic distinction 
between those entities which merely appear and those entities to 
which things appear, Sartre contends that Heidegger's account of 
human reality will lapse into a description of the phenomenon of 
our existence in the terms of thing-hood. The error here is not to 
inscribe existence simply in terms of substantia, as Heidegger 
criticizes Descartes and his successors for doing, but to miss what 
it is that separates off human being from the rest of being. 
For Sartre, this mistake consists in describing human being in 
terminology which applies to Being-in-itself; inanimate ad 
unconscious being. It is self-evident from the experience of first- 
order awareness, claims Sartre, that Being is fundamentally riven 
by a divide between those beings that exist simply in light of the 
manner of their being and those beings which are defined rather as 
overflowing their being, as the means by which nothingness and 
meaning enter the world. The latter, Being-for-itself, is conscious 
being23; it is around the link between being and consciousness that 
Sartre's ontology revolves. 
In analysing Heidegger's work in terms of the success of a 
description of human reality, Sartre mistakes Heidegger's 
22 BN., p. 73. 
23 For a discussion of the various complexities of the ways in which Sartre uses the terms 
'consciousness' and 'Being-for-itself see Bames's section 'Embodied Consciousness' in her essay "Sartre's 
Ontology", esp. pp. 20-22, in C. Howells (ed. ), The Cambridge Companion to Sartre. 
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intentions. The difference between the two here is best 
understood by examining Heidegger's identification of the basis or 
origin of meaning as pre-ontological. Dasein uncovers the meaning 
of Being, but it does so neither as representing Subject nor as the 
creator of meaning. Heidegger is clear that he focuses on Dasein 
because it provides access to Being, of which it is an aspect. Any 
account and any ontology are, however, derived from a horizon of 
meaning and Being which extends beyond any conscious reflection. 
Thus, Heidegger accepts that talk of the Subject and consciousness 
are meaningful but not primordial. 
My first Chapter dealt with what Heidegger means when talking 
of 'fundamental' or 'primordial'. What is of importance here is that 
Heidegger, having considered that the most transparent or 
indubitable entity might be the conscious T, rejects such a notion. 
Thus, Heidegger accepts the possibility of a "formal phenomenology 
of consciousness"24 but it remains only a derivative concern; 
merely an attempt to understand one region of Being. 
It is this belief to which Sartre takes particular exception. Any 
account which does not take consciousness as central will 
necessarily fail to distinguish between the two regions of Being 
(for- and in- itself). Sartre reads Heidegger as pointing towards 
an account which can be used to properly understand human Being 
by placing it in a concrete and discrete ontology, in which it stands 
apart from the world to which it attributes meaning. As Heidegger 
was later to protest, and as Being and Time itself makes clear, the 
treatment of Dasein as basically a tool in the Cartesian effort to 
study the nature of human reality is mistaken. Nonetheless it is 
24 BN., p. 15 1. 
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this outlook that prompts Sartre's most basic charge against 
Heidegger; that "the Dasein has from the start been deprived of the 
dimension of consciousness, it can never regain this dimension"25. 
Both Being and Time and Being and Nothingness profess to be 
works of phenomenological ontology. Heidegger considers the use 
of that method, in the analysis of Dasein, to aim at the provision of 
a formal (although concrete) interpretation [in terpre tie rung] of the 
question of the meaning of Being. For Heidegger, the aim of 
fundamental ontology is not to determine the structure of how 
men, or a man, inhabits the world, but to establish how things 
come to show themselves as they do. His notions of transparency 
[durchsichtigkeit] and Destruktion are not intended to signify that 
his work gives an explicit structure of Being, but rather form part 
of a philosophical approach which opposes that project in the first 
place; whether explicitly undertaken or implied by an acceptance of 
the tenets of humanism. In Sartre's work,, by contrast, it is human 
reality, conceived of as conscious Being-for-itself, that is the 
pivot and subject of his ontology in itself. 
Given the different object of the two studies, the convergence 
and divergence of their terminology at different moments can be 
used to demonstrate the disparity of the two projects almost ad 
nauseam. Having identified Heidegger's own perceived 
antihumanism as the fundamental division between the two. 
however, this study does not need to identify all such moments. 
What is relevant are the reasons Sartre gives for Heidegger's 
inability to give any account of the political dimension of 
experience. As was stated above, Sartre's charge is that Heidegger 
25 BN., p. 73. 
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is unable to give an adequate account of human reality as a result 
of seeing consciousness as simply one aspect, rather than the 
central pivot, of Being. To understand this does not require a 
survey of the full breadth of both thinkers' ethical horizons; a 
comparison of the two on the nature of freedom and the 
relationship to other individuals will suffice. 
2.3 Sartre's Notion of Freedom 
2.3.1 Heidegger on Freedom: Recap 
Heidegger, as was seen in the previous Chapter26, has a radical 
notion of freedom that he is at pains to divorce from any 
emancipatory ideal associated with either the subjective 
individual T or collective 'We'. Freedom, on Heidegger's account, 
consists of an understanding of (and approach to) Being that allows 
things to show up in ways which do not overlay them with 
technological preconceptions or judgements that overlook how 
beings come to have the meanings they do. Heidegger, thus, does 
not provide an account of political freedom but of how certain 
political understandings reflect ontological understandings that 
are unfree; Heidegger talks of freedom in terms of 'free 
relationships' to technology and humanism, for example. Freedom 
is not, therefore, a basic or essential capacity or ability of the 
self, but of the context of the interpretation of phenomena as a 
whole. 
Conceptions of the state that centre on the liberty of the 
individual or collective are analysed by Heidegger as further 
26 See my Chapter'Heidegger and the Political'. 
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manifestations of the technological/humanist understanding of 
Being. Although this does not necessarily rule out discussion of 
how political life can make humans more free, Heidegger's 
objection is that this is already a monopolistic hegemony. What is 
required, both philosophically and politically, is not more 
considerations of how human being can be made more subjectively 
liberated but a fresh consideration of what these aims entail. 
Heidegger thus shuns talk of the modern state in terms of a return 
to a consideration of the Greek conception of the poliswhich looks 
instead at how all aspects of life can become dominated by the 
technological humanism that he sees as characterising all modern 
life. 
Sartre's treatment of the concept of freedom is rooted in his 
humanist foundations. Exactly how Sartre theorises freedom is to 
be found in his analysis of bad faith. 
2.3.2 Sartre, Bad Faith and Freedom 
Sartre defines conscious being in relation to the absolute 
freedom of the negating activity which characterises 
consciousness. Consciousness, in other words, cannot be viewed in 
the same way as Beings-in-themselves; rather it is undetermined 
and indeterminable. Conscious being, Being-for-itself, is Being 
which has nothingness at its heart; that is it is always able to 
transcend any thinglike nature which one might ascribe to it. 
It is important at this point to be clear about the distinction 
between consciousness and Being-for-itself which was mentioned 
above. The two are not synonymous- consciousness is not, for 
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example, to be conceived of as a soul inhabiting a body. Instead, 
Sartre suggests that the attempt to understand human being on the 
Thomist model misses the point. There is no gap between the 
mental and the physical to be bridged, nor is the body a tool which 
consciousness uses. Rather, Sartre says that "consciousness 
exists its body"27. 
The intimate embodiment of consciousness, and more generally 
its necessary participation in the realm of Being-in-itself, Sartre 
calls the facticity of Being-for-itself. This might seem 
contradictory; if transcendent consciousness is necessarily 
embodied, does this embodiment (its facticity) not constitute a 
limit on the absolute freedom which Sartre suggests characterises 
Being-for-itself? This, however, is an error caused by the 
conflation of consciousness with Being-for-itself. The entity that 
is free is Being-for-itself. This is not because it owns or contains 
consciousness; Being-for-itself does not exist between the poles 
of its transcendence and facticity but is composed of them. The 
facticity of Being-for-itself should not be seen as a limit or 
constraint acting upon the individual, but simply facts constitutive 
of the situation in which freedom comes to exist and be expressed. 
Failing to make this distinction would lead one to think that 
consciousness was free but Being-for-itself is not. In fact, 
freedom is a description of the constant and inescapable activity 
of Being-for-itself, performed in a necessary context and directed 
by consciousness. 
His humanist origins and the notions of Being-for-itself, 
consciousness and freedom, thus combine to mould Sartre's basic 
27 BN., p. 73. Italics in original. 
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concern in Being and Nothingness; the description of human being in 
terms of absolute freedom. Moreover, it is this nexus of concerns 
which leads Sartre (echoing Heideggerian terminology although not, 
Heidegger insists, meaning) to frame the leit-motiv of 
existentialism; that "existence comes before essence"28. 
It is through the analysis of Bad Faith that Sartre pursues and 
presents his account of what he takes to be the fundamental aspect 
of human existence: freedom. Drawing on his skills as a novelist 
Sartre presents various, by now famous, situations (the waiter, the 
coquette) through which he seeks to excavate human freedom. 
Bad Faith/self -deception [mauvaise foil is the denial, implicit 
or explicit, that one is truly free. This is motivated, argues 
Sartre, by the desire to avoid the anguish which accompanies the 
realisation that one's freedom makes one wholly responsible for all 
that one is and does. This can be done in one of two ways; an 
identification with one's being not in terms of Being-for-itself, 
but with just one of the two poles of which it is composed. 
Sartre's first example is that of an individual who seeks to deny 
his freedom and responsibility by identifying his existence solely 
with his facticity. Thus the waiter seeks to immerse himself in 
the role of a waiter, telling himself that he has no choice but to 
carry the tray just so, to wipe down the tables this way and so on. 
Sartre accepts that particular roles come with particular scripts, 
but is unequivocal when it comes to the freedom of that individual 
to stop playing any particular role he has chosen to pursue. There 
28 Jean-Paul Sartre, (trans. P. Mairet) Existentialism and Humanism (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd 
1980), p. 26. Italics in original. For Heidegger's formulation of the relationship between existence and 
essence see BT., pp. 67-9, and, of course, The Letter on Humanism for Heidegger's distancing of his 
formulation from Sartre's. 
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is no role which we cannot give up; the transcendence of Being- 
for-itself cannot be obliterated by circumstances. 
Sartre is equally certain about the futility of the alternative 
path of self-deception. Denying one's facticity, rather than one's 
capability to transcend it, is also necessarily a deception. Sartre 
uses the example of a coquette who seeks to deny responsibility 
for her impending acceptance of her seduction by seeking to 
identify her existence entirely with her transcendence. To this 
end, Sartre describes a scene in which a woman flirting with a 
paramour, distances herself from the responsibility which attends 
that situation by identifying her self as a disembodied 
consciousness. Her body- she tells herself- is a possession of, but 
not constitutive of, her inner self; further, since it generates the 
sexual desires causing her future seduction, she is neither 
responsible nor able to resist. 
Sartre is clear that this is simply another version of the same 
self-deception. The account of Bad Faith serves two purposes in 
Being and Nothingness; it solicits a phenomenological/anecdotal 
agreement from the reader and, Sartre argues, offers a proof of the 
ontology of consciousness he has offered. To understand why he 
thinks this to be so one needs to examine what it is that Sartre 
claims the existence of Bad Faith reveals, and why. 
Conscious being, Being-for-itself, cannot be defined wholly in 
terms of either of its two poles- the self is a meld of the quality 
of transcendence with its necessary embodiment. The 
intentionality of consciousness, whilst adequate for the 
apprehension of Being-in-itself, is unable to represent its own 
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nature to itself. Faced with its own being, self-consciousness is 
unable to represent its own condition: the attempt to present 
consciousness as its own object necessarily mistakes the 
Nothingness beyond being that characterises Being-for-itself. 
Thus, although Sartre's initial examples show Bad Faith in its 
aspect as a psychologically attractive fiction (which one might 
avoid given greater sincerity), its more fundamental aspect is- 
because of its intrinsic link to the basic structure of intentional 
representation- unavoidable. It is this aspect that is crucial to 
Sartre; having elicited a recognition of the symptom he purports to 
show what must be the cause. 
I will leave a consideration of the persuasiveness of Sartre's 
theory of consciousness and the reliability of his method until 
after the next step, which is to consider how Sartre's account of 
human freedom informs his accounts of interpersonal 
relationships. 
Section 3) Sartre and Being-for-Others. 
Preamble: Reasons for focusing on the early Sartre, 
Sartre's thought frequently leads him to make pronouncements 
on ethical and political matters but, like Heidegger, these 
comments are never developed into an ethics or politics. In 
contrast to Heidegger, however, Sartre does not explicitly reject 
the project of providing an ethiCS29. Indeed, Juliette Simont 
argues, much of Sartre's work reads as an ethical commentary on 
29 Although this is not to discount Joanna Hodge's study, Heidegger and Ethics, which argues for the 
importance of ethics as a motif underpinning Heidegger's work. 
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the "ethical problematiC90 made in his two main works (Being and 
Nothingness and the Critique of Dialectical Reason). 
Given Sartre's lack of explicit focus on a theory of either ethics 
or politics, this study will not attempt to extract one from the 
detailed comments on either problematic made by Sartre, most 
expansively in the Critique of Dialectical Reason3l. This is not 
because I consider Sartre's later work to be irrelevant, or the 
differences from his earlier work insignificant, to a proper 
understanding of his thought, but because the very importance of 
his later formulations illuminates the limits of his earlier work. 
In assessing whether Heidegger has any insights to offer or 
underpin those seeking to develop a political theory it is Sartre's 
earlier work which is most revealing. Therefore, it is not Sartre's 
later theoretical moves that are of interest, but the limits and 
conflicts of the earlier work. 
3.1 Sartre, Solipsism and Ethics 
Although it does not constitute an ethics, one of the central 
themes of Being and Nothingness is evidently to clear the space for 
that project; indeed the final sentences of the book are a 
promissory note to deliver such a work. An exposition of the bars 
to a proper understanding of ethics and morality in the work of 
others is, therefore, a recurring theme of Being and Nothingness. 
Sartre's position, in this regard, is radical. He takes from 
Heidegger the belief that philosophers have previously 
30 Juliette Simont "Sartrean Ethics" in C. Howells (ed. ), The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, p. 178. 
The texts by Sartre in question are the Notebooksfor an Ethic (1947), The Rome Lectures and The Cornell Notes (1964 and 1965 respectively), see Simont p. 178. 31 Jean-Paul Sartre (tr. A. Sheridan-Smith), Critique of Dialectical Reason, (London: New Left Books, 
1976). 
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misunderstood human being as a result of a fascination with 
explanations and ontologies that seek identification with a 
suprahuman certainty. He departs from Heidegger in suggesting 
that this realisation leads one to individuated human 
consciousness rather than a concern with Being. By focusing on, 
and attempting to understand, human being through Heideggerian 
concepts Sartre's work seeks to combine the two perspectives; a 
project Fretz is far from alone in viewing as an "attempt to realize 
the impossible"32. 
These qualms aside, it is useful to focus on one of the problems 
of Heidegger's understanding of human being (for this is 
unambiguously how Sartre reads Dasein) which Sartre sees as 
common to the traditional understanding of the self. In Sartre's 
view, neither the tradition nor its critics have come up with an 
understanding of human being which addresses the problem of 
solipsism. It is this that lies behind Sartre's accusation that 
Dasein is blindly collective. 
Sartre looks at Heidegger's consideration of intersubjectivity in 
his Chapter 'On the Existence of Others'. Hegel, Husserl and 
Heidegger are united with Kant, argues Sartre, in failing to pass 
through an Idealistic conception of other people to what he calls a 
'concrete' understanding of them. All these thinkers are stranded, 
Sartre memorably claims, on "the reef of SolipSiSM"33. In this 
light, a consideration of the political implications of Sartre's 
approach to Heidegger requires two things. Firstly, an examination 
of those aspects of Sartre's criticism necessary to understand his 
32 Fretz, "Individuality in Sartre's philosophy", p. 80. 
33 BN., p. 223. 
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difference from Heidegger and, secondly, an understanding of how 
Sartre believes he has surpassed Heidegger's account. 
3.2 Sartre on Heidegger and Solipsism 
In considering the various attempts to render an account of the 
existence of OtherS34, Sartre considers the experience of feeling 
shame. Shame, says Sartre, requires the existence of an Other 
human reality; it is only felt in the presence of an Other- "shame is 
shame of oneself before the Other"35. Any account seeking to 
explain this phenomenon must, therefore, furnish an explanation of 
human reality which accounts for the concrete reality, not just of 
oneself, but of the Other as well. 
A Cartesian based realism, with the assumption of a separation 
between material and spiritual matter, cannot do this, claims 
Sartre. The Other on this scheme is encountered only as body 
(possibly as spiritual body) but this retains the difficulty of 
explaining how the two are linked, and without this we have no 
explanation as to why our experience of the Other leads to shame. 
there is nothing in Cartesianism to throw us outside of the Other 
as mere Object- whether as "stone or tree"36 or conjecture. The 
latter path Sartre identifies with Idealism, epitomised by the 
Kantian attempt to capture the reality of the Other in our mental 
representations of him/her. This approach equally fails to capture 
the reality of the Other in a way which throws me outside my own 
framework of reference however: 
34 For the purposes of this section I have capitalised 'Other'where this refers to the existence of another 
erson. 
5 BN., p. 222. 
36 BN., p. 224. 
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the Other within the perspective of Idealism can be considered neither as a 
constitutive concept nor as a regulative concept of my knowledge. He is conceived as 
real and yet I can not conceive of his real relation to me. I construct him as an object, 
yet he is never released by intuition. I posit him as a subject, and yet it is as the 
object of my thoughts that I consider him. 37 
What Sartre demands is that the analysis of Being-for-itself 
should consider the role of Being-for-Others in a way in which the 
cogito encounters, but does not constitute, the Other38. Heidegger's 
conception of Being-with (Mitsein) fails this test in Sartre's 
estimate. 
Mitsein does, of course, as an ontological category refer to 
Others- which Sartre sees as an improvement on the merely 
analogous status of Others in the work of Kant and Husserl. As was 
seen at the beginning of this Chapter, Sartre views the 
understanding of intersubjectivity at play in the notion of Mitsein 
as best characterized by the image of a crew. It is to this 
conception that Sartre objects. He does so on two connected 
grounds. 
Firstly, he argues, the conception of Mitsein as a basic 
ontological structure is an arbitrary one (Sartre later refers to the 
notion as that of a "We-subject" rather than the more fundamental 
"Us-objeCt"39) and, most damagingly, at odds with Dasein. 
Heidegger, Sartre is arguing, cannot have it both ways; either it is 
Mitsein that is the prime unit of human reality or it is the 
individual consciousness- which Sartre takes to be the true 
37 BN., p. 228-9. 
38 BN., p. 25 1. 
39 See BN., p. 426-430. 
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interpretation of Dasein. It cannot be both. As Peter Caws puts it, 
"the being of the Other [is given] only in a kind of indissoluble 
coupling, not in its own right"40. 
Secondly, Sartre claims, this problem arises because the Other 
is given in Heidegger's work in a way which is not concrete. That 
is to treat human reality along the lines of Mitsein, apart from 
being inconsistent with using instead the individuality of Dasein, 
mistakes the basic experience of the Other. The collective 
experience of the crew suggested by Mitsein is parasitic on a more 
fundamental experience of the Other that is marked, Sartre claims, 
by conflict. 
The question at hand now, therefore, is whether Sartre's theory- 
that of the look- overcomes these problems. 
3.2.1 Sartre and the Look 
It is in the experience of being caught in the gaze of an Other 
that Sartre believes he has both the explanation of shame, and the 
concrete proof of the existence of a definite Other. Shame, argues 
Sartre, can only exist through my becoming conscious that my own 
being is the object for an Other. This, in turn, demands an Other 
who challenges the significance of the meanings and projections I 
have attached to the objects in the world, and to my own being. 
The Other is not just an Object for me, but, crucially, is capable of 
seeing me as an Object. In the gaze of the Other the fragility of my 
freedom and my lack of solid centre is revealed; a state of affairs 
which culminates in the familiar Sartrean account of the struggle 
40 Peter Caws, Sartre (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 98. 
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for power and the strategies of avoidance which he sees as 
characteristic of human relations. Thus, Sartre says 
It is in and through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that I must be 
able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject. For just as the Other is a 
probable object for me-as-subject, so I can discover myself in the process of 
becoming a probable object for only a certain subject. 41 
It is not enough for one to construct an ideal subject- although 
Sartre concedes shame may be felt simply because we believe 
another to be present. Rather, the phenomenon can only be based on 
the experience of actually "being-seen-by-another"... "a concrete, 
daily relation which at each instance I experience"42. 
Sartre, therefore, feels that, in contrast to Heidegger (amongst 
others) he has provided an account- through the phenomenological 
analysis of shame- that treats the existence of Others in a 
concrete way. How convincing ought one to find this claim? 
There is, in fact, nothing in Sartre's account to show that the 
concrete other that he considers necessary for the experience of 
shame is not merely an abstraction. Since physical presence need 
only be suspected, the Other with whom I am concerned is not 
necessarily an individual identifiable by a proper name. Indeed, as 
Leo Fretz points oUt43, reflection upon the "other I" before which I 
feel shame can lead to the realisation that "the I that I just now 
encountered in the experience of shame... was not the product of a 
constituting deed on the part of a real other, but of myself, in the 
41 BN., p. 256-7. 
42 BN., p. 257. 
43 Fretz, "Individuality in Sartre's philosophy". p. 87. 
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sense that it was I that looked at me" 44. That is to say that the 
Other as theorised here is entirely consistent with an internalised 
structure of my own Ego, which, Sartre has previously argued, is 
outside consciousness. 
These are difficulties Sartre continues to address throughout 
his career, culminating in the Critique's attempt to understand how 
actual subjects relate to each other in conditions of material 
scarcity. This, however, is of less importance than the basic 
structure of Sartre's project; the establishment of an 
ethical/moral base, derived from the account of the individual 
subject found in Being and Nothingness, from which a politics 
arises. Peter Caws describes this inquiry as "the raising of the 
characteristic features of the existential subject- lucidity, 
negation, project- to a collective level"45. 
Returning to an analysis of Sartre's account of human reality as 
contrasted with Heidegger's notion of Dasein will illuminate why 
the former fails to provide the understanding of intersubjectivity 
which would allow him to ground an ethics, morality and 
ultimately politics of existential freedom. 
3.2.2 Sartre, Freedom and Value 
It has been widely noted that the early Sartre's account of the 
conflictual nature of human relations hardly constitutes a basis 
for a politics of solidarity. Iris Murdoch, indeed, sees his real 
brilliance as lying in the portrayal of "the psychology of the lonely 
44 Ibid., p. 87. 
45 Caws, Sartre, p. 154. 
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in d ivi dua1 1146. Murdoch's insight merits following up. The 
accusation that Sartre's work is no more successful than 
Heidegger's in conceiving of, or valuing, the difference between 
individuals in political terms is an enlightening one. 
Sartre is right in asserting that Heidegger's failure to provide 
either an ethical or moral account (with the implications for his 
flirtation with totalitarian politics) rests on an inadequate 
conception of intersubjective relationships. My contention, 
however, is that Sartre is triply wrong to think that altering the 
account of Dasein to incorporate the Cartesian cogito addresses 
that problem. The first error is to overlook the hermeneutical 
aspect of Dasein. This leads to his second mistake which is to see 
Dasein as lacking, rather than deliberately bypassing, an account of 
consciousness shaped by the Cartesian cogito. Thirdly, therefore, 
Sartre overlooks the development of the critique of instrumental 
reason associated with such humanist perspectives in Heidegger's 
work. 
Heidegger does lack theories of both intersubjectivity and 
politics that adequately allow for the differences between 
individuals. This lack of political imagination is not, as Sartre 
thinks, caused by Heidegger's failure to render a full philosophical 
account of the individual human being. Rather, Sartre's problems 
stem from a mistake akin to that he himself perceives Heidegger 
as making; levelling the difference between subjects. This is, 
ironically, arguably a product of a process that Heidegger lays 
bare- the universalist pretensions of humanism. 
46 Ifis Murdoch, Sartre: Romantic Rationalist (London: Fontana, 1974), p. 78. 
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Sartre thus can be seen as repeating the mistake he accuses 
Heidegger of- submerging the differences between subjects into an 
unitary account- for reasons which Heidegger points to. What 
emerges in both cases (regardless of the extent to which one reads 
Dasein as aiming at an account of human reality) is the 
impossibility of grounding a political theory in the certitude driven 
ontologies of human being that characterise some philosophical 
accounts. The contrast between Heidegger and Sartre's projects- 
and the similarities in relation to their lack of political 
imagination- can be examined in an analysis of Sartre's theory of 
value. 
For the Sartre of Being and Nothingness, value is indexed to 
what it is that reflexive consciousness perceives itself as lacking. 
Value, thus, at one level permeates all desire- emerging as an 
appetite for something which is perceived as needed. This need, in 
turn, revolves around a fundamental "lacked"- the desire for the 
total self; Being-for-itself-in-itself. This desire is impossible to 
fulfil, argues Sartre, it is the realm of God not man. 
Value, therefore, is a product of human freedom; to believe 
values are built into the fabric of the universe is to be guilty of 
the spirit of seriousness. This is a variation of Bad Faith, 
consisting in the denial of our responsibility for the choices and 
values that inevitably spring up from our freedom. There is no 
facticity that limits our freedom, claims Sartre, for facticity is 
the very material of our freedom; it is us. Thus, Sartre claims, I 
can be said to choose how to interpret and value all that I 
experience; my birth, bodily fatigue, the torture visited upon me 
during war or my skin colour. All are real, but all can be 
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interpreted according to the projects I choose. In all 
circumstances I remain able to accept or reject any meanings that 
come before me, contra the claims of those who would assert that 
meanings are ossified within the fabric of things. Sartre gives 
examples to show how we choose our values. 
Along with the difficulty in considering others at all, which 
accompanies Sartre's entanglement with solipsism, it is this 
conception of the unattainable nature of value that makes the 
provision of either a morality or a politics so difficult for Sartre. 
Given Sartre's own definition of value, as intrinsically linked to 
the freely chosen project of an isolated Being-for-itself against 
those around it, it seems hard to see how any regulation of moral 
or political conduct could appear as anything other than Bad Faith 
in Pespirit de s6rieux. That an ethics or politics remains an aim at 
all is a question which runs throughout a reading of Sartre's work- 
it runs counter to, and perhaps explains his later abandoning of, the 
starkness of his original existentialist insights. 
Comparing Sartre's humanist outlook with Heidegger's 
hermeneutical concern with Being allows one to see why this 
should be so. For Sartre, freedom is the necessary activity of 
human consciousness, and human being is the founding concern of 
his study. Sartre, therefore, struggles to say why any particular 
social configuration ought to be valued; however one conceives of 
those around one or the situation one finds oneself in, the formal 
nature of one's freedom is unthreatened. Sartre says as much in 
his account of the status of deliberate reflection. All causes and 
motives of my behaviour arise from the projects of my 
consciousness. Where reflection seems to indicate otherwise 
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Sartre is clear- "voluntary deliberation is always a deception 
When I deliberate, the chips are down"47. 
Freedom, for the Sartre of Being and Nothingness, exists 
independently of how one relates to one's fellow man or what one 
makes of the world. In the light of this it is unsurprising that 
Sartre's project- of finding grounds for an existential morality 
which defends the value of one's fellow man, and for a politics that 
reflects this- is lost. Iris Murdoch puts it thus: 
It as if only one certainty remained: that human beings are irreducibly valuable, 
without any notion of why or how they are valuable or how that value can be 
defended. 48 
Sartre, therefore, fails on two counts. Firstly, he fails to 
escape the problem, as he perceives it, of solipsism. As a result, 
secondly, he also fails to show why or how freedom ought to be 
considered a social or political value outside of the projects of any 
given individual. In both regards, a return to a comparison with 
Heidegger's work is informative as to why this should be so. 
Section 4) Sartre's Critique and Heidegger's Defence: 
Political Implications 
1. Sartre and Heidegger: The Contested Notions of Freedom 
In contrast to Sartre, value, ethics and politics are all 
peripheral concerns for Heidegger. When he does deal with these 
concepts it is usually to criticize existing notions as reflecting a 
47 BN., p. 450-451. 
48 Iris Murdoch, Sartre: Romantic Rationalist, p. 82. 
191 
deeper humanism. This relates to, and indeed culminates in, the 
alternative conception of freedom with which Heidegger operates 
and which was explored in the previous Chapter. 
Freedom, in Sartre's account, is located within the activity of 
an individual consciousness, and its formal nature is unaffected by 
relations with Others, or the theorised understanding of oneself or 
one's situation. Although one's relations with Others or the way 
one understands oneself and one's world lends a different flavour 
to the conscious experience of one's freedom, it never detracts 
from it. 
On Heidegger's account, by contrast, freedom is dependent from 
the first on self -understandings that exist in a shared, public 
space (represented by the One- das Man- in Being and Time). 
Further, the quality of the taking up of these understandings in 
framing the interpretations one comes to have of the world has an 
effect on the quality of one's freedom. Dasein, as the activity of 
interpreting Being, does not stem from the bare existence of an 
isolated individual consciousness but, as Heidegger's argument in 
Being and Time is intended to show, must depend first on a 
particular context. Moreover, the misunderstanding of this 
context- at both an individual and collective level- affects the 
nature of freedom: this is behind Heidegger's critique of 
instrumental rationality. 
A failure, whether private or public, to understand how we are 
constituted is, therefore, significant for Heidegger. We become 
unfree, for Heidegger, when a failure to recognise the temporality 
of our understanding of Being becomes reified in the public 
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meanings available to us. For Heidegger, believing that my goals 
and values can be understood apart from the public and temporal 
contexts in which they were produced is not only an error of 
hermeneutical understanding, but an expression of a world view 
which precludes one from possible understandings of Being. 
For Heidegger, therefore, freedom cannot be considered a facet 
of human existence in a traditional humanist sense. It is always 
intrinsically involved in a context in which one cannot take human 
Being, conceived of in terms of subjectivity, as the fount of all 
meaning or value. For Heidegger, Sartre's sticking with the 
Cartesian problem of how to place consciousness in the world is 
simply a variant of the basically instrumentalist understanding of 
the world to which he is opposed. 
4.2 Sartre and Heidegger on Intersubjectivity and Agency: 
Political Implications 
Sartre accuses Heidegger of failing to understand the true 
nature of intersubjectivity with the crew-like understanding 
expressed in Mitsein. The implication of the 1943 Being and 
Nothingness is clear; this understanding of human being is bound, if 
developed, to lead to totalitarian moral and political self- 
understandings which fail to defend the freedom of the individual. 
Sartre aims in Being and Nothingness to bring Heidegger's 
phenomenological approach to bear on the Cartesian problem of how 
we are placed in the world we experience. Sartre claims in Being 
and Nothingness that this will lead to an ethics. To see why this 
promise is never fulfilled, and why it never develops, as he clearly 
believes it will, into a framework allowing for a political theory 
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one needs to look at the structure of Sartre's disagreement with 
Heidegger. 
Sartre sees Heidegger's account of Dasein as providing an avenue 
of escape from the solipsism which he identifies as inevitable in 
ontological accounts which retain a reliance on suprahuman values 
or beliefs. Sartre criticizes Heidegger, however, for failing to 
make his departure point individual consciousness, and identifies 
this as the error underlying Heidegger's inability to provide an 
adequate account of the singular nature of human freedom which he 
sees as vital to any theory of intersubjectivity, itself crucial to 
ethical or political understandings. Sartre thus alms to amplify 
the existentialist parts of Dasein in order to provide what he sees 
as a truer and more authentic account of human being. In doing so, 
however, he is unable to satisfactorily clear the hurdle of 
solipsism and provide a political account on the existentialist 
terms from which he first moves. 
Sartre's critique of Heidegger can, from the perspective of a 
political theorist, be split into two parts and, from these, an 
attendant conclusion can be drawn. Firstly, Sartre has a 
philosophical critique of the constitution of Dasein, as 
underemphasising the importance of consciousness in 
understanding Being. Secondly, he identifies this error as 
compounded in Heidegger by an account of the relationships 
between subjects which is submerged in a totalizing collective 
subject- Mitsein. This, for Sartre, obliterates the individualistic 
nature of human freedom and leads to a reifying of one set of 
values in Bad Faith. For Sartre, freedom is- in the first instance at 
least- the domain of the individual. Sartre's implicit conclusion, 
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and the underlying project of Being and Nothingness, is that a 
revised account of human being, in terms of individuated 
consciousness, will allow for a satisfactory account of the 
relationships between subjects that will, in turn, lead to an 
adequate understanding of ethics and politics. 
Sartre's position combines a linking of Heidegger's ethical and 
political failings to his philosophical shortcomings, with a tacit 
acceptance that an adequately revised theory of human being will 
suffice to ground an ethical and political framework. In his 1945 
lecture Existentialism is a humanism this strand of Sartre's 
thought finds perhaps its keenest expression as he seeks to link 
the existentialist understanding of existence to a conception of 
freedom that is allied to certain key historical and moral 
movements within humanism. Heidegger's 1947 broadside against 
Sartre, the Letter on Humanism (and the later work on technology 
and identity in general) points to the limitations of Sartre's 
position. It is worth considering those criticisms here. 
Firstly, Heidegger distances himself from any humanistic 
interpretation of his work: Sartre's Cartesian inspired inquiry is 
one. Heidegger thus can, and does, draw back from any 
interpretation of Dasein or Mitsein as attempting to capture the 
underlying essence of Man in humanist, including existentialist, 
terms. It is not enough, in Heidegger's scheme, to bring the Subject 
into its world; rather the acceptance of the primacy of that 
separation in the first place is the error. 
Secondly, Heidegger can extend this philosophical criticism of 
the humanist interpretation of his work to a defence of his social 
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and political stance. Thus, the more modest interpretation of his 
work does not seek to identify principles upon which an ideal 
politics should be based, but provide a rejection of the 
objectivist/subjectivist error upon which it should not. In his 
interview with Der Spiegel, for example, Heidegger distances 
himself from Nazism as simply another manifestation of the 
technological enframing of which liberal humanism is also a part. 
Heidegger is thus increasingly able to pull back from any 
engagement with social or political responsibility by challenging 
the notion of identity which underpins an understanding of the 
properly human with atemporal principles of morality or politics. 
These moves and claims are both self-serving and, when taken 
with Heidegger's blithe linking of Nazism with all humanist liberal 
politics, repugnant. At the same time, however, Heidegger's 
declared departure from the course Sartre and others believe he 
has taken is supported by his philosophical position. The 
antihumanist strand of the analysis of Dasein does exist, as 
Heidegger claims, in Being and Time49. Heidegger, of course, does 
bear more responsibility for the humanist misinterpretation of his 
work than he allows and Sartre's indications about the inadequacy 
of taking Mitsein as a template for an account of intersubjective 
relations has a degree of bite. Nevertheless, Heidegger's defence 
extends further than Sartre allows, and in a way which reflects on 
Sartre's own failure to provide an account of intersubjective 
relationships of the type he seeks. 
49 A point discussed in my Chapter'Heidegger and the Critique of Subjectivism'. 
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If one accepts Heidegger's antihumanist interpretation of his 
work50, then Sartre's criticism of him- that he fails to provide a 
satisfactory account of human being upon which to base a political 
theory- loses its force. Heidegger, on this account, is more radical 
than Sartre gives him credit for; it is the demand for the provision 
of an account of human being, which Sartre himself desires, that 
Heidegger takes issue with. Thus, while Sartre is right that 
Heidegger provides no account of human being and intersubjectivity 
upon which a politics could be based he misreads- or at the least 
overplays- the extent to which Dasein and Mitsein represent an 
attempt to do this. Rather, as I suggested in my Chapter Heidegger 
and Modernity, if one views these concepts as part of an argument 
against the drive to certitude represented, not just by the 
distanced subject but by the philosophy of consciousness in 
general, then Sartre's criticism of Heidegger seems to reflect more 
on himself than on his intended target. 
In other words, Heidegger's criticism of Sartre is that in taking 
human existence as his departure point and focal concern he 
remains bound to a technological understanding of Being. In doing 
so, Sartre's position lacks both transparency and an understanding 
of the historical horizon of Being. Heidegger explicitly directs this 
criticism at Sartre in the Letter- "neither Husserl nor- so far as I 
have seen till now- Sartre recognises the essential importance of 
the historical in Being"51. Heidegger's value to the political 
theorist is not, therefore, to offer the definitive account of human 
being upon which political theorists can base the derivation of 
political frameworks, but to point to the historical and contextual 
50 Although, of course, doing so in no way entails that one sees this as unambiguous or accept that this 
excuses his identification with Nazism. 
51 Martin Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, p. 243. 
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conditions which pertain as much to politics as to any self- 
understanding. 
Sartre's attempt to delineate an understanding of human being 
along existentialist lines is as open to Heideggerian criticism as 
the earlier attempts to understand human being on Cartesian or 
Husserlian terms. What emerges is a calling into question of any 
position which seeks to found an ethical, moral or political 
understanding based on a reified understanding of Being, whether 
resulting from an adherence to the philosophy of consciousness or 
humanist perspectives. 
4.3 Conclusions 
Sartre is right that Heidegger fails to give an account of human 
being which allows for the acceptance of intersubjective 
difference necessary to any non-totalizing politics. Attempting to 
address this problem by recasting Dasein along humanist lines 
through a reintroduction of the philosophy of consciousness fails, 
however, to take full account of what Heidegger takes to be the 
(pre-political) greatest totalizing impulse of modernity; the 
hegemony of instrumentalist reason of which he considers 
humanism is a part. 
On Heidegger's account, therefore, one cannot- as Sartre does- 
seek to bypass the problems of traditional philosophy through a 
recasting of Dasein in terms of human consciousness. Reading 
Heidegger's work on those terms fails to take account of the full 
depth of his critique; that traditional understandings of human 
beings and, by extension, politics are necessarily partial 
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interpretations of Being. Specifically in relation to Sartre, 
Heidegger's point is that the identification of human being on 
existentialist terms retains the privileging of an atemporal 
certitude about Being. 
It is the attempt- not merely the failure- to provide a single 
and definitive account of human nature (even existentialist) which 
is the target of Heidegger's criticism. As was seen in previous 
Chapters, it is not any talk of subjectivity at all to which 
Heidegger objects, but the placing of the philosophy of 
consciousness at the centre of one's thinking. Sartre's attempt to 
render a definitive account of the ontology of consciousness and 
self-identity is marked by the finality that Heidegger associates 
with all perspectives marked by a technological understanding of 
Being. 
Sartre accuses Heidegger of providing an account of 
intersubjectivity which eliminates difference. Ironically, 
Heidegger's charge is that the closure to difference is effected by 
Sartre precisely because of the status he accords to an account of 
the subject and intersubjectivity, and the exclusivity of human 
being in questions of the meaning of Being. In contrast to Sartre, 
some thinkers have developed accounts from Heidegger which seek 
to develop and emphasise non-anthropological conceptions of 
difference. Of these, I want to turn my attention to one of the 
more familiar philosophical accounts, that of Michel Foucault, and 
to focus particularly on how this aspect of Heidegger's work is 
expressed in the more overt works of political theory found in the 
writings of William E. Connolly. 
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Chapter 5: The Politics of Difference: Foucault and 
Connolly 
Introduction 
Aims and Outlines 
I concluded my consideration of Sartre's response to Heidegger's 
work in my last Chapter with the observation that Sartre's attempt 
to incorporate Heideggerean insights into an account of 
intersubjectivity fails on two accounts. It neither provides nor 
completes the philosophical and phenomenological account of 
human reality as Sartre believes, nor does the humanist emphasis 
on the philosophy of consciousness offer an escape from the 
instrumental rationalism which, Heidegger argues, characterises 
(amongst other things) modern politics. 
I undertook at the end of that Chapter, therefore, to consider the 
works of some theorists who use Heidegger's work to support a 
conception of difference which they believe is more fundamental 
than the contrasts found between individual subjects. To this end I 
look in this Chapter at the work of Michel Foucault and William E. 
Connolly. I selected the former because he directly acknowledges 
the influence of Heidegger in his work, which has itself been highly 
influential upon many thinkers from a wide range of disciplines. 
Like Heidegger, however, Foucault does not present an explicitly 
political theory and so I look at the work of William E. Connolly, 
who does, and claims to do so in relation to the work of Foucault. 
In neither instance is my account intended to be exhaustive. 
Rather, I aim to trace, through an examination of the work of these 
two thinkers, the ways in which those who privilege Heidegger's 
200 
hermeneutic suspicion of traditional conceptions of identity seek 
to develop a political theory of Heideggerean openness. 
More needs to be said about why I have chosen these two 
thinkers. In the first instance I have chosen Foucault because he 
does develop a suspicion of traditional humanist understandings 
along Heideggerean lines. Unlike Heidegger, Foucault places much 
emphasis, at least implicitly, on liberation and particular 
historical and social contexts- although in both instances his 
success in doing so has been widely questioned. In addition, 
Foucault is of interest for two further, associated reasons. 
Firstly, because he acknowledges the importance of Heidegger- 
most particularly a Heideggerean interpretation of Nietzsche- in 
his work'. Although one should never take a comment by Foucault 
on his own work as authoritative, Dreyfus reports his claim in a 
late interview that "For me Heidegger has always been the 
essential philosopher... My entire philosophical development was 
determined by my reading of Heidegger"2. Secondly, Foucault also 
represents a major figure in the French intellectual scene through 
which Heidegger's work largely survives and re-emerges after his 
denazification. 
For the political theorist, Foucault's work, like Heidegger's, 
remains marked by the lack of a conceptually discrete 
consideration of the state3. William E. Connolly claims to find in 
Foucault's work an ethos wh ich he feels can be developed into a 
distinctly political account4 , and it is to his attempts to do so 
I On this see Tom Rockmore's Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism and Being, 
p. 57. 
2 See H. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world, p. 9. 
3A point raised by, amongst many others, Anthony Giddens in Politics, Sociology and Social Theory 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), p. 267. 
4 See William E. Connolly, "Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault" in 
Political Theory, vol. 21, no. 3 (Aug. 1993). Also see Connolly's The Ethos of Pluralization (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1995) and, to a lesser extent, IdentitylDifference: Democratic 
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with which I will be concerned in the second section of this 
Chapter. 
A third and concluding section will consider the criticisms 
levelled at both, particularly by Charles Taylor, and, briefly, the 
interpretation they offer of Heidegger's work. In the light of these 
concerns I evaluate what remains of value in their work to the 
political theorist. 
Section 1) Foucault 
Preamble 
My aim in the following sections is not to provide a complete or 
exhaustive account of Foucault's work. Foucault's concerns and 
influences were both various and, frequently, divergent. Thus, in 
what follows I take three aspects of Foucault's work of particular 
interest for my purposes. In the first instance I look at Foucault's 
early preoccupation with non-essentialist alternatives to 
traditional identities and identity thinking in his specific 
histories. I continue, in my second section, by tracing how this 
reflects, at least in part, a Heideggerean concern which is 
addressed explicitly in Foucault's consideration of the role of Man 
and humanism in the Western tradition. My third section examines 
the ethical and political conclusions that Foucault draws from his 
work on these topics. This section pulls together these concerns, 
and provides a comparative contrast between Foucault and 
Heidegger in each case. A final evaluation of the coherence of 
Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). Also Barry, Osborne and 
Rose's (eds. ) collection of essays, Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, neo-liberalism and 
rationalities of government (London: UCL Press, 1996) deal with how Foucault might inform an 
approach to directly political questions. 
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Foucault's notions of agency, intersubjectivity and politics awaits 
the concluding section of this Chapter. 
It should be noted that I say comparatively little about the 
differences between the various interpretations and 
reinterpretations Foucault himself makes of his work: viz the 
stages of archaeology, genealogy and the ethical techniques of the 
self into which his work is usually divided. Indeed my account of 
Foucault's ethical and political emphases will involve moving from 
the middle to the late periods of his work almost seamlessly. This 
is not to claim that there are not differences there which are 
important in developing a full reading of Foucault, but that they 
are, in themselves, peripheral to the ideas and concepts with which 
I am concerned. I contend that the themes I have identified remain 
relatively stable and constant throughout the Foucauldian oeuvre. 
Much has been said- not least by Foucault himself- about the 
disparities and continuities within his work. Again, I will leave 
these largely uncommented on, but it will suffice to say that I take 
Foucault's late claims to have been interested in both power and 
the subject as useful and not mutually exclusive5. 
If there is a leit-motiv running through Foucault's work, 
however, it is the interrogation and disturbance of the established 
and traditional concepts and institutions of Western society. The 
following section, therefore, provides something akin to an 
overview of Foucault's thought. 
1.1. Foucault and the Suspicion of Identity 
5 Gutting in his cditoes introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 4, relates Foucault's 1969 characterisation of his early work as "imperfect 
sketches" for the archaeological method of analysing discursive formations, a method itself reconsidered in 
1979 when Foucault asks "what else was I talking about.. but power? ", a question not so rhetorical as 
one might think as Foucault says five years later "it is not power, but the subject, which is the general 
theme of my research". 
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1.1.1 Foucault's Early Work 
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not 
exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to 
do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. 6 
This relatively late statement from Foucault is perhaps the best 
encapsulation of the most persistent themes of his work: the 
excavation, suspicion and disruption of the basic assumptions of 
Western institutions and concepts. 
Foucault's earliest works do not, however, deal specifically 
with the general concepts to which he later turned his attention. 
Rather, in Madness and Civilization and The Birth of the Clinic 
Foucault seeks to demonstrate how the categories of illness and 
madness have contributed to the construction of what is deemed 
normal in medical disciplines at different times in history. 
Following Canguilhelm, Foucault claims that the past histories of 
medicine and madness cannot be understood in terms of what is 
taken to be normal in the present, for norms are themselves 
defined in part by what has been constructed as abnormal. Foucault 
also acknowledged a debt to Bachelard's notion of the discontinuity 
of different theories throughout historical periods. 
One can already see parallels with Heidegger's attempt to show 
that it is untenable to understand or construct knowledge on 
ahistorical or atemporally objective grounds. The early works do 
not explicitly aim at developing a general critique of 
epistemological theory, however; Gutting refers to an interview 
6 Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An overview of Work in Progress" in Michel Foucault 
(ed. P. Rabinow), The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon, 1984) p. 343. 
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with Foucault in which he "remarks that it was only after finishing 
The Order of Things that he saw the possibility of construing the 
earlier works as part of a unified enterprise"7. In order to trace 
how Foucault develops and deepens these insights it is necessary 
to look at what Foucault called his archaeological method. 
1.1.2 Foucault and the Archaeology of Knowledge 
With The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge 
Foucault moves from highly localised studies of particular 
disciplines to more general observations about the conditions for, 
and production of, knowledge. Although. both works deal with the 
ways in which knowledge is produced- especially in history and the 
human sciences- I will concentrate on the Order of Things. This is, 
firstly, because it is structured in a way which allows for a more 
easy comparison with Heidegger's thought and, secondly, because 
its emphases on the concept of Man and the human sciences are 
also useful in a comparative contrast with my interests in 
Heidegger, pursued in the next section of this Chapter. 
In The Order of Things, Foucault analyses what he calls the 
three epistemes of Western history. An episteme is, as Gutting 
puts it, the "conceptions of order, signs and language... along with 
the conception of knowledge they entail... of a period"8. Foucault 
develops the underlying theme of his early work in seeking to show 
that the fundamental epistemological categories- and therefore 
what has been deemed knowable- have altered radically from one 
historical period to another. The later Archaeology of Knowledge 
would attempt to undertake an analysis of the grammar 
7 Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), p. 227. 
8 Ibid., p. 140. 
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underpinning the historical method itself in an attempt to 
demonstrate that Foucault did not wish simply to claim for himself 
the methodological certitude that he had identified as the 
arrogance of previous periods9. Instead of examining how tenable 
that claim is, I want to focus on the critique Foucault offers of 
what he takes to be the current and dominant concept which is 
emblematic of the present episteme: the notion of Man as 
understood in the human sciences. 
Already, the parallels between Foucault's archaeological method 
and Heidegger's "hermeneutics of suspicion" are apparent. Both 
thinkers seek to question afresh the established principles and 
tenets of modernity. At the same time, however, this should not be 
understood as a straightforward rejection of the particular 
emphases of, for example, the Enlightenment. Rather, what is 
attacked is the ahistorical nature of the perspective which 
structures these claims. I want to turn my attention now to 
another theme common to the two thinkers: the centrality and 
finitude of Man and the philosophy of consciousness in the concepts 
and understandings of modernity. 
1.2. Foucault and the End of Man 
Foucault, like Heidegger, asserts that the dominant 
understanding of existence at present is inconsistent, even on its 
own terms. The main argument which emerges from Foucault's 
examination of the human sciences and the key concept of Man in 
The Order of Things is that the assumption that there are a set of a 
priori principles or a constant and basic Law or entity which can 
ground 'truth' and 'knowledge' is a flawed one. Foucault argues, as 
9 See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 199 1), p. 16. 
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was seen above, that historical epochs are characterised by a 
specific and dominant mode of classifying and ordering existence. 
In modernity Foucault claims that it is the constitution of Man that 
has become central: 
Man's mode of being as constituted in modern thought enables him to play two roles: he 
is at the same time at the foundation of all positivities and present, in a way that cannot 
even be termed privileged in the element of empirical things. 10 
The modern age is defined, in other words, by a concentration on 
Man as both the object and subject of knowledge. In The Order of 
Things Foucault seeks to show how the modern sciences- whether 
mathematical, empirical or human- are both linked and apart from 
previous understandings of the world. This separation from what 
went before and linkage to each other is effected in both cases by 
the notion of 'Man'. 
When Foucault claims that 'Man' is a peculiarly modern entity 
what he claims is new and distinctive is the focus in modernity on 
human being as the means by which representation of the world 
comes about. Thus, Foucault claims, "what came into being with 
Adam Smith, with the first philologists, with Jussieu, Vicq d'Azyr, 
or Lamarck, is a minuscule but absolutely essential displacement, 
which toppled the whole of Western thought: representation has 
lost the power to provide a foundation"". In other words, the 
Classical acceptance that words and ideas simply and directly 
represented things collapsed. Instead, Foucault suggests, it was 
the foundation of representation, viz the notion of 'Man', which 
became the basic ordering concept of modernity. Foucault suggests 
that the clearest moment of the modern age is found in Kant's 
10 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Routledge, 1970), p. 344. 
Ibid., p. 238. 
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critical reflection upon the limits and categories which underpin 
representation. 
'Man', for Foucault is not one simple notion or entity. Rather, it 
names a number of understandings of, and approaches to, human 
being which focus on its role in founding representation, knowledge 
and truth. Man is both, therefore, the knowing subject, and the 
object about which knowledge is sought. Foucault considers 
several connected notions which are part of the modern reflection 
on the conception of man. In each case what is at issue is again 
reflected in the Kantian corpus: how can Man as the knowing and 
constituting Subject also be the Object of that gaze? 
Foucault considers the attempts made to understand the being of 
Man (to provide what he calls an 'analytic of finitude) in these 
terms through what he takes to be three predominant themes of 
modernity: Man viewed as an "empirico-transcendent doublet", 
through the " 'cogito' and the unthought" and through the "retreat 
and return of the origin"12. 
To treat Man in terms of the 'strange' empirico-transcendent 
doublet is to attempt to ground one pole of Man's Being (whether 
the objective or subjective) in the other. Thus, Foucault argues, 
Marx, Comte, and recently the phenomenology of Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty have sought to show that it is either the objective, 
empirical and physical constitution of Man which is taken to ground 
knowledge (Marx, Comte), or the philosophical constitution of Man 
that gives meaning to the 'outside' world (the phenomenologists). 
The former approach, the privileging of the empirical, Foucault 
calls positivism; the latter, the privileging of the transcendent or 
12 Ibid., p. 318,322,328. 
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philosophical, he calls eschatology. Beyond these differences they 
are, he claims, essentially the same. Both camps, bound by the 
fundamentally dual conception of Man which fires them, attempt to 
reduce the terms of the other to their own. Like Heidegger, 
Foucault does not think it is the execution, but the aim, of these 
attempts that leads to their failure. The goal, of finding a certain 
and permanent ground for knowledge in the identity of human being 
understood in terms of a fundamental diremption, is as unrealistic 
for Foucault as it is for Heidegger. 
From similar premises, Foucault rejects the attempt to find 
certitude through an analysis of the cogito- whether it be 
Cartesian, Husserlian or, by extension, early Sartrean. As was seen 
above, Foucault argues that the attempt to identify Man with pure 
consciousness is barren, unable to make the connection from the 
experience of consciousness of the Subject to its reality as object. 
Since Kant, and arguably even in Descartes, the thought processes 
of the cogito cannot simply be identified and accepted; the 
realisation that there is always something beyond the thought 
itself- the non-thought or the unthought- has rendered this 
assumption impossible. The experience of thought no longer 
evidences the existence of an T as thought of by Descartes, Kant or 
Husserl (and in this latter example one can see a direct parallel 
with Heidegger13). Whereas a consideration of the cogito does not 
necessarily lead to the reductionism of the empirico- 
transcendental doublet, it equally cannot provide a complete, 
coherent account of human being. This, Foucault believes, is 
because the modern age's focus on man as the means and manner of 
representation has rendered impossible the very idea of a simple 
identity of conscious being; reflection upon the cogito throws us, 
13 On this see the Section on Husserl in my previous Chapter 'Heidegger and the Critique of Subjectivism', pp. 37-42. 
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in other words, not onto our final identity but the finitude of our 
existence. The collapse of representation means that the concepts 
of labour, life or language cannot be seen as pure or final grounds 
of our identity. 
In contrast, Foucault looks to the work of H61derlin, Heidegger 
and, especially, Nietzsche who all refer to a Return to an origin 
which does not seek to 'complete' man but points to the "void of the 
origin"14. This strand of thought is the most advanced of the three 
approaches to existence found in modernity for Foucault, because it 
does not lay claim to present a totalised account of Being based 
upon an identity- centred around Man- that is only partial. 
Foucault believes that these positions remain flawed, however, 
because there remains a promised 'complete' or authentic moment 
to be found, in Heidegger's case, in the proper understanding of "the 
insurmountable relation of man's being with tiMe"15. There 
remains, therefore, a continuation and duplication of the modern 
motif of objective foundation: "[i]t is in the analysis of that mode 
of being, and no longer in the analysis of representation, that 
reflection since the nineteenth century has sought a philosophical 
foundation for the possibility of knowledge"16. 
It is, therefore, in this last instance that modern thought finds 
its completion and, ultimately, its nemesis. The notion of a 
Return, to an origin of man which characterises Being in ways 
which fundamentally challenge the projects of modernity- viz, 
completion and explicit knowledge by a knowing Subject- is 
attractive to Foucault. This is because it encompasses an 
awareness of the finitude of human experience. For Foucault, 
14 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 344. 
15 Ibid., p. 335. 
16 Ibid., p. 335. 
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Heidegger and, particularly, 
represents a truer analytic 
approaches discussed: 
Nietzsche's notion of the Return 
of finitude than the other two 
If the discovery of the Return is indeed the end of philosophy, then the end of man, for 
its part, is the return to the beginning of philosophy. It is no longer possible to think 
in our day other than in the void left by man's disappearance. For this void does not 
constitute a lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the 
unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think. 17 
This is particularly apt, in Foucault's eyes, because it 
recognises and opposes the "anthropological sleep"18 that he 
believes the philosophies of Man- of the first two types- have 
inculcated in modern thought. The focus on the constituting 
Subject, and the objects it constitutes, is part of a historical 
epoch that has been marked by a drive for total identity and 
completion using categories which cannot deliver those goals. 
Modern thought, Foucault thinks, has been trapped and hypostatised 
within anthropological categories that can no longer be thought of 
as coherent in relation to the Enlightenment aims which accompany 
it. Should these "arrangements" disappear, Foucault memorably 
claims, "if some event ... were to cause them to crumble, as the 
ground of Classical thought did ... then one can certainly wager that 
man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the 
sea" 19. 
This is the conclusion, not the beginning, of The Order of Things. 
There is no attempt in the book, or Foucault's later works, to give 
any concrete answer as to what will replace Man. Rather, what 
17 Ibid., p. 342. 
18 Ibid., p. 340. 
19 Ibid., p. 387. 
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follows, in The Archaeology of Knowledge and beyond, is an 
elaboration of the critical perspective from which Foucault posits 
that the end of Man is to be expected. There are two strands of 
Foucault's thought in, and after, The Order of Things with which I 
am concerned. The first is how Foucault expands on his claim in 
The Order of Things that "one might say that knowledge of man... is 
always linked, even in its vaguest form, to ethics or politiCS1120. 
This will involve a tracing of some of the ethical and political 
implications that Foucault, along with others, draws from his 
work. The second concern will be to analyse how coherent the 
account of Being and human existence with which Foucault 
underpins this statement is. 
1.3 Foucault's Ethical and Political Conclusions 
1.3.1 The Move to Genealogy 
Unsurprisingly, Foucault offers no explicitly ethical or political 
theory in which he states what could conventionally be taken to be 
the ethical and political implications of his work. My aim in 
looking at Foucault's subsequent work is to show how his later 
thought develops his critique of the Enlightenment conception of 
the knowing Subject into what he considers ethical and political 
areas. It is worth restating that my aim is not to provide a wholly 
faithful account of Foucault's theoretical consistency but instead 
to identify the political themes which arise from his earlier 
concerns. 
In the later works, Foucault increasingly aimed to show how his 
early analyses can be brought to bear on the modern practices of 
20 Ibid., p. 328 
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politics. It is in this mode that Foucault talks of his work as 
'genealogical' and publishes Discipline and Punish. Whereas this 
book might appear, at first, to be another historical examination of 
a particular set of institutions and social concepts- the use of 
punishment and control within societies- Foucault claims that his 
analysis of the birth of the prison system is the history of a "new 
economy of power"21. Foucault argues that the "completion of the 
carceral system" is one, major, mechanism amongst others which 
combine to "exercise a power of normalisation"22. 
With these analyses Foucault adds another dimension to his 
work. The early phases of his work can be read as an attempt to 
show, contra the Enlightenment orthodoxy as Foucault perceives it, 
that truth is a "thing of this world"23. In the later works, he adds 
to this a more overtly pessimistic dimension. To his earlier 
concern, to show that 'Truth' does not result from unchanging a 
priori principles, Foucault adds a more urgent concern with the 
technical and controlling aspects of truth: knowledge and power. 
The move from considering the "truth axis" to a concern with the 
"power axis"24 marks both a move to a more recognisably political 
stance on Foucault's part, and a politicisation by him of his earlier 
work. Foucault is no longer content simply to show how the truths 
of medicine or the human sciences are constituted by historical 
practices. Rather, he now aims to show how it is power that 
fashions these disciplines/discourses and, further, that there has 
been a move in recent times for power to be exercised and 
expressed in ways at once controlling of the individual and 
increasingly insidious. 
21 Michel Foucault (tr. Alan Sheridan), Discipline and Punish (London: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 304. 
22 Ibid., p. 293,308. 
23 Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power" in Michel Foucault (ed. C. Gordon, tr. Gordon et al. ) 
PowerlKnowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77 (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), p. 
131. 
24 Michel Foucault, "on the Genealogy of Ethics", p. 352. 
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Power for Foucault is not fundamentally exercised by 
individuals, nor is it a substance25. Foucault's prime concern is 
how the way knowledge is constituted reflects systems of power. 
Power and truth, therefore, go hand in hand: 
'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, 
regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. 
'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and 
sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A 'r6gime' of 
truth. 26 
Discipline and Punish trades on a twofold definition of 
'discipline'. On the one hand, there is the standard conception of 
the discipline of prison, the police, legal system and the 
mechanisms of social control. Increasingly the latter take the 
form of "lighter, more rapid, more effective" techniques of 
surveillance, as opposed to physical punishment. This modern 
trend moves the first sense of discipline closer to Foucault's 
second: discipline as the nexus of truth and power relations which 
shape human beings. Thus, in Discipline and Punish we find the 
claim that: 
... discipline 
fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion... it 
establishes calculated distributions... It must master all the forces that are formed 
from the very constitution of an organised multiplicity; it must neutralize the effects 
of counter-power that spring from them and which form a resistance to power that 
25 "Power is not a substance", Foucault states in "Politics and Reason"- see Michel Foucault (tr. 
Sheridan et al. ) Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984 (New York: 
Routledge, 1988), p. 83. 
26 Foucault, "Truth and Power", p. 133. 
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wishes to dominate it: agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations, coalitions- 
anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions. 27 
This holds true both for the disciplining of political subjects by 
the state and, especially, for the shaping and controlling of human 
actions and self-determination in the face of a modern 
power/knowledge nexus "that insidiously objectifies those on 
whom it is applied"28. For Foucault, the political questions of 
modernity are not about how to control the power of the State, but 
how one can analyse the ways in which power and truth operate to 
produce these relations. This, Foucault argues, takes one beyond 
the limits of the State. Foucault talks of the need for "subversive 
recodifications of power relations" and claims "that one can 
perfectly well conceive of revolutions which leave essentially 
untouched the power relations which form the basis for the 
functioning of the State"29. These struggles are painted in 
Clausewitzian terms by Foucault; he suggests that in the face of 
modern understandings of existence the cause of human freedom is 
losing a war that is largely hidden from us. 
This stance is continued through to the final works- the History 
of Sexuality and the late interviews and essays, of which perhaps 
What is Enlightenment? stands pre-eminent. Foucault talks in 
these works of ethics as techniques and care of the self. In his 
1983 lectures at the Collbge de France and Berkeley he links his 
own analyses of truth to parrh6sia, the Socratic practice of truth- 
telling30. Further, in What is Enlightenment?, he compares his 
27 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 219. 
28 Ibid., p. 220. 
29 Foucault, "Truth and Power", p. 123. 
30 On this see both Arnold Davidson "Ethics as ascetics: Foucault, the history of ethics, and ancient 
thought" and Paul Rabinow "Modem and counter-modem: Ethos and epoch in Heidegger and Foucault", both in G. Guting (ed. ), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). 
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outlook to Kant's, and finds a common link in the concept of 
critique. Whereas Kant introduces the notion of critique in respect 
to a past in which reason was not sovereign, Foucault sees critique 
as motivated by the question "What difference does today introduce 
with respect to yesterday? "31. This, he argues, entails a refusal of 
what he sees as the "'blackmail' of the Enlightenment"32. For 
Foucault, the concept of critique applies equally to the action of 
universal and objectifying reason upon human being in the present 
as it does to the religious or feudal rationalities of the past. 
A position has now been reached where Foucault's various 
thoughts can be marshalled together in order to provide an account 
of his treatment of the understanding of human being and the 
political implications which follow from it. In doing so, I will also 
provide a comparison with Heidegger's thought. 
Foucault, like Heidegger, starts by challenging modern and 
Enlightenment approaches to the understanding of human being and 
experience. Also along with Heidegger, Foucault presents a 
critique of the notion of certitude which underlies modern 
understandings of truth and knowledge, particularly when applied 
to the understanding of human being. Both thinkers find that the 
fundamental philosophical conceptions of human being prevalent in 
modernity, from Descartes to Kant and beyond, are internally 
incoherent. Foucault and Heidegger also concur that the 
Enlightenment, and post- En lighten ment, conception of knowledge 
as objective certitude is partial, at best, and inappropriate when 
applied to the understanding of human being. 
31 Michel Foucault (ed. Paul Rabinow), "What is Enlightenment? " in The Foucault Reader, p. 34. 32 Ibid., p. 42. 
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The two thinkers, however, part company in their responses to 
the metaphysics of the subject-Object distinction. Foucault's 
criticism of Heidegger, as was seen above in the discussion of his 
section 'The Retreat and Return of the Origin, is that the latter 
retains, in his emphasis on the history of Being, the impulse to 
foundational objectivism. Habermas picks this out as a particular 
problem for Foucault in the light of the general proximity of 
Foucault's early works to Heidegger; for Habermas the Foucauldian 
concept of an episteme is instantly rendered problematiC33. I Will 
have occasion to return to the overarching arguments about 
Foucault's relativism below, but the issue at hand is that Foucault 
believes the motivations which underpin his analyses lie 
elsewhere. 
Foucault believes that the thrust of his work can be 
distinguished from Heidegger's, and to some extent from his own 
early thought, by his greater awareness in avoiding relapsing into 
the objectivism found in the tradition. This means that Foucault 
has to find a basis other than unchanging principle or law-like 
truth for his work; he believes this is to be found in his 
genealogical analysis of power. The implication is twofold; 
firstly, this will provide a clearer understanding of the nature of 
truth and, secondly, it will demonstrate the errors of previous 
understandings. This will be liberating, both ethically and 
politically, for human beings. To this end, Foucault talks of the 
genealogical interpretation of his work- the unmasking of the way 
that power forms truth- as ethical. 
This is, as Foucault readily acknowledges, a position heavily 
influenced by Nietzsche; a point which will again become important 
33 See JUrgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 267. 
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in the consideration of the overall coherence of Foucault's position 
below. For now, however, two points are of particular importance. 
Firstly, Foucault reinterprets his previous work as a build-up to 
the genealogical project of unmasking how the truths of the 
present are based on historical nexuses of power. Secondly, 
Foucault is at pains to point out he is not offering a more objective 
foundation or alternative set of epistemological or moral 
principles with which to understand the world. Rather, he 
suggests, his work provides a set of strategic tools for 
understanding and furthering the cause of human being and freedom: 
it is not a privileged truth that underpins his work, but an ethos. 
This is perforce a whistle-stop account of Foucault's work and 
development. My aim has been to show that there are common 
themes that run throughout Foucault's treatment of his basic 
concepts of truth, knowledge, power and the subject which 
themselves are indexed to a fairly consistent (within the context 
of his own oeuvre) conception of human freedom and its 
importance. The next step is to analyse how Foucault conceives of 
human freedom, and the ethical and political inferences he draws 
from it. 
1.3.2 Human Freedom, Genealogy and PowerlKnowledge 
It is clear that Foucault, whilst highly critical of morality, 
believes strongly in the ethical value of human freedom. Thus, 
although Foucault is suspicious of traditional 'objective' 
understandings or moral images of 'Man', his interest remains, 
nevertheless, focused on human action. Thus, Foucault in What is 
Enlightenment? reflects upon what a mature approach to 
philosophy would look like; it... 
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will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are 
what it is impossible for us to do and know; but it will separate out, from the 
contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, or 
thinking what we are, do, or think. It is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics 
that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as 
possible, to the undefined work of freedom. 34 
This interpretation of Foucault's work allows two important 
conclusions to be drawn about how he conceives of freedom. 
Firstly, he conceives of freedom as a facet of human relationships 
and subjects. Foucault claims to have no organising principle or 
founding lens through which history needs to be understood. He 
offers, therefore, no ontology underpinning human action and 
understanding, but an interest in the limits and structures of 
human actions in particular contexts. Thus, where Heidegger talks 
of an essence of Man in relation to the history of Being, Foucault 
focuses instead on the "undefined" work of human freedom. The 
evaluation of any particular account or institution is not indexed to 
an essential role for Man, but to the effects it has on the shape of 
human freedom. For Foucault, this does not entail that one ceases 
to be concerned with the Subject- quite the opposite: "It is through 
revolt that subjectivity... introduces itself into history and gives it 
the breath of life"35. Foucault views freedom as a facet of the 
actions and relationships of subjects. This, as has been discussed, 
is in contrast to Heidegger's conception of freedom which is a 
facet not of man's relation to man, but of Man to Being36. Hubert 
Dreyfus usefully puts the contrast between the two in the 
34 Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment? ", p. 35. Emphasis my own. 
35 J. Bernauer and M. Mahon "The Ethics of Michel Foucault" in The Cambridge Companion to 
Foucault, p. 153. 
36 See my previous Chapter "Heidegger and the Political", pp. 132,151-153, and esp. 147. Note, 
however, that I am not following Foucault's understanding of Being in Heidegger's work, as Foucault 
does, as objective. 
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following terms: "Foucault is not interested in how things show up 
but exclusively in people's actionS"37. Foucault does not seek to 
overcome the notion of the Subject by providing a new set of poles 
with which to frame the Subject-object division; rather he aims to 
provide a historical perspective which reinvigorates the 
understanding of the practices that have produced modern 
subjectivity. 
At this stage it might appear that the second aspect of 
Foucault's conception of the character of freedom- that it is both 
undefined and nonteleological- might lead him close to the theories 
of the early Sartre. There are, however, key differences. Foucault 
does not aim to render a theory of the essential nature or 
ontological foundations of subjectivity; he is opposed to the 
anthropological assumptions inherent in even the most minimalist 
existential account. The subject, in Foucault's work, cannot be 
understood in terms of basic structures of consciousness; rather, 
the philosophy of consciousness itself must be understood in the 
light of the power structures prevalent at the time. This original 
disagreement between the two- Foucault sees no worth in the 
attempt to establish outside of historical analysis what man is 
really like- leads to an equally fundamental different conception of 
freedom. 
For Sartre, as was seen in the previous Chapter, freedom is in 
the essence of human being. It may be denied but not escaped. 
Foucault, in marked contrast, has no theory with which to 
pronounce the inevitability of human freedom. Rather, his 
approach, which find its roots in Nietzsche and Heidegger's 
hermeneutics of suspicion, rejects the viability of a theory which 
37 Hubert Dreyfus, "On the ordering of things: Being and power in Heidegger and Foucault" in T. 
Armstrong, Michel Foucault., Philosopher (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 8 1. 
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seeks the 'truth' of human being without an awareness of the 
contextual and historical contingency of any such search. Thus, in 
contrast to Sartre's picture of the individual framed in terms of 
Bad Faith and authenticity, Foucault claims that the work of human 
freedom is, and must be undefined. 
Like Heidegger, Foucault extends a critique of the modern 
understanding of Man- in Foucault's case focusing on the human 
sciences- to an examination of the bases upon which any attempt 
to understand human being must stand. Also with Heidegger, and 
pace Sartre, Foucault rejects the philosophy of consciousness as 
the ultimate or original basis for any understanding of existence. 
Foucault claims, however, that what is called for is not a history 
of Being which surpasses any reference to the Subject, but an 
understanding of how power constitutes the Subject. For Foucault 
this involves an examination of how subjects are currently formed 
which requires an examination of intellectual, institutional and 
physical discourses. In doing so, Foucault warns of the dangers of 
reinscribing the impulse to objectivity of which he is critical 
through a "theologization of man, the redescent of God on earth"38. 
1.3.3 Foucault's Ethical and Political Conclusions 
Thus, in contrast to Sartre's work, Foucault might be thought of 
as concerned less with the description of freedom than with the 
conditions of, and for, liberty and liberation. Foucault did not wish 
to be described as a philosopher but designated his chair at the 
Collbge de France as in the 'History of Systems of Thought'. He 
does not, as both Heidegger and Sartre attempt to do, offer an 
explicit theory of how human being ought to be understood. Rather, 
38 Bernauer and Mahon, "The Ethics of Michel Foucault", p. 152: the comment was made in 
correspondence with Sartre. 
221 
he offers critical analyses which problematicize existing 'truths', 
coupled with the enunciation of an ethos which values resistance.. 
Following Foucault's own claims, Jon Simons characterises 
Foucault's work as a whole as a "transgressive work on JiMitS"39. 
Foucault does not, therefore, offer a new theory of the Subject 
but a set of analyses as to how any particular understanding of the 
Subject comes about. This, ultimately, is an account of the 
relationship between power and truth to" which I return below. 
Given this analysis, it is futile to look to Foucault's work for a 
clearly defined set of ethical and political values correlated to the 
'truth' of a particular conception of the Subject. Rather, one 
frequently has to index Foucault's ethical and political claims to 
what Connolly calls an 'ethical sensibility. 
There are, I argue, two distinct moments worth distilling from 
Foucault's position as described so far. The first is a Heideggerean 
suspicion of the constructs and accretions of modernity, 
particularly of the instrumental conception of the self. Foucault's 
analyses, it should be noted, range more widely than (although not 
necessarily at odds with) Heidegger's when looking at how these 
conceptions are embodied. The second moment, arising in part 
from Foucault's scepticism about Heidegger's success in escaping 
the objectifying impulse, is Foucault's attempt to adumbrate an 
approach with which human beings can revolt against traditional 
(and contemporary) understandings of themselves. 
In both cases, Foucault's account is informed and motivated by 
his belief in the value of human liberation. For Foucault, 
genealogy, as the exposition of the relationship between power and 
39 Jon Simons, Foucault and the Political, (London: Routledge, 1995) p. 3. 222 
truth, is ethical in two ways: it allows the subject to become 
liberated from the received wisdom and practices of their society, 
and allows for what Foucault calls "rapport i SOP'40, the ethical 
relationship with oneself on aesthetic terms of self-creation. 
If human freedom and the dispelling of the illusion of 
rationalist claims to objectivity are the values that underpin 
Foucault's position, what implications does he himself draw for 
ethical and political practice? Again, Foucault's refusal to give a 
positive image of the self or society means one cannot derive hard 
principles or a moral code from Foucault's work: this has, in turn, 
made him susceptible to being 'claimed' by many, often opposed, 
camps. The Foucauldian ethos has been called on to support causes 
from liberal individualism to communal, if minority, solidarity4l. 
What can be said, however, is that although he does not privilege 
one conception of the subject, Foucault's analyses emphasise 
certain themes or moments of subjectivity. 
The first is an individualism. Foucault's suspicion of received 
moral codes and modern self -understandings frequently entails a 
Nietzschean moment in which the individual distances himself 
from the practices and wisdom of others. Foucault, however, does 
not elevate an isolationist conception of the will to power as 
Nietzsche does. Since the individual, volitional subject is no less a 
creation of contingent historical power than any other, it is, as an 
identity no more privileged or true than any other. There is, 
therefore, for Foucault no necessary atomism in the project of 
self-creation which he espouses. Arnold Davidson, in this respect, 
shows how Foucault's treatment of the Ancients in developing his 
40 Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics", p. 352. Italics in original. 
41 See, for example, the collection of essays in Barry, Osborne and Rose (eds. ) Foucault and Political 
Reason. 
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conception of 'care of the self' demonstrates a wariness of 
identifying the self with the "modern understanding of 
subjectivity" which "shrinks the world to the size of oneself"42. As 
Foucault's suspicion of ossified and objectified identity leads him 
to an individualism, so, Davidson reports, it lead him to a concern 
that "the ancient principle 'Know thyself' had obscured, at least for 
us moderns, the similarly ancient requirements that we occupy 
ourselves with ourselves, that we care for ourselveS"43. Thus in 
addition to individualism, one finds a commitment to solidarity and 
community in pursuing otherness and differenCe44. 
Foucault's point- that the construction of the subject is not to 
be understood in universalist terms which persist ahistorically- 
means that there is equally no one 'right' or true image of 
intersubjectivity. What one can say, however, in contrast to 
Heidegger's account, is that Foucault's retention of subjectivity as 
a focus means that intersubjectivity is at least an issue for him. 
Foucault is also less predisposed to view individual human beings, 
and their relations to each other, as constituent parts of das 
Volk45, or in the confrontational, individualistic terms of the early 
Sartre. At the same time, however, Foucault's deliberately 
amorphous account of the subject means he does not offer a 
concrete theory of the relations between human beings but an 
account of the tools one would use in analysing them. 
Similarly, Foucault's treatments of politics and political theory 
are either contained within localised histories or unclear. 
42 Arnold Davidson, "Ethics as ascetics", p. 131,129. 
43 Ibid., p. 134. 
44 Bernauer and Mahon make this point also, in their essay (cited above) "The Ethics of Michel 
Foucault", see p. 156. It is also the topic of Mark Bevir's "Foucault and Critique: Deploying Agency 
against Autonomy" where he frames the distinction, as his title suggests, both more severely and 
speculatively. 
45 A point Foucault made explicitly in "Politics and Ethics: An Interview" in The Foucault Reader, p. 
374. 
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Foucault does not, as he views it, seek to build a politics which 
responds to either the truth of Being or the truth of the nature of 
Subjectivity, since both are contingent and historical formations 
of power. Nevertheless, as one can distinguish proclivities 
towards particular approaches to Subjectivity in Foucault's work, 
the same is true of his approach to politics. In addition to 
extrapolating from the 'spirit' of Foucault's sociological analyses 
and the many suggestive comments Foucault made in interviews 
and on the political situations of his day46, one can also turn to the 
direct treatments of politics and political theory found in the 
lectures and essays "Politics and Reason", "On Power" and "The 
Subject and Power"47. 
Foucault opens his essay "The Subject and Power" with one of 
his periodic summations of the thrust of his work up to that point. 
After emphasising once more that his work is " neither a theory nor 
a methodology", he claims that "[m]y objective... has been to create 
a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human 
beings are made subjects. My work has dealt with [ ... ] modes of 
objectification which transform human beings into subjects"48. 
In his Stanford lectures (published as 'Politics and Reason'), 
Foucault turns his attention to politics, reason and the state. In 
the lectures Foucault aims to account for what he takes to be the 
two opposing tendencies in modern political discourses; 
centralisation and individuation. Foucault outlines what he takes 
to be the Ancient Western understanding of politics- as centred 
around, and limited by, either a knowable and accessible conception 
46 His defence, for example, of the fights of Boat People and his defence of sexual freedom. 47 The first two can be found in The Foucault Reader, the latter in Dreyfus and Rabinow's Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982). "Politics and Reason" is the 
text of Foucault's 1979 Stanford lectures. 
48 Michel Foucault, "Afterword: The Subject and Power" in Dreyfus and Rabinow, Beyond Structuralism 
and Hermeneutics, p. 208. 
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of the Good life or, later, by the edicts and power of the prince. In 
both cases (one might be termed metaphysical and the other 
strategiC49), Foucault argues that political power remains 
controlled by "divine, natural, or human laws"50. In contrast, he 
argues, a new sort of political power and mechanism of control 
arises from Machiavelli's focus on the techniques and strategies of 
the prince: Foucault calls this new phenomenon "reason of the 
state"51. 
For Foucault what is distinctive about reason of the state is 
that the art of governing ceases to be about the pursuit of the Good 
life or the maintenance of the power of the prince, but produces a 
new aim- "to reinforce the state itself"52. The new goal, the self- 
maintenance of the state, demands an increase in the strength of 
the state (to hold off threats from internal and external sources) 
over an indefinite period of time. Thus, rather than the explicit 
political theories of Aristotle and Christianity or the strategic 
advice to the prince offered by Machiavelli, Foucault claims that 
the most important expressions of political rationality are the 
'police' manuals that appear from the seventeenth century onwards. 
By 'police' Foucault means everything that attempts to make 
subjects compliant with the interests of the state: whether 
"applied policies (such as cameralism or mercantilism), or as 
subjects to be taught (the German Polizeiwissenschaft... the title 
under which the science of administration was taught in 
Germany)"53. 
49 The tenns used by Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 136. 
50 Foucault, "Politics and Reason", p. 77. 
51 Ibid., p. 76. 
52 Ibid., p. 76. 
53 Ibid., p. 79-80. 
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Divorced from a public and shared conception of the Good or the 
interests of a particular prince, the 'policing' of the state becomes 
an insidious and all-pervading mechanism of control, shaping every 
aspect of its citizens' lives. Through an examination of some 
writings on these topics, Foucault aims to show how the interests 
of subjects have been harnessed to the interests of the state. Thus 
land becomes territory, people become populations, schools 
become mechanisms for control, and the happiness, religion and 
morality of the citizens' lives are ordered by the need of the state 
to perpetuate itself. 
Towards the end of the lecture Foucault makes a crucial 
distinction. Power is not to be identified with coercive force, but 
can rather only be exercised on the free individual: 
A man who is chained up and beaten is subject to force being exerted over him. Not 
power. But if he can be induced to speak, when his ultimate recourse could have been 
to hold his tongue, preferring death, then he has been caused to behave in a certain 
way. His freedom has been subjected to power. He has been submitted to government. 
If an individual can remain free, however little his freedom may be, power can subject 
him to government. There is no power without potential refusal or revolt. 54 
The reason of the state, with all its rational isations, is not, 
therefore explicitly forceful or coercive. Instead, the true nature 
of the power of political rationality is to mould and produce the 
subject in a way that delimits the possibilities open to realisation 
by the individual. To truly pursue the cause of human freedom it is 
not simply violence or force that need to be questioned but the 
underlying tenets of political reason: individualisation and 
totalization. In other words, Foucault is arguing that the cause of 
54 Ibid., p. 83-4. 
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human freedom requires an attention not just to the centralised 
and centralising state apparatus but als o to the way that the 
individual subject is formed. It is the conjunction of the two, 
rather than the domination of the one by the other, that Foucault 
takes to be the central problem facing any critique of political 
rationality. 
At this point, three things are worth noting. Firstly, Foucault's 
treatment of politics and political theory is centred around the 
genealogical approach, itself motivated by an ethos that has at its 
heart the value of human freedom. Secondly, his analyses of power 
lead him to see the decisive political question as framed not in 
terms of Vollrath's distinction between das Politische and die 
Politik55, but in terms of Von Justi's distinction between die 
Politik (the perpetuation and defence of the state) and Polizei (the 
disciplinary mechanisms of the state)56. Foucault, therefore, 
shares with Heidegger the belief that it is an the concreting of the 
rationalist perspective that is the dominant issue of the politics 
of modernity. In contrast to Heidegger, however, Foucault does not 
attribute this directly to humanist understandings of the world. 
Thus, whereas Heidegger, insofar as he has a political interest at 
all, seeks to rethink the notion of the political in terms of the 
antihumanistic conception of the sendings of Being, Foucault seeks 
ways of understanding and controlling political rationality in order 
to protect human freedom. Thirdly, therefore, this leaves Foucault 
free (pace Heidegger) to identify his own concerns- the limiting of 
political rationality conceived of in terms of the reason of state- 
as intersecting with liberaliSM57. 
55 See my Chapter "Heidegger and the Political, p. 119. 
56 Foucault, "Politics and Reason", p. 82. 
57 See Michel Foucault, "Knowledge, Space, Power" in The Foucault Reader, p. 242. See also Barry, 
Osborne and Rose's editorial introduction to Foucault and Political Reason and Jon Simons, Foucault and 
the Political, p. 56-9 for other considerations of Foucault's relation to liberalism. 
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Foucault considers liberalism as sharing his basic drive towards 
establishing a "principle of limitation that applies to governmental 
actionS1158. He shares with Mill a support for nonconformity59. it is 
clear, however, that he departs from traditional forms of 
liberalism in arguing that the desire to limit government cannot be 
built around the image of the universal rights-bearing and 
autonomous subject. Foucault's work and the concept of freedom 
with which he operates identify precisely that entity as one of the 
means by which governmental power itself can be expressed and 
exercised, through the surreptitious disciplinary mechanisms with 
which Foucault is occupied. Foucault argues that the true ethical 
and political question is not concerned with determining the 
principle as to how the state ought to be limited in relation to an 
universal conception of the subject or citizen. Hence, the question 
is the one that Foucault considers fundamental in the analysis of 
society in general: to see how political technologies, broadly 
conceived as above, contribute to the constitution of the self as 
subject. 
Insofar as Foucault offers a moral or political argument, rather 
than a series of critica l images, it is related to the refusal of the 
autonomous Subject as the starting point for one's political 
institutions or goals. In this respect is useful to examine how 
Foucault's si milarities with, and differences from, Heidegger 
illuminate his work as political theory. 
58 Michel Foucault, "Knowledge, Space, Power", p. 242. 
59 An observation also made by Jon Simons, Foucault and the Political, p. 116-117. 
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1.3.4 Foucault's Political Conclusions in Comparison with 
Heidegger 
As I remarked above, Foucault shares Heidegger's subordination 
of political theory to a more general question of how to approach 
the understanding of human being. Foucault follows Heidegger in 
bypassing a distinctly political consideration in favour of what he 
takes to be a more fundamental (or disillusioned) approach- I have 
never tried to analyze anything whatsoever from the point of view 
of politics, but always to ask politics what it had to say about the 
problems with which it was confronted"60. These problems, in 
Foucault's eyes, are concerned with power and the subject. 
This leads Foucault's pronouncements on politics and political 
theory to mirror Heidegger's at times. Foucault sees his work as 
going through the traditional, and rather peripheral questions of 
politics to a more basic analysis. Hence, Foucault rejects the 
question of sovereignty as of real political importance: 
... political theory has never ceased 
to be obsessed with the person of the sovereign... 
what we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem 
of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to 
cut off the King's head: in political theory that has still to be done. 61 
Heidegger, it will be recalled, is similarly dismissive of law, 
the state or sovereignty in understanding politics, preferring 
instead to approach political questions with the motifs of poiesis 
and the Greek polis, understood as the place where understandings 
of Being are collectively gathered62. 
60 Michel Foucault, "Polemics, Politics and Problemizations: An Interview" in The Foucault Reader, p. 
385. 
61 Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power", p. 121. 
62 On this see my Chapter 'Heidegger and the Political', section 1.3, pp. 123-129. 
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Similarly, Foucault rejects what he takes as the traditional 
political choice between liberalism and socialism. In attempting 
to control "nascent state rationality", he claims that "[o]pposing 
the individual and his interests to it is just as hazardous as 
opposing it with the community and its requirements"63. Again, 
this should call to mind Heidegger's own rejection of - or 
indifference to- the choice between the "I" or "We" subject as the 
basic unit of political understanding or value64. 
Despite sharing Heidegger's subordination of the political to 
what he takes to be more fundamental questions, Foucault 
disavows anything which he believes amounts to a resurrection of 
objectivism. This refusal, in Foucault's view, applies equally to 
the traditional universal subject of liberal thought or the sendings 
of Being. Foucault will not, and cannot, draw on anything beyond 
his reliance upon the instruments of genealogy and the value of 
human liberation which he takes them to defend. 
It has been claimed by some thinkers that given Foucault's 
refusal to give conventional 'grounds' to support his radical 
critique of existing political rationality "he thus forecloses the 
possibility of other institutions taking its place"65. This specific 
criticism arises from a more fundamental point, repeated by many 
writers, that Foucault's position is incoherent as a whole. 
Foucault's conception of genealogy as the "history of the present"66 
and his associated accounts of truth and human being are all 
attacked as being marked, in the words of Charles Taylor, by 
63 Michel Foucault, "Politics and Reason", p. 84. 
64 See Heidegger (tr. Lovitt), "The Age of the World Picture", pp. 132-3., and the discussion of this in 
my Chapter 'Heidegger and the Political', p. 138. 
65 From Paul Rabinow's Introduction to "Politics and Reason", p. 57. 
66 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punishment, p. 31. 
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"confusion and contradiction... linked with the impossible attempt 
to stand nowhere"67. 
What Taylor is pointing to is the tension or contradiction 
between Foucault's conception of "truth as imposed order"68 and the 
application of the genealogical method- as if true- across 
historical epochs. This tension is expressed in different ways by 
different thinkers. Jon Simons sees Foucault as straddling the 
Kunderan-inspired poles of a life of unbearable heaviness in which 
experience appears as "entirely bound to a purpose that is 
experienced as an 'overriding necessity' ", and a life of unbearable 
lightness in which "[t]o be devoid of purpose is to be constrained by 
no limitationS"69. Dreyfus and Rabinow characterise Foucault's 
position in relation to the terms of structuralism and 
hermeneutics, Connolly contrasts the maintenance of an identity of 
generosity with the recognition of difference upon which this 
identity rests. These thinkers, who are linked by their sympathy 
for Foucault, defend him from accusations that the tensions in his 
work amount to contradictions by suggesting that Foucault is 
resorting to irony or strategies necessary in exposing the 
subjugations of power. 
At a philosophical level these defences do not impress 
Foucault's critics. Thus Taylor claims that Foucault "adopts a 
N letzschean-de rived stance of neutrality between the different 
historical systems of power, and thus seems to neutralise the 
67 Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth", Political Theory, vol. 12, no. 2 (May 1984), pp. 
153,183. A similar point is made by, amongst others, JUrgen Haben-nas, who argues that Foucault 
lacks the "normative yardsticks" necessary to frame an ethical or political understanding. See Habermas's 
"Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present" in D. Hoy (ed. ) Foucault: A Critical Reader (London: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), p. 108. 
68 A phrase used by Charles Taylor, "Connolly, Foucault and Truth", Political Theory, vol. 13 no. 3 (Aug. 1985), p. 384. 
69 Jon Simons, Foucault and the political, p. 3. 
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evaluations that arise out of his analyseS"70. Similarly, discussing 
how Foucault can distinguish particular instances of power and 
oppose them without an implicit anthropocentrism of the sort he 
criticises, Habermas offers an alternative expression of Taylor's 
objections, arguing that "Foucault only gains this basis by not 
thinking genealogically when it comes to his own genealogical 
historiography and by rendering unrecognizable the derivation of 
this transcendental-historicist concept of power"71. 
The criticism is a direct one. However much Foucault, or his 
supporters, identify with an ethos of human liberation, the claim is 
that Foucault's account and genealogical analysis can provide 
neither a philosophical defence of that stance nor the means to 
support it. In considering these criticisms of Foucault I turn now 
to the debate in which they are presented between Charles Taylor 
and William E. Connolly. There are two reasons for placing my 
focus here. Firstly, Connolly defends Foucault's work against 
Taylor's charges of incoherence at some length. Secondly, in 
relation to the criticism mentioned earlier, Connolly's defence 
comprises part of a wider project in which he aims to develop 
specifically political conclusions from a Foucauldian perspective. 
Section 2) Connolly's Adoption of Foucault 
2.1. Connolly's Account of Foucault's Ethico-Political 
Spirituality 
Connolly is very sympathetic to what he takes to be Foucault's 
message. There are, as above, two particularly interesting and 
associated parts to Connolly's work. The first is his dialogue with 
70 Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth", p. 162. 
71 Jurgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 269. 
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Taylor about the coherence of Foucault's conception of truth, 
initiated by Taylor's 1984 article "Foucault on Freedom and 
Truth"72. The second, the building of a political theory from that 
account is to be found throughout his work, but culminates in his 
book IdentitylDifference: Democratic Negotiations of Political 
ParadOX73 and the1993 essay "Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical 
Sensibility of Michel Foucault"74. My analysis starts with this 
second, constructive effort. My consideration of Connolly's concept 
of truth accompanies a similar consideration of Foucault in my 
concluding section. 
In his 1993 article Connolly professes to be, tellingly, of the 
Toucauldian faith"75. He states his aim, to "fill out" Foucault 
through a dialogue with Nietzsche- one of Foucault's two dominant 
influences- until he reaches a perspective, as he puts it, that he 
can endorse. Insofar as this goes beyond Foucault's own work he 
terms his position "Fou-connoism"76. Connolly then applies this 
'ethical sensibility' to suggest a "political spirituality"77 that 
culminates in the identification of three political themes which 
Connolly attributes to a Foucauldian ethico-political spirit. 
The first step is to note that Connolly's introduction of 
Nietzsche is not intended to, and does not, compromise Foucault's 
position but complements it. Connolly uses Nietzsche to 'fill out' 
the gaps in Foucault's ethical stance, illustrating how Foucauldian 
genealogy, employed in the 'care of the self', pulls on the 
Nietzschean values of agonistic respect and a questioning of 
established identities. For Connolly, behind Foucauldian genealogy 
72 See footnote 67. 
73 William E. Connolly, IdentitylDifference. 
74 William E. Connolly, "Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault". 
75 Ibid., p. 369. 
76 Ibid., p. 368. 
77 Ibid., p. 368. 
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lies the insight that identity is always maintained in relation to 
difference or otherness. In IdentitylDifference Connolly recalls 
how the early Foucault made these points in relation to sanity and 
madness, sickness and health78. In the later Foucault, this becomes 
enshrined in the notion that truth and knowledge are always the 
products of power. 
Connolly recognises that whilst Foucault might utilise the 
Nietzschean "notion of truth as imposed order"79, he does not take 
with it the Nietzschean concept of 'life' or 'will to power' as a 
straightforward regulative ideal. In this case, Connolly thinks, 
Foucault fills out Nietzsche. 'Life', when transferred from 
Nietzsche's work into Foucault's becomes not the celebration of a 
particular identity but a refusal to submit to ressentiment80. 
Hence, Connolly argues, the Nietzschean conception of the power of 
'life' as expressed in Foucault should be read not as providing a new 
Law, object or principle but as an "indispensable, nonfixable 
marker"81. Connolly argues that Foucault's diagnosis of the 
impossibility of transcendental and absolute identity is perfectly 
consistent with a Nietzschean commitment to celebrating the 
contingency of one's identity. 
Connolly reads Foucault's basic assertion that "Nothing is 
fundamental"82 as expressing the claim that the stuff of Being is 
not ingrained with a logic, and cannot therefore be captured by an 
ontology simply of identity. In this alogical universe (he calls 
Foucault's account ontalogy), Connolly sees no essentialism in the 
valuing of what he calls a 'generous sensibility'. Rather, Connolly 
78 See Connolly, IdentitylDifference, p. 65,67. 
79 Charles Taylor, "Connolly, Foucault and Truth", p. 384. 
80 See Connolly, "Beyond Good and Evil", p. 378. 
81 Ibid., p. 371. 
82 Ibid., p. 377. 
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views it as the right response. Thus, Connolly claims, "[tlhe point 
is to ward off the violence of transcendental narcissism... [t]he 
goal is modify an already contingent self... so that you are better 
able to ward off the demand to confirm transcendentally what you 
are contingently"83. 
It is against this realisation, of the contingency of identity that 
Connolly outlines Foucault's non-essentialist ethical sensibility. 
Once we have realised the contingency of existence, "[g]enealogical 
analyses that disturb the sense of ontological necessity" and a 
valuing of the "active cultivation of the capacity to subdue 
resentment"84 become not claims to truth but ethical and 
'reasonable' strategic reactions. Further, once one allows this, 
Connolly argues that Foucault's understanding of the contingency of 
identity allows him to put the refusal of ressentiment "on a 
political register"85. Unhampered by the Nietzschean fascination 
with the will of the individual or Heidegger's notion of Being86, 
Connolly supports Foucault's valuing of a "generous sensibility that 
informs interpretations of what you are and are not and infuses the 
relations you establish with those differences through which your 
identity is defined"87. This understanding of intersubjectivity has 
an associated political set of values: " [e]xpl orations of new 
possibilities in social relations opened up by genealogy, 
particularly those that enable a larger variety of identities to 
coexist in relations of 'studied indifference' on some occasions, 
alliance on others, and agonistic respect during periods of rivalry 
and contestation" 88 
83 Ibid., p. 373. Italics in original. 
84 Ibid., p. 367. 
85 Ibid., p. 378. 
86 In this latter instance, as I argue below, I think Foucault crucially misunderstands Heidegger. 
87 Connolly, "Beyond Good and Evil", p. 367. 
88 Ibid., p. 367-8. 
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2.2 Connolly's Foundations and Conclusions 
Connolly's argument can be filleted as follows. He follows 
Foucault in rejecting Enlightenment (and HeideggerS 89) theories of 
being as wrongly appealing to transcendental criteria of necessity 
in thinking about identity. For Connolly the crucial aspect of 
identity is that it is contingent and historical. The constant 
danger, he argues, is the temptation to conceive of one's identity 
as if it was objective or necessary, and thus to overlook or accept 
the suppression and eradication of otherness and difference. 
In the absence of "a highest law, nature, or principle [that] can 
be brought into full presence; [or] the confidence that there is a 
fundamental law or purpose governing existence that can be more 
closely approximated in life through hermeneutic piety"90, Connolly 
argues we must realise the need to develop an ethically generous 
sensibility. Hence our moral and political relationships will cease 
to be concerned with the maintenance of our identities through the 
suppression of difference and violence against others. 
These changes, Connolly thinks, will follow from our realisation 
(and adoption) of the irony resulting from an awareness of the 
paradox in the relation of identity to difference. Connolly puts it 
thus: 
[t]he paradoxical element in the relation of identity to difference is that we cannot 
dispense with personal and collective identities, but the multiple drives to stamp truth 
upon these identities function to convert differences into otherness and otherness into 
scapegoats created and maintained to secure the appearance of a true identity. To 
89 That this is a fundamental misreading of Heidegger I argue later. See especially in this regard 
Heidegger's "On the Principle of Identity" (tr. Stambaugh) in Identity and Difference (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1969). 
90 Connolly, "Beyond Good and Evil", p. 386, fn. 21. 
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possess a true identity is to be false to difference, while to be true to difference is to 
sacrifice the promise of a true identity. 91 
The giving up of the drive to ontological certitude that this 
entails, Connolly thinks, cultivates an ironical relationship to our 
selves. This irony in turn entails a moment of solidarity in which 
one realises that one is equal with everyone else in that there is no 
transcendental guarantor of any claim to necessity or superiority 
for one's identity. Hence, Connolly claims: 
One may live one's own identity in a more ironic, humorous way, laughing occasionally 
at one's more ridiculous predispositions and laughing too at the predisposition to 
universalize an impulse simply because it is one's own... Laughing in a way that 
disrupts this persistent link between ethical conviction and self -reassurance... Such 
laughter counters and subverts a Hobbesian sense of humor, where I show myself to be 
ahead and you to be behind 92 
The irony involved in the realisation of the contingency of one's 
own identity is applicable to those around one, and the 
relationships one has with others. This in turn means there is no 
drive to create and suppress 'scapegoats' such as exists in the 
politics of transcendental identity. Moral and political relations 
will thus be characterised, Connolly argues, by an acceptance of 
lagonistic respect' for difference and others. 
Connolly believes that these tendencies are allied to an "ethos 
of democracy"93 which entails an attachment to certain political 
practices. Hence, Connolly suggests that the ambiguity and 
equality of identity call for a democratic state in which "[i]ts role 
91 Connolly, IdentitylDifference, p. 67. 
92 Ibid., p. 181. 
93 Connolly, "Beyond Good and Evil", p. 379. 
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as an instrument of rule and governance is balanced and countered 
by its logic as a medium for the periodic disturbance and 
denaturalization of settled identities and sedimented 
conventions"94. Connolly also argues for a limit to the monopoly of 
states as the site of political rights and duties and an associated 
"politicization of nonstatist global movements"95. 
I will say little about the details of these institutional and 
'practical' constructions. I want instead to focus on the arguments 
with which Connolly supports these recommendations. In this 
respect one finds a crucial declaration in Connolly's 
identitylDifference. Having argued that he and Foucault move in a 
world defined by the paradox of identity, Connolly argues that both 
their positions ought to be seen as primarily characterised by 
disruptive strategies. Connolly actively identifies his work with 
theorists who are characterised by what I called earlier a 
hermeneutics of suspicion and argues for those who seek to get by 
without transcendent, objectified Truth. Connolly anticipates (or 
perhaps more properly reflects on) those who are scandalised by 
what they see as the promotion of social or political strategies of 
liberation over the standards of consistency and philosophical 
rigour: 
Critics treat the quest by Nietzsche, Heidegger and Foucault to expose paradoxes in the 
relation of identity to difference as expressions of incoherence or self-contradiction or 
amoralism in their thought... Critics translate the code of paradox into the charge of 
incoherence and easily enough convict opponents of the sin they have defined. 96 
94 Ibid., p. 379. 
95 Ibid., p. 380. 
96 Connolly, IdentitylDifference, p. 68. 
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I want to conclude my considerations of Connolly and Foucault's 
work by raising three considerations. Firstly, does Connolly's 
attempt to stave off those- particularly Taylor- who charge 
Foucault's position with incoherence succeed? Secondly, are 
Taylor and Foucault right to identify their conceptions of critique 
with Heideggerean suspicion- conceived of as the only partially 
successful attempt to encode otherness or difference? I argue this 
crucially misunderstands Heidegger, and in the light of this will 
provide, thirdly, an evaluation of the political value of Foucault and 
Connolly's work. 
Section 3) Foucault and Connolly on Truth and 
Liberation 
3.1 Taylor on Foucault and Connolly on Truth 
As has been seen above, Connolly attempts to defend Foucault 
against Taylor's charges of incoherence. Given the non- 
logomorphic nature of the world, Connolly argues, both he and 
Foucault should not be judged by the standards of non- 
contradiction that are emblematic of the very positions they 
criticize. 
Taylor is dismissive of this plea and the grounds (or lack of 
them) from which it is made. This "evasion" amounts to "confusion 
defended itself with confusion"97. Taylor starts by accepting that 
insomuch as theories of truth operate as "putative representations 
of an independent reality"98 they are, as epistemologies, best 
understood as attempts to secure particular ways of Being against 
question. Further, he accepts both that this may include force in 
97 Charles Taylor, "Connolly, Foucault and Truth", p. 381,383. 
98 Ibid., p. 377. 
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order to impress a "form onto 'that which was not designed to 
receive it' "99 and that one's "opponent may have to use another 
language to make his or her case"100. Taylor is clear, however, that 
this does not extend to allowing Foucault or Connolly to determine 
when and when not to "stick to a straight line of noncontradictory 
argument"101. 
This is because, Taylor argues, one cannot "envisage liberating 
transformations within a regime"102 or against any particular 
conception or regime of truth without some sort of (at least 
implied) theory of truth. Thus Taylor asks of Foucault and 
Connolly's work: "Are they not put forward as true? "103. Whilst 
agreeing that theories of truth which demand a logomorphic 
structure to the world are indefensible, this is not entailed by 
questions concerned with the "interpretations of human life by 
which we live" 104. 
Foucault and Connolly miss this distinction, between an 
underlying onto-logical structure of the world, and a logic 
informing human self -interpretations, asserts Taylor. It is a 
mistake to link the 'violence' of the first with the actual violence 
against the order of persons in the latter. For Taylor, human self- 
interpretations must be governed by a conception of truth if they 
are to have any force at all. This realisation, Taylor argues, allows 
one to see Foucault and Connolly caught on the horns of a dilemma 
from which irony will not be an escape. 
99 Ibid., p. 377. The internal quote is from Connolly. 
100 Ibid., p. 380. 
101 Ibid., p. 381. 
102 Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth", p. 176. 103 Charles Taylor, "Connolly, Foucault and Truth", p. 378. 104 Ibid., p. 380. 
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Taylor argues that truth is to be understood not as a claim to 
absolute certainty guaranteed by a transcendental logic, but as the 
need for human beings to operate some sort of discrimination 
between distorted and less distorted understandings. Thus, he 
claims, if Foucault or Connolly wish to render all conceptions of 
truth as equally distorted then, Taylor argues, without any notion 
of truth as other than imposition "there is no place left to 
stand. "105 One may or may not sympathise with Foucault's political 
commitments, but his work offers no reason why the cause of 
liberation is to be considered superior to its opposite. If Foucault 
and Connolly wish instead to argue from the premise either of the 
value of liberation and revolution, or the paradox of identity and 
difference, then, Taylor argues, these can only rest on tacit claims 
to truth of the sort outlined above. In other words, Taylor demands 
an account from them of what is to count as a gain or a loss in our 
self -understandings; such an account must make reference to the 
truth of these understandings. Thus, Taylor asks, "in offering us a 
new way of reappropriating our history and in rescuing us from the 
supposed illusion that the issues of the deep self are somehow 
inescapable, what is Foucault laying open for us, if not a truth that 
frees us for self -making" 106. 
Hence, whilst proclaiming to find himself in sympathy with 
Foucault's basic ethical and political impulses to expose the 'denial 
of otherness', Taylor sees these as being without philosophical or 
practical support in Foucault's and Connolly's work. Insomuch as 
their ethical or political sentiments are coherent they rest on 
unexamined truth claims. It is at this point that Connolly and 
Foucault take refuge in 'irony' or 'strategies of disruption', yet 
Taylor argues, a more subtle understanding of truth as self- 
105 Ibid., p. 383. 
1()6 Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth", p. 180-1. 
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interpretation would allow them to see that it is at this point that 
"the real debate ought to start"107. Considering this debate, over 
"what has been gained, and what lost, and what doors to otherness 
we have closed", Taylor professes exasperation with his perception 
that "the writer [Foucault] who has done so much to bring us to the 
threshold of a vital issue should have created one of the greatest 
obstacles to crossing it"108. 
Taylor's conclusion is clear. However much one agrees with the 
values Foucault and Connolly express at a moral or political level 
they offer no forceful argument for them: one's agreement or not is 
entirely contingent upon one sharing the detail of their avowedly 
aesthetic outlooks. 
Applying Taylor's criticisms to Connolly one can see that the 
latter's support for democratic institutions and the fostering of 
agonistic respect- although one might feel them admirable- are not 
established in his work as responses to which one need be 
committed. One might argue, as Taylor does, that to seek to derive 
political commitments from an ethical stance of irony does, in 
fact, represents an attempt to be excused the need for coherence. 
There is also a further set of questions about Connolly's 
political assertions. There is, in fact, no need to draw the 
political conclusions that Connolly does, even if one were to share 
his belief that the universe is 'really' fundamentally contingent. 
Even if one accepts, as Taylor does not, that there are no 
transcendent truths or features of the human condition, Connolly 
gives no reason as to why that ought to lead one to be modest of 
one's own identity, or respectful of others. In other words, it is 
107 Charles Taylor, "Connolly, Foucault and Truth", p. 383. 108 Ibid., p. 383,385.243 
not clear that my belief that all share my fundamental contingency 
will perforce lead to generosity or agonistic respect with regard 
to others instead of, say, an instrumentalist acquisitiveness. 
There may be pragmatic arguments to link my identification with 
the ontalogical predicament of others to an identification with an 
obligation to treat them a certain way but Connolly does not offer 
t hem 109. It is hard to see how any further appeal to Nietzsche 
would be of help here. Indeed, without some sort of transcendental 
moral guarantor of equality, which Connolly rules out, our stand in 
relation to each other might well resemble not the generous equals 
envisaged Connolly but the untrustworthy atheists feared by Locke. 
From this perspective it is hard to see how Connolly could develop 
an account of political legitimacy which takes account of 
intersubjective differences that extend beyond his own aesthetic 
vision. 
As is seen in the next Chapter, Taylor's conception of truth and 
his associated readings of Foucault and Connolly, are less secure 
than he realises. What is established here, however, is that the 
Foucauldian ethos, as Connolly calls it, does not in itself ground an 
authoritative theory of politics. Before considering what does 
remain of value to the political theorist in the works of Connolly 
and Foucault, I want to develop this claim through an examination 
of the relationship borne by the latter to Heidegger. 
3.2. Foucault and Heidegger 
In The Order of Things, Foucault claims, as was seen earlier, to 
have avoided Heidegger's return to the objectification of a 
privileged identity; that of Being. Foucault finds Heidegger 
109 They might be more Hobbesian than Connolly would like! 
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important as a developer and conduit of Nietzschean unmasking, but 
sees him as failing to avoid the temptation to create another mask 
in its place. Specifically, Foucault thinks there is a move, in 
Heidegger's conception of Being and Dasein, to seek a return to the 
origin of Man. 
I have argued previously"O against the objectivist and humanist 
interpretations of Heidegger's work: in any case Foucault's 
criticisms of Heidegger are not developed. As Gutting puts it, 
"Foucault's 'critique' is once again merely a matter of gratuitously 
denying the possibility of what the philosophers he is criticizing 
present as the ultimate achievement of their mode of analysis""'. 
I have already argued that Heidegger's hermeneutic of suspicion is 
symbiotically linked to his hermeneutic of everydayness. For 
Foucault to take the former without a simultaneous attention to 
its relation with the latter leads him to a vitiated understanding 
of both moments in Heidegger's work. 
This is important for two reasons. Firstly, it allows Foucault, 
like Sartre, to read Heidegger as providing a less penetrating 
consideration of the subject-Object division than he in fact does. 
Secondly, this in turn means that Foucault misses a more 
fundamental similarity between himself and Heidegger: neither 
provide a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or politics 
separate from their conceptions of agency or existence. Their 
failure to provide adequate grounds for considering these accounts 
legitimate means they are unable to support concerns with moral 
or political validity separated from more general concerns with 
meaning. Thus, in the fairly rare instances where politics becomes 
I 10 See my previous Chapters 'Heidegger's Critique of Modernity' and 'Sartre: The Politics of Existential 
Freedom'. 
Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, p. 223. 
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of explicit interest to either Heidegger or Foucault they are largely 
unconcerned with questions of, say, a distinctly political authority. 
3.3 Foucault, Connolly and Political Theory 
Foucault and Connolly share and extend the critique of 
subjectivism found in Heidegger's work. They can be read as 
offering an exploration of human agency which is not structured by 
traditional modern understandings of the autonomous individual'12. 
What Charles Taylor points to, however, is that the nature of this 
exploration, when constructed in the languages of power alone, 
cannot serve as the basis for an alternative account of society and 
politics. 
Foucault and Connolly both follow Heidegger in the attempt to 
overcome the philosophy of consciousness and the associated 
instrumental rationality which all see as characterising modernity. 
Both, however, fail to address the roots of Heidegger's political 
failings through the attempt to provide a politics of difference or 
otherness. In each case they do not address but share Heidegger's 
inability to articulate an intersubjective dimension which takes 
account of the differences which exist between agents. For both 
thinkers, therefore, legitimacy is not the product of, or indexed to, 
a political understanding of intersubjectivity. Instead their moral 
and political accounts depend on the persuasiveness (or otherwise) 
of truth claims which are either incoherent or privative. 
Hence, although the content of their political commitments and 
pronouncements is less troubling than Heidegger's, it can be seen 
112 For a reading of Foucault's work in this respect see Mark Bevir's "Foucault and Critique: Deploying 
Agency against Autonomy". By his own admission, Bevir attributes a rather more composed reading of Foucault on ethics and politics than is in fact to be found throughout the works as a whole. 
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that their failure to consider the question of intersubjective and 
political legitimacy puts them formally on the same footing. 
Foucault's belief in rebellion and liberation and Connolly's support 
of democratic and liberal institutions are as open to criticisms of 
aesthetic adventurism as Heidegger's refusal of these institutions, 
and embracing of Nazism. Connolly and Foucault's work provides a 
statement of moral and political values, but no arguments for 
considering these values, or any of their institutional implications, 
compelling. They neither establish the arrogance of theory per se 
nor lend theoretical support to the values they espouse. Thus 
Foucault and Connolly arguably succeed, as Heidegger does, in 
showing how political understandings can reflect and illuminate 
more general aspects of agency, but, also with Heidegger, these 
moments should be separated from their more ambitious, and less 
successful, efforts to offer a rethinking of the reason of the state 
or political theory in general. 
I will now return to the arguments of Taylor by looking at how 
he uses Heidegger's work to develop both a theory of agency and of 
intersubjectivity. 
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Chapter 6: The Politics of Recognition: Charles Taylor 
Introduction 
Aims and Outlines 
In my previous Chapters I have looked at Heidegger's critique of 
subjectivism and the instrumental rationalism that pervades 
modernity. Having argued that Heidegger's position rests on a 
double hermeneutic (of everydayness and suspicion) within which 
his philosophical terms must be situated, I suggested that his 
inability to articulate a notion of intersubjective difference means 
he is unable to provide a political theory. Further, I suggested, his 
attempts to politicise his philosophy in the absence of such an 
account leads to a recasting of his basic notions (fundamental 
ontology, Dasein, Being) into a political vernacular susceptible to 
the fascistic usage to which he puts them. 
In the light of these claims I considered the attempts of Sartre, 
Foucault and Connolly to develop moral and political accounts that 
do not repeat Heidegger's failing. Sartre, I argued, does articulate 
an intersubjective dimension, but this success is bought at the 
cost of failing to address the depths of Heidegger's criticisms of 
the conceptions of agency which Sartre's Cartesian inspired 
humanism does not escape. Foucault and Connolly, I suggested, 
take on Heidegger's suspicion of the rationalist conception of 
agency but repeat his failure to offer an account of the 
relationships between agents that recognises the differences 
between them. In particular, Connolly's attempts to drive 
principles on which to found a political order from Foucault's truth 
analyses characterises social difference in terms of fundamental 
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features of agency. It is, rather, an account of intersubjective 
difference, I argued, that is crucial to the development of any 
account of political legitimacy. In the final analysis I suggested 
that Foucault and Connolly's political claims are on a formal par, 
though more palatable, with Heidegger's own philosophical 
adventurism. 
In this Chapter I look at the work of Charles Taylor. His work 
seeks to develop a non-rationalist understanding of the nature of 
human agency. For Taylor, the detached, epistemological Subject 
needs to be replaced by a contextual perspective on agency; a task 
he identifies as largely initiated in its modern form by Heideggerl. 
Further, Taylor explicitly aims to articulate an account of moral 
and political relationships in intersubjective terms based on his 
ontology of identity. He, like Heidegger, finds modern accounts of 
these relationships unsatisfactory. My argument in this Chapter, 
however, is that Taylor's strength in criticizing the modern 
account of agency is not carried through into his own alternative 
accounts of agency and intersubjectivity. These accounts, I argue, 
are marked by Taylor's claim that the best account of moral and 
political value draws on an ontology that makes reference to 
preterhuman moral objects. I query this claim and, as a result, 
Taylor's conclusion that a superior account of agency would 
necessarily lead one to reject procedural liberalism. Ultimately, I 
conclude that Taylor's thought does not, as it stands, lead to a 
satisfactory account of political legitimacy. 
To this end this Chapter is divided into four sections. Firstly, I 
look at Taylor's ontological framework of agency. Secondly, I 
provide an account of the moral and political conclusions that 
I See Tayloes essay "Engaged agency and background in Heidegger". See also his essay "Heidegger, 
Language, and Ecology" in Dreyfus and Hall (eds. ) Heidegger: A Critical Reader. 
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Taylor draws from this account. My third section provides a 
critical analysis of these claims. A fourth and concluding section 
seeks, in the light of the previous three, to see how, in comparison 
with Heidegger's work, Taylor contributes to political theory. 
Section 1) Taylor's Ontology of Agency 
Taylor's treatment of agency and the moral and political 
dimensions of identity are spread throughout his oeuvre, from the 
writings on Hegel, to the essays contained within his Philosophical 
Papers, and, more recently, in "The Politics of Recognition"2. 
Taylor's concerns, however, find their basic foundation in his 
monumental Sources of the Self., The Making of the Modem 
Identity3. In the first part of his book he offers a moral ontology; a 
formal framework within which he thinks human beings must 
operate and understand themselves. The second part of the work 
attempts to provide an account of the content of the modern 
identity. It is to the ontology and method outlined in the first part 
of the book to which I will turn first. 
1.1 Taylor's Introduction and Aims 
Taylor's Sources of the Self reflects the dominant concern of 
his work, identified in the introduction to his collection of 
Philosophical Papers as "philosophical anthropology"4. With this 
focus comes a recurring theme: the impossibility of understanding 
human identity solely on the model of epistemological knowledge 
2 The most important texts here are Charles Taylor's Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), his collections Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Vol. I 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical 
Papers Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and Philosophical Arguments 
(Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1997), and his essay "The Politics of Recognition". 3 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self., The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Hereafter SOS. 
4 Taylor. Philosophical Papers Vol. 1, p. 1. 
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found in the 'natural sciences'. Taylor characterises his work as a 
search for "richer languages" with which to understand ourselves; 
these languages will reflect the "inextricably intertwined themes" 
of "selfhood and the good"5. 
What Taylor wishes to do is provide an account of "our" moral 
identity. Taylor, however, has a wider than usual understanding of 
what constitutes the 'moral'. For Taylor, moral concerns include 
not just our considerations on how to treat others fairly, but those 
questions which address "what makes life worth living"6. Taylor 
notes, therefore, that he takes as moral what others might 
consider as "self -regarding"7 issues. 
His account rests on his identification of the asking of moral 
questions, thus conceived, as both necessary and implying "a given 
ontology of the human"8. The first set of arguments Taylor offers, 
therefore, are concerned with the fundamental need for moral 
identity in the first place. 
1.2 The Moral as Inescapable Framework 
What underpins all our approaches to moral questions, Taylor 
argues, is our capacity for, and need of, "strong evaluation 
Discussed at length in Taylor's essay 'What is human agencyT9, 
strong evaluations are concerned with, following Frankfurt's 
terminology, 'second-order desires', "whose object is my having a 
certain (first-order) desire"10. Thus, although Taylor believes that 
some 'higher' animals are able to order their desires so as to 
5 SOS, p. 4. 
6 SOS, p. 4. 
7 SOS, p. 4. 
8 SOS, p. 5. 
9 In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1. 
10 Ibid.. p. 15. 
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maximise the fulfilment that can be derived from them, the 
distinctively human capacity for strong evaluation rests in the 
qualitative ordering of these desires. Strong evaluation reflects 
our ability to divide our desires and motives into the noble and the 
base; acting out of spite might cause me much satisfaction but I 
recognise it as part of a life with which I want no part. Following 
certain motivations and desires, although they are real and 
tempting, is judged as a less worthwhile course of action. 
This qualitative distinction, Taylor argues, can only be derived 
from a notion of merit as arising from beyond mere desire or wish- 
fulfilment. Our sense that our moral impulses are real or deep, 
coupled with "the demand to be consistent in our moral reactions"" 
takes us outside of ourselves. The appeal to moral consistency, 
and the idea of qualitatively more noble choices, "can only arise 
when the [moral] reaction is related to some independent property 
as its object"12. One of Taylor's main goals in Sources of the Self 
is to establish that this perception of the independent properties 
of one's moral intuitions can be defended against those who argue, 
from naturalistic premises, that moral realism is necessarily 
illusory. 
Taylor argues that the linking of moral claims to properties 
beyond our isolated subjective wills and desires entails an appeal 
to a background picture within which our values and actions are 
situated. Our moral intuitions make reference, usually implicitly, 
to a map of our assumptions about the self, society and the world 
in which we move. It is with these 'background pictures', or moral 
ontologies, and the way they are understood- or misunderstood- in 
modernity, that Taylor is concerned. In developing this argument, 
II SOS, p. 7. 
12 SOS, p. 7. 
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Taylor links the assault on moral realism with the social and 
political phenomenon of atomism: he promises to return to, and 
refute, the value of both. 
Taylor's crucial claim can be found towards the end of the book. 
Without our moral intuitions, and the ontologies that they imply, 
we would lose any meaningful sense of relief in our lives. To lose 
our moral horizons, to be unable to articulate, or have the 
resources to articulate, a "believable framework"13 would be to 
experience a life without meaning. A world without these 
"spiritual contours" would be one where "nothing is worth doing", 
experienced in terms of "a terrifying emptiness, a kind of vertigo, 
or even a fracturing of our world and body-space"14. 
1.3 The Self in Moral Space 
Taylor, then, argues that the self needs to be understood as 
situated in moral space. The phenomena of strong evaluation and 
qualitative judgement are necessary to live tolerable lives. What 
these capacities and needs reveal, claims Taylor, "is the essential 
link between identity and a kind of orientation" 15. 
Taylor asserts that modern philosophy and the human sciences 
have been unable to account for this relationship, between the self 
and the good. This, claims Taylor, is a product of the attempt to 
treat the self as a target for objective study. The naturalist 
reduction, argues Taylor, cannot on these terms understand either 
the self or the good. 
13 SOS, p. 17. 
14 SOS, p. 18. 
15 SOS, p. 28.253 
Nor, argues Taylor, can the good be understood on 'subjectivist' 
terms- that is as simply an extension of the wills and desires of 
the subject. The self cannot be considered without reference to 
the "issues that matter for US"16. For Taylor, the crucial aspect of 
our agency is the enunciation of our identity in terms of what has 
significance for us. The self, thus conceived, is not therefore a 
proper target for knowledge on objective terms. We cannot 
understand the self apart from its own self -interpretations: there 
is no absolute 'object' about which we seek knowledge. Nor, 
asserts Taylor, can we seek full and explicit knowledge of the self 
because our self -understandings are themselves linguistic. Hence, 
the very attempt to attain 'objective' knowledge of ourselves is 
itself an internal feature of the project of self-understanding. 
Finally, argues Taylor, the attempt to seek knowledge of a self 
apart from others also collapses with the realisation that our 
self -understandings are themselves products of a "language 
community"17. 
The crucial aspects of agency cannot be understood in wholly 
objectivist nor subjectivist terms. The crucial aspects of agency 
and identity are neither utterly volitional nor immediately 
objective. Rather, our identity is a product of our definition of 
"Who I am"18 and exists in the context of using language to 
describe, and accord significance to, the relations which lend 
meaning to my life. 
These relations have associated social and moral dimensions as 
a product of the horizons of meanings available to us being part of 
a public language. Our orientation in moral space is not therefore 
16 SOS, p. 34. 
17 SOS, p. 35. 
18 SOS, p. 35. 
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to be modelled merely on subjectivist opinion, or epistemological 
knowledge, but is a facet of the need for narrative structure. At 
this point19, Taylor references Heidegger as a thinker whose work 
illustrates how temporality, as a narrative element in our lives, 
has been traditionally misunderstood. But, in Sources of the Self, 
Heidegger is a peripheral figure. Typically, Taylor refers to 
Heidegger as sharing certain critical concerns with him, but any 
more fundamental methodological commonality goes unremarked 
upon. Taylor, therefore, acknowledges Maclntyre's notion of "life 
as a queSt"20 as a more immediate influence at this point. I will 
argue, however, that- as Taylor later suggests21- Heidegger is 
more of an influence than is being allowed in Sources of the Self. 
This becomes clear when one identifies the parallels between 
Taylor's account of the limits of the modern understanding of the 
self and Heidegger's work. Taylor's account is given in his chapter 
'The Ethics of Inarticulacy'. 
1.4 Taylor and the Ethics of Inarticulacy 
1.4.1 The Centrality of the Best Account Principle 
Taylor's third chapter seeks to show how the modern 
misunderstanding of our identity, and its intrinsic relation to the 
good, arose. The problem, Taylor believes, is that we no longer 
have the languages with which to explain and express our moral 
identities. We have lost the belief in the external guarantors of 
moral claims- the Platonic logos or the absolute authority of the 
19 SOS, p. 47. 
20 SOS, p. 48. 
21 See Taylor's "Engaged agency and background in Heidegger" and his reply to Frederick Olafson in 
"Reply to Commentators" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LIV, no. 1 (March 1994), 
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Church- in the light of the move to a natural scientific conception 
of objective proof. With this loss came a further loss, the 
languages and self -understandings with which to refer to the good 
and the right as "real" or "part of the world"22. Further, Taylor 
argues, the naturalistic reduction does not leave the question open, 
but pushes us to see moral language which expresses external 
notions of the good as illusory and self-deceiving. 
The link to Heidegger's work is a direct one. Heidegger's 
suggestion that the subject-object division and the resulting 
epistemological models of knowledge are not necessarily wrong or 
false but must be partial is mirrored by Taylor. Rejecting the 
primacy of the traditional scientific approach to understanding 
human being Taylor asks: "How can we ever know that humans can 
be explained by any scientific theory until we actually explain how 
they live their lives in its terms? "23. The question, of course, is 
rhetorical; there is, for Taylor, a more fundamental ontology than 
that based on the subject-object division, or the project of 
certitude. 
Hence we find Taylor arguing that, in contrast to the partiality 
of the epistemological approach, it is the phenomenological 
approach that has priority in understanding our lives. This is 
expressed, in Taylor's work, in the 'Best Account Principle'. This 
states that in seeking to understand our existence we need an 
approach which " 'make[s] sense' of our lives... across the whole 
range of both explanatory and life uses"24. It is the best account on 
these terms- "which no epistemological or metaphysical 
22 SOS, p. 56. 
23 SOS, p. 58. 
24 SOS, p. 58. 
256 
considerations of a more general kind about science or nature can 
set aside"- that "is truMpS"25. 
The comparison with Heidegger here is illuminating. Firstly, 
and obviously, Taylor shares Heidegger's hermeneutical and 
phenomenological concerns with the understanding of all 
phenomena, rather than taking as legitimate evidence only those 
which can be known with certitude. Secondly, therefore, Taylor's 
principle serves a role similar to that of 'transparenCy26, which I 
have argued previously is a crucial notion in Heidegger's work. 
Transparency, in Heidegger's thought, functions alongside 
Heidegger's division between explicit, deliberate and practical 
interpretation [Interpretierung and Auslegung]27. These are, as I 
have claimed previously, key considerations because they reveal 
the extent to which interpreting Heidegger's conception of 'Being' 
as a source of justification (either for truth or politics) is a 
mistake. 'Transparency' is, for Heidegger, a necessary facet of 
explicit Interpretation and philosophy, of which Being and Time is 
a part. It is introduced as a part of the methodology of inquiry in 
both explicit and practical termS28. Taylor's introduction of the BA 
principle is, however, less theorised. 
It is initially introduced as the principle by which people 'make 
sense' of their liveS29- a practical guide used in the structuring of 
the narratives necessary, as was seen earlier, to living rewarding 
lives free from moral or spiritual vertigo. In the first instance, 
therefore, the BA princ iple looks like an observed facet of 
25 SOS, p. 58. 
26 For a discussion of this see my Chapter 'Heidegger and the Critique of Subjectivism', esp. p. 41-2. 27 Ibid., p. 63. 
28 See BT., pp. 24 and 186-7. 
29 SOS, p. 58. 
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everyday, practical interpretation. However, in the following 
paragraph, Taylor goes beyond the assertion that the BA principle 
is an everyday heuristic used by individuals in the actual 
structuring of their personal narratives, and claims also that 
"theories of moral judgements as projections, and the attempts to 
distinguish 'value' from 'fact', fall afoul of this BA principle"30. 
Taylor thus introduces the BA principle as both a practical 
heuristic operated by, at least 'self-aware', agents in the courses 
of their lives, and as the methodological criterion by which 
theories of the self and existence ought to be evaluated. That 
Taylor fails, in Sources of the Self, to clearly flag the 
interpretative contexts in which the BA principle works has a 
number of ramifications. 
Most significant of these at this point is the unclear role Taylor 
assigns his phenomenological approach. Taylor offers the BA 
principle as both a methodological starting point which stresses 
that validity depends on interpretative transparency (as Heidegger 
introduces his use of phenomenology) and as a means of supporting 
the basic assumptions he makes in Sources of the Self. 
Taylor thus frames a phenomenological principle that at once 
seeks to subscribe to the rigours of Destruktion in interpreting 
reality, whilst reinvigorating the deeper meaningS31 unarticulated 
in the present understandings of modernity. He thus identifies both 
with Heidegger's injunction not to approach the interpretation of 
Being in terms of unproved "vouchsafed" revelations (e. g. subject- 
Object foundationaliSM)32 and with the Hegelian aim of 
30 SOS, p. 58. Italics my own. 31 See in this regard Taylor's discussion of the parallels between Heidegger's work and 'deep' ecology in "Heidegger, Language and Ecology" in Philosophical Arguments. 
32 See Charles Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology" in Philosophical Arguments. 
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establishing fuller articulations of the moral objects whose 
expression constitutes our moral growth. The indistinct way in 
which Taylor introduces the BA principle means that he is not clear 
on how these two aims relate to each other; an issue I return to in 
my consideration of Taylor's operation of the Best Account 
principle in the following section. 
Having framed the BA principle, Taylor goes on to apply it to 
demonstrate the partiality of the self -understandings of 
modernity. What the hermeneutic and phenomenological approaches 
of Hegel, Heidegger and otherS33 demonstrate, Taylor suggests, is 
that we cannot explain the meanings of our moral languages and 
evaluations in the reductivist terms of epistemological accounts. 
The separation of interpretation from action, and subject from 
object, made in these accounts is queried by the BA principle. 
Taylor thus follows Heidegger in subjecting the self- 
understandings of modernity to the charge of internal incoherence 
resulting from a misunderstanding of the true nature of the 
interpretative process. Taylor argues, however, that he has in the 
final instance more in common with Hegel because his aim is 
authentic human self -u nderstanding34. 
The next step, therefore, is to see how Taylor thinks the 
tradition has failed, and how he thinks a better understanding 
might be articulated. 
33 Primarily Herder and Humboldt -see Taylor's "Theories of Meaning" in Philosophical Papers Vol. I. 34 See Taylor's Hegel and Modem Society and his "Hegel's Philosophy of Mind" in Philosophical Papers 
Vol. 1 
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1.4.2 Taylor and the Understanding of the Good in Modernity 
Taylor identifies one of the central problems of modernity as 
the inability to provide an account of the motivation behind our 
qualitative moral intuitions and claims. Our dominant modes of 
understanding ourselves and the world do not account for moral 
experience in the qualitative terms with which we actually live. 
Taylor's BA principle states that we ought to consider as 'real' 
those moments crucial to an agent's own self -understanding35. In 
particular, this entails an account- based on the recognition of the 
necessity of strong evaluation- which explains the 'reality' of 
moral judgements. Taylor identifies two claims underpinning his 
argument: 
1. You cannot help having recourse to these strongly valued goods for the purposes of 
life... you need these terms to make the best sense of what you're doing... 
2. What is real is what you have to deal with, what won't go away just because it 
doesn't fit with your prejudices... Your general metaphysical picture of "values" and 
their place in "reality" ought to be based on what you find real in this way. It couldn't 
conceivably be the basis of an objection to this reality 36 
Given the multiplicity of goods cited by different people and the 
conflict which individuals themselves can identify between 
different goods, we need, Taylor argues, "a multi-levelled 
understanding of the good"37. As Maclntyre notes, "Taylor is at once 
a pluralist and a realist about goodS"38. 
35 See SOS, p. 57. 
36 SOS, p. 59. 
37 Charles Taylor, "Prdcis of Sources of the Self", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 
LIV, no. I (Mar. 1994), p. 185. 
38 Alasdair MacIntyre, "Critical Remarks on The Sources of the Self by Charles Taylor". Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, vol. LIV, no. I (Mar. 1994), p. 187. 
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The need to order other goods is frequently fulfilled by appeals 
to "hypergoods". These are "goods which not only are incomparably 
more important than others but provide the standpoint from which 
these must be weighed, judged, decided aboUt"39. Hypergoods range 
from the Platonic conception of the Idea of the Good to Kantian and 
Habermasian universalizability. Perspectives in the light of 
different hypergoods have different responses to the conflict and 
plurality of goods. Thus, Taylor argues, there is, in Plato's work, a 
denial of the goods of property and family life which compete with 
the reductionist hypergood that culminates in the life of the 
philosopher. Alternatively, Aristotle aims to recognise all 
competing goods in his time, including the subordination of women 
and slaves. 
This, Taylor argues, is at the root of the basic problem of 
modernity. In an age of pluralism it is no longer possible to 
account for our sense of the reality of the good in the reductivist 
terms of an extrahuman order- the sort of hypergood one finds 
expressed in the Platonic ontic logos. Equally, the Aristotelian 
approach has been taken to culminate in a naturalism that cannot 
distinguish between perspectives on the good at all. This 
resonates with naturalist and projectivist accounts that can 
conceive of the reality of moral language, if at all, only in ways 
which fail to account for our sense of the "moral growth"40 that 
accompanies our sense of the good. 
The need to develop an articulation of the good which can 
account for our moral beliefs and intuitions in a way which 
recognises both their reality and their claims on us, is the 
motivating force behind The Sources of the Self. This is because 
39 SOS, p. 63. 
40 SOS, p. 72. 
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the form it is presumed such accounts must take has, Taylor 
claims, been misconstrued in modernity. 
One set of these accounts has sought to explain the 'power' of 
moral claims in terms of an ontological account of reality. Taylor 
observes that these objectivist accounts- whether based on a 
Platonic conception of the ontic logos, a single religious account or 
the commands of a divine King- can, in modern societies, no longer 
command the universal acceptance they once did. This partiality 
has led to the exclusion of those views and goods at odds with the 
dominant conception; an option Taylor no longer considers open in 
the pluralist societies of the modern world. To account for the 
reality of our moral judgements and our sense of the good this way 
is no longer enough to meet the challenges of a world marked by a 
collapse of universal common reference points and the emergence 
of self -reflexivity: "Platonism is dead"41. 
A second set of accounts, framed in response to the claims of 
the existence of a natural order independent of human wills and 
desires also fails. Rather than look to an independent objective 
reality, this approach focuses on the projections of the subject as 
the source of value. These accounts, which also arise from the 
naturalist reduction of being to a neutral world and a world of 
human desires and projections, although able to comprehend 
pluralism, cannot account for the qualitative and real dimensions 
of our moral judgements and impulses. 
Projectivism, for example, cannot account for the reality of 
moral claims and the qualitative dimension of our evaluations of 
the good. Thus, Taylor considerS42 the early Sartre's account of 
41 Charles Taylor, "Comments and Replies", Inquiry, vol. 34 (June 1991), p. 248. 42 Charles Taylor, "What is human agency? ", Philosophical Papers, Vol. I, p. 29. 
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value as arising from radical choice. Whereas Sartre's picture of a 
young man choosing between fighting with the resistance and 
looking after his mother is indeed a dilemma, Taylor argues, it is 
so only because the two alternatives embody different claims. If 
it was choice alone that was the source of moral value and 
dilemmas there would be no qualitative distinction between the 
choice to look after one's mother and to have an ice cream, claims 
Taylor. 
Equally any conception of reality based on a naturalistic 
reduction can either offer no account of moral reality or do so only 
through importing hidden hypergoods it cannot itself explain. 
Taylor's treatment of Foucault's and Connolly's writings in this 
respect were discussed in the previous Chapter. 
The basic understandings of modernity, centred around the 
volitional and desiring self detached from a neutral world are thus 
unable to support or explain the moral values and language we 
nonetheless feel and use. Nor can one appeal to one unquestionable 
order which validates a particular set of goods or hypergood 
against others without being aware that there are, Taylor thinks, 
other answers one could have meaningfully chosen. The prevailing 
ontological understandings of the world and self fail to leave an 
avenue, Taylor believes, for the developing of an account of our 
moral lives. 
What is needed, Taylor suggests, is an understanding of agency 
which allows for an articulation of the good in accordance with the 
Best Account Principle43. I need a way to evaluate hypergoods, or 
potential hypergoods, which offers a way of weighing up and 
43 SOS, p. 74. 
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deliberating upon the moral choices and dilemmas I am faced with. 
There needs to be a way of understanding myself and the world 
which accounts for moral reality: an "alternative between 
Platonism and projectiviSM"44. 
Taylor considers the parameters and demands a best account on 
these terms must respect. Firstly, any account I offer must take 
account of my need to live a coherent life, characterised by the 
capacity to make strong evaluations and locate myself in a world 
of diverse moral goods capable of exerting real moral pressure on 
me. This, Taylor believes, rules out most contemporary accounts 
of the nature of the self or the world. Secondly, against this 
background my best account will serve as a basis for a practical 
evaluation of the various competing moral goods and claims I am 
faced with. It will not, Taylor suggests, offer me a priori 
principles about which hypergood I must choose nor what 
constitutive goods I will consider important, but it will allow me 
to understand something about how they derive their moral power. 
Taylor concludes the consideration of modern accounts of the 
good, or the lack of them, by seeking to show how the failure to 
provide a best account on his terms, and the paucity of existing 
moral ontologies, has had a detrimental effect in modernity. 
1.5 Articulacy and Moral Sources 
Taylor offers several reasons why modernity's moral 
inarticulacy is damaging, and how a philosophy of articulation 
would have positive effects at an individual, moral and social 
level. 
44 Charles Taylor, "Reply to Commentators", p. 210. 
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The first of these reasons Taylor flags as simply intuitional: a 
commitment to the Socratic belief that knowledge is itself "part 
of the telos of human beingS"45. Fundamentally, however, Taylor's 
argument rests on his claim that "articulation can bring us closer 
to the good as a moral source, can give it power"46. It is through 
our articulations of our sense of the good that we can understand 
which goods are constitutive to our moral growth. 
To fail to articulate this understanding is to run the risk of 
forgetting or obscuring the goods upon which our modern narratives 
implicitly draw. The reductive naturalist, Taylor argues, will still 
feel the power of the moral value of the individual- he will just 
not be able to say why. Similarly, Foucault's genealogy, Taylor 
feels, still draws on the notion of moral growth and the value of 
human liberation which it vitiates and cannot offer support for47. 
Taylor argues that the BA Principle, which treats the 
qualitative dimension of the moral as real, points to the 
inconsistencies implicit in these positions. Further, he argues, 
once one sees what it is these positions are actually drawing on, 
and articulates the moral visions that motivate them and give them 
power, we will see that "articulation can bring them [moral 
sources] closer"48. In articulating our notions of the foundations of 
the good life, Taylor believes, we will also find or develop an 
account which shows why our love of certain goods and the good is 
well-founded. Understanding and articulating why we "love or 
respect" our constitutive goods enables us to better live up to 
45 SOS, p. 92. 
46 SOS, p. 92. 
47 See, for example, SOS, p. 71., and Taylor's articles "Foucault on Freedom and Truth" and "Connolly, 
Foucault and Truth". 
48 SOS, p. 99. 
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them: "that is why words can empower; why words can at times 
have tremendous moral force"49. 
Conversely, the modern inability to account for, or conceive of, 
the reality of the good risks obscuring the moral sources by which 
our lives nonetheless continue to be motivated. Thus, towards the 
end of the book, Taylor claims that the norms 'we' just about all 
agree on- the "demands of justice and benevolence" which cross 
"great differences of theological and metaphysical belief"-50 need 
an ongoing and vigilant defence. Without an account which offers 
this we risk distancing ourselves from the moral goods which 
empower us. This both cuts us off from the full richness of our 
being in terms of the goods that motivate us, and, in turn, 
threatens the stability of the standards to which we are 
committed. This account is needed in modernity, therefore, as 
"[h]igh standards need strong sourceS"51. 
Section 2) Taylor's Moral and Social Ontology 
2.1 The Dialogic Self 
The key element in Taylor's account is a revised conception of 
the nature of agency and the self. Pivotal here is Taylor's 
assertion that the "crucial feature of human life is its 
fundamentally dialogical nature"52. The capacity for strong 
evaluation and the need to locate ourselves in moral space both 
require interpretations of ourselves in terms of meanings and 
languages which involve others. Taylor emphasises two ways in 
which our self -interpretations have social dimensions. 
49 SOS, p. 96. 
50 SOS, p. 515. 
51 SOS, p. 516. 
52 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p. 32. Italics in original. 
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The first of these follows from Taylor's assertion, already 
examined, that full human agents understand themselves and define 
their identity through an articulation of the good. Since this is 
achieved "through our acquisition of rich human languages of 
expression", then, following Wittgenstein53, it follows that "[t]he 
genesis of the human mind is in this sense not monological, not 
something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but 
dialogical"54. In other words, "[p]eople do not acquire the languages 
needed for self-definition on their own"55. 
Secondly, Taylor argues, the role of others in the language of 
identity extends beyond the merely instrumental. Our interaction 
extends beyond the moment of genesis; "[w]e don't just learn the 
languages in dialogue and then go on to use them for our own 
purposeS"56. Rather: 
We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the 
things our significant others want to see in us. Even after we outgrow some of these 
others- our parents, for instance- and they disappear from our lives, the 
conversation with them continues within us as long as we live. 57 
Thus Taylor identifies two moments of relating to others in the 
necessary process of defining one's identity in relation to the good. 
The first, already considered, is formal, reflecting the linguistic 
aspects of self -i nte rp retation. The second is substantive: for 
Taylor it is simply true that fundamental, constitutive goods are, 
properly understood, qualitatively dependent on others. 
53 SOS, p. 38. 
54 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p. 32. 
55 Ibid., p. 32. 
56 Ibid., p. 32. 
57 Ibid., p. 32-33. 
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2.2 The Dialogic Self Contra The Punctual Self 
For Taylor, therefore, if one wants to understand the wills and 
desires of the individual one has to make reference to the society 
of which they are part. Hence, Taylor argues, one needs to appeal 
to the dialogic model of agency in framing one's social and 
political understandings. Taylor's claim, however, is that the 
moral and political understandings of modernity are in fact based 
on a misunderstanding of the nature of agency with unhappy 
consequences. 
These effects- "the grip of modern rational iSM"5 8- are linked by 
Taylor, in common with Heidegger and Foucault, to the nexus of 
epistemological certitude, instrumental rationality and the 
detached conception of the self. It is particularly in the attempt 
to offer an alternative account of agency that Taylor sees the 
closest parallels between his own work and Heidegger's. 
Thus Taylor follows Heidegger in arguing that the failure of 
modern ontological accounts of existence arises from, and finds its 
keenest expression in, the concept of the punctual, disengaged 
self59. Taylor, like Heidegger, finds Descartes and Kant to be at the 
forefront of the movement, to which he adds Locke. 
The criticisms he offers of these thinkers are, he readily 
admits, familiar ones. As Taylor puts it, "the developing power of 
disengaged, self -responsible reason has tended to accredit a view 
of the subject as an unsituated, even punctual self"60. Sources of 
58 Taylor, "Engaged Agency and background in Heidegger", p. 317. 
59 See, for comparison, Heidegger's criticism of the punctual self on p. 187 of Being and Time, as cited 
in my Chapter, 'Heidegger and the Critique of Subjectivism', p. 45. 
60 SOS, p. 514. 
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the Self and many of Taylor's other works offer various accounts of 
how these notions became prevalent and where they can be 
identified, but he is clear that there is no simple cause and effect 
in operation. Rather, he takes the two, disengaged reason and the 
disengaged self, to coexist and reinforce each other. 
Thus, although it might seem that the Enlightenment emphasis 
on scientific, objective reason is at odds with the Romantic focus 
on natural, creative expression, Taylor argues both are marked by 
deeper similarities. The naturalism of Romanticism, which 
indexes the good to the creative expression of the individual is 
summed up in Herder's notion that "Jeder Mensch hat ein eigenes 
Maas"61. The scientific or calculative understanding of the good, 
expressed most simply in Benthamite utilitarianism, equally 
understands each individual in isolation from those around him. 
Although these positions are, at times, in conflict they are 
actually more marked, Taylor argues, by a subscription to common 
beliefs. Primarily, they view the individual apart from his or her 
social context. For all their differences, those who seek to 
understand themselves and their moral identities in the terms of 
these positions are marked by a shared inward focus on the 
individual. Thus, as Olafson paraphrases Taylor on this point, "the 
development of modern scientific objectivism is merely the 
obverse of transcendental subjectiviSM"62. 
What has emerged, Taylor argues, are various understandings of 
both the individual and society which are united in subscribing to 
the basic tenets of atomism, or as it is frequently called by those 
61 Taylor, "The Politics Of Recognition", p. 30. 
62 Frederick A. Olafson, "Comments on Sources of the Self by Charles Taylor", Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, vol. LIV, no. I (Mar. 1994), p. 195. 
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espousing it, individualism. I have already traced above Taylor's 
arguments about the limits of these conceptions of agency in terms 
of understanding moral reality. Taylor's criticisms of the 
disengaged subject extend further, however: "[w]hat is important to 
note here is that this is not just a wrong view of agency; it is not 
at all necessary as a support to self -responsible reason and 
freedoM"63. 
Indeed, Taylor claims, to conceive of the self on traditional 
epistemological terms, whether subjectivist or objectivist, is not 
just a vitiating understanding of our own agency, but underpins a 
social theory that exacerbates the problem. His claim is that a 
philosophical misunderstanding of agency gives rise to inadequate 
social practices. 
Atomism, for Taylor, resonates with the focus on the individual 
found in modern conceptions of epistemology and agency. Taylor 
defines it in opposition to Aristotle's view that man is a social 
animal; atomism, by contrast, asserts that man can be both 
understood and exist independently of society64. Taylor qualifies 
this by stating that what is at stake for both himself and his 
opponents is not biological survival, but the conditions needed for 
men [sic] to "develop their characteristically human capacitieS"65. 
Taylor's criticism of atomism stems from his belief "that living in 
society is a necessary condition of the development of rationality, 
in some sense of this property, or of becoming a moral agent in the 
full sense of the term, or of becoming a fully responsible, 
autonomous being"66. 
63 SOS, p. 514. 
64 Taylor, "Atomism". Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, p. 189. 
65 Ibid., p. 190-1. 
66 Ibid., p. 191. 
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2.3 The Dialogic Self, Atomism and Freedom 
Before exploring Taylor's account of the limits of atomistic 
social and political theories it is important to recall why Taylor 
believes their basic motivating motif unsatisfactory. As was 
considered in the first Chapter, Taylor's objection to the punctual 
self- the individual agent considered in isolation from those 
surrounding him or her- is based on his operation of the Best 
Account Principle. For Taylor, the problem with attempting to 
understand the individual in modern, atomistic terms is the 
inability of that image to account for the crucial phenomenon of 
identity: our orientation towards the good. 
Hence, Taylor claims, it is the dialogic self, not the punctual 
conception of agency, that will provide the basis for the 'best 
account' of moral ontology. In order to understand how this 
assertion underpins Taylor's development and analysis of social 
and political theories it is useful to trace his treatment of a key 
notion in both his own work and those of whom he is critical; the 
nature of human freedom. I turn first to the tradjtion of which he 
is critical. 
2.3.1 Atomistic Conception of Freedom 
Taylor argues that the notion of the punctual self is allied to 
what he calls an atomistic- or monological- understanding of the 
nature of human agency. Those who hold a fundamentally atomistic 
view of the individual locate freedom as a basic capacity which 
exists independently of society, argues Taylor. On this picture, 
values are a product of the wills, desires and choices of the 
individual considered apart from their social context. The 
271 
individual's moral fulfilment is thus seen in terms of individual, 
authentic self-expression. The hypergood that emerges is thus 
individual freedom conceived of as unconstrained choice: the social 
theses that result emphasise the primacy of right. 
The predominance of rights theories in the modern world is a 
result of the fundamentally atomistic conception of the individual 
agent's capacity for choices as existing either pre-socially or 
independent of society. This conception of free choice, and the 
attendant notion of individual authenticity, becomes a hypergood: 
the aim of social and political life becomes the framing of a 
schedule of rights which reflects and secures this 'negative' 
conception of the liberty of the individual. 
For Taylor, this wrongheaded approach 
misconception. The false premise has already 
inadequate view of agency. This is expressed 
several ways throughout Taylor's oeuvre, but 
arguments resonate with those offered in 
freedom. 
is premised on a 
been discussed- the 
and expanded on in 
in each instance his 
iis consideration of 
2.3.2 Taylor's Dialogical Conception of Freedom 
Freedom, argues Taylor, is not a basic capacity of the lone 
individual but a facet of an identity framed and shaped by a 
society: "In other words, the free individual or autonomous moral 
agent can only achieve and maintain his identity in a certain type 
of culture"67. This social dimension, as we have just seen above, is 
not just one of instrumental reliance: freedom and autonomy "are 
carried on in institutions and associations which require stability 
67 Ibid., p. 205. 
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and continuity and frequently also support from society as a 
whole- almost always the moral support of being commonly 
recognised as important"68. These early claims are reinforced in 
Taylor's later statements that "[m]y own identity crucially depends 
on my dialogical relations with others"69. 
Atomistic moral, social and political theories are thus mistaken 
in the way they conceive of, and thus seek to secure, freedom and 
autonomy. Taylor argues that in asserting a right what is actually 
being asserted is the good of certain capacities. What is missed by 
these theories, Taylor argues, is that freedom, autonomy and -in 
his later formulation- authenticity are only available as a result of 
common, publicly shared institutions, practices and relations 
which support these capacities as valuable. 
In an essay on Heidegger70, Taylor follows Heidegger's argument 
that the disengaged subject of epistemology cannot explain the 
range of meanings phenomenologically available to an individual. 
Rather, Taylor follows Heidegger in asserting, one needs an 
approach which reflects the ways in which agency is shaped and 
expressed in practical, engaged activity. Similarly, Taylor 
suggests that the social and political theorists of atomism miss 
the link between the capacities and characteristics of the 
individual and the background vocabulary of social possibilities 
from which these individual articulations are drawn. 
For Taylor, therefore, it is the dialogical conception of freedom 
which will provide the basis for a satisfactory understanding of 
politics. In order to defend and foster the values which motivate 
68 Ibid., p. 205. 
69 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p. 34. 
70 "Engaged agency and background in Heidegger", as footnote 1. 
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us, Taylor argues, we need to recognise the dialogical and social 
dimensions of our agency. It is against this backdrop that Taylor 
frames his account of the demands of a politics of this sort. 
2.4 Intersubjectivity and Recognition 
Taylor's provision of an account of a 'better' politics is, 
therefore, based on his own 'best account' of moral ontology. Both 
the methodology and the content of Taylor's less distorted account 
of moral agency have already been considered. What is required is 
an account that can treat as real moral values which, for Taylor, 
requires an attention to the social context in which they arise. Our 
social context is, for Taylor, more than just an instrumental 
backdrop from which we emerge; it is an intrinsic part of many 
moral goods itself. 
Taylor appeals to a model of intersubjectivity and a politics 
which express the fuller notion of the good with which his theory 
operates. What is required, Taylor argues, is a Hegelian 
recognition of the particularity of actual identities. This 
recognition is not based around an universal conception of the 
autonomous individual but "comes to include the equal value of 
what they have made of [their] potential in fact"71. 
The proper recognition of others, therefore, involves more than 
just according them an universal respect in light of our common 
humanity. Once one understands that their identities are 
intrinsically linked to the particular communities of which they 
are part, genuine recognition entails more than that they conform 
with a detached conception of abstract identity. Thus to respect 
71 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p. 42-3. 
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the dignity of others at times demands that we recognise the 
collective claims about the good made by the communities which 
ground their identities. 
It is this focus on the importance of the articulation of the good 
within identity which grounds the wide scope Taylor wishes to 
extend to his notion of recognition. For, Taylor argues, implicit in 
the notion of the dialogic self is a moral identity that, clearly 
understood, will lead us to realise that it is in our own interests 
to recognise and respects the claims of others. This applies to the 
claims of others whether they come from a community with which 
we closely identify or from a culture further from our immediate 
interests. 
The interest we have in taking the claims of others seriously is 
motivated, Taylor claims, by the recognition that our own best 
accounts of the good can be neither certain nor exhaustive. In a 
world of real and plural goods we can realise that others who live 
different lives from ourselves are still motivated by common 
interests in living happy and healthy lives. These interests reveal 
an "inescapable place for a sense of debt to, or solidarity with, 
some others"72. For Taylor, this is a debt which extends beyond the 
immediate communities of which we are part and extends to all 
those who make available articulations of the good. Taylor's 
implication is clear: the richest visions of the good are those 
which are developed in dialogue with as many significant others as 
possible. 
Thus Taylor, responding to Quentin Skinner, claims that as a 
Christian, although he may not personally find the goods of Islam 
72 Taylor, "Comments and Replies", p. 252. 
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or Judaism the basis of an adequate ethic for him, he can recognise 
the "spiritual greatneSS"73 of them as moral sources. To refuse to 
try and understand these goods- or any articulation of the good- 
through a resort to a single, unquestioned approach to the world is 
to suffer, Taylor claims, "betokens an astonishing selective 
narrowness of spirit"74. 
Taylor's theory of intersubjectivity is thus coloured by a 
common interest we all have in pursuing the good. We share a 
common feature which motivates all but the most damaged human 
beings- the love of the good. The dialogic nature of the 
articulation of the good links us not just to the community within 
which we frame our own moral view; rather, our moral intuition 
about the equal worth of all human beings links us to all 
communities which make available visions of the good. Thus, 
Taylor claims: 
it is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for 
large numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a 
period of time- that have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy 
the admirable- are almost certain to have something that deserves our admiration and 
respect... it would take a supreme arrogance to discount this possibility a priori. 75 
There is, in Taylor's eyes, a moral dimension governing 
intersubjective relations implicit in the most basic account of 
agency. The presumption of equal moral worth is a safe hypothesis 
when one realises the different articulations of the good which can 
be found in perspectives other than our own. 
73 Ibid., p. 241. 
74 Ibid., p. 241. 
75 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p. 72-73. 
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There is perhaps after all a moral issue here. We only need a sense of our own limited 
part in the whole human story to accept the presumption. It is only arrogance, or 
some analogous moral failing, that can deprive us of this. 76 
The final step is to explain why a failure to engage with 
alternative perspectives constitutes an unacceptable arrogance. 
The form of the answer Taylor gives varies but remains essentially 
the same in each case. A failure to articulate one's vision in 
dialogue with others runs the risk of cutting ourselves off from 
the good; in Sources of the Self this good is identified with 
benevolence and a Christian notion of grace, in 'The Politics of 
Recognition' Taylor talks of a "fusion of horizonS"77. This 
transformation of our standards occurs in particular instances 
when: 
we learn to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have formerly taken for 
granted as the background to valuation can be situated as one possibility alongside the 
different backgrounds of the formerly unfamiliar culture. 78 
It may not itself be an achievable goal but it is clear that Taylor 
has, at least as a motivating ideal, a notion of a horizon so broad 
as to encompass the reality of all the goods of all different 
cultures: 
that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be 
evident 79 
76 Ibid., p. 72. 
77 Ibid., p. 67. 
78 Ibid.. p. 67. 
79 Ibid., p. 72. 
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Taylor's aim, "to recognise a plurality of goodS"80, underpins the 
politics of recognition. Taylor's politics, therefore, are indexed to 
a conception of intersubjectivity which emerges from the nexus of 
his notion of the dialogical nature of identity and his conception of 
the moral realism around which that identity is built. 
2.4.1 The Politics of Recognition 
Taylor does not offer a detailed manifesto for the political 
institutions or policies which will follow from his conception of 
recognition. This is unsurprising given that his point is that the 
recognition of identity requires an attention to particular contexts. 
Taylor's claim is a more modest one; a revising of one's ontological 
understanding will impact on the horizons of positions and policies 
one is likely to consider advocating8l. 
Hence, Taylor offers a diagnosis of the shifts he expects the 
move from an atomistic to a dialogical conception of the self will 
precipitate. Taylor's central claim is that the political problems 
of an age of pluralism (of both goods and cultures) cannot be 
addressed by recourse to principles framed in terms of a single 
overarching view of the good. The aim instead is to understand 
how we can protect and foster a plurality of goods, from the 
universal standards of individual human equality and dignity to the 
particular needs and aims of communities which enable individuals 
to give their lives meaning. 
The worth of individuals is not therefore served by a simple 
protection of the individual from majority claims. Individuals need 
80 SOS. p. 518. 
81 See Charles Taylor "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate" in Philosophical 
Arguments, esp. p. 183. 
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to be understood against the collective backgrounds from which 
they emerge and there is thus a need to consider the goods and 
needs necessary to the existence of these communities. The 
political balancing act is not therefore simply between the 
competing inalienable rights of individuals, but between individual 
and collective goods. 
Taylor is at pains to point out that he is not espousing a 
straightforward communitarianism. Of that, he says "[i]t sounds as 
though the critics of this liberalism wanted to substitute some 
other all-embracing principle, which would in some equal and 
opposite way exalt the life of the community over everything"82. 
Hence, Taylor does not argue that there should be an a priori 
assumption of equal worth by all claims made by communities. 
That would be an alternative principle which would be both as 
partial as that of liberal proceduralism and patronising. Taylor 
believes instead that: 
There must be something midway between the inauthentic and homogenizing demand for 
recognition of equal worth, on the one hand, and the self-immurement within 
ethnocentric standards on the other... What there is the presumption of equal worth... 
Perhaps we don't need to ask whether it's something that others can demand from us as 
a right. We might simply ask whether this is the way we ought to approach others. 83 
For Taylor, it would be at best self-defeating to unnecessarily 
risk cutting ourselves off from alternative articulations of the 
good. What is required, therefore, is an openness to collective 
goals as an intrinsic part of recognising the worth of individuals. 
Where the goods of collective life or cultural survival clash with 
82 Taylor, "Charles Taylor replies" in James Tully (ed. ) Philosophy in an age ofpluralism: The 
philosophy of Charles Taylor in question (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 250. 
83 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p. 72.279 
individual choices or desires, a healthy attitude towards framing 
public policy requires that the goods of neither are automatically 
denied. To choose to support collective needs at the expense of the 
latter is not necessarily discriminatory. Instead it reflects the 
realisation that an individual's pursuit of the good life involves the 
pursuit of both private and public, individual and collective goals. 
At this point the aim is to see why Taylor thinks the dominant 
ontological understandings of modernity have led to the advocacy 
of political systems that have failed to meet these demands. 
Prime amongst the political understandings based on the atomistic 
conception of agency to which Taylor objects is what Taylor calls 
neutral or procedural liberalism. 
2.5 Taylor and Liberalism 
Before analysing Taylor's criticisms of liberal political theory 
it is important to note, as Daniel Weinstock has, that "Taylor's 
arguments against liberalism are often difficult to assess because 
they tend to be addressed not at particular liberal thinkers but 
rather at liberalism as a general civilisation trend"84. Weinstock 
is right, but the main characteristics of that trend are discussed 
by Taylor; he links liberalism to the prevailing ontological and 
moral accounts of our identity. 
Thus, Taylor adumbrates a liberal perspective centred around 
"various formulations of the main idea"85. This idea, which he 
identifies with thinkers as diverse as Rawls, Dworkin, Ackerman 
and emerging from the ideas of, amongst others, Locke and Kant is, 
84 Daniel Weinstock, "The Political Theory of Strong Evaluation", in James Tully (ed. ) Philosophy in 
an age ofpluralism: The philosophy of Charles Taylor in question, p. 177. 
85 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p. 56. 
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at a political level, a prioritising of a procedural notion of 
political justice over any substantive moral ends. Broadly 
speaking, 'liberalism' in Taylor's vocabulary covers those theories, 
based on an atomistic conception of agency, which focus on the 
rights of the individual. As Taylor sums up the liberal perspective 
"[a] liberal society must remain neutral on the good life, and 
restrict itself to ensuring that however they see things, citizens 
deal fairly with each other and the state deals equally with all"86. 
Taylor offers a picture of how this liberal commitment to the 
real goods of universal equal dignity and respect is expressed, both 
socially and politically. What is aimed at is a "fair and difference- 
blind society" based on "universal, difference-blind principleS"87. 
Although these principles are debated there is an assumption that 
"one such theory is right"88. 
Equal respect in this instance is indexed to an individualistic 
conception of autonomy. Motivated by this account the political 
principles generated aim to treat all the same irrespective of any 
difference. To give one individual or group rights which are not 
possessed by others is seen as discriminatory. Fairness is a 
product of finding the neutral principles which ignore the different 
contents people give to their lives in favour of an identical 
Huniversal human potentiaf'89. 
Taylor offers two associated criticisms of this type of politics. 
Both stem from his fundamental perception of liberalism as 
supporting, and motivated by, an account of identity and agency 
86 Ibid., p. 57. 
87 Ibid., p. 43. 
88 Ibid., p. 44. 
89 Ibid., p. 41. Italics in original. 
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which Taylor views as "inhuman"90. The first criticism concerns 
how effective liberalism is in delivering the hypergood of private 
autonomy which it espouses. His second criticism calls into 
questions whether the hypergood of private autonomy is itself an 
useful or adequate one. 
2.5.1 The Practical Limits of Moral Individualism and Liberalism 
The roots of Taylor's first set of criticisms have already been 
touched upon: the inability of liberalism to deliver the atomistic 
autonomy it values. This, for Taylor, is a result of the failure of 
liberals to see the importance of the moral community in defining 
and making available the basic capacity they value: private 
autonomy. This strand of Taylor's thought finds early expression in 
his essays on 'Atomism', 'What's wrong with negative liberty? ' and 
'The diversity of good'91, continues throughout Sources of the Self, 
emerging in its most sustained form in "The Politics of 
Recognition". 
Taylor's worries descend from those of Tocqueville and Mill. A 
politics that emphasises the rights of the individual against those 
of the community is at risk of undermining the social articulation 
of, and commitment to, the moral visions upon which it is actually 
based. Where that good- the freedom of the autonomous individual- 
is understood as a basic capacity rather than a social achievement 
there is a risk, Taylor thinks, of individuals developing an 
apathetic or instrumental approach to the practices and 
institutions of a society. This conception of freedom, however, can 
only survive in a particular sort of society- one in which the value 
of individual freedom is part of a publicly available set of social 
90 Ibid., p. 43. 
91 All in Philosophical Papers Vol. 2. 
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and moral meanings. The goal of individual freedom can thus lead 
to social consequences that militate against it. 
The problem is not just practical, however. Unlike Mill, Taylor 
argues that the difficulties of establishing a society in which the 
autonomy of the individual thrives are not just practical. What is 
overlooked, Taylor argues, is that the good of autonomy is in fact 
not just private; rather, it is derived in part from common and 
collective action. 
For Taylor, therefore, the problem with rights-based liberalism 
is not just that its operation is weakened by the vitiated 
understanding of agency with which its proponents operate. 
Rather, it is the partiality and limits of the atomistic conception 
of agency with which he takes issue. The political problem we 
face, Taylor argues, is not merely how to find a better way of 
defending an atomistic conception of liberty, but how to rethink 
the role and nature of politics in the light of a fuller understanding 
of human agency. 
2.5.2 The Ethical Limits of Moral Individualism and Liberalism 
Taylor's second strand of criticism hence forms the core of his 
objection to liberalism. His argument is that liberal political 
principles, based on the moral ideal of procedural neutrality 
derived from the detached conception of the self, are unable to 
recognise, or respond to, certain goods which are only available 
collectively. This also leads Taylor to conclude that liberal 
principles miss the importance which should be ascribed to actions 
taken to ensure the survival of community identities. 
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Thus, to the claim that liberalism is unable to preserve the 
autonomy it values is added a further claim; that the understanding 
of autonomy at issue is itself only partial. There is, Taylor argues, 
a public dimension to autonomy which is qualitatively different 
from autonomy in the private sphere; and the enshrinement of the 
latter dimension in a supposedly neutral liberal politics can 
threaten the former. 
This inadequate understanding of agency underlies two problems 
which Taylor identifies with liberal neutralism. The first 
concerns the transparency of the principles themselves, the second 
their ethical adequacy. 
The first problem Taylor identifies with liberal neutralism is 
that it cannot be neutral at all. Once one understands liberalism as 
based on an atomistic conception of agency which in turn rules out 
as legitimate certain (for Taylor both legitimate and necessary) 
understandings of the good, the worry Taylor has is that liberalism 
is "a particularism masquerading as the universal"92. The picture 
of the detached, autonomous and creative self upon which it is 
premised has, as Taylor points out, come under fire for being far 
from uncontestable. In practice, therefore, the supposed 
universalism of liberalism has served often oppressive European 
and American interests. The goods of equal respect and dignity 
when informed by a focus on the isolated individual have come to 
be seen as allied to cultural imperialism. 
This worry about the neutrality of liberal political principles is 
deepened and compounded in Taylor's second criticism. It is not 
just the genesis and neutrality of liberal political principles that 
92 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p. 44. 
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Taylor calls into question, but the picture of the good that they are 
intended to defend. The problem with the Western political 
tradition, based on the conception of an atomistic self, is not just 
that it has been poorly executed; the ontological account upon 
which the hypergood of equal respect is premised is inadequate. 
What is respected by a system of neutral, liberal politics is an 
identity with which Taylor thinks it would be impossible to live. 
To prioritise the right- the good of procedural equality 
irrespective of particular identity- over the good is to accept 
unquestioningly an individualistic, atomistic conception of agency. 
As we have seen above, framing autonomy, or the individual's good, 
simply in terms of the individual is an error. Taylor makes this 
point starkly in a reply to critics in Inquiry: 
You cannot have an ideal without some notion of what gives human life value. 
Moreover, you will never be able to develop your ideal, or, indeed, even grow Into an 
undamaged human being, without exchange with others, involving some modicum of 
love or at least recognition. 93 
At the very least, Taylor suggests, what we need to realise is 
"some goods become accessible to us only through... common 
enjoyment"94. In fact, for Taylor, "the making and sustaining of our 
identity, in the absence of a heroic effort to break out of ordinary 
existence, remains dialogical throughout our lives"95. Moreover, 
even goods that might appear intrinsically private- those of, "the 
hermit [ ... ] or the solitary artiSt"96, are, 
Taylor argues, pursued in 
dialogue with others (God and a future audience respectively). A 
politics that responds only to the private dimension of autonomy 
93 Taylor, "Comments and Replies", p. 250. 
94 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", p. 33. 
95 Ibid., p. 34. 
96 Ibid., p. 34. 
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and interprets the claims of collectives as simply a threat is in 
error for Taylor. It confines us to an unitary but partial 
understanding of the good framed in the light of a mistaken notion 
of identity. A politics which seeks to rule against collective 
conceptions of the good as a matter of course isolates the 
individual from goods constitutive to a life which will be 
experienced as 'undamaged'. 
Taylor finds liberal politics framed in terms of neutral 
principles of equal respect to be marked by an inadequate concept 
of agency. This expresses itself in two negative ways. Firstly, it 
obscures the liberal's own need for a society which can support 
their vision of the good. Secondly, it also obscures other 
collective goods that are available only through a richer 
understanding of public life. Taylor looks to the works of Rousseau 
and Hegel for examples of these goods; he names the non- 
competitive senses of dignity, honour and pride in oneself and one's 
community that can only exist in "a regime of reciprocal 
recognition among equaIS"97. 
2.5.3 Taylor on Liberalism: Conclusions 
Beyond the simple inability of an atomistic ontology of isolated 
choice to account for the reality of moral life, Taylor identifies 
several connected disastrous social and political implications that 
result from this misunderstanding. Prime amongst these is the 
link between an atomistic conception of moral agency and what 
Taylor calls liberal politics. For Taylor, the link between seeing 
one's community in terms of "self -f ulf illers, whose affiliations 
are more and more seen as revocable"98 and the defence of that 
97 Ibid., p. 50. 
98 SOS, p. 508.286 
image of society with liberal principles needs to be examined. 
This is important, a rgues Taylor, because a society based on 
atomism and characterised by a liberalism based on moral 
proceduralism "cannot sustain the strong identification with the 
political community which public freedom needs"99. 
A supposedly neutral procedural liberalism fails, as we have 
seen, on two accounts. Firstly, it is based on a misunderstanding 
of moral agency and thus revolves around goals which are either 
undeliverable or- viewed as a single principle- ultimately 
undesirable: "the integral realisation of only this principle verges 
on the impossible" 100. Secondly, Taylor argues, a less distorted 
account of our moral agency will allow us to realise the goods 
accessible through public action itself. As Habermas paraphrases 
Taylor here, the problem with traditional liberalism is that it 
"fails to recognize that private and public autonomy are 
equiprimordial"101. 
The emphasis in liberal neutralism on a priori principles of 
equality reflected by 'difference-blindness' is thus counter- 
productive for Taylor. His argument is that refusing to take into 
account the differences between individuals, by referring to a 
model of identity that strips them of any particular 
identifications, denies precisely what it is that constitutes them 
as individuals. This is their situation within (usually linguistic) 
communities. To actually defend the goods which motivate 
procedural liberals- universal dignity and respect- demands, says 
Taylor, a realisation that these values are not best defended by 
99 Ibid., p. 508. 
100 Taylor, "Charles Taylor replies", p. 25 1. 
101 JUrgen Habermas (tr. S. Nicholsen), "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional 
State", in A. Gutmann (ed. ), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, p. 112-113. 287 
"[n]eutral liberalism as a total principle"102. Rather, he argues, 
recognising and responding to the claims of some individuals and 
communities may involve the suspension of difference blindness 
and the extending of certain rights and powers to some that are not 
available to others. 
Taylor outlines his position in a response to Daniel Weinstock. 
His problem is not with the goods neutral liberalism is intended to 
defend, but with a position that "claim[s] to have found the 
principle of liberal society; or the principle which ought to trump 
all others wherever they come into conflict"103. Taylor's point is 
that goods are plural, and that different goods are addressed by 
individual and collective rights and powers. To enshrine either set 
of rights or goods in a "single canonical principle", at the expense 
of the other, is a futile exercise in "trying to pretend that we 
aren't dealing with two independent goods which have to be 
combined"104. 
Section 3) Taylor's Moral and Social Ontologles: A 
Critical Analysis 
As was seen in the previous section, Taylor offers a social and 
political analysis on the strength of his account of agency. This 
section first considers the merits of Taylor's ontology of agency. 
In the light of this, I then look at Taylor's account of the politics 
of recognition and his criticisms of liberalism. 
102 Taylor, "Charles Taylor replies", p. 253. 
103 Ibid., p. 250. 
104 Ibid., p. 251. 
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3.1 Taylor's Conception of Identity: The Dialogic Self and Moral 
Realism 
As traced throughout the previous two sections, Taylor's 
account of identity, upon which his political theories are based, is 
built upon two planks; the dialogic self and a moral realism. For 
Taylor, politics and the power of state should address this best 
account of our moral agency. Taylor's arguments thus rest on his 
claim that a politics which is based on the dialogic view of moral 
agency is superior to a proceduralist account based on an atomistic 
understanding of agency. Taylor's basic account of identity has, 
however, come under attack. 
I want to consider, in the first instance two objections to 
Taylor's account of the dialogic self. The first questions the 
account of the good with which Taylor operates, the second 
questions his assumption that our dialogue in pursuit of that good 
requires recognition of and from as wide a constituency as Taylor 
suggests. 
The crux of the matter is Taylor's notion of the good as the 
fundamental feature of our identity. For Tay lor, the good is 
something which we are brought closer to through dialogic 
articulation with the result that our lives are lent empowering 
meaning. His politics of recognition is framed so as to respond to 
this need. The first question to ask, therefore, is whether Taylor's 
account of moral identity is, in fact, persuasive. 
A central feature of Taylor's account is his claim that it is the 
independently real nature of the good and goods that makes the 
articulation of our moral sources enabling and empowering. Taylor 
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asserts that the hypergoods by which we structure our lives, 
properly understood, have a preterhuman reality. It is by 
articulating our relation to these sources that Taylor thinks we 
can draw the power we require to sustain our identities. The 
assumption implicit in Taylor's work is, as Rorty phrases it, that 
"a hypergood be at least as much found as made"105. 
The crucial point here, on which many thinkers have taken issue 
with Taylor'06, is whether he can establish the reality of the good 
on the substantive terms he desires. Taylor's account relates the 
notion of the good to a continual craving in human beings for 
deeper, richer meanings, the meeting of which counts as 
'broadening our horizons' and constitutes our 'moral growth'107. The 
aim of Sources of the Self is to identify and articulate those 
hypergoods which will meet these needs and thus counter the sense 
of lost identity which Taylor identifies with the self- 
understandings of modernity. 
The problem arises, however, when one considers the 
characterisation Taylor offers of some of the sources to which he 
finds himself drawn. Theistic sources impress Taylor, as we have 
seen, with their 'spiritual greatness'- an attraction which is 
understandable given his understanding of hypergoods "as a step to 
higher moral consciousness" 108. The histories and accounts of the 
sources Taylor deals with are thus considered by him primarily in 
relation to the extent to which they contain the germ of a link to 
105 Richard Rorty, "Taylor on Self-Celebration and Gratitude" in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, vol. LIV, no. 1 (Mar. 1994), p. 200. 
106 See, for examples, ibid., Quentin Skinner, "Who Are "We'? Ambiguities of the Modem self', in 
Inquiry, vol. 34 (Jun. 1991), Rdal Robert Fillon, "Foucault contra Taylor: Whose Sources? Which Self? " 
in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, vol. XXXIV, no. 4 (Autumn, 1995) 
107 See the first section of this Chapter for Taylor's account of moral growth. 108 SOS, p. 64.290 
higher (i. e. preterhumanly real) things. It is this approach to moral 
realism which is contentious. 
For many thinkers "the intellectual depth and reach of modern 
unbelief"109 disallows an understanding of the nature of the good on 
these terms. From these perspectives, the 'good' or goods espoused 
by sources such as the Church or capitalism are not best analysed 
as the bearers, or otherwise, of higher moral meanings. Rather, 
Marxist, feminist and Foucauldian analyses offer causal histories 
which claim the moral sources on which 'we' draw are better seen 
as shaped by interests that have "very little to do with the truth or 
even the spiritual value of [their] creed"110. 
The issue at stake here is not whether or not we have 
frameworks through which our moral identity is framed, but what 
the articulation of these frameworks involves. For Taylor, it 
involves an empowering "moral growth"; for those who share 
historicist views of the type adumbrated above, of whom Quentin 
Skinner is one, it culminates instead in the view that "[we] will 
some how have to be satisfied by whatever meanings we can find in 
everyday life""'. 
The question of who is right in this debate is considered in the 
following section in relation to Foucault. At the moment, however, 
it is important to note that if Taylor cannot establish the power of 
his vision of the nature of the good then his assumption that it is 
through the articulation of these moral truths that 'we' sustain our 
social lives becomes tenuous. If Taylor is wrong in assuming that 
our moral frameworks are structured by independent, preterhuman 
109 Qu entin Skinner, "Who Are'We'? Ambiguities of the Modem self", p. 148. 110 Ibid., p. 148. 
111 Ibid., p. 149. 
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and empowering expressions of the good- rather than say 
contingent histories- then our relations to other may take on a 
different aspect' 12. Thus, our strong evaluations and moral 
identities might not lead to a sense of identification or common 
cause with others. On this understanding, for every Taylor whose 
hypergoods lead them to strongly evaluate "we are all one"113, there 
is a Nietzsche whose strong evaluations lead him instead to see 
the influence of others as a potential brake on creative self- 
expression. 
The problem from this perspective is that Taylor asks a lot of 
his moral vision in framing his political theory. The respect for 
others he wishes to defend becomes, on his account, indexed to a 
view of the good which is premised on an ethical understanding 
that many do not share. This has two worrying implications for a 
politics of recognition. Firstly, if one does not relate moral 
meanings to empowering and edifying sources of the good then 
Taylor's assumption, that the realisation of the common features 
of our moral frameworks can address political conflict, does not 
appear to be necessarily safe. From this perspective, a greater 
articulation of our moral identities may be the cause, rather than 
the solution, of political conflicts'14. Secondly, Taylor's 
assumption that our moral frameworks articulate an 
"understanding of what a human being is"115 raises the suspicion 
that those with whom we disagree will be prone to being cast as 
'damaged' rather than as political interlocutors. 
112 A point well made by Quentin Skinner: "Too many of us have come to the painful conclusion that, 
even though it would be a fine thing to converse with angels, there are in truth no angels with whom to 
converse... we must somehow find the values to sustain social life within the practices of social life 
itself. " in ibid., p. 149-150. 
113 Martin L6w-Beer, "Living a Life and the Problem of Existential Impossibility", Inquiry, vol. 34 
(June 1991). p. 232. 
114 See Ibid. 
115 Frederick A. Olafson, "Comments on Sources of the Self by Charles Taylor", p. 196. 292 
Much rests, therefore, on the moral account to which Taylor's 
politics are indexed. The next step, therefore, is to see how 
persuasive an account it is. 
3.2 Taylor, Heidegger and the Operation of the Best Account 
Principle 
Taylor's moral and political claims thus depend, in part, on his 
attempt to provide a convincing account of reality "between 
Platonism and projectivism"116. For Taylor, this best account has 
two features; firstly, the claim that our identities are formed in 
dialogue with others and, secondly, that it is the orientation we 
thus gain in relation to moral objects and goods that lends our 
identities potency. 
Taylor, as was seen in the previous section, manifestly fails to 
convince some thinkers of the second strand of his account, In 
response to one thin ker'17 who poses the criticism that our 
identities are not best conce ived in terms of the language of 
selfhood that he offers, Taylor professes puzzlement: 
[t]his is the more surprising to me, in that (on my view) Heidegger -a philosopher 
on whom both of us have drawn- occupies one such position. 118 
The remainder of this section questions whether Taylor's view 
of what he has taken from Heidegger is well drawn. Indeed, as I 
argue below, it is not. Further, what he (mis)takes is a part of 
Heidegger's fundamental criticism of projects just such as 
Taylor's. 
116 Taylor, "Reply to Commentators", p. 210. 
117 The criticism is offered by Frederick A. Olafson in his "Comments on Sources of the Self by 
Charles Taylor". 
118 Taylor, "Reply to Commentators", p. 210. 
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Taylor draws on Heidegger in two ways. Firstly, as referred to 
earlier in this Chapter, Taylor sees Heidegger as offering an 
account of agency which surpasses traditional accounts by 
stressing the constitutive nature of the engagement of the self 
with both the world and a public, social background horizon of 
meaning. Secondly, and less clearly, Heidegger exerts at least an 
influence in the formulation and the role of Taylor's 'Best Account' 
principle. 
The difficulty involved in ascertaining precisely the role, or 
roles, of the BA principle in Taylor's work was discussed 
previously. This problem arises because Taylor conflates its role 
in supporting his argument that identity is dialogically constructed 
with a support for his claim that our identity is constructed in 
relation to a notion of the good that is real independent of human 
action. This leads Taylor to conflate his account of identity with 
his understanding of the good. What emerges, I suggest, from this 
is that the BA principle- insofar as it is intended to offer a 
grounding for Taylor's theory- does not establish Taylor's own 
project of offering a moral ontology. 
The reason for this becomes apparent if one compares the BA 
principle with its predecessor, Heidegger's account of 
phenomenological hermeneutics. 
3.2.1 Heidegger contra the BA principle 
As discussed earlier'19, Heidegger's espousal of hermeneutic 
phenomenology arises from a philosophical concern with the 
119 See section 1.4.1 and my previous Chapter 'Heidegger and the Critique of Subjectivism' for a 
discussion of this and the following concern with trans arency. 29T 
meaning of Being. For Heidegger, the best account is, formally, 
that which does not take as evidence any phenomena outside of the 
inquiry into the meaning of Being. It is this which constitutes 
transparency. Heidegger is clear that any attempt to understand 
Dasein in terms exceeding this criterion, particularly humanistic 
ones, runs contrary to the framing of his approach. 
By contrast, the BA principle combines a practical claim about 
the most effective way individuals can articulate their moral 
sources with a supra-epistemological claim akin to Heidegger's 
phenomenological commitment to transparency. What is not clear, 
however, is how Taylor's humanistic rendering of the first sphere 
rests with the philosophical critique of the language of selfhood 
(and moral sources indexed to such self -interpretation) implied by 
the second dimension of the BA principle. 
This tension becomes apparent when one examines the sources 
of the assumptions Taylor makes. In retaining a focus on the 
explanation of the modern identity Taylor shows his Hegelian roots. 
Taylor's ontology aims to show how our identities can best be 
articulated in terms of the moral space and framework in which we 
move. This provides Taylor's topography, in which the aim is to 
provide richer or fuller articulations of that framework. 
The suggestion that arises in Heidegger's notion of transparency 
and rejection of humanism, however, and which is taken up and 
developed in Foucault's work, is that the conception of that moral 
space and framework is itself a peculiarly modern construction. 
Although they disagree about precisely what that entails, both 
Foucault and Heidegger agree that the better articulation of one's 
identity in modern terms offers no a priori justificatory power. 
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For Heidegger, the sources upon which our identities must be 
constructed in modernity are products of an understanding of 
agency which is at best illusory. More modestly, Foucault argues 
that the space within which our identities are articulated is itself 
fluid, shaped by the contingent historical practices of power. 
For both Heidegger and Foucault, therefore, the histories through 
which our identities are constructed in modernity, on closer 
scrutiny, lack the justificatory power that Taylor attributes to 
them120. This reading of Heideggerean transparency, developed in 
Foucauldian genealogy, suggests that the 'best account' of our 
identities does not lead to more or greater self-surety, but a 
continual questioning of the assumptions upon which that identity 
is based. Justifications and moral frameworks exist, but always 
relative. 121 
This is important because it means that Taylor's arguments 
about the nature of moral identity do not necessarily have the 
status- that of a moral ontology- which he claims for them. 
Heidegger's ontological focus is not directly on how one conceives 
of one's self or the world; or, in Taylor's terms, whether or not 
moral sources can be conceived of on Platonist, projectivist or a 
"third alternative" 122 set of terms. For Taylor, this third 
alternative rests in a realisation that one's moral understandings 
are mediated by the self -inte rp retation of an individual situated 
within a horizon of public meanings. Heidegger's challenge, 
however, is to ask whether knowledge (or ontology on Taylor's 
account) can ever be understood in terms of how an agent comes to 
know- or articulate- a reality separated from them. 
120 in this regard, see Rdal Robert Fillon, "Foucault contra Taylor: Whose Sources? Which Self? ", esp. 
p. 670. 
121 A point covered in some detail in the above article. 
122 Taylor, "Reply to Commentators", p. 210. 
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From this perspective, the basic ontology within which Taylor 
moves- the notion of a separate, objective and at least partially 
knowable moral space within which our agency is situated- is 
structured by the initial distinction between the "in me" and the 
"outside of Me"123. Thus Taylor's topography and, therefore, his 
constitution of what counts as a fuller meaning upon which to 
premise a stronger articulation of our identities remains marked 
by the impulse to self-certitude that Heidegger identifies as the 
basic but flawed characteristic of the modern understanding of 
Being. 
This does not, as previously argued, entail that Heidegger can 
countenance no talk of subjectivity or objectivity at all; merely 
that he asserts that this cannot be one's starting point in seeking 
to understand Being. Applied to Taylor's work, the suggestion is 
that the self- Taylor's main concern- is not a starting point for an 
ontology. This, however, causes problems for Taylor, who wishes 
to establish the reality of the moral in relation to self- 
interpretation. For Heidegger, however, a moral account based on 
the notion of the self is not necessarily wrong, but it is derivative 
of a more fundamental ontological understanding of reality. What 
this comparison suggests is that the philosophical authority of 
Taylor's account rests on the provision of an account which shows 
the notion of self to be fundamental. 
For Heidegger, this account rests in taking human being to be 
derivative of Dasein, conceived of as the horizon of understandings 
required for any meaning of Being to exist at all. For Foucault, our 
self -conceptions are to be understood through historical analyses 
123 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 249. 
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that show how our identities draw on meanings and sources that 
are contingently shaped by power. Both Heidegger and Foucault 
focus on the conditions within which our identities are produced. 
They both conclude that there is a danger inherent in seeking to 
ontologize- or make certain- the features of our self- 
understandings without a scrutiny of the frameworks within which 
they are produced. On this view the problem with Taylor's account 
is his belief that a fuller articulation of his, basically humanist, 
notion of our moral framework will counter the "painful and 
frightening experience" that comes from perceiving our identities 
as based on meanings which are "unfixed, labile or 
undetermined" 124. For Heidegger and Foucault, it is the claim that 
there is a moral space with objective, universal features that is 
without ontological warrant125. 
Thus, a perspective informed by the Heideggerean notion of 
transparency, suggests that Taylor's focus on how we defend our 
identities is fundamentally of secondary interest. Rather, the 
fundamental questions concern what the articulation of those 
identities assumes and entails. 
Hence, insofar as the BA principle serves to lend Taylor's 
account any philosophical authority, the basic question is 
postponed. Heidegger's contribution is not to better allow us to 
articulate 'our' conception of the good, but to call into question the 
adequacy of the grounds upon which these articulations are based. 
In other words, from a Heideggerean perspective, the problem with 
our understandings of reality is not whether or not our conclusions 
are valid, but what is entailed by the assumptions with which we 
start. For Heidegger, instrumentalism expresses itself not just in 
124 SOS, p. 28. 
125 Or, at least, in Heidegger's case that it is available in modemity. 
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vitiated understandings of our own moral agency, but in the 
assumption that there is an objective, essential human identity to 
which we should aspire. 
Taylor's account of the first of these questions- how my 
interpretations are related to the cultural and public background 
from which they emerge- is stronger than his considerations of the 
second. From a Heideggerean perspective the question of whether 
or not the T may be a product of a more collective 'We' is less 
interesting126 than the assumptions upon which the whole nexus is 
built. Taylor's operation of the BA principle offers, I argue, a more 
persuasive support for his considerations on the former question 
than it does on the issue of whether or not the clearer articulation 
of our supposed deepest intuitions represents a more perspicacious 
understanding of Being. Specifically, the BA principle thus 
conceived does not lend Taylor's account of the moral realities of 
modernity the foundational status he accords them. 
The BA principle thus serves to show how Taylor believes an 
account of moral identity ought to be rendered alongside the 
fundamental assumption of the essentially dialogic nature of 
selfhood he makes. What it does not do is show why that 
assumption, or the conclusions that follow from it, ought to be 
though of as true- or in Taylor's language "rich" or "full". To see 
why that should be so, one needs to look at Taylor's account of the 
basic nature of selfhood. 
126 For a discussion of this see my Chapter, "Heidegger and the Political", section 3.1. 
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3.3 Taylor, Agency and Identity 
Taylor's account of agency, as has been discussed above, rests 
largely on an account of self -inte rp retation. As has been argued 
above, however, it is far from clear that Taylor's account has the 
transparency which it would require in order to have the 
foundational power that the BA principle suggests it should. 
Two things follow from this. Firstly, Taylor is open to 
criticism, as detailed above, that he accords too much importance 
to questions of the good and morality in his account of the 
constitution of identity. Secondly, it is unclear that the challenge 
to moral realism posed by modernity is met by a history of the 
development of the modern identity as offered by Taylor. For 
Heidegger, the problem of modernity is not that instrumental 
rationality is unable to deliver us the liberal ideal of private 
autonomy, but that human agency has come to be understood in 
terms of a basic autonomy- whether public or private- at all. In 
contrast to Taylor, and Hegel, Heidegger (and, later Foucault) 
argues that the frameworks within which our identities are framed 
are not marked by dialogic progression or the move towards 
greater certainty of identity. For Heidegger, no understanding of 
Being offers a certitude that extends beyond the finitude, 
temporality and hiddenness which accompanies any act of 
disclosure. 
For Heidegger, therefore, the basic problem of modernity- and 
one which subsumes both moral and political categories- is how to 
meet, or at least be open to, understandings of Being beyond those 
which focus on humanistic ideals. Taylor's critique of subjectivist 
understandings of procedural ist/instru mental ist conceptions of 
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freedom, offered at the end of Sources of the Se/fI27 reflects these 
concerns. Where Taylor and Heidegger differ, however, is in what 
they put in its place. It is not clear that Taylor's alternative- a 
politics of mediation between the public and private spheres 
grounded in the reality of the recognition of our equal moral 
worth- has what Olafson calls a "more secure basis in moral 
phenomenology than that of 'projection' "128. 
Heidegger's work suggests that Taylor's attempt to secure that 
basis in self -inte rp retation is unlikely to succeed; for the modern 
self is centred, in his eyes, around notions and ideals that are 
misconceived. Taylor does not offer an account of the self which 
shows why we ought to conceive of its moral identity as 
'phenomenologically secure'. An account of that sort would either 
have to identify essential features of the self which would be 
undeniable, or accept a scaled down historicist account of the sort 
he rejects in others129. 
3.3.1 Taylor and Identity., Conclusions 
The criticisms considered in this section suggest two 
shortcomings in Taylor's account of identity. His critics ask 
whether a moral realism of the sort Taylor espouses is 
ontologically coherent and, in turn, whether it can therefore 
establish the substantive commitments from all that would ground 
a politics of recognition. Taylor's ontological framework of 
identity at most might show why an individual has an interest in 
the society of which they are part, not that this interest ought to 
include the goods or recognition of others that Taylor wishes. 
127 See SOS pages 519-520. 
128 Olafson, "Comments on Sources of the Setf by Charles Taylor", p. 194. 
129 See for example my discussion of Taylor's treatment of Foucault in the previous Chapter. 
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This explains why Taylor shows himself unwilling to accept a 
history of moral identity that seeks sociological or historicist, 
rather than ontological, interpretations of the origins of moral 
value. For Taylor, what we recognise in others is informed by a 
basically Christian understanding of the moral worth of others. We 
recognise in others orientations towards the same objective notion 
of the good that underpin our own sense of self. 
I have already suggested what some of the implications of these 
criticisms might be for Taylor's moral and political theories. I 
want to develop these further through a wider examination of the 
limits of Taylor's account of liberalism. 
3.4 Taylor's Reading of Liberalism 
I consider below two sets of criticisms which have been made 
of Taylor's account of liberalism. The first set is concerned with 
whether Taylor's characterisation of liberal thought, as failing to 
take into account the social dimension of moral value, is a fair one. 
The second set of criticisms are concerned with the suggestion 
that Taylor thus mistakes the nature of the liberal commitment to 
neutrality and procedure. 
In considering Taylor's assertion that liberal theory risks 
cutting itself off from the values and social practices which 
sustain it, it is worth noting again that the general and idealised 
nature of Taylor's intellectual history makes things unclear. 
Richard Tuck130 and Daniel Weinstock both take Taylor's early essay 
on 'Atomism' to be a critique of rights theorists in general. They 
130 Richard Tuck, "Rights and Pluralism" in James Tully (ed. ), Philosophy in an age ofpluralism: The 
philosophy of Charles Taylor in question. 
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both find Taylor's claim that "foundational moral properties are 
supposed to inhere in individuals rather than in any other 
entities"131 underestimates crucial moments of particular rights 
theorists. 
Tuck argues that, as a matter of historical fact, Grotius, Hobbes 
and Locke amongst many others do not reduce the moral to the 
political; rather, motivated by the "central ethical problem [ ... of] 
intercultural conflict"132, they simply seek a political 
accommodation of a pluralist moral conflict of which they are 
keenly aware. Further, none of these responses need to be thought 
of as assuming that morality and moral value do not have a social 
dimension; simply that there is no one universal perspective on the 
good which can reconcile these differences. 
Weinstock similarly takes issue with Taylor, perceiving him to 
claim that Rawls "justifies his preferred political principles 
without any awareness of the human goods which they subserve"133. 
In Weinstock's view, Taylor simply mistakes Rawls's principles of 
justice as themselves foundational when it is precisely "the 
fostering of certain human capacities (a 'sense of justice' and a 
capacity to conceive, to revise, and to carry out one's own 
conception of the good life)134" which is appealed to in grounding 
the principles. 
Two things emerge from these criticisms and Taylor's response 
to them. The first is that Taylor asserts that the early essay 
'Atomism' is more exclusively concerned with Nozick's formulation 
131 Ibid., p. 160. 
132 Ibid., p. 168. 
133 Weinstock, "The political theory of strong evaluation", p. 178. 
134 Ibid., p. 178. 
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of liberalism in Anarchy, State and Utopia than his critics alloW135. 
Because many of the key terms of Sources of the Self are drawn 
from, and build on, the early essays this move requires some 
scrutiny. 
In 'Atomism', it is not Nozick but "social contract theory" 
[Taylor cites Hobbes and Locke], "[c]ertain forms of utilitarianism" 
and "contemporary doctrines which hark back to social contract 
theory"136 that Taylor nominates as his targets. Although Taylor's 
essay is clearly indexed to Nozick in particular, his work is very 
much treated by Taylor as emblematic of this much broader group 
of thinkers and theories137. Taylor's later reinterpretation of his 
focus runs the risk of seeing him fall between two stools. If the 
essay was indeed specifically about Nozick (and not as one might 
easily assume about Rawls) it is odd that this is not both clearly 
flagged and that Nozick's own particular arguments are not more 
closely followed. Further, losing the general sweep of his 
arguments in that essay would make it unclear as to how one ought 
to understand Taylor's continuation of the use of the term in 
Sources of the Self. 
Taylor clearly does retain a general application for the term 
atomism, therefore, and it does remain intimately linked to his 
criticisms of liberal theory. As both Tuck and Weinstock realise, 
and as was argued earlier, Taylor's objections to liberalism extend 
beyond a perceived inefficacy in delivering the goal of private 
autonomy, and encompass a critique of the goal- as hypergood- 
itself. 
135 Taylor, "Charles Taylor replies", p. 246,249. 
136 Taylor, "Atomism", p. 187. 
137 In each case they are united as they "inherited a vision of society as in some sense constituted by 
individuals for the fulfilment of ends which were primarily individual": "Atomism", p. 187. 
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Thus, much more turns on the second of Taylor's claims about 
theorists of procedural or neutral liberalism: that they operate 
with a fundamentally atomistic ontology which limits the types of 
good of which they can conceive whilst simultaneously lending 
their partial (yet equally culturally situated) view a bogus 
authority. What procedural liberalism is certainly guilty of, for 
Taylor, is a "trump foundationalism"138: an assumption of 
"philosophical authority"139 based on an incomplete account of 
agency in atomistic terms. Thus, as Habermas observes, Taylor's 
core aim is not to supplement liberal principles but to "call[s] into 
question the individualistic core of the modern conception of 
freedom"140. 
Taylor's assumption that procedural neutrality between 
individuals is simply an expression of a liberal commitment to an 
atomistic moral ontology has been questioned, however. Rather, 
some claim- Weinstock and Tuck above, for example- that some 
liberals are quite able to accommodate the realisation that 
individuals can find their good life through collective 
identification with a continuing subscription to a system of 
individual rights. 
This is Weinstock's defence of Rawlsian liberalism. Rawls, 
Weinstock argues, can and indeed does accommodate the 
importance of "cultural stability" at the level of the particular 
"cultural community"141. Within a Rawlsian politics the needs of 
cultural survival can be addressed. This is because neutrality does 
not demand that one ignore these claims or never take public action 
to address them, only that any claim: 
138 Taylor, "Charles Taylor replies", p. 248. 
139 Ibid., p. 248. 
140 Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State", p. log. 141 Weinstock, "The political theory of strong evaluation", p. 182. 
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be given political weight regardless of the cultural community from which it 
emanates... While Rawlsian liberalism need not be neutral about human beings' nature 
as cultural beings, it must in conditions of cultural plurality remain neutral between 
the various cultures which coexist in a given society, lest it undercut the capacity of 
some to fully exercise their capacities as cultural beings. 142 
Weinstock's point is similar to Tuck's, discussed above. His 
claim is that liberal neutrality need not arise from atomistic 
understandings of the good. Rather, a procedural account of both 
political justice and moral conduct may be differently motivated; 
as the only way to mediate between competing individual or 
communal visions of the good. 
The point being made by those defending modern procedural 
moral and political theory is that our accounts of the good are 
realised (whether atomistically or socially) pre-morally. The 
debate is not, as it is for Taylor, about whether or not "there are 
goods independent of the Will"143. There is in the works of many 
modern moral and political theorists conceptual room for that 
belief, even where it may not be subscribed to by the individual 
writer. From this perspective, the crucial fact is not whether or 
not an individual's identity is framed in relation to objective moral 
goods, but that there exist plural and conflicting perspectives of 
the good. On this account Taylor misreads both the motivation and 
role of procedural accounts of moral and political theory. The aim 
of morality is not to articulate or empower visions of the good; 
rather, given their existence, it is to see that they are lived up to. 
It is the job of morality to defend individuals in the light of the 
values and powers of these goods. Will Kymlicka makes this point 
142 Ibid., p. 182. 
143 From Will Kymlicka, "The Ethics of Inarticulacy", Inquiry, vol. 34 (June 1991), p. 161. 306 
when he argues against Taylor that "[m]orality is in the first place 
a social institution, and cannot be reduced to questions about what 
particular individuals should be or do"144. 
This builds on the criticism of Taylor's notion of a moral 
framework that emerged in my discussion of his work in 
comparison with Heidegger and Foucault145. The existence of moral 
frameworks and values is not denied in much modern moral and 
political theory; rather (just as Foucault and Connolly point to the 
finitude of these frameworks), the point being made here is that 
our visions of the good, in themselves, lack the universal common 
features or power to eliminate social and political confliCt146. 
Taylor's response to his critics here is telling. Taylor claims 
that "what divides me from Kymlicka, and in general from other 
'proceduralists', is a quite different view of the human 
condition"147. Taylor does not share a vision of human being which 
allows one to ever place moral or political demands over an ethical 
imperative a priori. In deciding what moral or political decisions 
are justified we must always make reference, Taylor argues, to the 
demands of ethical life. 
This is linked to the importance Taylor attaches to his account 
of moral realism in questions of human agency and 
intersubjectivity. For Taylor, liberal and proceduralist appeals to 
practical considerations, framed in the light of a separation 
between the right and the good, are flawed. Hence, in his account, 
the coercion of the state or an appeal to a moral principle can only 
144 Ibid., p. 173. 
145 In Section 3.2.1 above. 
146 Indeed, as Lbw-Beer points out, they are frequently the motivating force behind violence and conflict. 147 Charles Taylor, "Comments and Replies", p. 244. 
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be justified in the light of a fundamentally ethical view of human 
being. 
As the discussion in this section suggests, however, the 
assumptions upon which such a politics is based are not as secure 
as Taylor believes. Further, from this perspective, both Taylor's 
criticisms of liberal theory and his own politics of recognition 
become problematic. The point has now been reached where some 
general conclusions about the implications of Taylor's conception 
of the nature of politics can be considered. 
Section 4) Taylor, Heldegger and Politics 
Taylor seeks to develop an account of politics which meets what 
he sees as the threat posed by instrumentalist conceptions of 
human being. In doing so, he offers an alternative account of human 
being that posits moral identity as its central feature. Taylor 
argues the pursuit of the good, which constitutes an unavoidable 
part of our existence, is a feature we all share, as is the potential 
for clearer understandings of our moral identities to enrich our 
lives. Common to all clearly ('undamaged') agent's articulations of 
the good are certain moral ideals which apply universally. For 
Taylor, therefore, our moral and political dealings with others 
ought to be informed by the realisation and implementation of 
these ideals. This, in turn, entails a recognition of both the worth 
of all individuals, and of the needs of communities which these 
individuals require. 
What Taylor calls 'liberalism' fails, he argues, to recognise, and 
hence to meet these needs. This stems from a failure to connect 
the good of the individual to the moral community of which they 
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are part. This is caused by the paucity of proceduralist accounts of 
morality which take the good to be simply extensions of the will of 
the individual. A better politics, in Taylor's eyes, will both 
recognise the social needs of moral agents, and conceive that 
agency in terms which reflect the reality of the goods that 
motivate them. It will also reflect the realisation that the good 
can be articulated in multiple ways, irreducible to a single 
principle. A focus on private or formal autonomy alone both fails 
to provide the practical realisations of the public dimensions of 
individual's moral identities, and fails to recognise goods which 
are themselves only collectively available. The aim ought rather to 
be the inclusion and fostering of as many perspectives on the good 
as possible. A politics based on recognition thus rejects liberal 
neutralism as premised on an inadequately proceduralist moral 
account, and focuses instead on the fostering of multiple and 
collective identities. 
Taylor comes under criticism from liberals and non-liberals 
alike. Liberals stress the neutrality and proceduralism of the 
political theories they offer do not run contrary to the picture of 
moral identity Taylor offers. Rather, they argue, their accounts 
are based on non-ethical considerations in the justification and 
foundation of moral and political accounts. Taylor's concept of 
intersubjectivity, in contrast, requires a degree of commitment to 
his own brand of moral realism which, in fact, exceeds that 
demanded by ontological necessity. For these liberals, therefore, 
Taylor needs to look to alternative, less ambitious, sources upon 
which to base political identity. 
From a non-liberal perspective the suggestion arises that 
Heidegger's critique of the modern identity cuts deeper than Taylor 
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allows. This line of criticism suggests that Taylor's rejection of 
the liberal conception of identity is of value, but that this is based 
on a questioning of the modern conception of instrumental 
rationality which undermines the alternative account of agency and 
intersubjectivity which Taylor seeks to provide. 
The work of two of these thinkers, Heidegger and Foucault, can 
suggest where this arises. For both Heidegger and Foucault, 
freedom or autonomy conceived of in humanist terms are at best 
historically contingent ideals, with no secure phenomenological 
basis in any essential feature of the self. Both thinkers argue that 
an ontological account must do without autonomy, at least on these 
terms. Features of Taylor's history of agency in Sources of the 
Self, underpinned by the BA principle, reflect this, but the politics 
of recognition and his account of intersubjectivity in general build 
on a stronger, phenomenological account of the BA principle which 
Taylor offers little reason to accept. Indeed, they build on claims 
about the nature of the good which Taylor, in response to Olafson's 
and Alasdair Macintyre's criticisms of the Sources of the Self148, 
describes thus: 
The book, particularly towards the end, contains affirmations or hints of affirmations 
which go beyond what I made any systematic attempt to argue for. I thought and still 
think this is a good procedure, because it sometime helps the reader to understand what 
you've said, if you're a little more forthcoming on where you'd like to end up. But of 
course, readers, particularly philosophical readers, find it difficult to treat these 
hints differently from the central thesis I've been arguing. 149 
This quote hints at a fundamental commonality between Taylor's 
political theory and Heidegger's treatment of the political. Taylor 
148 Published, interestingly, two years after 'The Politics of Recognition'. 149 Taylor, "Reply to Commentators", p. 203. 
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and Heidegger both criticise the degree to which the detached 
subject of traditional epistemology has come to dominate modern 
understandings of agency. As Taylor says of projectivism: "Why 
should a shaky metaphysical theory, based on a flawed 
epistemology, trump the best account on the ground? "150. Both 
Taylor and Heidegger develop alternative accounts of agency, 
through accounts which are set up to run counter to the tradition of 
epistemological certitude. These accounts differ radically in 
terms of the substantive concepts of what is considered important 
in agency. For Heidegger, it is the capacity to be open to the 
'sendings of Being'; for Taylor, it is an openness to real, plural and 
diverse understandings of the good. 
The different content of these conceptions of agency, however, 
do not lead to radically different formal understandings of 
intersubjectivity. I have argued previously151 that, philosophically, 
Heidegger does not develop, but does not rule out, a theory of 
intersubjectivity; rather, he offers an account of the legitimacy of 
the conceptions of agency upon which modern accounts are based. 
As also argued in my third Chapter, when Heidegger does consider 
the place of the political he does so in terms of a conception of 
intersubjectivity which draws on social, political and cultural 
understandings that belong to the tradition his philosophical 
understanding criticizes. 
As I have claimed above, and in the light of Heidegger's critique 
of the modern conception of identity, Taylor's position is similar. 
The social and cultural understandings which motivate Taylor are 
obviously indexed to far less destructive ideals than Heidegger's, 
but he remains nonetheless wedded to them. Thus, although Taylor 
150 Ibid., p. 207. 
151 See my Chapter "Heidcgger and the Political", especially pp. 149-153. 
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offers a more extensive consideration of the relationships between 
agents than Heidegger, he does so in terms which subordinate the 
differences between them to a more fundamental identification 
with a shared identity in relation to a foundational account of the 
good. 
There are arguably two strands to Taylor's thought. The first 
suggests that what he calls 'liberal' theories, which include a 
broad horizon of rights-based political understandings, are limited 
by their appeal to a detached notion of the individual subject as an 
adequate ground. His argument is that this assumption vitiates the 
ends and means which the liberal can contemplate. Taylor's second 
strand thus suggests a fuller, richer account of our identity from 
which such a politics could be drawn. Thus Taylor attempts to 
articulate a more powerful justificatory vision than is to be found 
in liberalism, and which will support a politics of recognition of 
the differences between agents. 
My argument throughout this Chapter has been that Taylor's 
success in establishing his first strand of thought does not entail, 
and indeed undermines, the success of his second. This arises in 
part because, unlike Heidegger, Taylor's critique of modernity is 
limited to our own moral and political self -understandings. 
Taylor's assertion that political identity ought not to reflect the 
liberal conception of the self, but a richer, fuller account of 
identity retains the assumption (which he believes is made by 
liberals) that politics is an expression of an ethical ideal. 
As shown above, Heidegger questions whether it is in fact a 
better articulation of the modern identity that is requiredI52. 
152 And again, of course, Foucault develops a similar point. 
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Heidegger's work suggests that it is the attempt to articulate 
understandings of human being on the models of explicitness and 
certitude which is part of the problem. Similarly, within the 
horizon of rights-based political theory are theorists who protest 
that their vision of politics is not based on the ontological 
assumptions Taylor ascribes to them. Rather, these theorists 
argue, it is precisely because they do have a fuller conception of 
ethical and moral agency than Taylor allows that they operate a 
limited conception of political identity. On this understanding, 
Taylor's attempt to reconcile intersubjective difference through an 
appeal to particular common moral sources does not contrast with 
the liberal's failure to acknowledge these sources. Rather, the 
liberal argues, it is precisely because these differences are 
recognised that a political framework has to be found within which 
conflict between them can be managed. For the liberal, or rights 
theorist, this is not done by making political identity dependent on 
a particular, or any, substantive moral identity. 
Taylor thus identifies an important question for liberal 
theorists: how to clearly delineate a political identity from one's 
own ontological or moral commitments. In asserting that liberals 
need to look beyond atomistic conceptions of agency to explain and 
defend the value of autonomy, Taylor underestimates the degree to 
which liberalism contains such traditions. These theorists can, 
with justification, claim to be able to countenance supposedly 
richer, fuller conceptions of agency than Taylor allows. Taylor's 
reading of liberal theory here reflects his own retention of a 
politics which is intended to express a fundamentally ethical 
account of human being. 
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As I have argued in this Chapter, the philosophical authority 
Taylor seeks to accord his own humanistic account can itself be 
questioned from a Heideggerean perspective. Further, Taylor's 
approach might be thought of as repeating Heidegger's failings in 
attempting to frame political obligation in relation to a 
purportedly authoritative and objective moral ontology in the first 
place. As some of the theorists in this Chapter suggest, the basis 
of moral and political legitimacy in the modern era must be based 
on accounts of agency which account for intersubjective difference 
in alternative and more disparate terms. For these theorists, it is 
precisely the contestability of moral language and realism that 
leads them to frame political identities and autonomy procedurally 
and without appeal to moral sources. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Introduction 
Heidegger and Agency 
For the political theorist, Heidegger's legacy has two main 
strands. In the first instance, his work serves as the basis for an 
ongoing critique of the predominant conceptions and institutions of 
modernity, including those of politics. Further, Heidegger's work 
serves as the basis for those seeking to develop an alternative 
politics in the light of this critique. 
In both cases the crucial factor is the account of agency. The 
problem with liberalism (and democracy, socialism and 
communism) is, in Heidegger's eyes, that it is the culmination of an 
understanding of Being which takes as fundamental an image of the 
human being as Subject. Heidegger believes that this perspective 
is perforce a misinterpretation, inconsistent on its own terms. For 
Heidegger, hermeneutical analysis reveals the inability of what he 
sees as instrumental subjectivism to account for the full range of 
the phenomena of Being. Yet, Heidegger argues, the language of 
subjectivism and the privileging of epistemological certitude are 
part of a wider domination of the world by technological reason. 
The problem, he claims, is that an, at best, partial account of 
human agency has been taken as both full and fundamental. 
Heidegger argues that the image of the rational autonomous 
Subject, seeking knowledge of the Object of his study, has been 
taken as the basic departure point, rather than itself one of a range 
of phenomena to be understood. As a result, this partial 
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understanding of our agency has come to determine which 
phenomena are considered legitimate or, indeed, considered at all. 
Heidegger's argument is that the vitiated understanding of human 
agency leads, in turn, to a vitiated understanding of our freedom. 
For Heidegger, this occurs because the account of our freedom is 
indexed to, and limited by, the placing of the epistemological 
Subject at the centre of our interpretations of existence. The 
freedoms and values attributed to this Subject are, especially 
when elevated to exclusivity, phenomenologically untenable. The 
legitimacy of any moral, social or political notions or institutions 
premised on this understanding is, for Heidegger, in question. 
Thus, Heidegger's work suggests two ways in which the politics 
of modernity might be found wanting. Most famously, his recasting 
of Dasein in the terms of das Volk leads him, briefly but sincerely, 
to embrace Nazism as a political movement that can overcome 
global technology and reconnect politics with the values of a 
deeper, more divinely inspired understanding of our being. More 
significantly, Heidegger also provides the basis of an internal 
critique of traditional liberal and humanist politics whose aims 
are generated and justified by reference to a metaphysical or 
ontologically subjectivist conception of the human individual. For 
Heidegger, the difficulties liberals have in delivering the goal of 
individual autonomy stem not from their inability to find the one 
appropriate set of rules or institutions, but from the fundamental 
importance attributed to this aim in the first place. Further, any 
success a liberal, or similarly humanist, politics does have in 
ensuring its freedoms comes at the expense of the freedoms of a 
fuller understanding of human being. 
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Hence, Heidegger's suggestion is that unless one can find a 
language of agency which accounts for the full range of meanings 
and values available to us (and, as such, surpasses the language of 
epistemological certitude and instrumental reason), then our self- 
understandings will continue to be, at best, partial. Further, these 
partial self -u nde rstandings- in particular, the assumption of the 
primacy of the metaphysical conception of the autonomous, 
volitional individual- will continue to serve as the basis of a 
politics which is itself misconceived. 
Heidegger and Politics 
Although Heidegger's criticisms of the metaphysical foundations 
underpinning liberalism resonate with current issues within 
political theory, it is clear that his proposed political alternatives 
do not. Whereas some thinkers have sought to explain this through 
a separation of Heidegger's hermeneutic into two autonomous 
parts- a hermeneutics of everydayness and a hermeneutics of 
suspicion- and then sought to show that the fault lies with one 
pole at the expense of the other, I argued this was not the case. 
Rather, my interpretation is that both hermeneutical moments 
stem from a critique of instrumental reason of which Dasein is an 
expression. 
Thus, if one wishes to retain Heidegger's philosophical 
questioning of traditional understandings of agency it is not an 
option to cleanse the Nazism from his thought by eliminating one 
of his two hermeneutical dynamics whilst retaining the critical 
perspective one identifies with the other. Heidegger's 
hermeneutical perspectives combine symbiotically to offer a basic 
criticism of modernity. For Heidegger, the understanding of agency 
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is not enhanced by seeking a Subject detached from the object of 
its intention. As a result, he does not offer a critical perspective 
that aims at objectivity within the terms of a Cartesian philosophy 
of consciousness. Rather, Heidegger argues, our agency is a 
process of self -interpretations that are intrinsically linked to the 
environment of which we are part. From a Heideggerean 
perspective, therefore, one can neither ignore his suspicion of the 
self -understandings of modernity nor his claim that it is 
nonetheless to our everyday engagements that we must look in 
providing an account of our self -interpretations. Heidegger's 
political commitments thus cannot be attributed to one pole of his 
philosophical thought without indicting the other. This does not 
entail, however, that Heidegger's philosophy has necessarily 
fascistic implications. The philosophical interpretation which 
reads Dasein as the expression of a bipartite hermeneutical 
dynamic that denies the 'transparency' of the epistemological 
Subject does not, however, commit one to Heidegger's political 
adventurism. Indeed, I argue, the explanation of Heidegger's 
Nazism is likely to involve an interpretation of Dasein which is 
incompatible with my preferred philosophical interpretation. 
I thus conclude that the problem for those seeking to develop 
political theories which respond to Heidegger's insights is not 
intrinsically contained within the philosophical construction of 
Dasein. Dasein alone does not, and cannot, serve as a full account 
of human agency. It is better read as a regulative principle 
governing the understanding of the horizons within which such an 
account is framed. The problem arises when Dasein is mistakenly 
read as providing a full account of human agency. Read this way, 
the problem with Dasein is not locating which aspects of its 
formulation are intrinsically fascist, but framing a theory of 
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agency which, whilst addressing the issues raised by Heidegger, 
includes the bases of moral and political relationships which 
Heidegger does not. 
Following Stephen K. White's' treatment of Heidegger's work, I 
identify Heidegger's failure to consider the relationships between 
subjects apart from the relationship between the individual and 
Being as at the core of his political failing. For Heidegger, the way 
in which instrumental rationality has narrowed the interpretative 
scope of our understanding of Being is of such overriding 
importance that all uses of technical reason are seen by him purely 
as obscuring better understandings of Being. In my discussion of 
Heidegger's work I point out- as he himself realises- that the 
languages of Subjectivity and of technical reason are, when not 
taken as fundamental, compatible with his other concerns. 
There is, therefore, no conceptual bar to developing a political 
theory which resonates with Heidegger's thoughts on agency. What 
is required is the development of a conception of agency that, 
whilst meeting Heideggerean concerns, considers the mediation and 
co-ordination of intersubjective relations. 
Sartre, Agency and Politics 
Sartre is the first thinker I look at who tries to provide such an 
account. As I have argued, Sartre correctly recognises that 
Heidegger's account of politics is flawed because he fails to 
develop an adequate account of intersubjectivity. Crucially, Sartre 
maintains, Heidegger is unable to account for the radical 
differences which exist between Subjects and the values they hold. 
I Stephen K. White. Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994). 
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Unfortunately this realisation is, in Sartre's case, indexed to a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Heidegger's work. For Sartre, 
Heidegger's failure to capture the true nature of intersubjectivity 
stems from an underplaying of consciousness in the original 
construction of Dasein. Sartre, impressed with what he sees as 
the potential of a phenomenological ontology to overcome the 
traditional Cartesian problem of solipsism, seeks to remedy this in 
his account of consciousness. 
For Heidegger, this treatment of Dasein is fundamentally 
misconceived. On these terms, Sartre accepts the division between 
Subject and world in opposition to which Dasein is framed. Marked 
by the dictates of instrumental reason, Sartre's work thus fails to 
avoid the obstacles which Heidegger identifies with all 
fundamentally Cartesian accounts: a drive to certitude on 
(humanist) terms that are ultimately unable to deliver that 
certainty. 
Sartre's position thus remains, from a Heideggerean 
perspective, inscribed with the limits that mark all philosophies 
of consciousness. Seeking to provide an explanation of the origin 
of value in the terms of a Cartesian account of Subjectivity is, for 
Heidegger, an impossible project. In Being and Time, Heidegger 
argues all such accounts will be unable to provide the certainty at 
which they aim, whilst simultaneously narrowing down the scope 
of their inquiry in a way which obscures this limitation. 
Heidegger thus outlines the flaw which bars Sartre from 
supplying a theory of intersubjectivity which will allow for a 
persuasive account of the bases of either morality or politics. For 
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Heidegger, the Subject is simply an inappropriate ontological 
starting point on which to base one's interpretation of the 
phenomena of existence. From this departure point, I argued, 
following Heidegger, that Sartre can neither escape the reef of 
solipsism as he claims, nor can he, by extension, say why one ought 
to have a moral or political understanding that reflects the value 
of human freedom as Sartre understands it. 
Heidegger thus anticipates Taylor's criticism of Sartre's 
account of valUe2. Unable, on the model of radical choice, to 
account for the power moral claims exert upon us, Sartre provides 
an unsatisfactory image of the moral and political values he seeks 
to inscribe. 
Thus, although Sartre identifies what it is that Heidegger 
lacks, he fails to take on the full depth and force of Heidegger's 
critique. Sartre thus seeks to develop a phenomenological 
perspective based on Heidegger's hermeneutics of everydayness, 
grounded in the philosophy of consciousness and divorced from 
Heideggerean suspicion. As a result, his account of 
intersubjectivity remains subject to the same criticisms that a 
richer understanding of Heidegger's work raises about other 
humanist and subjectivist accounts. 
An examination of Sartre's work thus illustrates one of the 
lessons that Heidegger's work offers the political theorist. This is 
the futility of seeking to base on e's moral or political 
understandings on an ontological account of agency which is 
couched in the terms of instrumental subjectivity. Thus, although 
Sartre is right that it is a theory of intersubjectivity that 
2 See my Chapter "The Politics of Recognition: Charles Taylor", pp. 262-3. 321 
Heidegger's account lacks, he is wrong to presume that this can be 
developed from within the philosophy of consciousness. Any early 
Sartrean notion of legitimacy would thus remain dependent on an 
ontological account of agency that Heidegger has undermined. 
Foucault, Connolly, Agency and Politics 
Foucault, in contrast to Sartre, realises that Heidegger's 
hermeneutical dynamic cannot be bent towards establishing an 
account of agency, based on conscious Subjectivity, possessed of 
the certainty required to ground authoritative moral or political 
claims. Foucault thus shares Heidegger's hermeneutical suspicion 
of the predominance in modernity of the philosophy of 
consciousness. Indeed, for Foucault, it is the hermeneutics of 
everydayness which, on Heidegger's part, masks an illegitimate 
desire for the reification of one particular identity. 
Thus, in Foucault's hands, Heideggerean suspicion is transformed 
into a hermeneutics which translates the understanding of all 
meaning into the dynamics of power. For Foucault, there is nothing 
outside of this vernacular with which human agency can be 
identified without making illegitimate claims to 'discovering' a 
truth which is, in fact, only ever historically made. 
A couple of things are thus of particular political interest in 
Foucault. The first is a continuation of the critique of the modern 
emphasis on the autonomous Subject as the definitive image of 
human being. Secondly, Foucault offers some indications of what 
political implications he takes to follow from this. These Dolitical 
concerns are not fully developed and, located within the often 
confusing Foucauldian nexus, not always easily linked together. 
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Most suggestive in this area, however, is Foucault's distinction 
between force and power3 and his resulting identification with the 
liberal aim of limiting government4. 
Foucault, however, does little to develop these comments into a 
theory of politics. Some conclude that this is because he lacks the 
resources to offer any account of moral or political legitimacy5. 
William E. Connolly, on the other hand, argues that he can defend 
what he sees as a Foucauldian ethos and outline its political 
implications. 
In fact, I find that neither Foucault nor Connolly offers an 
account of politics which extends beyond a continuing uncovering 
of the implications of theories of agency that are based on images 
of autonomy and subjectivity. Whilst I do not draw the conclusion- 
as some of Foucault's most vehement critics have- that this is 
because Foucault is conceptually incapable of developing a 
coherent theory of agency, I do argue that, in common with 
Heidegger, neither Foucault nor Connolly moves the argument 
beyond that point. 
Both Foucault and Connolly continue Heidegger's assault on the 
dominant conceptions of agency in modernity. Their rejection of 
instrumental subjectivity does not, however, lead them to the 
extreme, fascistic politics which Heidegger embraced. Indeed both 
Foucault and Connolly show some sympathy with liberal democratic 
politics; it is with the traditional bases to those politics that they 
take issue. 
3 See my Chapter "The politics of difference: Foucault and Connolly", p. 227. 4 Ibid.. p. 229. 
5 See my discussions of, amongst others, Taylor and Habermas in the above Chapter. 323 
Foucault and Connolly's emphasis on power reflects Heidegger's 
own ideas on agency. This similarity continues, however, when one 
looks at how these thoughts are related to their provision of 
alternative political accounts. The Foucauldian concept of agency 
cannot, when framed exclusively in the language of power, be 
extended to ground an account of the legitimacy of the moral and 
political goals with which Foucault and Connolly suggest they 
identify. 
Thus, I conclude, there is a parallel between Heidegger's 
approach to politics and that of Foucault and Connolly. All seek to 
develop understandings of politics from understandings of agency 
which are one dimensional. For both Heidegger and Foucault, 
morality and politics are structured according to understandings of 
agency which do not take account of a separate dimension of 
intersubjective action. Neither Heidegger's emphasis on Being nor 
the Foucauldian focus on power can in themselves generate moral 
or political imperatives. To suggest that they do, either indirectly, 
as in the case of Foucault's analysis of political reason, or 
directly, as Connolly does, leads to a political understanding 
marked by the adventurism- although less terrible- that 
characterised Heidegger's engagement. 
Thus where an examination of Sartre's 
impossibility of developing a politics based on 
itself framed simply in terms of the 
everydayness, an examination of Foucault's 
reveals the equal futility of seeking to develop 
the hermeneutics of suspicion alone. 
work reveals the 
a theory of agency 
hermeneutics of 
and Connolly's work 
a politics based on 
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Taylor, Agency and Politics 
Charles Taylor offers both an account of agency which he 
believes offers a specific consideration of the intersubjective 
dimension and a diagnosis of why the previous thinkers I have 
looked at fail to develop adequate political theories. 
My analysis of Taylor suggests that comparing his work with 
Heidegger's is illuminating. As with all the thinkers examined in 
this thesis, Taylor is critical of what he sees as the predominant 
conception of agency in modernity. I argue that this stems from a 
commitment to phenomenological transparency (expressed in 
Taylor's Best Account Principle) akin to Heidegger's own 
phenomenological position. 
It is from this position that Taylor rejects Foucault and Sartre's 
accounts of moral and political agency. As was seen above, Taylor 
finds that Sartre's account simply fails to account for the sense of 
obligation that moral claims exert upon us; it thus fails the 
phenomenological test. 
Similarly, Taylor claims, Foucault's ontological account (or, as 
Connolly puts it, ontalogical) is equally unable to provide an 
explanation of the values by which we live our lives. Taylor's 
argument is that Foucault's ethical, moral and political support for 
'otherness' is incoherent without an account of the source of the 
value of that otherness. For Taylor trying to explain the value of 
human agency in terms of power alone cannot provide that account. 
Hence, although Taylor rejects the traditional account of 
agency, his phenomenological approach equally leads him to be 
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unsatisfied with Sartre and Foucault's accounts. Most importantly, 
however, Taylor takes issue with the atomistic ontological account 
of the individual that he believes underpins much of modernity's 
self -understandings. Without an adequate understanding of the 
nature of human agency and value, Taylor argues, it is unsurprising 
that the political orders envisaged from within each perspective 
are limited. 
For Taylor, a stronger ontological account of both agency and the 
source of value is required. Whilst Taylor does not claim that this 
account alone will provide the content of one's political order, he 
does argue that to misunderstand the nature of agency can lead one 
to misconceive the parameters and aims which frame that order. 
Taylor thus sets out to provide a superior account of agency which 
leads onto his consideration of the legitimate scope of politics. 
The Best Account principle, with its Heideggerean 
phenomenological origins, leads Taylor to provide an account of 
agency that resembles Heidegger's in two crucial ways. 
Firstly, Taylor shares Heidegger's rejection of those 
conceptions of agency based on the "rationalist model"6. In his 
view, neither an external metaphysical order nor subjectivist 
projection can viably explain the sense we have of the values we 
hold and the qualitative growth that following them instils in us. 
Hence he rejects atomistic ontologies of agency which seek to 
understand the individual subject apart from the context against 
which they move. These accounts are simply unable to explain the 
crucial phenomenon of human agency; our capacity to make strong 
evaluations. 
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Secondly, Taylor's account of this background itself mirrors 
that given by Heidegger. His hermeneutics of value leads him to a 
realism that explains moral values as the interpretations of moral 
objects. Ultimately, this leads Taylor- as it does Heidegger- to 
focus on certain fundamental values as divinely inspired. 
It is from this nexus that Taylor develops his political theory. 
This falls into two parts. The first offers an account of how an 
improved politics might be shaped in relation to a superior 
understanding of human agency. The second, associated moment 
consists of a critique of traditional understandings of liberalism 
from this perspective. 
For Taylor, the dialogic account of agency emphasises the 
importance of communities and collectives in making available the 
goods which make up a healthy and substantive life of freedom. 
Atomistic understandings of agency miss some collectively 
accessed goods entirely and lead to moral and political 
perspectives which do not best defend those goods and capacities 
which are recognised. 
The defence of freedom, Taylor argues, requires a politics that 
reflects the roles communities have in facilitating the moral lives 
of individuals by legislating for the needs and survival of 
collective identities. It is only then that we can achieve the 
political aim of better expressing, and moving closer to, the moral 
sources that motivate us. 
Thus, although Taylor recognises that "an ontological position 
doesn't amount to advocating something"7, he does argue that this 
Charles Taylor. Philowphical Arguments, p. 183. 
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account of agency leads to moral and political parameters that can, 
at times, be incompatible with a rigorous, procedurally neutral 
liberalism. For Taylor, the attempt to defend human freedom 
through such a politics (although as I argue 'liberalism' is a broad 
term for Taylor as for Heidegger) is premised on the atomistic 
misunderstanding of human agency. Given the social, dialogic 
nature of agency, Taylor argues, it can be seen that the moral 
worth of individuals can require the extension of different rights 
and privileges to different communities in order to protect goods 
which may be threatened by the identical 'neutral' treatment of all. 
Taylor's political philosophy thus rests on three planks, all 
supported themselves by his commitment to the phenomenological 
method. The first of these is his assertion that the agency of the 
individual must be understood within a social context. The second 
is that one's moral perspective consists in an orientation towards 
real, preterhuman goods. The third plank consists in his rejection 
of neutral, procedural liberalism as inconsistent with the first 
two planks and his sketching of an alternative politics of 
recognition. 
My argument was that, while Taylor's treatment of the situated 
nature of agency represents his strength, his attempts to fill the 
moral and political lacunae he diagnoses are less successful. Put 
simply, the 'Best Account Principle' does not ground the brand of 
moral realism that Taylor offers; his account of agency conflates a 
persuasive case for seeing agency as engaged with an unpersuasive 
account of the substance of moral identity. It is these 
unwarranted set of ontological commitments which, I argue, lead 
Taylor to characterise the nature of politics in some 
unsatisfactory ways. 
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Taylor's belief in certain, privileged preterhuman sources of the 
good underpin the account he offers of the goods to which he thinks 
we must all be committed. It is these goods (e. g. love and 
benevolence) which, he claims, ground the assumption of the equal 
worth, and subsequent political respect, of others. Thus, for 
Taylor, the basic political problem of modernity is that it has 
failed to adequately express the modern moral identity. 
My argument was that without establishing the truth of the 
modern moral identity in the realist terms he uses, Taylor's 
attempts to enrich the political reflection of our freedom and 
autonomy flounder. Taylor focuses on the ways in which politics 
might better reflect his, fundamentally moral, ontology of agency. 
He thus seeks to co-ordinate and reinforce what he sees as the 
basic moral motifs of modernity. What he does less well is 
address the challenge Heidegger's operation of the 
phenomenological approach throws up: what if the challenge to 
human freedom comes from the very attempt to articulate the 
modern moral identity? Even those more sympathetic to the 
achievements of modernity than Heidegger query whether or not it 
has the moral resources to ground the rich sense of growth Taylor 
seeks from our relations with others8. 
This break between the strength of Taylor's account of agency 
and his attempt to render an account of our moral and political 
identity lead me to look at the claims made by, amongst others, 
those seeking to defend the types of liberalism Taylor attacks. If 
8 See for example Quentin Skinner's argument that our history is best told not in terms of moral 
ontology or growth but as a story of causal links of 'contingent' moral value and 'lost possibilities' in 
"Modernity and disenchantment: some historical reflections" in James Tully (ed. ), Philosophy in an age 
of pluralism: The philosophy of Charles Taylor in question , p. 55. Consider also Rdal Robert Fillon's criticisms of Taylor in "Foucault contra Taylor: Whose Sources? Which Self? ". 
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the conflicts between values in fact cannot be seen as expressing 
different interpretations of the good but are, in fact, more 
radically in conflict than Taylor allows then a couple of political 
ramifications follow. 
Firstly, if one gives more modest or sceptical readings of the 
nature or basis of our moral reality then one's expectations of 
politics may change. If one views agency as engaged with truths 
indexed to contingent historical chance rather than separate moral 
goods, for example, then Taylor's efforts to found a principle of 
equal respect based on the recognition of the validity of others' 
moral interpretations in this latter sense, become problematic. 
This leads to a second concern; whether or not Taylor's rejection of 
liberal proceduralism is well-founded. Thus, I look at the work of 
several of Taylor's critics who argue he underestimates the degree 
to which liberals who may have a less expansive account of moral 
identity than Taylor, nonetheless can, or do, incorporate a more 
sophisticated ontological account of agency than Taylor allows. 
These thinkers ask whether, if one does not subscribe to his 
particular moral commitments, Taylor is right to assume that his 
ontological claims are not, in fact, best served by procedural 
liberalism. 
I thus conclude that Taylor's strongest conclusions continue 
Heidegger's exploration of the nature of agency when conceived 
beyond the terms of epistemological certitude. For the political 
theorist, however, Taylor surpasses Heidegger's account in 
considering the social and intersubjective differences between 
agents. This, coupled with Taylor's division between ontology and 
advocacy, ensures that his politics are indexed to the needs and 
values that arise from the relationships between agents; this is in 
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contrast to those other thinkers I have looked at in the thesis, 
whose politics are often extrapolated from a single characteristic 
of the individual agent alone. 
Taylor's ontological account bounds his political theory. He does 
not succeed, however, in providing a convincing account of political 
legitimacy because his ontological account of agency conflates a 
strong argument about the situated nature of agency with a weaker 
set of claims about the nature of our moral identities. It is this 
latter set of claims which lead Taylor to view political legitimacy 
as largely a question of the authentic expression of the goods upon 
which we draw. Within my Chapter on Taylor, I argued that the 
reality of these goods is not reliably established by Taylor. Thus I 
follow the arguments of those critics who suggest that, in the 
absence of such goods, legitimacy is not a product of the authentic 
expression of the goods one recognises, but derives from the 
approaches and procedures one has for dealing with those with 
whom one does not agree. 
Conclusion 
Heidegger raises questions with which the contemporary 
political theorist must be concerned. Foremost amongst these is 
concerned with the link between our understanding of the nature of 
agency and the nature of political identity. Heidegger's work is an 
early and powerful statement of one of the central themes of 
recent philosophy; the inability of the instrumental, rational 
Subject to wholly account for the nature of human agency. 
Heidegger's work is lent an extra resonance as many of the 
political projects which are taken to accompany the traditional 
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understanding of agency are seen as either failing or being 
radically challenged. 
Thus the aim of this thesis has been to examine how Heidegger 
and his successors seek to develop an account of political identity 
from their reconsideration of the nature of agency. With the 
exception of the early Sartre's efforts, which I argue fail to 
address Heidegger's concerns about the limits of the traditional 
understanding of agency, I trace why each of the thinkers I look at 
fails to develop a persuasive account of political legitimacy. 
In the cases of Heidegger, Foucault and Connolly, I argue that 
this is because each characterises agency in the terms of an 
understanding that exists independently of the goods and values of 
the subjects who hold them. Questions of how the differences 
between agents can be co-ordinated or negotiated are thus largely 
ignored. Instead the predominant issue becomes the extent to 
which a political system reflects what are taken to be basic 
ontological principles. In each case I argued that there was an 
insufficient case to establish the values that each thinker attached 
to these principles, without which a claim to political authority or 
legitimacy could not be grounded. 
Charles Taylor makes the important distinction between 
ontological commitments and political advocacy. Further, for 
Taylor, a phenomenological account of agency entails a 
consideration of the social context of the individual. Thus, Taylor 
explores what- he takes to underpin traditional constructions of 
political identity; particularly the moral values which are invoked 
by those subscribing to procedural neutralism and liberal 
autonomy. 
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However, Taylor's assumption that it is the success or 
otherwise in reflecting moral goods which provides the criteria by 
which to judge a political system undermines the authority of his 
own account of politics. As with Heidegger, the value judgements 
in relation to which Taylor frames his account themselves lack 
binding philosophical authority. In the light of this failure, 
Taylor's politics, which appeals to the fundamental nature of 
certain moral goods, remains open to the charge levelled at 
Heidegger; that it offers a notion of legitimacy only to those who 
share certain commitments. 
In the final analysis, therefore, Heidegger's work is premised on 
his identification of two central themes of contemporary thought: 
the collapse of the instrumental conception of Subjectivity and the 
problems that have arisen with the defence of the political values 
that are associated with it. His work thus raises the perennial 
question of political theory- on what can the legitimacy of the 
state be based? - whilst proclaiming the inadequacy of the 
resources upon which modernity has drawn in providing an answer. 
This thesis charted the failure of Heidegger and his successors 
to provide an alternative answer but argued that the debate has 
nevertheless been moved on. Heidegger's claim is that the 
traditional notion of epistemological certitude is not usefully 
applied to the understanding of human action; a suggestion that is 
applied to models of political justification by Foucault, Connolly 
and Taylor. For these thinkers, the politics of the instrumental 
Subject cannot adequately account for the need to recognise what 
Stephen K. White calls the "responsibility to otherness"9. 
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These thinkers illuminate the question of how a rethinking of 
the notion of agency might reconfigure the understanding of 
political identity. Further, the different accounts of agency 
operated by each thinker culminate in different understandings of 
politics. The limits of their conceptions of legitimacy, coupled 
with the defence of liberalism offered by some of their critics, 
clarify a couple of issues. The first is that the political problems 
which Heidegger associates with modernity are not addressed 
through the provision of an alternative account of agency alone. As 
Taylor realises in a way that arguably Heidegger, the early Sartre, 
Foucault and Connolly do not, this is in part because of the gap that 
exists between one's ontological commitments and the values one 
holds. 
The second issue also crystallises most clearly in an 
examination of Taylor's work. This is that there is a gap not just 
between one's ontological and moral commitments but also 
between the values one holds and what counts as politically 
legitimate. Again, this gap is not an absolute break but it does 
determine the parameters of the latter sphere. This corresponds 
with Taylor's claim that political justification will relate to, but 
not simply be determined by, the moral nexus from which we make 
sense of our world. 
From this perspective, however, Heidegger's work has a further, 
more worrying suggestion with which Taylor deals less 
successfully. This is the philosophical claim which, I argue, 
underpins Heidegger's hermeneutical dynamic (although not his own 
political proclamations) that there is no understanding of human 
being which will deliver the moral or ontological certitude 
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required to determine that one has a 'right' politics. In other 
words, although Taylor is right that a theory of political 
justification will be influenced by- or at least compatible with- 
our basic ontological commitments, it is not clear that these 
commitments can in themselves ground universal or binding 
imperatives to moral or political action. 
The suggestion that arises from Heidegger's work is not simply 
that the model of understanding based on epistemological certitude 
has failed because it is unable to lead to the atemporal or 
universal principles upon which our moral and political lives are 
based, but that the error is to look for principles of these sort as a 
foundation for justification at all. To borrow from Heidegger's 
pronouncement on epistemological treatments of subjective 
dualism, "the scandal is not that this proof has yet to be given, but 
that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again"10. 
From this perspective, Heidegger's value is not just to suggest we 
look elsewhere for the understandings of agency to which our 
moral and political justifications are indexed, but to open up the 
question of what sort of parameters such justifications will have. 
This aspect of Heidegger's work has more in common with 
Foucault's refusal of the ontological or historical priority of any 
single identity. It suggests that one of Taylor's key aims- to 
express and reflect the goods upon which our moral and political 
lives are based- is overambitiously stated or, at least, contentious 
at points that Taylor considers phenomenologically secure. This 
line of thought argues that there are no common goods or truths 
which can universally justify either political or moral norms. This 
reasoning links with the liberal defence which argues that the 
10 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 249. Original includes italics. 
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procedural and neutral dimensions of liberalism do not necessarily 
deny the role of social context in framing our understandings of the 
good; rather, they argue, it reflects the impossibility of justifying 
either moral or political ideals through an appeal to the truth or 
reality of these goods. 
This is perhaps the common failing of all those thinkers who 
seek to develop Heidegger's critiques of subjectivism and 
modernity into political theories. Viewed alongside his political 
failings, the culmination of Heidegger's work is arguably the 
realisation that there is no final justification for the moral 
beliefs which give substance to one's political identity. 
If political identity does not find its legitimacy in relation to 
the right or correct moral vision then the error common to 
Heidegger and his successors is to frame an account of politics 
that draws too heavily on the recognition of goods or truths that 
are, at best, questionable. In each instance the articulation of a 
particular vision of agency encompasses a particular good or 
perspective that is taken to be the crucial foundation for the 
framing of the appropriate political identity. Hence, in the final 
analysis, the early Sartre's account of the individual conscious 
Subject, Foucault and Connolly's language of power and Taylor's 
hermeneutic, moral expressivism come to dominate the notion of 
political identity operated by each thinker. 
These thinkers have insights of various degrees to offer on the 
nature of agency which, in turn, colour how one can understand the 
construction of moral and political theories. The result is that 
each frames political identity in relation to methodological or 
moral realisations that lie outside of the realm of intersubjective 
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action. The casualty in each instance is an account of political 
legitimacy that lends sufficient weight to the substance and 
content of the negotiations between agents both within and about 
the nature of their political identities. It is ironic that Heidegger, 
who warned of the arrogance of previous philosophical 
understandings, set such a chilling example of where that omission 
can lead. 
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